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 At the outset of the Clinton Administration, relations with Russia and assisting its 
transition to a market democracy sat at the top of the U.S. foreign policy agenda.  
Analysis of democracy promotion in Russia in the 1990s reveals three distinct levels of 
activity.  First, through legislation and public statements, the U.S. foreign policy elite set 
the goals to assist the new independent states of the former Soviet Union in developing 
the rule of law with an independent judiciary, market economy, plural representative 
political institutions including free and fair elections, and civil society with independent 
media.  Second, accomplishing these goals fell to the key foreign affairs agencies—the 
State Department, U.S. Agency for International Development, and the U.S. Information 
Agency—to translate them into actionable democracy promotion programs.  Finally, 
through federal acquisition regulations and institutional procedures, those agencies 
conducted competitions and awarded grants to U.S. non-governmental organizations to 
design and implement programs in country to build market democracies in the former 
Soviet space.  Analysis of this three-tiered process suggested that democracy promotion 
programs in the 1990s were designed and implemented in isolation from one another.      
By the end of the decade, Russia clearly had not made the progress in economic 
and political reform, which U.S. officials initially expected.  Russia’s internal dynamics, 
over which the U.S. had no control, hindered external assistance efforts.  Because 
building democracy is such a complex and long-term internal process, external actors 
could not create democracy where the ground was not fertile.  In order for democratic 
institutions to take root, the Russian population needed to be open to democratic values 
like transparency, accountability, tolerance, and political participation.  Democracy 
programs needed to be customized, taking into account the relationships among political 
and economic institutions, rule of law, and civil society on the ground.  Targeting 
elements of a market democracy individually created gaps and relegated some important 
programs, particularly targeting the rule of law, to lower priorities.  Greater attention to 
connecting people through educational exchanges and sharing information through 
Internet access would have helped prepare the ground for democracy.      
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In the short space of two years beginning in 1989, the United States government 
shifted sharply from its policy of containment toward Soviet communism during the Cold 
War to democracy promotion in the New Independent States of the former Soviet Union, 
first and foremost in Russia.  No blueprints existed then to chart the path to market 
democracy for the former communist states of Eastern Europe or to assist the U.S. in 
supporting reform there.  Building on common understanding of the attributes of a 
democracy, the U.S. Congress acted swiftly and assuredly to pass the Support for East 
European Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989, setting into law U.S. policies to support the 
creation of plural democratic and market institutions and strengthen the rule of law and 
civil society.  When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the Bush administration, which 
initially had been cautious in supporting East European revolution, took the lead to 
respond this time by presenting to the Congress, the Freedom for Russia and Emerging 
Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets Support Act of 1992 (FREEDOM Support 
Act), designed to support democratic reform in the countries of the former Soviet Union.  
Its purpose was to: 1) meet urgent humanitarian needs; 2) establish democratic and free 
society; 3) create and develop free markets based on principle of private ownership; and 
4) create conditions for trade and investment.  To meet these objectives, the U.S. 
government sought programs in Russia to create and strengthen: 1) the Rule of Law with 
an independent judiciary; 2) market institutions; 3) political institutions, including free 
and fair elections; and 4) civil society with an independent media.  Over half of FSA 
funding was devoted to the Russian Federation because of its size and dominant influence 
in the region, its progress in the early 1990s in pursuing political and economic reform, 
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and U.S. concerns over its large nuclear arsenal.  This study analyzes the bureaucratic 
politics of the U.S. decision-making process to design, construct, and implement 
democracy promotion policies in Russia.1 My working definition of democracy is broad.  
Democracy is a system of governance whereby the people exercise the fundamental right 
to choose who governs them through free and fair elections; the economy is market-
based; civil society provides space for individuals to pursue their interests and includes 
independent media to inform citizens; and the rule of law establishes written laws that are 
widely accepted by the people.  Democracy promotion is the active policy of the United 
States in its relations with other countries to foster the development of market 
democracies outside the U.S.   
Democracy Promotion on Three Levels
In Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Graham Allison and 
Philip Zelikow (1999) analyzed on three levels the decision making process in the U.S. 
government surrounding the Cuban Missile Crisis:  first, the perspective of the United 
States as a monolithic rational actor, second, the impact of the various federal agencies or 
branches of the military and their rules for engagement, and finally, the influence of 
individual behavior.  U.S. democracy promotion in Russia, which involved a complex set 
of decision and policy actions on three levels, lends itself to similar examination at first 
from the official U.S. foreign policy leadership then from the perspective of the federal 
agencies and organizations translating the visions from the top into actionable programs 
and finally the third level where individuals on the ground in Russia implemented U.S. 
democracy programs.  Each level of actor used its particular tools to advance the goals of 
 
1 In the context of this paper, “Russia” refers to the Russian Federation. 
iv 
 
the democracy promotion agenda.  Lacking, however, was sufficient coordination among 
the levels on definitions and methods and an appreciation for the complex inter-
relationships of the goals they were pursuing.  (See Table 1.)   
Table 1: Three Levels of Democracy Promotion 





Level 1: US Foreign Policy Elite         
Bush Administration (41)  Secretary of State Baker 
Secretary of State 
Baker Secretary of  State Baker Secretary of State Baker 
Clinton Administration  President Bill Clinton POTUS Clinton POTUS Clinton POTUS Clinton 
US Congress SEED Act of 1989 SEED SEED SEED 
FSA of 1992 FSA FSA FSA 
Level 2: Foreign Affairs Bureaucracy  
State Department State Dept/INL 
USAID USAID USAID USAID USAID 
USIA USIA  USIA 
Commerce Commerce Dept. 
Justice  Justice/OPDAT 
OPIC OPIC 
Treasury Treasury 
Level 3: Private Sector Implementers  
ABA/CEELI HIID (USAID) 









US lawyers pro bono 
volunteer TUSRIF (USAID) IRI/Political Parties (USAID) ACIE/MuskieFSA Fellows 
Russian law 
enforcement 
Business for Russia 
(USIA) IFES/EISD (USAID) ACIE/TEA Teacher Exch. 
HIID BDC (Commerce) ACIE/RLP (USAID) ACIE/PiE Ed Reform 
IIE/ABA/CEELIE 
Collegium of lawyers 
BISNIS/BISTA 
(Commerce) IIE/Muskie FSA Fellows 
ARD/Checchi SABIT (Commerce) IIE/Undergrad 
ABC (USAID) IREX/FSA Grad 





PMTI IREX/Internet Access 
IREX/Moscow Ed Info Ctr 
Internews (media) 
RAPIC (media) 
Level 1 sets the objectives to achieve the goal of promoting democracy. 
Level 2 translates those goals into actionable programs through competitive bids among 
NGOs. 
Level 3 implements democracy promotion programs on the ground in Russia. 
v
Presidents and secretaries and deputy secretaries of state articulated the goals of 
democracy promotion, explaining in official public statements and congressional 
testimony why democracy promotion programs were in the interest of the United 
States—for purposes of U.S. national security and economic prosperity. The official 
record reflected accurately the attributes of democracy as established in the scholarly 
literature—the importance of the rule of law enforced by an independent judiciary, free 
market institutions, pluralist political institutions including free and fair elections, 
political parties, and a representative legislature, and civil society with an independent 
media.  The FREEDOM Support Act “Findings” (Public Law 102-511, Sec. 101) called 
the collapse of the Soviet Union “an historic opportunity for a transition to a peaceful and 
stable international order and the integration of the new independent states into the 
community of democratic nations.”  From the perspective of the top foreign policy 
leadership, promoting democracy in Russia was in the U.S. national interest.  In the early 
years of the transition, those leaders emphasized support primarily for Russia’s 
privatization efforts to build a free market and free and fair elections.    
Federal agencies like the State Department, U.S. Information Agency (USIA), and 
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) translated those broad visions and 
goals into actionable programs within the framework of their organizational rules and 
regulations through traditional instruments like Requests for Proposals (RFPs) and 
cooperative agreements.  The FREEDOM Support Act established within the State 
Department a new office to coordinate assistance activities across U.S. federal agencies 
vi 
 
and to interface with the U.S. private sector.  These three main players came to 
democracy promotion with varying levels of experience.  The new State Department 
Office of the Coordinator for Assistance to the NIS did not have sufficient legitimacy to 
exercise its coordination responsibility over the broad range of federal assistance 
programs until the middle of the 1990s.  To the contrary, USIA was able to rely on its 
standard operating procedures and well-established methodology from the start of the 
transition as it expanded its popular exchange programs.  Called the U.S. Information 
Service (USIS) in country, USIS officers had been posted to Embassy Moscow for many 
years, tasked to spread America’s message of freedom to Soviet society.  Like State, 
USAID had to create institutions to deal with its new responsibilities of democracy 
promotion in the more developed, post-communist Second World, with different 
demands than its traditional Third World development programs.  USAID had to open 
missions where none had existed before.  It did not have on staff the necessary talent 
combining development knowledge with area expertise.  As a result, USAID foundered at 
first, but took significant efforts to create and adjust a strategic plan for assistance to 
Russia throughout the decade.  Through RFPs, USIA and USAID provided grants to or 
entered into cooperative agreements with U.S. non-governmental organizations and 
educational institutions to implement technical assistance programs in Russia to support 
market reform and privatization of the economy, trade and investment initiatives, rule of 
law, free and fair elections, political party development, professional training, and 
academic and cultural exchanges. 
The Coordinator’s Office reported annually to the Congress on the general 
accomplishments of the democracy assistance programs according to the federal agency 
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responsible for their implementation.  In other words, the report relayed, for example, the 
programs USIA funded, USAID’s accomplishments during the year, and what the 
Commerce Department supported.  This, however, was only part of the picture of 
democracy promotion.  These reports did not clearly reflect the work of the U.S. NGOs 
actually conducting the programs in country, so missed the details of the third level of 
democracy promotion actors.  The results of U.S. government efforts to promote 
democracy rested in the hands of the individuals who took action on the ground, 
implementing programs to accomplish the broad goals set at the highest levels and 
framed by the federal agencies.  The behavior of individual program officers, working 
within Russia’s internal political dynamics, determined what was accomplished on the 
ground in Russia.  It was at this grassroots level where U.S. NGO program managers 
performed much of the valuable work of assistance programs as they connected 
thousands of individual American and Russian citizens in profound and lasting ways.2
By the end of the 1990s, the U.S. government, along with many others in the 
international community, had spent billions of dollars to support Russia’s transition to a 
market democracy.  While significantly more open and pluralistic than the Soviet Union, 
Russia made only modest progress toward democracy by passing new laws, instituting 
relatively free and fair elections, and creating numerous NGOs.  Its stilted economic 
reforms, however, did not lead to rising prosperity for the majority of Russian citizens.  
Suffering from the pains of ill-conceived economic reforms, the Russian people had 
become disillusioned with the promises of futures gains and were not deeply committed 
to democratic and market reform by the end of the decade.  Even more recently, Russia 
 
2 Throughout this study, the term “Russians” refers to citizens of the Russian Federation. 
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has slipped further from these moderate gains toward a more centralized and state-
controlled system.  As a result, many in the U.S. have been quick to criticize the 
ineffectiveness of U.S. efforts to promote democracy in Russia, claiming that the West 
had failed.  The review of how U.S. assistance programs to Russia were designed and 
implemented at the three levels provides a more positive, longer-term perspective of U.S. 
accomplishments in Russia during the 1990s under the FREEDOM Support Act. 
The transition to democracy is a long-term evolutionary process, which, in the 
case of Russia, requires changing people’s deeply engrained political culture.  It is too 
early to conclude that Russian democracy or U.S. assistance to promote Russian 
democracy failed.  Clearly, the wildly euphoric early expectations of U.S. foreign policy 
leaders that Russia would make a natural and smooth transition to democracy were not 
realized.  On the surface it appears that Russia is becoming more centralized and less 
democratic, but below that level, at the grassroots, U.S. and Russian citizens are 
collaborating and interacting on an individual and ongoing basis.  From those 
interactions, networks are growing among people and between organizations.  My 
research suggests that the results of long-term democracy promotion programs have yet 
to payoff.  Specifically, those are the programs involving educational and cultural 
exchanges and professional training that build relationships between Russians and 
Americans from high school students to established professionals.  These programs 
received very little attention or recognition under FSA until the end of the decade.  By 
then, tens of thousands of Russians had studied in the United States and returned home to 
begin or resume their careers.  They represent a critical and still growing mass of 
Russians who have experienced democracy and open society first hand and signify hope 
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for Russia’s democratic future.  They may be the catalysts for developing the broad based 
support that Russia needs to become more democratic.  
The U.S. government approached democracy promotion only by focusing 
separately on specific democratic attributes, but the process of building democracy 
involves a complex inter-related set of variables.  The emerging democracy promotion 
field offers little guidance to practitioners in the way of a holistic approach to building a 
democratic market society.  Much data sits on the shelves of U.S. government program 
officers or in U.S. government archives waiting to be gleaned for a more comprehensive 
approach to democracy promotion.  There needs to be a better understanding of how the 
various democracy promotion goals interact, not always in unison or in expected ways.   
This study traces a decade of U.S. democracy promotion beginning in Eastern 
Europe in 1989 then focusing on Russia from 1992 through the end of the decade.  
Informed by the writings of democracy theorists of the last quarter-century, this study 
analyzes U.S. government policy makers’ and program managers’ understanding of the 
democracy building process and assesses how those programs were designed and 
implemented against the theoretical understanding of democracy and democracy 
promotion in the scholarly community. 
The benchmarks of democracy 
Chapter One provides a review of the scholarly analysis of democracy, the process of 
democratization, and the embryonic field of democracy promotion.  It sets forth the basic 
attributes of a democracy as background for the analysis of U.S. government programs.  
Democracy requires: 
x
• The fundamental commitment of the people to principles of tolerance, respect for 
the individual, accountability and responsibility; 
• Rule of law and independent judiciary; 
• Market economy; 
• Representative government selected through free and fair elections; and 
• Civil society with an independent media. 
The designs of assistance 
Chapter Two analyzes the designs of U.S. democracy promotion programs from 
the many pieces of legislation leading up to the passage of the Support for East European 
Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989 and the foundation it created for the FREEDOM 
Support Act of 1992.  Prior to 1989, the communist threat had served as a major unifying 
goal for U.S. policy makers in the executive branch and Congress.  With the 
disintegration of communism in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and the demise of the 
Soviet Union in 1991, the U.S. government was divided on how vigorously it should 
respond to the changed international environment.  The immediate post-Cold War era 
was a period of confusion and profound uncertainty for U.S. policy makers.  The 
Congress resolved to act quickly and vigorously to pass the SEED legislation while the 
executive branch cautiously watched the reactions of the Soviet leadership to the fall of 
communist regimes across Eastern Europe.  Upon the collapse of the Soviet Union and at 
the height of an election year, the executive branch was emboldened to respond and 
drafted the FREEDOM Support legislation, placing its emphasis squarely on advancing 
economic and political reform in Russia.  Chapter Two concludes with an analysis of 
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how closely the democracy promotion elements of those two key pieces of legislation 
match the benchmarks for democracy as established in the scholarly literature. 
The context of assistance 
Democracy promotion is not carried out in isolation.  It is impacted by events on 
the international scene as well as the internal dynamics of both the target country and the 
donor country.  Chapter Three provides the background against which the U.S. conducted 
its democracy promotion programs.  The first part of the chapter addresses the mixed 
state of Russia’s democratic reform in the chaotic 1990s—its weak rule of law with a 
judiciary under the influence of the Kremlin; partial economic reforms and complete 
economic collapse near the end of the decade, regularized and generally free and fair 
elections; weak political party system; and growing civil society and independent media.  
Under the leadership of President Boris Yeltsin, Russia was unpredictable due to his 
flamboyant nature and compromised health.  The second half of the chapter assesses 
U.S.-Russia relations at the executive level throughout the decade, specifically the very 
close, if sometimes volatile, relationship between Presidents Boris Yeltsin and Bill 
Clinton.  This review shows how democracy promotion as a top foreign policy goal was 
relegated to the backburner as conflict erupted around the world.     
The structure of assistance 
Chapter Four analyzes the structure of U.S.  democracy assistance—
institutionally and fiscally—tracking the budget, implementation, and reporting processes 
in the context of the organizational cultures of the State Department, USAID, and USIA.  
U.S. democracy assistance under FSA in the 1990s falls into three distinct stages 
beginning with the priority to meet urgent humanitarian needs (1992-1993) then to create 
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a market economy (1994-1995) and finally to develop democratic political institutions, 
the rule of law and civil society (1996-2000).  The first stage, focused on humanitarian 
aid, was short-lived as the feared famine and chaos of the transition did not materialize.  
Just as Soviet citizens had survived the shortages of the Soviet economy, Russian citizens 
managed to survive its collapse.  Within FSA funding to Russia, the vast amount was 
devoted to building a market economy, though that shifted in 1996 as the program 
priority became the development of democracy and civil society.     
Implementing democracy programs 
The next two chapters focus on those shifting program priorities, Chapter Five to 
efforts to strengthen the rule of law and build a market economy and Chapter Six to 
projects aimed at developing democratic political institutions and civil society.  These 
chapters draw on the annual reports to Congress prepared by the State Department’s 
Office of the Coordinator for Assistance to the NIS, reports by the U.S. NGOs 
implementing the assistance programs on the ground, evaluations by the General 
Accountability Office (GAO), and personal interviews with U.S. NGO program 
managers in Russia and in Washington.  This review shows where U.S. efforts 
corresponded with scholarly findings and where they fell short.   
Lessons learned 
Finally, Chapter Seven draws the lessons learned for democracy promotion as a 
U.S. foreign policy goal from the three levels of analysis—first, the public statements of 
top foreign policy leaders as explained in Chapters Two and Three; second, the 
interpretation of those broad goals into assistance programs through the organizational 
mechanisms of the foreign affairs agencies as developed in Chapter Four; and third, the 
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implementation of those assistance programs by individual program managers of U.S. 
NGOs working with U.S. officials on the ground, as presented in Chapters Five and Six.  
The most significant lesson, framing all other lessons, is that external donors can only 
have a marginal impact on promoting democracy without the support of the host 
population.  In other works, democracy will only happen in Russia when the Russian 
people want it and the elite permit some opening for it, no matter what the U.S. and other 
international donors desire for the Federation.  Regardless of the type of democracy 
promotion activity pursued, external donors will be impacted by internal political 
dynamics over which they have no control.  That said, however, my research suggests 
that assistance programs targeting the grassroots level, can introduce democratic values, 
practices, and societies to Russian citizens who can later become change agents in their 
societies.  Exchange programs with follow-on support to exchange alumni promise to 
build broad-based support for democracy.  They help to cultivate societies at the 
grassroots level to be ready to take advantage of and work in concert with political 
openings at the top.  The emphasis of such democracy promotion assistance speaks to Joe 
Nye’s analysis of America’s “soft power.”   
This concluding chapter also explores the implications of these lessons learned for 
future U.S. efforts in democracy promotion.  The U.S. government approach to 
democracy promotion has been stove-piped with individual agencies targeting individual 
democratic attributes without much coordination among them.  Some fundamental 
attributes received much too little attention – specifically programs supporting rule of law 
and the social safety net.  The necessary attributes of democracy—rule of law, market 
economy, civil society, representative political institutions, independent media, and 
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independent judiciary are dependent on and affected by one another.  Democracy 
promotion requires a detailed strategic plan reflecting those relationships and 
connections.  In the U.S. government, even the country specific strategic plans are 
stovepiped—USAID has its own, State has its own.  Further research on democracy 
promotion for the practitioner should focus on the inter-relationships among the various 
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Chapter 1: Visions of Democracy  
At the beginning of the 21st century, democracy appears to offer the most 
equitable system of governance that human society has developed for political and social 
organization.3 Its strength is rooted in the rule of law, the mechanism by which 
participation in the system is regulated and conflict is mediated in the context of a clear 
set of rules that apply to all citizens.  Clear rules enforced by a judiciary independent of 
political power lead to trust, the foundation of democratic society.  People trust the 
democratic government to protect their civil liberties—the right of expression and 
assembly—and the right to a free press, private property, and to vote.  Through the 
constitution, the liberal democracy protects the rights of the individual and establishes a 
set of checks and balances that keeps power fairly distributed.  People give their consent 
to the democratic state in return for public health, safety and the freedom to pursue their 
interests.   
Democracy provides freedom with broad space for a diversity of voices and 
interests and speaks to the soul of the individual promising a stake in and hope for the 
future.  The free market, regulated through the rule of law, is essential to democracy, 
encouraging innovation that can lead to economic growth and prosperity.  It creates an 
environment conducive to risk taking while offering the protection of law.  Democratic 
political culture embodies openness, transparency, inclusiveness, and accountability, 
values that need to be exercised at all levels of society from interactions among 
individuals to within and among organizations and among national governments.  At the 
 
3 By “democracy,” I mean a liberal democracy, a representative government regulated by a constitution that 
protects the rights of the individual and minorities.     
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core of the widespread appeal of democracy is the protection of the rights of the 
individual and checks on executive power.  Democracy protects the right to speak truth to 
power.     
 Many political scientists and government officials have expressed their own 
version of Winston Churchill’s often cited quote that “democracy is the worst form of 
government, except all those other forms that have been tried.”  Democracy is an 
attractive choice because it provides an orderly mechanism for people with diverse 
interests to compete peaceably through elections and the market for political and 
economic benefits and to have a say in how they are governed.  Democracy as it is 
practiced today is the result of gradual and fitful evolution over the very long-term.  
The Fitful Evolution of Democracy
For all its positive attributes, democracy emerged only rarely up to the 20th 
century because it is such a complex system of relationships among the state, the market 
and civil society.  As a form of government and ideology, democracy has experienced 
waves of popularity and development, obscured at various points in history by the 
predominance of other forms of government from empires and monarchies with colonies 
to oppressive collective arrangements.  In the 20th century, democracy’s popularity was 
clearly on the rise.   
A lengthy evolution and rare occurrence 
 The attributes of democracy evolved piecemeal over 2000 years in conjunction 
with the development of markets and trade.  Democracy first appeared in Athens in the 
5th century B.C. in the form of the direct participation of men in the governance of city-
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states.  Athens introduced the concept of rule of law, which primarily meant binding the 
power of the state to make its use less arbitrary, and supported the idea of equality before 
the law (Belton 8).  The Roman Empire demonstrated a form of democracy more 
representative and less direct than Athens.  Rule of law spread during the Roman Empire 
through the application of Roman law across the vast territories of the empire.  During 
the Middle Ages, the idea of representative government faded under feudalism that tied 
lord and vassal together on the basis of land ownership and servitude, though the spread 
of Christianity planted the idea that all men are equal in the sight of God.  Medieval 
economic relationships were limited to transactions between individuals. 
 The feudal period gave way to the Renaissance beginning in the 14th century, with 
the rise of the Italian city-states and the spread of economic competition and international 
trade.  After the dismal period of the Dark Ages, people sought to recapture the glories of 
Ancient Greece and Rome.  By the early 16th century, the French monarchy pursued an 
economic system of mercantilism based on the balance of trade with high exports and 
low imports.  In the mercantilist system, the power of the state rested with its wealth as 
determined by the amount of gold and silver the state held.  Trade was seen as zero sum 
based on a finite amount of capital over which states competed.  Governments became 
deeply involved in the economy during the mercantilist period, closely regulating the 
flow of imports and exports and establishing monopolies.  An outgrowth of this system 
was an accounting system to monitor those flows.  The merchant class grew, benefiting 
from the monopolies, cheap labor, and protectionist policies that limited foreign 
competition.  Governments, in turn, benefited from the wealth of the merchants.  From 
this growing international trade emerged the beginnings of the market – a banking 
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system, contract law, shipping law and guarantees of transactions (Sachs and Pistor, 4).  
Nation states became stronger as governments shifted from exporting raw materials and 
invested in domestic production of finished goods to export.  The intense competition 
over perceived limited capital led to many wars during this period.  The British economic 
system at the time was less mercantilist, restrained by the growth in the power of the 
parliament and the establishment of common law.  The concept of limiting the power of 
the state was introduced in England in the Magna Carta and expressed in the English 
Petition of Grievances of 1610 (Belton 8).  The mercantilist period lasted until the French 
Revolution in the 18th century, when Adam Smith criticized the system as unsustainable.  
In The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith introduced his economic theory supporting the 
invisible hand of the market, suggesting that free trade is mutually beneficial and not zero 
sum, so governments should not interfere in the economy and instead should allow 
markets to self-correct.  Smith believed that people acting in their own self-interest was 
good for the interest of all.  
 The Age of Enlightenment in the 18th century shifted the focus of authority from 
the king to the individual.  The idea of equality before the law re-emerged.  Government 
officials and clergy were to be tried under the same laws and methods as ordinary people 
(Belton 9).  John Locke, a key figure in the Enlightenment, believed in a law based 
society, the sanctity of the individual and the search for truth through reason, not through 
mere acceptance of the word of authority.  Individuals possessed natural rights that 
preceded the ruler.  Jean Jacques Rousseau asserted that men needed to come together to 
make laws that the government then was charged to enforce for the good of all.  In this 
way, the state brought law and order to the natural brutish state of man that Thomas 
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Hobbes had described the century before.  Looking back on the chaos and religious wars 
of earlier centuries, the philosophers of the Enlightenment period proclaimed that the 
rights of the individual were based on a rational universe.  These beliefs were powerful 
influences on the American and French Revolutions in the last 18th century. 
 Having thrown off British ruled and won its independence, the United States 
Constitutional Convention drafted the Constitution, which was ratified in 1787, 
introducing the separation of powers among the three branches of government—the 
executive, the legislative and the judiciary.  Following the election of George Washington 
as the first President of the United States, James Madison drafted the Bill of Rights in 
1789, providing for rights of the individual of freedom of speech, religion, assembly, 
private property, due process, civil trial by jury, among others.  Participation in the 
democracy, however, was still limited only to men and the practice of slavery continued 
in the United States for another 100 years until its abolition in the 19th century.  The 
secret ballot was introduced in the United States by the end of the 19th century.  The 
Industrial Revolution brought scientific discoveries and increased power for the United 
States and Germany, challenging Britain’s premier position in the global economy.  
Philosophers like Karl Marx and Frederick Engels focused on the division of labor into 
classes and the alienation of the worker in the capitalist system that served to embolden 
workers unions and led to the rise of socialism (Chilcote 79-83).  The 19th century also 
brought the dissolution of empires with the rapid rise and fall of the Napoleonic Empire 
and the end of the Germanic or Holy Roman Empire early in the century, and the collapse 
of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires by the end of World War I early in the 
20th century.  In the latter part of the 19th century, rising economic competition compelled 
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major powers to seek colonies to provide raw materials to feed into the growing 
industrialization of their economies.         
Democracy on the rise 
 While men had experimented with forms of democratic governance for over 2000 
years, at the outset of the 20th century there still were no liberal democracies “elected on 
the principal of universal adult suffrage.” That changed dramatically, however, by the 
end of that volatile century when there were 120 electoral democracies in the world 
(Freedom House 1999b, 2).  The rise of democracy over the 29th century was not a 
smooth linear trend upward, however, with a significant setback in the interwar period of 
1922-1942.  Samuel Huntington (1991, 17) pegged 1926 as the end of the first long wave 
of democratization, which grew out of the American and French Revolutions.  By that 
point, there were 33 democracies, many of which had emerged around the time of the 
First World War.  Ironically, following that war, which was fought to make the world 
“safe for democracy,” many of the newer democracies reverted to more authoritarian 
forms of government.  There were many challenges and alternatives to the democratic 
model.  Following the fall of the Russian Empire in 1917, the Soviet Union turned shortly 
thereafter to communism.  Italy turned to Fascism in 1922 and Germany to Nazism in 
1933.  With the global economic decline of 1929 and decade of depression to follow, 
people around the world looked to centralized governments, as more efficient means of 
economic organization.  During the bleak interwar period, the number of democracies in 
the world declined to 12.  In 1939, Germany moved to take over nations in its 
neighborhood in Central, Southeastern and Western Europe and in Scandinavia, 
triggering a response by the United States and drawing it into the war.  With the defeat of 
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Germany and Japan in 1945, the United States and its Allies occupied and established 
democratic systems in those countries. 
 In the post World War II period, up to the early 1960s, the number of democracies 
rose to 36 with the rise of national sovereignty and free market development.  The main 
threat to democracy at this time came from communism, which spread under the 
influence of the Soviet Union throughout Eastern Europe and around the world.  The 
international system was split into two competing ideologies—democracy and 
communism—for 40 years.  Democracy suffered a second reversal in the 1960s as 
military coups overthrew civilian governments in Latin America and Africa in the 1960s, 
leading many to question the appropriateness of democracy for developing countries 
(Huntington 1991, 19).  The democratic trend revived, however, with the overthrow of 
dictatorship in Portugal and the end of the Portuguese empire in 1974.  The number of 
democracies rose again with the addition of 30 more in the third wave.  During the 1980s 
and 1990s, democracy spread to Southern Europe, Latin America, Asia and Africa, 
coinciding with the disintegrating influence and ultimate collapse of the Soviet Union 
(Huntington 1991, 24).  The international system, which for nearly fifty years had been 
dominated by the competition between the U.S. and the USSR, became less and less 
bipolar.  With the collapse of the Soviet Union, communism was discredited and many 
people living under former communist systems chose deliberately to pursue democracy in 
its place.  The international system became unipolar under the leadership of the United 
States and, therefore, supportive of the emergence of democracy.  Calling this the 
“Democratic Century,” Freedom House (1999a) found that at the end of the 20th century 
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58.2 percent of the world’s population lived in electoral democracies, of which 85 
countries or 38 percent of global population were liberal democracies. 
 What does this acceleration of democracy over the last century mean for 
international relations, especially for the established democracies?  The response of the 
United States, particularly since the 1990s, has been to promote deliberately the 
development of democratic systems through its foreign policy and specially designed aid 
programs.  To assess the effectiveness of this response, it is necessary first to identify the 
requirements for a democracy to take hold and consolidate.   
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Necessary Conditions for Democracy
Democracy involves a complex set of political, economic and social institutions, 
some of which are critical to its existence.  Those elements without which democracy 
cannot survive are: 1) the consent of the people; 2) the rule of law; 3) the free market; 4) 
competitive elections that are free and fair; and 5) space for civil society.  The role of the 
individual as an active participant in these institutions is key to democracy.  
Indigenous support 
 First and foremost, democracy must have the support of the people to survive.  
Fundamentally, democracy relies on the deliberate choice of the people to be willing to 
participate actively in the democratic process, e.g., to run for elected office, to vote, or to 
protest.  Robert Dahl’s (1989) definition of democracy as a “polyarchy” or government 
by the many puts the citizen at the center of democracy.  In a democracy, “citizenship is 
extended to a relatively high proportion of adults, and the rights of citizenship include the 
opportunity to oppose and vote out the highest officials in government” (Dahl 1989, 221).   
In this system, the criteria for democracy are: 
• “effective participation” so individuals have ample opportunity to make known 
their policy preferences; 
• “voting equality at a decisive stage” so every citizen feels assured his/her vote 
carries equal weight to that of all other citizens; 
• “enlightened understanding” so every citizen has equal opportunity to gather 
information in a timely manner on the decision at hand; 
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• “control of the agenda” whereby citizens determine what issues are to be pursued 
in the democratic process; and 
• sovereignty of the people, meaning that the people have the final say (Dahl 1989, 
109-114). 
 
Support for democracy can be inspired from a visionary and charismatic leader or 
can result from a pact or agreement among elites.  External actors, however, cannot 
impose democracy on an unwilling population, but they can pursue programs in country 
that can help build broad-based support for democracy.  The key is that the initiative for 
reform must be indigenous at some level.  Indigenous support for democracy can be the 
people’s willingness to pursue democratic reform that can lead to the development of a 
democratic political culture over time.   
A democratic political culture 
 As individuals interact in political and civil society and free market of a 
democracy, they develop a democratic political culture.  A state’s political culture is the 
overall behavior of its citizens and their interactions based on their beliefs, memories, and 
past experiences.  Political culture can be defined as “the persistence of certain mental 
forms that tend to direct, inspire, and orient individual responses to significant and often 
divisive issues, including the attitudes toward the state, bureaucracy, change, minorities, 
and so forth” (Tismaneanu and Turner 1995, 7).  Political culture also has been described 
as “a set of norms that encourages the formation of individual and collective preferences, 
and the submission of those preferences to the political arena for satisfaction, within the 
context of support for a set of institutional arrangements for political decision making 
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that is responsive to those preferences” (Gibson 1995, 56).  Political culture is directly 
related to the survival of democracy through its linkages to the political structures.   
 The rule of law gives rise to a democratic political culture because it provides 
individuals the security to trust the state.  The values inherent in a democratic political 
culture are: 
• respect for transparency, accountability, and openness; 
• acceptance of plurality; 
• tolerance; and  
• willingness to participate actively in the political process. 
 
In an overlapping space between civil society and the state is “political society,” 
where individuals act out their political interests.  Expressed in this political society is a 
country’s political culture which reflects the people’s deepest feelings about the 
trustworthiness of fellow citizens and the legitimacy of and respect for their rights and 
interests; their own ability to influence government; the legitimacy of their political 
institutions; and how conflict should be resolved (Parrott 1997, 21).  A democracy must 
have a political culture that is civic, meaning citizen based, with norms of high 
interpersonal trust, readiness to compromise over conflict rather than resort to violence, 
and acceptance of democratic institutions as legitimate.  Importantly, a society’s political 
culture is capable of changing in response to historical events and generational turnover.  
In order words, no community is pre-determined to be forever unsuitable to democracy.  
Democracy remains a possibility for all states. 
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Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (1989), leaders in the field of civic culture, 
stress the importance of the public’s attitudes regarding its ability to influence the 
political system and impact political decisions, and the overall level of trustworthiness of 
society.  There is a symbiotic relationship between the formal political institutions and 
the ultimate consolidation of democracy.  They are self-reinforcing as they build trust in 
society.  People are more willing to support democracy when they trust that the political 
institutions will protect their interests.  “The legacy of mistrust must first be overcome in 
order for a previously atomized society to establish the basic level of tolerance and civil 
responsibility required to sustain even the most basic levels of freedom” (Dawisha 1997, 
52).  This is particularly true of societies that are transitioning from previously 
authoritarian systems.  The rules by which people choose to live are unique to their 
culture and history, but over time this political culture can change, especially as citizens 
re-examine their past. 
 Many debate whether democratic institutions can survive in a political culture that 
is not fully democratic or alternatively if those institutions can spur the development over 
time of a political culture that becomes increasingly more democratic.  Some believe that 
the selection of specific political institutions is not as important as the underlying 
political culture.  Unless a country’s political culture is already accepting of democracy, 
prospects for the consolidation of democracy are much more challenging and uncertain 
(Lipset 1993, 136). 
The rule of law 
 Conventional wisdom holds and U.S. government policy statements assert that a 
democracy must be based on the rule of law, backed by an independent judiciary, but 
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such statements often lack a clear definition of what constitutes rule of law.  Tom 
Carothers (2004, 122) defines the rule of law “as a system in which the laws are public 
knowledge, are clear in meaning, and apply equally to everyone.  They enshrine and 
uphold the political and civil liberties that have gained status as universal human rights 
over the last half-century.”   
 Karen Kleinfeld Belton (2005) draws a distinction between two different current 
definitions of the rule of law that she believes have become conflated in the general 
public.  The first, and the one she supports, is a definition based on the end-goals of the 
rule of law.  Specifically, the rule of law means: 1) the state abides by law; 2) there is 
equality before the law; 3) there is law and order in society; 4) justice is exercised 
efficiently and impartially; and 5) human rights are upheld.  The rule of law exists when 
these five separate goals hold.  Achieving these goals often requires reform across many 
institutions at the same time—the courts, the police, and the judiciary.  Success in one 
alone, however, does not bring rule of law and each goal has separate constituencies 
which may support reform in one area but not another.  Achieving these five goals 
together is needed to bring rule of law to society.  According to Belton (7), these goals 
are historically and culturally determined.  Such clarity allows designers of programs to 
strengthen rule of law better address and counteract opposition to reform.  U.S. 
democracy promotion programs to support rule of law should address each of these five 
goals. 
 The first goal of limiting the power of the state requires an independent judiciary 
and court system.  The idea of the bound state must be codified in law and, in 
transitioning countries, requires court reform and independent law enforcement, where 
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the military and police are allied to the people, not the regime.  The second goal of 
equality before the law requires the protection of minorities and the strength and 
independence of the court system to enforce the law and not give in to corruption and 
bribes.  The third goal of law and order requires that people trust the state to be just, 
rather than taking justice into their own hands.  A society based on law and order attracts 
foreign investment, ensures the well-being of the poor who cannot afford to protect 
themselves, and contributes to global security (Belton 11).  The fourth goal of efficiency 
and predictability eliminates the tactic of delaying court proceedings or subverting 
justice.  Belton (12) credits Friedrich Hayek (1994) for emphasizing the importance of 
predictability that the rule of law provides, especially for the market economy.  
Predictability gives people control over their affairs and allows them to make decisions.  
“A predictable, efficient legal system allows businesses to plan, enables law-abiding 
citizens and businesses to stay on the correct side of the law, and provides some level of 
deterrence against criminal acts.  It enables a free market by providing for efficient 
adjudication of contract disputes” (Belton 13).  A particular concern in this goal is that 
the laws should not change too frequently, a tendency in transitioning states.  When laws 
change often, the uncertainty undermines the efficiency of the legal system and takes 
away the predictability of the rule of law.  The final goal of protection of human rights 
means providing for the security of the people, which has been at the core of many 
outside approaches to transitioning states.  Some believe that the content of the laws is 
particularly important; others feel that the procedure of laws is primary.  The human 
rights goal clearly falls into the former category.  Belton suggests that laws are the 
weakest tool to promote human rights.  Cultural acceptance of human rights as a norm is 
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necessary for such protection.  In established rule of law systems, these five goals 
complement one another, but in transitioning societies, they are in tension and progress at 
different rates.  Advances in one area can undermine work toward another goal.               
 Belton’s second definition, and the one she claims is most often used by 
democracy promoters/practitioners, focuses on the institutions of the rule of law, 
specifically:  1) the laws which are publicly known and accepted; 2) a judiciary that is 
trained and knowledgeable about the law and independent of political power; and 3) an 
enforcement mechanism that can enforce laws, executive judicial judgments, and keep 
the peace and security in society.  The forms these institutions take can vary widely 
among countries.   These institutions are often the targets of specific reforms and putting 
these institutions in place is used as a tool to get to the desired end state of the rule of 
law.  Belton argues that institutions alone cannot create the rule of law.  They require a 
larger supporting structure including the legislature, a system of legal education, and 
prisons, intelligence services, and border guards (Belton 16).  Reforming institutions is a 
means to an end, not an end in itself, but it has become so in democracy promotion 
efforts.  Reforming institutions is not enough to bring about a market democracy, which 
requires cultural and social change, too—the way people think about society.  This is a 
much more difficult and longer-term process than re-writing laws or training police, for 
example.  Measuring the number of new laws or the number of police trained does not 
indicate whether establishing the rule of law in a society has advanced.  The rule of law is 
not just about legal institutions; it is about a cultural and political model.  For this reason, 
each rule of law system needs to fit its cultural and political context.            
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The foundation of the rule of law is the constitution, which contains the basic 
rules and principles of governance, determining the rights of the individual and how 
power will be shared.  The rule of law brings order to democracy through a complex 
system of checks and balances among various sources of power, for example, among 
branches of the central government and the relationship between central and regional 
government. 
 Adherence to the rule of law guarantees that everyone plays by the same rules, 
which are transparent and fair, and that the state does not play favorites in handing out its 
benefits.  The rule of law establishes checks on the arbitrary abuse of power by 
government, giving citizens the protection they desire and the freedom they need to 
pursue their interests both economically and politically.  Rule of law requires that state 
institutions like the police force and the military are trustworthy, and that the judiciary is 
independent and not beholden to the state.     
 The democratic system is self-governed by rules acceptable to the wide majority 
of citizens.  In a democracy each of the three separate, but inter-related sectors of the 
market, the state, and civil society respects the existence of and cooperates with the other 
two working within the rule of law.  Each sector is made up of institutions such as private 
enterprises in the market, elections and political parties in the political state, and 
independent media and non-governmental organizations in civil society, each with its 
own set of laws specific to its realm.  In the free market, the rule of law guarantees 
contract enforcement and property rights.  In the political society, rule of law establishes 
the rules for electoral competition.  In civil society, rule of law protects freedom of 
expression, which can hold the state accountable for its actions. The rule of law is a 
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powerful source of persuasion to convince people to participate in the democratic system 
when it gives them protection to pursue their interests safe from the arbitrary actions of 
the state. 
 Conventional approaches to rule of law promotion can be described, on the one 
hand, as “top down” and on the other as “bottom up” (Spense, 16).  The “top down” 
approach means putting in place the institutional structures and laws based on best 
practices from around the world.  The “bottom up” approach focuses on the development 
of those who underpin the legal system—the lawyers and judges—by training them in 
western practice and building up respect for the law so they will demand that the 
government undertake reform.  The passage of the Russian Criminal Procedure Code in 
2001, which is discussed in Chapter Five, was the result of an approach somewhere 
between the conventional extremes. 
 The rule of law is fundamental to democracy because it provides the basis and 
trust on which to develop market and pluralistic political institutions and civil society.  
Clear written rules, widely accepted by the citizenry and impartially enforced, provide a 
predictable and level playing field on which individuals can make choices.  Rule of law is 
the counterweight to corruption.       
A market economy 
 The free market has been a driving force behind the historical development of 
democracy as it is accompanied by a rise in literacy and education level among the 
citizens, and the growth of a middle class that is not dependent on the state, and the 
expansion of a vibrant civil society. (Huntington 1991).  The market creates and enriches 
a middle class of citizens who demand participation in their governance and expect the 
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state to provide certain conditions conducive to market transactions.  These factors lead 
to a citizenry that is more willing to be pro-active and hold government accountable 
(Diamond 2003). 
 The market serves the needs of the people and the democratic state.  It can 
provide a mechanism to empower people outside the realm of the state’s influence.  
Because the middle class has its own interests to protect, it wants to have a say in setting 
the rules that impact it.  The middle class is important to the state for the revenues it 
provides through taxes, which then allow the state to invest in public infrastructure and 
defense for the people.  People expect the democratic state to provide for a certain quality 
of life including education, health care, defense, communications, and other features of 
modern society.  The market provides the means for the state to make these provisions.  
Because a democracy requires stable economic growth in order to consolidate, the state 
needs to manage the market economy effectively and be accountable to competing 
interests (Sachs, 4). 
 Through the freedom to make their own decisions in an open society, individuals 
have the opportunity to reap economic benefits for personal benefit through the free 
market.  Seymour Martin Lipset (1994, 31) was the first to establish empirically the 
relationship between level of development and democracy, observing that developed, rich 
countries tended to be democracies.4 In order words, the wealthier a country the more 
likely it is to be a democracy.  Many have questioned the direction of this relationship.  
Does democracy lead to economic development or does economic development lead to 
democracy?  Adam Przeworski concluded in Democracy and Development (2000) that 
 
4 Lipset builds on modernization theory that suggests less developed nations can benefit from the 
experiences and lessons of the developed, i.e., democratic, world in terms of sustainable development.   
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there was no general pattern of development, which instead is determined by a country’s 
past. His research in the mid-1980s found that countries with about $6,000 per capita 
income or higher did not suffer a reversal in democracy.  In other words, the higher the 
per capita (above $6,000) the more likely democracy would be sustained.  In more recent 
work, Przeworski (2004) has suggested that democracies become more durable as they 
become more developed, but not that development necessary leads to democracy.  He 
contends that democracies and dictatorships both can exist at certain levels of 
development, but that the duration of dictatorship is shortened as countries develop 
because such regimes experience instability. 
 In its study on Freedom in the World 2000-2001, Freedom House found a 
significant link between political freedom and economic development in those countries 
deemed “Free” in its survey.5 The study showed that the economies of “Free” countries 
grew at an average annual rate of 2.56 percent over a nine-year period, a rate 70 percent 
higher than the growth rate of the countries it deemed “Not Free.”  The study concluded 
that “economic growth is accelerated in an environment where the rule of law is 
respected, property rights are enforced, citizenry is actively engaged in the political 
process, and investigative media serve to expose, and thus reduce corruption” (Freedom 
House 2000).  The study also noted that some impoverished countries also extended 
political rights and civil liberties to its people.    
 Dan Usher (1981, viii) believes that the free market is the primary condition for 
democracy because it assigns national income impersonally.  The politics and economics 
 
5 Freedom House, a non-profit organization that tracks political freedom and human rights, regularly 
surveys the global state of those attributes.  It rates countries as “Free,” “Partially Free,” and “Not Free” 
depending on their political and human rights record. 
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of a democratic system cannot be separated and the government must have the support of 
the people for its economic policies and institutions before democracy can be 
consolidated (Haggard and Kaufman 1995, 16).  The democratic state needs equitable 
economic growth for its long-term survivability. 
 In a democracy, society, not the state, must take the lead in assigning national 
income through the market or the “system of equity,” which must be acceptable to both 
the legislature and the people (Usher, 1981).  The legislature must not be involved 
substantially in the distribution of national income, which must be removed from the 
pressure of the vote.  Economic policies should be examined and pursued depending on 
their impact on the system of equity.  Experience shows that the free market best fulfills 
this mission.  Capitalism with its private ownership and control of the means of 
production provides the only system of equity suitable to democracy.  Through its 
openness and freedom, it provides incentive for innovation that leads to economic 
prosperity across the board and benefits all.  A democracy cannot exist without a 
capitalist economic system.  
 Joan Nelson (1994, 6) recommends certain steps to introduce market reforms and 
set the stage for structural reforms later.  These include pursuing first, macroeconomic 
stabilization to control inflation or correct a balance of payments deficit; second, 
removing state controls of the old regime involving trade, prices, and labor mobility; and 
third, setting up market mechanics like financial institutions, property rights and 
commercial law, and regulations to protect the public.  The greatest obstacle to the 
consolidation of market reforms is the necessary shift in people’s attitudes to accept the 
new rules as legitimate.  People have to believe that these new rules are good for them 
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and that others will cooperate in their implementation.  Building that legitimacy takes 
time. 
 The state creates economic rules acceptable for the democracy, such as property 
rights, and guarantees their enforcement through the well-established rule of law.  
Property rights must be structured to give people a stake in the modern free market 
system.  Mancur Olson made the compelling argument that democracy and elections are 
not enough to secure property rights, which must be protected within the rule of law.  
“The only societies where individual rights to property and contract are confidently 
expected to last across generations are the securely democratic societies” (Wolf 2004b, 
13-14).  The state also needs to redress the gap between rich and poor, for example, 
through a progressive income tax and by providing a certain safety net for those at the 
lowest income level.  The state, especially an advanced democracy, must be alert always 
to the degree of its involvement in the economy for fear of undermining its own 
democracy.  The larger the bureaucracy becomes the more it is involved in the 
assignment of national income and the greater threat it is to the democracy (Usher 1981).  
It is a balancing act then for the state to keep capitalism in check by protecting those who 
cannot compete in the market, while at the same time, not becoming too involved in 
regulation of the market and distribution of income. 
 While market reforms are necessary to build democracy, the social costs of such 
reforms can be devastating for individuals.  This was especially true at the collapse of 
communism, when under the old system, people had certain expectations that the state 
would care for them in retirement at least at a minimal level for housing, food and 
transportation.  When the Soviet Union disappeared, so did those guarantees.  Joan 
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Nelson (1997, 248) noted that it took relatively few people to institute reforms for 
macroeconomic stabilization and price liberalization, but that the fallout from those 
changes was vast.  Social sector reforms impacting health care and pensions are much 
more difficult to institute.  The impact of the collapse of communism on the “middle 
class” of the Soviet system, i.e., the professionals such as teachers, was particularly 
difficult.  Nelson emphasizes that in the process of transition, sufficient attention needs to 
be given to social sector reforms because they are at the heart of the individual’s security 
and well-being.  As leaders design such reforms, those reforms need to be subjected to 
public debate and discussion (Nelson 1997, 263).  This may take longer than simply 
implementing changes, but is healthier in the long run for democratic consolidation.       
 Markets allow people to exchange what they have for what they want and the 
government provides the legal system to regulate those transactions.  States alone have 
the monopoly of violence to enforce those rules.  Without the infrastructure and rule of 
law, outsiders will not invest in economies and states will not be able to attract the 
foreign investment they need to grow their economies.  “As countries grow richer, they 
are better able to afford higher standards of education, health and public services.  As 
citizens become better informed and more prosperous, they insist on higher standards in 
public life.  . . . A positive cycle of reinforcement goes from the economy, to polity and 
society, and back again” (Wolf 2004b, 6).  There is mutual dependence among the state, 
the market, and society. 
 Values matter in the transition to a liberal democracy, especially the honesty of 
those in positions of authority like judges and policemen.  The armed forces must abide 
by civilian control that has been elected by the people.  A democracy depends on the 
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social contract in which the market sells its goods to the highest bidder, but does not have 
access to the legitimate use of force.  The state, which controls the use of force, cannot 
sell its protection to the highest bidder.  Herein lay the social contract between the state 
and the market within a liberal democracy.  The market allows the state to control the use 
of violence and the state allows the market to sell its goods to the highest bidder.  This 
complex relationship between the state and market in the liberal democracy is difficult to 
spread to other cultures. 
 For Wolf (2004b, 15) the process of economic globalization offers a way to 
spread liberal democracy around the world.  He claims that the same forces, like 
“regulatory competition,” that led to the advanced democracies are still at work today 
(ibid., 15).  With this force of economic globalization and competition has been at the 
same time the “unprecedented spread of democracy” (Wolf 2004b, 15).  Regulatory 
competition alone will not lead to global prosperity, and needs to be accompanied by 
constitutional democracy, government elected by the people and rooted in the rule of law.  
Governments need to provide good policy in the form of “transparent, market-oriented 
instruments, modest taxes and liberal markets, . . . [which] work by raising prosperity and 
so increasing the size of the well-informed and demanding middle classes; by reducing 
opportunities for corruption; and by increasing exposure to the demands of foreigners, 
who cannot be readily coerced by the state” (Wolf 2004b, 16).  International 
organizations like the World Bank or the World Trade Organization have a special ability 
to enhance the good governance of states by incorporating desired behaviors and values 
of transparency in contractual agreements.  International organizations, therefore, can 
hold states accountable for their behavior. 
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It is incumbent on the world’s richest states to assist those that are suffering from 
extreme poverty and to intervene when governments fail to provide for their own citizens.  
It is to the benefit of the established democracies to live in a world of stable states, and 
this means helping states perform better for their people.  The market is not to blame for 
the vast inequality of resources in the world between the haves and the have-nots (i.e., 
between the democracies and the non-democracies); it is the fault of politicians who have 
manipulated the markets to their own greed and dishonesty.  Government can use profits 
from the market to enrich a few privileged people or to share the wealth among many.  
Martin Wolf (2004a) advocates getting the politics right and letting the markets work.  
Liberal democracies have achieved this balance of good politics and effective markets.  
Research has shown that democracies do not have famines and that democratic 
government is a prerequisite for sustainable development.  In fact, the poor need the 
freedom of democracy to give voice to their economic plight and demand change 
(Amartya Sen 1999).  By promoting democracy, the established democracies can also 
improve the quality of life for people in dysfunctional states.         
Democratic political institutions 
 The democratic political system must be plural and representative, achieved 
through regular competitive elections that are free and fair.  A liberal democracy is the 
combination of competitive elections with “freedom, rule of law, and good government” 
(Diamond 2003, 5).  Through the constitution, the people choose the form of their 
government, for example, selecting a presidential or parliamentary system.  Political 
parties, where people of like views come together to influence the political process, may 
be few or many.         
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In a democracy, the political state must abide by the rule of law, in which: 
• governmental policy decisions are made by elected officials; 
• elected officials are chosen and replaced in routine free and fair elections; 
• the right to vote for elected officials is extended broadly to adults; 
• most adults have the right to run for office; 
• citizens enjoy freedom of expression, including the right to criticize government;  
• citizens have access to information not controlled by the government; and 
• citizens have the right to join autonomous associations, including political parties, 
which can try to influence government through elections. (Dahl, 233)    
 
Competitive elections are a vital, some say the critical, component of democracy 
because they give citizens choices—among alternative platforms of values according to 
political parties and even whether to participate in the competitive process or not.  
Political parties in a democracy are the vehicles through which citizens express and make 
known their preferences to political leaders.  Elections, however, must be embedded 
institutionally within the rule of law to guarantee that they are free and fair, that parties 
have access to the media, and that the count can be trusted.  Democracy is about citizens’ 
ability to influence their government.  Regular, free, fair and competitive elections can be 
a minimal test of a democracy (Diamond 2003, 4).    
 In analyzing the post-communist transition, Dawisha (1997) described two major 
types of electoral systems:  majoritarian where the candidate with the largest number of 
votes wins and proportional representation (PR) for multimember bodies where seats are 
allocated according to the percentage of votes received.  Parties in the majoritarian 
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system tend to move to the center to capture as wide a constituency as possible, whereas 
parties in the PR system are more likely to be diverse and more extreme.  There can be a 
mixed system using the PR method to elect the representative body and a majoritarian 
method to elect the executive.  This draws on the strengths of both systems: enhanced 
governability of the majoritarian model and broader representation of the PR model.  
Closely related is the structure of the government, whether it is presidential or 
parliamentarian.  Juan Linz suggested that the parliamentary structure is more flexible 
and aims at consensus building.  Presidentialism, on the other hand, focuses on an 
individual and away from the party system.  “Presidential systems foster the creation of a 
two-party or two-bloc system . . . [which tends to] reduce their distinctiveness and 
internal cohesion” (Dawisha 1997, 56).  Presidentialism tends to over-represent the 
majority.  Linz suggested that in a new democracy the winner-take-all presidential system 
can be weak and unstable.  Power highly concentrated in the presidency means the 
country could tip either way—toward democracy or toward authoritarianism—depending 
upon the character of the individual holding the position. 
 Political parties are a necessary part of democracy because they channel citizens’ 
interests to the state; they are one way citizens can influence political decisions.  “If 
politics represents a society’s dialogue with itself—one in which problems are 
thematized, solutions debated and eventually, decisions adopted—then political parties 
might be regarded as major partners in this ongoing conversation” (Urban 1997, 175).  
Elections play an important role in driving political party formation and providing 
channels through which citizens may express their interests.  In this way, political society 
and civil society can overlap and are closely related. 
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Civil society 
 Civil society is that space, separate from the free market and the state, where 
individuals can pursue their interests by associating and operating within a network of 
issue-focused, voluntary organizations.  Such organizations may be trade unions, political 
parties, religious groups, cultural groups, voluntary associations, interest groups, non-
governmental, and non-state organizations.  Civil society is unofficial, autonomous, and 
self-regulating, and is built on trust among individuals.  There is no single formula for 
civil society where people create institutions that fit their needs.  Civil society, therefore, 
is flexible and adaptive.   
 The network of interactions among the many organizations in civil society builds 
trust that binds society together.  The very foundation of civil society is the respect for 
the integrity of the individual and his/her freedom to choose associations.  Individuals 
utilize this space to express their preferences to the state and the economy and the state 
allows individuals the freedom to create the institutions they need (Diamond 1994). 
 As the free market grows, so does civil society.  One of the most important 
features of civil society is the emergence of a middle class, which can serve as the career 
civil service for the democratic state.  Ideally, “economic liberalization may lead toward 
a civil society sustained by the growth of socioeconomic groups with a vested interest in 
further democratic change, predictable commercial laws, and vigorous civil association” 
(Parrott 1997, 26).  Some have suggested that a civic tradition is a better indicator of 
future growth than past growth as it requires the mutual trust and respect for rule of law 
beneficial to commercial transactions (Putnam 1993, 182).  Trust within society leads to 
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greater cooperation among people that can be mutually beneficial when coupled with 
accurate information and reliable enforcement. 
 Through civil society, individuals can organize to bring their interests to bear on 
the political process and can express any number of identities as they participate in the 
variety of cultural, professional, and social groups, without any one identity consuming 
or dominating the others.  Civil society serves democracy well by helping to educate and 
inform the citizenry about political participation.  It is the arena for debate on economic 
and political policies.  Such debate makes civil society a possible training ground for 
participants in the democratic state.  Through such interactions, the individual can learn 
tolerance, compromise, trust, and respect for the rule of law—all values central to 
democracy.   
 In a democracy, the relationship between civil society and the state is tense.  The 
rule of law, which is impersonal and procedural, protects individuals from the arbitrary 
abuse of power by the state.  For its restraint, the state expects that civil society will be 
self-limiting and not challenge its authority to govern (Cohen and Arato 1992, 17-18).  
The self-limiting character of civil society suggests that individuals, too, must hold 
themselves in check; that they can pursue their self-interest in the context of the rules 
established for the common good (Putnam 1993).  In a democracy, both the state and 
civil society respect and feel protected by the law. 
 Civil society, with its free press and open communications, serves to hold the 
state in check and to make it accountable.  The role of independent media is vitally 
important in providing objective information broadly to all groups and in return reflecting 
the interests of citizens and deepening the level of trust in society because everyone is 
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working from the same information, without the privilege of insider knowledge.  It is also 
through the independent media that the voices of civil society make themselves heard to 
the government, which can then be influential in shaping the public’s attitudes toward 
democracy.  “A society is civil only if its constituent groups demonstrate a substantial 
measure of self-restraint rooted in a recognition of the legitimacy of the interests of other 
groups—a recognition often reinforced by the existence of overlapping group 
memberships—and a commitment to forgo violence as a means of deciding social 
conflicts” (Parrott 1997, 22-23).  Tolerance is the name of the democratic game.  “An 
active civil society can hold in check nationalist passions and animosities, as long as the 
institutional framework is based on consensus and legitimacy.  In post-communist 
societies, the objective of civic-oriented groups and parties is to create a sense of 
identification with the democratic process” (Tismaneanu 1998, 4).  Civil society allows 
individuals to influence, not just escape, the state bureaucracy.  
 The importance of civil society for democracy is the equality of its members and 
the broad networks of horizontal relationships based on reciprocity and cooperation.  
Civil society is not structured hierarchically.  “Citizens interact as equals, not as patrons 
and clients nor as governors and petitioners” (Putnam 1993, 88).  In civil society, 
organizations are equal and are part of a consensual agreement that supports the 
democratic state.  “Civil associations contribute to the effectiveness and stability of 
democratic government, it is argued, both because of the ‘internal’ effects on individual 
members and because of their ‘external’ effects on the wider polity.  Internally, 
associations instill in their members habits of cooperation, solidarity, and public-
spiritedness. . . . Externally . . . ‘interest articulation’ and ‘interest aggregation’ are 
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enhanced by a dense network of secondary associations” (Putnam 1993, 89-90).  Civil 
society organizations, however, are not inherently cooperative and tolerant and must be 
deliberately designed to foster these values.  At the heart of the civic community must be 
individuals who take seriously their role as citizens, are politically active, and are 
committed to the idea of political equality of all citizens.   
 Some scholars suggest that the power of civil society lies in its ability to teach 
democratic skills and deepen democratic values.  Dissent can be expressed in civil society 
within the framework of the democracy and individuals learn how to participate in the 
political process within civic institutions.  This is an important arena, therefore, for civic 
education and can play a role in the consolidation of democracy.  “Where associationism 
flourishes, where citizens attend to community affairs and vote for issues, not patrons, 
there too we find leaders who believe in democracy, not social and political hierarchy” 
(Putnam 1993, 102).  In the civic community, people learn to trust one another through 
their interactions in social networks.  Because the level of trust is denser, they also are 
more likely to compromise.  Putnam suggests, “The fact that vertical networks are less 
helpful than horizontal networks in solving dilemmas of collective action may be one 
reason why capitalism turned out to be more efficient than feudalism in the eighteenth 
century, and why democracy has proven more effective than autocracy in the twentieth 
century” (Putnam 1993, 175).  Such norms are in large part determined by history.  
“Social context and history profoundly condition the effectiveness of institutions” 
(Putnam 1993, 182).  Creating new formal political institutions gradually has an impact 
on informal norms, but the extent to which those norms shift depends strongly on 
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historical experience.  The more civic a society, the more democratic and prosperous it 
likely will be. 
 Civil society in itself, however, is not sufficient to lead to democracy.  Contrary to 
Putnam’s emphasis on the value of civil society, other scholars warn that there is nothing 
inherently good about such freedom.  Civil society is a neutral space in which people 
create the organizations they wish.  As such, there is plenty of room for anti-democratic 
or corrupt forces.  The key to ensuring that civil society is conducive to democracy is 
transparency of procedures which should reflect democratic values.  In other words, the 
institutions of civil society need to conduct themselves internally in ways consistent with 
democratic values of fairness, accountability, openness, and respect for the rule of law.  
These are all elements that lead to the development of a democratic political culture.      
 Democracy is a complex mechanism of many interacting pieces—the rule of law 
establishing clear written laws that are enforced through an independent judiciary, 
representative government chosen through free and fair elections with universal suffrage 
of adults, the free market, and civil society with non-governmental organizations and 
independent media.  A democracy must have the support of the people who demonstrate 
a democratic political culture valuing transparency, accountability, and respect for the 
individual and for the rule of law.  The established democracies have developed these 
attributes gradually over a long period of time.  The collapse of communism at the end of 
the 20th century presented unprecedented challenges to the potential creation of market 
democracies across 27 new states of the former Soviet sphere.     
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Paths to Sustainable Democracy
A consolidated democracy requires a strong state able to enforce its decisions, and 
strong social structures to hold the strong state in check.  While most can agree on the 
elements of an established democracy, there is a wide variety of opinion about how to get 
there.  Clearly, it is not a linear process of following certain steps.  There is much room 
for variance, missteps, and reversals on the way to democratic consolidation.  Some 
transitions to democracy have been initiated from the top, some from revolution from 
below, others through invasion and occupation.  Great Britain’s democracy came from 
evolutionary enlightenment and the development of civil society; the United States and 
France’s through violent revolution in the late 18th century; post- World War II Germany 
and Japan’s by imposition from conquest and, the countries of Central Europe and some 
of states of the former Soviet Union from grassroots initiatives.  Each of these paths, 
however, must lead ultimately to the necessary conditions described above including, the 
implementation of the rule of law with an independent judiciary that regulates activities 
and interactions among people and institutions and the creation of the free market to 
establish a middle class independent of the state.  Elections and political parties play a 
vital role in the development of a democratic political system.  Conventional wisdom 
among leading theorists suggests that democracy, in order to be consolidated, needs 
representative political and free market institutions and a robust civil society.  Because 
these necessary and sufficient relationships are so complex, many transitioning countries 
get stuck in a “gray zone,” as Tom Carothers (2004) calls it, between authoritarianism 
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and democracy.  Putting these pieces of democracy in place is not a smooth or easy 
process and there is no roadmap to show the way. 
 One key question about the transition to democracy is to what extent new 
democracies can benefit immediately from the two hundred years’ experience of the 
established democracies or whether they must go through their own evolutionary and 
often conflicted processes of democratization.  In other words, can they leap-frog to 
democracy, drawing on the institutions that established democracies have designed over 
time?  Or is the evolutionary development of democracy necessary for its consolidation?  
The answer depends on specifics of the country in transition.  The experience in Central 
Europe in the last 15 years suggests that those countries with a willing population and 
some past experience with democracy can draw on institutional designs available and 
implement them effectively in a fairly short time frame.   
 Some scholars suggest that there is a basic set of preconditions that are more 
conducive to democracy taking hold in a society.  Those conditions include: 
• a certain level of economic development and wealth that gives the people 
independence from the ruling political power; 
• some past experience with democracy, so it is not an entirely foreign concept; and  
• proximity to other states that are democratic, in other words, how democratic the 
neighborhood is. 
 
The relationship among democratic political institutions, the free market, and civil 
society is complex.  Many have asked whether one set of institutions should precede the 
other for a better chance of democratic consolidation. 
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Free market first 
 Dan Usher (1981) and Martin Wolf (2004b) emphasize free market institutions as 
the prerequisite for democracy.  Fareed Zakaria (1997) agrees that in the long run it is 
better to focus first on economic growth and leave opening up competitive politics for 
later.  The result of combining Western democracy with constitutional liberalism over the 
past fifty years has created liberal democracy, the democracy that everyone seeks to 
create.  However, too often, early political openness through elections can lead to an 
“illiberal democracy,” which displays only the façade of democracy while a small 
powerful group continues to control the economic resources to their own personal benefit 
and to the detriment of the rest of society.  More important than quickly opening the 
political process to elections is the more time consuming task of crafting an imaginative 
constitution that protects the rights of the individual and checks executive power (Zakaria 
1997).  The sequence of reforms, therefore, impacts the extent of democracy achieved in 
the end.   
Political reforms first 
 Many, like Larry Diamond (2003), put much more emphasis on the importance of 
political reforms, focusing first on the quality of governance and the need to remove 
dictators and their cronies from the political scene because they have a vested interest in 
maintaining the status quo, i.e., their power.  Free and fair elections can be a key first 
step.  The process continues with the granting shortly thereafter of civil liberties and 
political rights and creation of state institutions under rule of law and of civil society 
institutions that mediate between state and society.  Regular elections also serve to keep 
officials in check.  As democracies consolidate, the growth of an independent judiciary 
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becomes an important guarantee in which people can rely for protection against the 
arbitrary abuse of power by the state.  With emphasis on good governance, economic 
development will follow because the business climate will have improved and become 
attractive to investors.  
Civic tradition first 
 Robert Putnam (1993), stressing the impact of a country’s past experiences on its 
ability to develop a democratic system, suggests that the most important element for 
“making democracy work” is the civic tradition, including values such as cooperation, 
fairness, trust, and tolerance which he terms “social capital.”  For Putnam, the 
individual’s active participation in civil society builds interpersonal trust and a civic 
community, which influences the political and economic institutions that are created.  A 
strong civil society leads to a strong economy and a strong state built on interpersonal 
trust and connections (Putnam 1993, 176). 
Synthesis in institutions 
 Margaret Levi (1997) agrees that trust matters, but contrary to Putnam who 
focuses on the importance of interpersonal trust, she believes trust comes from 
institutions, which mediate between individuals and the state.  She has combined the 
focus on the role of institutions with the rational choice of individuals by looking at the 
tradeoffs made between the state and the people.  In other words, the incentive structure 
of institutions impacts how individuals will respond to the actions of the state.  Are the 
rewards promised by the state sufficient to elicit the consent of the individual?  In her 
view, the important feature is not trust between people but between individuals and 
institutions.  That trust is strongest in the democratic state where people create and work 
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through institutions to influence the state.  The institutions that people trust are those that 
are organized democratically themselves and thus seen as fair (Hanson et al. 2004).      
 Karen Dawisha (1997, 44) combines many of these elements, suggesting that the 
consolidation of democracy requires: 
• the “two-turnover test” where the group that obtains power in the first free and 
fair election loses the next election and turns over power peacefully and willingly 
to the election winners who in turn lose the next election and turn power over to 
those winners; 
• weak public support for parties who seek to thwart the advancement of 
democracy;  
• strong public commitment to values and norms of democracy; and 
• elite consensus about instituting democratic values and norms. 
 
Citizens also must accept the rules of the democracy game, which must be 
institutionalized, as legitimate and be willing to self-regulate their interests and actions 
for the good of democracy. 
Challenges in the transition to democracy 
 One of the critical factors in the sequencing of reforms is timing and acute 
awareness on the part of new leaders to the attitudes of the public.  The newly 
democratizing state, for example, must reduce socioeconomic inequalities, develop 
appropriate institutions to earn the support of the people, and encourage the emergence of 
a civic culture.  
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For elected officials, democracy is a tricky balancing act as they are held 
accountable by and to the citizenry to whom they must be responsive, and yet they need 
to be free enough to resist the pressure of special interests in society.  The early stages of 
a transition from an authoritarian regime are particularly challenging.  At the outset, 
executives may need more authority to make difficult economic decisions, but as 
democracy strengthens, executive authority needs to be replaced by impersonal 
institutionalized authority.  Maintaining exclusive executive powers that are too strong 
can undermine the consolidation of democracy.  Representative institutions must be 
designed as arenas in which to work out compromises, rather than relying on executive 
decree to continue to make decisions.  One of the problems with executive authority is 
that in new democracies, the independent judiciary is not developed sufficiently to 
provide adequate oversight for accountability. The leaders of the emerging democracies 
of the 1990s were under a different time constraint to construct a fully functioning 
democracy than were their predecessors—the established democracies.  The gradual 
evolution of democracy over time, as was the experience of the established democracies, 
was not an option at the collapse of communism.   
 In Eastern Europe, new leaders could not wait for economic forces to create 
conditions favorable for democracy.  Publics had real and heightened expectations that 
they would attain civil liberties and economic prosperity concurrently and in the short-
term.  In the face of these demands, new democratic leaders had to accelerate the 
evolutionary process of democracy by creating intentionally the political and economic 
institutions of a functioning democracy, thereby sustaining their political legitimacy in 
the eyes of their publics.  In other words, new democratic leaders had to demonstrate 
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economic gains in the short-term to help ensure the survival of democracy in the long-
term.  New democracies are potentially weak as they try to maintain the delicate balance 
between accountability and special interests.  Early in the transitions, expectations are 
high for the immediate benefits of democracy at a time when the necessary political 
culture to support democracy likely has not yet developed. 
 As authoritarian regimes come under pressure to reform, leaders of the established 
democracies are faced with the decision of how to respond.  They can decide that the 
internal politics of another country are not their concern; they can watch from the 
sidelines and let the non-governmental sector work through its channels or they can look 
for ways to work with authoritarian regimes to encourage peaceful change.  What is the 
responsibility and role of the established democracies in the process of democratization?    
Democracy Promotion as Foreign Policy
Increasingly over the last fifty years, the established democracies, particularly the 
United States, have pursued the spread of democracy as a foreign policy objective.  The 
unspoken assumption is that other states would do well to be “just like us,” i.e., a market 
democracy, because this would lessen the uncertainty in foreign relations.  It sounds 
deceptively straight forward, but the difficulty in meshing the necessary political and 
economic institutions to create a market democracy is extremely difficult.  It is 
particularly challenging, for example, to create the rule of law from a culture of non-
competition and corruption.   
 The first major effort at U.S. democracy promotion was the reconstruction of 
Germany and Japan after their defeat by the U.S. and the Allies in World War II.  This 
reconstruction was carried out under the European Recovery Program or Marshall Plan in 
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which the U.S. took the lead as the primary driver and funder for rebuilding Europe.  
Ronald Reagan made worldwide democratization a foreign policy objective in his June 8, 
1982, “Evil Empire” speech before the British House of Commons from which emerged 
the National Endowment for Democracy (NED).  Upon the disintegration of communist 
regimes across Eastern Europe at the end of that decade, the U.S. response was to support 
reform toward openness in the region.  As the countries of Eastern Europe reclaimed their 
sovereignty and the former Soviet republics declared their independence, U.S. efforts 
toward these countries became more deliberate to encourage the establishment of 
democratic institutions, a market economy, and the growth of civil society.  Since the 
1990s, U.S. government officials have pursued democracy promotion through high-level 
dialogue among state leaders, international trade agreements as a condition for loans and 
aid, and at a grassroots level through people-to-people exchanges. 
Understanding democracy promotion 
 Selecting appropriate methodologies and emphases for democracy promotion is as 
complex as understanding the linkages among the various components of democracy 
itself.  There was in 1989 and remains today no blueprint for democracy promotion 
policies to indicate which types of programs should be used under what circumstances.  
Over the course of the 1990s, however, understanding of democracy promotion as a 
foreign policy objective and the use of foreign policy tools like academic and cultural 
exchanges has evolved.  In the attempt to understand the process better, analysis of 
democracy promotion efforts pulls from the fields of foreign aid, diplomacy, and 
international relations and has become part of the development assistance field (Carothers 
2004, 3).  The key finding and point of consensus for those who study this issue is that 
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external actors, i.e., democracy promoters, can only do so much.  That frames the field of 
democracy promotion, tempers expectations of what can be achieved, and reconfirms the 
first condition of democracy that unless the people want it, democracy will not take hold.  
External actors who wish to promote democracy, however, can help set up the institutions 
of a free market, representative electoral system and civil society, and can seek to foster 
support for democracy where it exists in the population and introduce it where it does not 
yet exist.  External actors know what they want to accomplish, i.e., the establishment of 
liberal democracy, but how to do it is not so clear.     
The democratic peace theory 
 U.S. government officials across administrations and political parties have cited 
as a key rationale for supporting the development of democracy the democratic peace 
theory, which purports that democracies, in general, are more peaceable than non-
democracies.  The idea behind the democratic peace theory is that democracies are more 
prone to negotiation and less prone to violence.  Political scientists have taken different 
approaches to this argument, drawing on the work of Immanuel Kant who focused in the 
Enlightenment period on man’s use of reason and the choice of the individual to conduct 
himself morally.  From this idea of universal moral laws, R.J. Rummel’s (2001) on-going 
research concludes that democracies do not (or virtually never) make war on each other.  
Michael Doyle in the 1980s refined the theory to say that liberal democracies do not 
make war on each other.  Others have suggested that manipulating the set of what is 
considered a democracy can reduce the democratic peace theory to such an extent that it 
becomes meaningless.  Regardless of the theoretical distinctions, however, U.S. 
government officials have used the democratic peace theory to justify democracy 
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promotion in support of U.S. national interests and security. In their view, the more 
democracies there are in the world, the safer is the United States.  As a result, democracy 
promotion has been a component and, since the end of the Cold War, a cornerstone of 
U.S. foreign policy.              
Lessons from the Marshall Plan 
 The first major attempt of the U.S. government at democracy promotion was 
implementation of the Marshall Plan at the end of World War II with the reconstruction 
of the economies of defeated Germany and Japan and the establishment of a democratic 
political system in both countries.  With the European economy shattered, the U.S. 
economy suffered from loss of trade and there were growing fears of Soviet 
expansionism at the end of the war.  U.S. officials determined, therefore, that assistance 
to Europe was in the U.S. national economic and security interest. 
 Secretary of State General George C. Marshall charged the State Department’s 
policy planning staff to design a plan to assist the reconstruction of Europe.  What 
became known as the Marshall Plan required the European nations to devise an integrated 
plan, including the reconstruction of the German economy (Woods 1997, 15).  As a 
result, Congress passed legislation, The Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, which set 
forth the European Recovery Program (ERP) as a four year economic aid program, 
implemented strictly through national governments.  The goals of that first democracy 
assistance program were: 
• to create a strong production effort; 
• to expand foreign trade; 
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• to create and maintain internal financial stability; and 
• to develop European economic cooperation (Wexler 1983, 5) 
 
These goals were aimed at the overriding objective that within four years the 
European economy should be sufficiently strong not to need any special outside help, and 
that this could be accomplished only through deep cooperation among the Europeans 
themselves, not by relying on assistance from the outside.  Over the course of the four 
years, U.S. funds would diminish to be phased out completely by the end of the term.  In 
turn, the European countries needed to furnish “proof” that they were making economic 
progress.  Specifically, those countries would need to stabilize their currencies and 
balance their budgets to control inflation, as well as dissemble trade barriers among 
themselves toward developing a customs union.  Finally, the ERP required that Europe 
create an organization to carry out these steps (Woods 1997, 17).  In the immediate 
aftermath of the war, the Allies established international financial institutions, including 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, to provide such assistance in the 
future.  Since then, countries have come together as well in regional organizations such as 
NATO, the OECD, and the EU to support development. 
 While the Europeans were anxious to comply with the terms of the ERP, the U.S. 
Congress was not convinced that this support was critical to U.S. national interests.  The 
Truman administration explained its urgency in terms of the threat of spreading 
communism within Europe and relied on private U.S. citizens in the business community 
to help make the case that a strong Europe served U.S. purposes.  Interestingly, at the 
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passage of the legislation in April 1948, Americans tended to view and approve ERP as 
an act of humanitarianism, not in response to the communist threat (Woods 1997, 19). 
By ERP’s end in December 1951, the program had been a success for American foreign 
policy.  It offered several lessons for reconstruction of a market economy that would be 
replayed in U.S. efforts in Eastern Europe in 1989 such as the focus on currency 
stabilization, the need for balanced budgets, and creation of regional organizations to 
assist economic policy.  The Marshall Plan had little to offer in terms of creating 
democratic political institutions and culture from scratch.  The overarching lesson of the 
Marshall Plan is that the United States by itself could not transform a devastated region 
into a market democracy.  Under ERP, the U.S. relied on cooperation with and among the 
recipient countries.  By the end of the Cold War, the U.S. could turn to the other 
established democracies to coordinate the offering of assistance through partnerships 
between governments and non-governmental entities in the U.S., Western Europe, Japan, 
and again the recipients. 
Beware the double standard 
 One of the greatest challenges to democracy promotion is the risk of hypocrisy.  
For example, as the U.S. promotes free and fair elections, it needs to be prepared to 
accept the outcome of those elections, assuming they are, indeed, free and fair, even if its 
preferred candidate does not win.  The United States often is accused of saying one thing, 
but doing another, i.e., of holding some newly emerging democratic governments to very 
high standards of democracy while letting others get away with unacceptable, i.e., 
undemocratic, behavior.  This selective application of democracy promotion as a foreign 
policy tool and the appearance of a double standard risks discrediting the goal of 
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democracy as a universal standard.  It can be difficult for government officials to balance 
competing strategic interests.  For example, it is in the interest of the United States to 
promote the establishment and consolidation of democracy in the context of bilateral 
relations because democratic states tend to be more reliable partners, but it is also in the 
U.S. interest to secure access to energy resources or foreign territory to support military 
operations.  Such latter priorities often are pursued with less regard for the type of 
regime, e.g., democratic or authoritarian, that controls access to the energy resources or 
needed territory. In other words, the U.S. sometimes has not pressured authoritarian 
governments, which hold strategic value for the U.S., on standards of democracy and 
treatment of their own people.  The U.S. has been accused precisely of this double 
standard in its relations with Russia, not protesting strongly enough the Russian 
government’s violent actions against its citizens in the republic of Chechnya, as will be 
discussed in Chapter Three.  The U.S. has been accused of being soft on Russia at first 
for fear of undermining reformist President Boris Yeltsin and later for strategic purposes 
of access to energy and for Russia’s cooperation in the global war on terrorism. 
Good governance 
 Larry Diamond (2003) is a strong supporter of democracy promotion and, based 
on his governance first theory, believes that the first goal must be to remove authoritarian 
leaders from the scene and expose the people to as much information about their choices 
as possible.  Diamond asserts that the U.S. must take the lead to “build a culture of 
democracy—the understanding of its rules, possibilities, obligations, and limits, the 
norms of tolerance, civility, participation and mutual respect” (Diamond 2003, 13).  
Cultural change will happen through “economic development, increasing education, and 
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exposure to the global environment” (ibid., 13).  In order to build this democratic culture, 
donors should provide support directly to civil society actors, not to authoritarian leaders 
who then can postpone needed reform.  The policies of individual leaders make a 
difference because they can constrain development through bad decisions.   
 The world’s democracies must pursue a coherent, coordinated strategy to build an 
incentive structure for democracy, tie explicitly all foreign aid to good governance, and 
put authoritarian leaders on alert that they cannot continue to do as they please.  Good 
governance means developing democratic political institutions, respect for human rights, 
a free press, independent judiciary, and civil society.  Countries that pursue these 
objectives deserve to receive foreign aid.  Diamond recommends pursuing a strategy that 
supports democracy and good governance as the basis for development.  He concedes 
that “there is no one formula for getting to democracy or for structuring it institutionally 
so that it works reasonably well.  Different countries need different sequences, strategies, 
and structures” (Diamond 2003, 16).  Some countries will transition quickly, others much 
more slowly with setbacks along the way. 
 Martin Wolf (2004a) agrees and urges donors who wish to promote democracy to 
pay sufficient attention to what is happening inside the countries to which they are 
lending.  Too many projects are funded with little regard to their quality and too often 
loans can keep government leaders from making needed policy changes.  Some lessons 
for democracy promotion are that “policy changes could make a huge difference to 
economic performance. Such changes could be put into effect by relatively small teams 
of intelligent, motivated and well-disciplined individuals.  And most important of all, 
those changes could not be imposed from the outside” (Wolf 2004a). 
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Developing a strategy 
 Some analysts have complained that the U.S. government has been lured into 
democracy promotion “fads,” jumping from programs centered alternately on elections, 
civil society, rule of law, decentralization, and anticorruption, without pursuing a 
coherent strategy to democracy promotion.  Tom Carothers (2004) has written 
extensively about democracy promotion over the past decade, finding much to criticize 
about its practice in the U.S. government, but offering little to government officials on 
how to move forward.  For example, he claims that the practitioners of democracy 
promotion have been too wedded to the “transition paradigm,” which holds that countries 
moving away from authoritarianism are considered to be heading toward democracy.  
The path to democracy then proceeds in a series of sequences from the opening of 
political liberalization, to the breakthrough with the collapse of the old regime and the 
emergence of a new democratic system, and finally to the consolidation of democracy 
with the acceptance of the new democratic rules of the game, regularized elections, and a 
robust civil society—a very linear process.  In the transition paradigm, elections are 
considered the determining factor to bring further democratic progress.  In the transition 
paradigm, according to Carothers, the particulars of a country, such as its history, 
economic development and culture, are not considered major factors in the transition to 
democracy.  Carothers discredited the transition paradigm and posited his view that many 
countries, following the collapse of an authoritarian regime, get stuck on the way to some 
other system, not necessarily on the path to democracy.  Carothers recommends, 
therefore, that those in the business of democracy promotion need to examine separately 
each country in transition, crafting individual strategies that often require state-building, 
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putting in place first the foundations of a functioning state and economy. While I do not 
disagree with Carothers’ final conclusion, I take issue with his assertion that democracy 
promotion practitioners were wedded to the transition paradigm.  While that paradigm 
may have accurately described the assessment of the foreign policy establishment at the 
outset of the transition, it did not hold long as practitioners began adjusting expectations 
and timeframes as the genuine challenges to democracy building became apparent.  This 
will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.        
Customized assistance 
 After more than a decade of democracy promotion efforts in the former Soviet 
space, all agree that building democracy is challenging and extremely complex work.  
“Trying to help another society fundamentally change and improve its political life, 
whether through aid programs, diplomatic carrots and sticks, or any other approach, is 
tremendously difficult.  The principles of democracy are quite clear.  The processes for 
achieving them are not . . . There are no recipes or formulas that can be neatly applied by 
well-intentioned outside actors looking to help” (Carothers 2004, 262).  Democracy 
programs need to be designed in the context of the local reality and what the people on 
the receiving end say they need.  For this reason, democracy promotion programs have to 
be flexible and customized to fit the specific needs of a country.  To promote democracy, 
outside actors need to create expectations and raise the bar for assistance to policies and 
practices of good governance, to educate and inform the public to hold government 
accountable to standards of good governance, and to assist prosperity. 
 Promoting democracy requires a delicate and often uncertain balance between 
supporting individual reformers on the one hand and the process of reform on the other.  
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Being too closely wedded to an individual who falters can jeopardize the whole 
democratization effort, which must be institutionalized in the rule of law to be successful 
and lasting.  Yet, such institutionalization cannot take place without the commitment of 
individuals who are willing to take personal risks.  Democracy promoters need to support 
both individuals and processes.  There is nothing easy about creating, consolidating, and 
maintaining democracy.    
 The established democracies need to work in concert to think creatively about 
these competing demands, especially in a globalizing world that is changing dramatically 
how states may relate to one another.  This is a moment of looking to the future.  The 
relatively stable bipolar world, which lasted the fifty years of the Cold War, has given 
way to a much more complex international scene and global challenges that require 
nations to work together.  Rapidly advancing technology allows that connectivity as 
never before, across governments and more importantly, across peoples.  Larry Diamond 
(2003) has suggested that “we are on the cusp of a grand historical tipping point, when a 
visionary and resourceful strategy could—if it garnered the necessary cooperation and 
effort among the powerful democracies—essentially eliminate authoritarian rule over the 
next generation or two” (Diamond 2003, 1).  Noting that the most powerful nations, the 
United States and the members of the European Union, are liberal democracies, Diamond 
added, “There is no model of governance with any broad normative appeal or legitimacy 
in the world other than democracy [and] there is a growing international legal and moral 
momentum toward the recognition of democracy as a basic human right of all people” 
(Diamond 2003). 
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The U.S. government has chosen democracy promotion as a powerful foreign 
policy objective drawing on many tools across agencies to implement programs with the 
intention of developing the critical attributes of democracy around the world.  The 
remaining chapters of this study focus specifically on U.S. efforts to design and 
implement democracy promotion programs in Russia during the 1990s and the U.S. 
government apparatus to support those goals.    
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Chapter 2: The Birth of the Democratic Project (1989-1992)  
 Confusion, uncertainty, bewilderment, disbelief and euphoria—this mix of 
emotions accurately described the state of U.S. foreign policy in 1989 as the bipolar 
world that the U.S. national security establishment knew for 40 years disintegrated.6 The 
U.S. government was fundamentally unprepared and divided on how it should respond to 
the demise of communism.  As events unfolded swiftly in Eastern Europe, President 
George H.W. Bush kept an anxious eye on Moscow, while the U.S. Congress pushed 
vigorously to support the demands for freedom in Eastern Europe.  As it became clear 
that communism, indeed, was collapsing across the Soviet sphere, voices within the U.S. 
government united in calls to assist the transitions from communism to market 
democracy. 
 To explain the ultimate design of the U.S. assistance programs to the post-
communist countries, this chapter scrutinizes the most significant debates within the U.S. 
government as it crafted the Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989 
and subsequently the FREEDOM Support Act of 1992.  This analysis illuminates the 
goals and policies of the United States government in response to the disintegration of the 
communist threat and sets the stage for analysis in subsequent chapters on the 
effectiveness of the design and lessons learned about democracy promotion. 
The First Hints of Change
Shortly after General Secretary of the Communist Party Mikhail S. Gorbachev 
came to power in the Soviet Union in 1985, Soviet watchers in the U.S. government 
 
6 The United States had been singularly focused on containing communism, and, while not diminishing the 
pervasive threat of nuclear war during that time, the global environment had been relatively stable. 
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noticed at first a subtle, then marked shift in the approach of the Soviet leadership toward 
its citizens as it pursued new policies of glasnost (openness) and perestroika 
(reconstruction) to improve the standard of living in the USSR.  Glasnost introduced 
political reforms, giving Soviet citizens expanded opportunities to express their opinions 
and to participate in the political process through multi-candidate elections.  Perestroika 
allowed people greater involvement in the economy, which under Soviet plans had been 
centrally controlled by the communist party.  By the end of the decade, Gorbachev had 
renounced the Brezhnev Doctrine, which had declared Soviet supremacy over the 
countries of Eastern Europe, and made clear that he did not intend to rescue the 
communist regimes of Eastern Europe.  Citizens across the region rose up in protest and 
communist governments fell like dominoes beginning with Poland in spring 1989. 
 It is difficult to recapture the mixed sense of excitement and hopefulness among 
U.S. officials at the prospect that the Soviet threat might be diminishing and their fear 
and apprehension that the new openness might be just another Soviet ploy of deception.  
Decision makers in the U.S. government were faced with the challenge of interpreting, 
trusting, and deciding how to react to these dramatic changes after decades of pursuing 
the relatively clear policy of containment of communism.  During the 40 years of the 
Cold War, there had been thaws and earlier periods of détente in the U.S.-Soviet 
relationship followed by returning tensions so it was hard to tell at the outset how 
genuine or lasting was this shift under Gorbachev. 
 In the United States, the legislative and executive branches responded differently 
to events in Eastern Europe.  Broad, bipartisan support in the U.S. Congress called for 
assisting the East Europeans in their struggle for freedom as congressmen responded to 
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their constituents at home who had close connections with these countries.  Many in the 
Congress wanted to offer financial assistance to the people of Eastern Europe.  On the 
other hand, the executive branch, President Bush in particular, was extremely cautious, 
fearing a more hard-line Soviet reaction to events in Eastern Europe that could incite 
violence across the region.7 The executive branch stayed focused on the Soviet 
leadership and the personal relationship that Presidents Gorbachev and Bush had 
developed. 
A Cautious Executive
The White House was most concerned about how the Soviet leadership would 
respond to events in Eastern Europe where their Soviet comrades were losing power one 
after another.  In the past, unrest in Eastern Europe had been greeted with strong military 
crackdowns by Moscow and the arrival of Soviet troops, as had happened in Hungary in 
1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968.  The Bush administration took a “wait and see” 
attitude toward these changes in the Soviet sphere.  The President wanted to express 
support for reformers in Eastern Europe without alienating the Soviet leadership.  
Meanwhile, only six weeks before parliamentary elections, the Polish communist 
government allowed the trade union, Solidarity, to participate in those elections, turning 
the administration’s attention to Poland.       
 
7 The foreign policy leadership of the Bush Administration in 1989 was a tight, small group of 
professionals with the intimate involvement of President Bush, his national security advisor Brent 
Scowcroft, Secretary of State James A. Baker, III, and by the end of the term, Deputy Secretary Lawrence 
Eagleburger.   
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Envisioning a new world 
 In response to the unfolding events in Eastern Europe and Gorbachev’s ongoing 
reforms in the Soviet Union, President Bush undertook a series of five speeches in the 
United States over the course of a few short weeks in spring 1989 to put forth his vision 
for a “New World Order.”  The first speech on April 17, 1989, coincided with the 
successful completion of the Polish Roundtable Agreement between the communist 
government and Solidarity, led by Lech Walesa.8 In this speech, the President offered 
initial economic assistance to Poland in the form of trade, investment and debt relief, but 
not large sums of money.  At that time, the United States was running a large budget 
deficit with tight resources, which the President felt constrained what he could offer 
Poland.9
President Bush addressed U.S.-Soviet relations in his second speech, “Beyond 
Containment,” pledging that the U.S. would forge a new relationship on the condition 
that the Soviet Union fundamentally changed its economic and political system.10 The 
third speech focused on the future of Europe and fully supported the continent’s goal of 
unity.  President Bush took this opportunity to remind Europeans, that while Gorbachev 
was riding a high wave of popularity, the Soviet Union still had a long road of reforms 
before the Cold War could be considered over and the USSR no longer a threat.11 In his 
 
8 This speech was set in Hamtramck, Michigan known for its East European, especially Polish, population. 
9 The Office of Management and Budget had proclaimed, under President Bush’s guidance, that no new 
monies could be requested for such assistance and that funding for new initiatives had to be taken from 
other already existing programs.  In the President’s view, the U.S. did not have the funds at that time to 
offer much more than his initial package. 
10 Drafted by the NSC’s then Soviet expert, Condoleezza Rice, the speech delivered at Texas A&M 
University’s commencement exercises on May 12, 1989, stated that the U.S. would respond positively to 
Soviet moves for conventional forces reduction, pursuit of self-determination of the East European 
countries, cooperation with the U.S. on regional conflicts, particularly in Central and South America, and 
pursuit of political pluralism and the protection of human rights. 
11 The President delivered this speech on May 21, 1989, at Boston University’s commencement exercise. 
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fourth speech, the President addressed security issues in the post-Cold War period, stating 
“We are witnessing the end of an idea—the final chapter of the communist experiment . . 
. But the eclipse of communism is only one-half of the story of our time.  The other is the 
ascendancy of the democratic idea. . . . There is an opportunity before us to shape a new 
world. . . . [We want to see] a growing community of democracies anchoring 
international peace and security, and a dynamic free market system generating prosperity 
and progress on a global scale. . . .” (Hutchings 1997, 43).12 
The President’s capstone speech on May 31, 1989, in Mainz, West Germany, 
summarized the U.S. strategy for the post-Cold War era.  It began with the call for the 
U.S. to be “partners in leadership” with Germany, followed by the goal of a “Europe 
whole and free” which was to be the new mission of NATO.  Overall, the U.S. grand 
strategy sought a fundamental shift in how the East and West viewed one another away 
from the adversarial relationship of the past to one of a united, undivided Europe and a 
new transatlantic relationship.  This was the call for the Berlin Wall to come down to end 
symbolically the division of Europe.  Political and economic liberalization in Eastern 
Europe became the number one goal, while maintaining the role of the United States in 
Europe as vital to European security and U.S. national interests to balance Soviet power 
(Hutchings 1997, 47).  The U.S. approach toward the countries of Eastern Europe was 
 
12 Delivered on May 24, 1989, at the Coast Guard Academy’s commencement exercise, this speech was the 
object of some debate between Bush’s speechwriters and the NSC.  The first draft by the speechwriters was 
reportedly too filled with Cold War rhetoric for the President’s intentions, so was quickly rewritten by 
National Security Adviser Scowcroft who put military strategy in the context of maintaining deterrence at 
lower force levels. (Bush and Scowcroft, p. 55) Scowcroft explained that they “were shifting policy from 
the old and narrow focus on strategic arms control to a wider dialogue designed to reduce the threat of war 
and bring real peace—including progress in Eastern Europe, CFE (Conventional Forces in Europe), and 
regional issues” (Bush and Scowcroft, 55-56). 
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bound up in the conviction to re-unite Europe, bringing in East Germany and the other 
former satellite countries of the USSR. 
 The Bush administration based the “new world order” on the American values of 
democracy, free market, and the rule of law.  The development of this concept 
deliberately “combin[ed] the realist’s appreciation of the permanence of the power factor 
in world affairs with the liberal internationalist’s recognition that democracies make 
better partners than dictatorships in building a secure order.” This new order had at its 
core the Western democracies with an expanding circle of new democracies in which the 
“major powers calibrated and coordinated their actions with due consideration for the 
interests of all” (Hutchings 1997, 146).  It required strong international institutions like 
the United Nations and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) 
through which to coordinate international actions.  In this series of speeches, the 
executive branch made clear it recognized the profound changes underway, but its actions 
or lack thereof were still well grounded in Cold War thinking.   
Competing foreign policy objectives 
 While the Administration tried to respond somewhat positively to events in 
Eastern Europe, it also focused clearly on Moscow’s reactions to those events.  As 
President Bush set forth his grand strategy for the U.S. to end the Cold War, Secretary of 
State Baker added specificity to the cautious and realistic approach of the U.S. in forging 
a new relationship with the East.13 For the Bush Administration, the primary goal in 
 
13 In a May 4, 1989, address at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Secretary Baker described 
the administration’s hesitancy to trust completely the actions of the Soviet leadership. “The General 
Secretary [Mikhail S. Gorbachev] pledged that Soviet troops would leave Afghanistan on February 15, and 
they did.  He signed the INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] Treaty, and SS-20s are being destroyed.  
Last December, he announced unilateral troop cuts in Europe, and now we’ve seen Soviet tanks leaving 
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dealing with the Soviet Union in early 1989 continued to be the U.S. national interest of 
protecting U.S. citizens and territory against an adversary—the USSR.  There was a real 
sense in the administration of being pulled in two directions, wanting to help the East 
Europeans and fearing that Soviet “new thinking” was not genuine.  However, since 
Solidarity’s success in the Polish parliamentary elections on June 4 did not trigger a 
Soviet crackdown, the administration looked more seriously at how to provide assistance.  
While the President’s sights were on Moscow, other parts of the executive branch were 
involved intimately in events on the ground in Eastern Europe. 
 John Davis, who was the U.S. Ambassador to Poland in 1989, recalled in a 
personal interview the stream of visiting congressional and official delegations to 
Warsaw during that summer and fall when he received nearly all of the House of 
Representatives, 30-40 leading senators, and 14 cabinet members.  Ambassador Davis 
was a driving force for assistance to Poland, stressing in cables to Washington and to the 
visiting officials that Poland was doing everything the U.S. wanted and deserved 
substantial support.  Ambassador Davis was deeply disappointed by the President’s 
meager offer of assistance.  By June 1989, after Solidarity had won parliamentary 
elections and a free press was gaining strength, Ambassador Davis urged Washington to 
design an effective assistance package including provisions for debt reduction.  As 
Solidarity assumed control of the government in August 1989, Ambassador Davis felt 
that the U.S. had to do something meaningful and soon.  “We had spent $4 billion on the 
Cold War, which was won for us by the Poles for free.  They needed our help.”14 He 
 
Hungary.”  Yet, a few moments later, Secretary Baker stated, “We must all, I think, face the fact that the 
Soviets continue to pose a significant military threat to Western interests” (U.S. Department of State 
1989a).  
14 Interview with Ambassador Davis on May 5, 1999. 
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wanted to secure substantial assistance for Poland early on, sensing that the rest of 
Eastern Europe soon would be joining the assistance queue. 
 Shunning the traditional U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) 
approach to development assistance, Ambassador Davis looked for innovative and quick 
ways to make funds available to Poland.  As a result, Embassy Warsaw was the 
birthplace of the “Enterprise Fund” concept.  As originally conceived, the enterprise fund 
would support entrepreneurship and the private sector in Poland by funding small and 
medium-sized businesses, technical training, MBA programs, and a variety of projects 
that would help build up the private sector. 
 Critical to the enterprise fund concept was flexibility and the ability to get funds 
quickly into the hands of the entrepreneurs.  Initially, the designers hoped to be able to 
have the funds appropriated directly to a private board of directors that would manage the 
enterprise fund, thereby circumventing the volumes of governmental, specifically 
USAID, regulations that would delay implementation of the program, possibly by years.  
Because events were unfolding so rapidly in Eastern Europe, the idea behind the fund 
was to get the money quickly into the hands of those who were doing the ground work of 
building Poland’s private sector without micromanagement on the part of the U.S. 
government.  This meant that the U.S. government would have to be willing to take the 
risk of allowing considerable freedom to the entrepreneurs to design their individual 
projects as they deemed most beneficial to Poland’s needs on the ground.  This was 
indeed an innovative approach for U.S. foreign assistance.  According to Ambassador 
Davis, original designs of the enterprise fund portrayed it as an aid program without 
USAID, fearing that the agency’s bureaucratic regulations would bog down the effort to 
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move the money quickly.  The enterprise fund was a new semi-private arrangement 
where a private board of directors would manage U.S. government assistance.  
Ambassador Davis, stressing the importance of the private sector in the transition to a 
market democracy, thought such a program would appeal to Republicans on the Hill. 
 The enterprise fund was designed to be a gamble.  Ambassador Davis explained 
that the board of directors would accept 50 promising looking proposals of business plans 
and private sector investment, and even if only one or two of them turned out to be a big 
success, that would make a huge difference in Poland’s transitional environment.  He 
noted that it was impossible to tell in advance which of the 50 proposals may be the 
successes, but accepting such a risky proposition made sense because the transitions 
underway in Eastern Europe were unprecedented.  There were no road maps or theories 
to guide U.S. assistance in fostering the transition from a centralized command economy 
into a market democracy. 
 Ambassador Davis shared this vision of the enterprise fund, developed with his 
embassy staff, with Senator Paul Simon (D-IL) during the Senator’s visit to Poland in 
July 1989.  The Senator was enthusiastic about the concept and instrumental in pushing it 
forward.  Together, late at night in the Ambassador’s residence, the two of them drafted 
what would become the SEED legislation.  
 The concept of the enterprise fund, initiated in the Executive Branch, was popular 
with Congress and ultimately became an institutionalized part of the U.S. assistance 
packages to the post-communist world, but not without some changes.  The first tranches 
of enterprise fund money indeed were transferred directly to the Fund’s board of 
directors, but not without objections from USAID.  The agency worked hard to convince 
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the Congress and the Board of Directors that circumventing the traditional aid 
mechanisms meant deleting the protections and guarantees inherent in USAID run 
programs.  The original idea of taking a risk with enterprise funds was squelched and 
enterprise funding, as all other SEED funding, would be appropriated through USAID.  
With USAID involvement, the board of directors had to report on its activities and 
progress every six months for USAID review and approval in Washington.  Ambassador 
Davis explained that, technically, when posted abroad in an Embassy, the Ambassador 
has authority over USAID personnel, but, often in practice, the USAID personnel on the 
ground tend to stand back, and leave controversial matters to be resolved between the 
Ambassador and USAID/Washington. 
 According to Ambassador Davis, Poland’s Enterprise Fund was successful 
because, as the first one, it enjoyed the most robust funding, and because Poland had a 
cooperative environment with a legal structure and a competent pool of promising 
entrepreneurs.  He explained that the Poles had the political will to make the difficult 
choices and tough out the years of declining living standards before the turnaround.  The 
Polish-American community and its several noteworthy members of Congress, including 
Congressman Daniel Rostenkowski (D-IL) and Senator Barbara Mikulski (D-MD), 
provided critical support for the SEED initiative.  Throughout the Soviet period, the 
Polish-American community, supporting the Polish people and not the communist 
leadership, had been successful in obtaining P.L. 480 funds for Poland from the 1950s 
through the 1970s.15 From the mid-1950s, close contact between Polish-Americans and 
 
15 P.L. 480 was legislation passed on July 10, 1954, as the “Agricultural Trade Development Assistance 
Act” with the purpose of fighting hunger and malnutrition and providing sustainable economic growth and 
development.  Renamed the “Food for Peace” program by President John F. Kennedy, USAID ran the 
program (USAID 2004). 
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Polish citizens fostered considerable travel and emigration.  Solidarity’s win in June 1989 
was a huge psychological boost for the Polish-American community and its 
congressional members, in particular, who wanted to make sure the Polish experiment in 
democracy succeeded.  Solidarity’s victory was the catalyst in the decision for the U.S. to 
offer assistance to Poland and then to Hungary. 
 The President traveled to Eastern Europe in July as a signal of new policy support 
for reform there and to lay out for the new leaders of the region his vision for the future, 
as he had done at home in the five speeches in the spring.  His trip targeted first Poland 
then Hungary, both of which were moving fastest away from the Soviet sphere of 
influence.  The administration hoped that Poland would serve as the model for other bloc 
countries.  Pressure was mounting in the region for the U.S. to provide more tangible 
forms of assistance, and hopes were high that the President would reveal such in his trip.  
Severe budget deficits in the U.S., however, continued to constrain what he could offer.  
National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft lamented, “The days were over when the 
United States could pick up the check for everything: a new Marshall Plan was not 
possible.  Our resources had shrunk . . .” (Bush and Scowcroft 1998, 113). 
 In seeking to help Eastern Europe, the Bush administration felt that desired results 
would be accomplished best by focusing on the economy.  In July 1989, the President 
established the Polish-American Enterprise Fund, which ultimately would serve as a 
model for several other post-communist states, to provide start-up loans and technical 
assistance for new small- and medium-sized private businesses in Poland, a sector likely 
61
not to be targeted by the World Bank.16 In Poland, the President announced plans to 
reschedule the Polish debt of $39 billion, to request the World Bank make available $325 
million in new loans, and to provide “$100 million in U.S. funds “to capitalize and 
invigorate the Polish private sector” (Bush and Scowcroft 1997, 114).  In Hungary, he 
offered less: a $25 million Enterprise Fund, $5 million for a regional environmental 
center, and various U.S.-Hungary exchange programs.  The White House had a real 
dilemma.  It realized this package did not send a strong enough message of U.S. support 
for reforms in Eastern Europe where the administration wanted to be seen as a catalyst 
for democratic change, but the funding constraints and concerns about Soviet reaction 
remained. 
Pushing for more internal Soviet reform 
 Secretary of State Jim Baker realized increasingly that the policy of containment 
toward the East was becoming an ill fit as the threat posed to the U.S. by the Soviet 
Union clearly was diminishing.  He felt that the U.S. could have an impact on Soviet 
foreign and defense policy most by pursuing mutual advantages in arms control and 
regional conflicts.17 He warned against U.S. policy makers assuming that Soviet new 
thinking, if left to its own trajectory, automatically would fit with U.S. interests.  
Recognizing the important opportunity that Gorbachev and his new policies offered to the 
United States, Secretary Baker took the approach to put perestroika to the test.  As such, 
he searched for common interests between the two superpowers, focusing on the 
 
16 Bob Hutchings (1997, 63) described the small-medium sizes private business as the sector where U.S. 
assistance “could make the most difference.”  
17 Secretary Baker acknowledged the early calls of recognized U.S. scholars like Edward Hewett who 
stressed, “however strong Western feelings may be about the possible outcomes of this reform effort, 
Western policymakers should see that their ‘influence’ on this process can be no more than modest” (U.S. 
Department of State 1989b, 2).  
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reunification of Europe, regional conflicts in the Third World, nuclear and chemical 
weapons proliferation, and transnational issues like the environment, narcotics, and 
terrorism.18 
Most importantly, the Secretary presented his thinking on assisting reform in the 
East.  “We and our allies in Western Europe can offer help at three stages.  In the short 
term we can offer aid, especially food that can help to alleviate the immediate crisis.19 
Over the medium term, working through the IMF [International Monetary Fund] and 
other multilateral financial institutions, we can put together packages that combine 
monetary stabilization, structural reform, and effective debt management.  Over the long 
term, we can encourage and stimulate the creation of a private sector and conditions to 
attract private capital for the reconstruction of these economies.”  While these steps were 
indeed pursued in essentially this sequence, the time frame was startlingly collapsed.  
This approach, laying out actions for the short-, medium-, and long-terms, inferred the 
passage of some period of time.  The rapidity of events in Eastern Europe in 1989, 
however, suggested that the momentum of change in the communist countries would not 
fit such a gradual sequence of assistance. 20 
18 The U.S. would seek agreement with the USSR on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, which would 
require a drastic reduction of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe.  He gave special attention to German 
reunification.  “We have made clear our view that a Europe can never be whole or free if the so-called 
Brezhnev doctrine justifying Soviet military intervention against its Warsaw Pact allies continues to be a 
principle of Soviet foreign policy” (U.S. Department of State 1989b, 3).   
19 Leading up to its collapse in 1991, the Soviet Union faced increasingly severe shortages in its economy, 
particularly in foodstuffs.  Anders Aslund (1991) cited official Soviet data that “the general availability of 
basic foodstuffs (in both volume and kind) fell from 90 percent of demand in 1983 to 22 percent in 1989 to 
11 percent in the middle of 1990. 
20 Of particular interest in this speech is the Secretary’s emphasis on the U.S. alone supporting reform in 
Eastern Europe.  He wanted to be seen speaking as well for the allies of the United States.  Likewise, the 
administration expected to rely on the international financial institutions to play a significant role in 
assistance efforts. (U.S. Department of State 1989b, 3).   
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Secretary Baker spoke especially of the need for democratization within the 
Soviet Union.  “We believe the emphasis on the rule of law in the writings of the 
reformers is a positive step.  We are encouraging the Soviets to make permanent in their 
legal code and practice the protection of individual rights to which they subscribed in the 
Helsinki accord. . . .We are prepared to provide technical assistance in certain areas of 
Soviet economic reform.  The Soviets are entering uncharted waters, experimenting with 
markets, competitive enterprises, and realistic pricing, all of which we take for granted” 
(U.S. Department of State 1989b, 3.)  The administration was on the right track in 
focusing first on rule of law and market reform.  It was saying the right things, but not yet 
taking sufficient action in the view of the Congress.  
Congressional Designs to Promote Market Democracy 
While the executive branch was focused on its “new world” speeches and modest 
support to Poland, the U.S. Congress pursued ways to support the emerging new leaders 
and the increasingly vocal peoples of the communist countries of Eastern Europe.  
Support for encouraging the democratic reform efforts in Eastern Europe was widespread 
as congressmen added their sponsorship to numerous bills introduced from spring to fall 
1989.  Several similar bills were offered simultaneously, calling ultimately for a need to 
consolidate them into a coordinated package.  By the end of the 101st Congress, both 
houses had dealt with almost thirty bills targeting assistance to the East European 
countries.  Drafts of proposed legislation and expert testimonies set forth various 
suggestions of what the U.S. should do in its relations with Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union.  In the first initiative, Congressman Lee Hamilton (D-IN) introduced the 
“Democracy in Eastern Europe Act of 1989” (H.R. 2550) to provide assistance to Poland 
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and Hungary, the first of the 30 bills toward such efforts that led to the passage on 
November 28, 1989, of the Support for East European Democracy Act of 1989. 21 Unlike 
the administration, the idea of a Marshall Plan was not out of the question for the 
Congress (Schuerch 1994, 339). 
Seeking expert advice 
 Chairman of the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Senate’s Committee 
on Foreign Relations Joe Biden (D-DE) called on expert witnesses to testify about U.S. 
policy toward Eastern Europe. On July 26, 1989, Senators Robb (D-VA) and Murkowski 
(R-AK) heard testimony from Charles Gati of Union College, Karen Dawisha of the 
University of Maryland, Angela Stent of Georgetown University, former U.S. 
Ambassador to Czechoslovakia, William Luers, and Jan Nowack of the Polish-American 
Congress. One by one the experts shared their assessment of current events in the region 
and recommendations on how the U.S. should respond.  Charles Gati explained that the 
United States must proceed on the basis of the assumption that the radical changes 
underway in the Soviet Union, Poland and Hungary are for real.  The U.S. “clearly has a 
major opportunity to make at least a marginal contribution to the success of reform and 
democratization,” but that those changes are reversible or, could be arrested along the 
 
21 H.R. 2550 authorized assistance programs for Poland and Hungary including science and technology 
exchanges, medical assistance, and democratic institution building.  It explicitly called for the President to 
encourage privately administered educational and cultural exchanges between the United States and both 
Poland and Hungary, working through such organizations as the International Research and Exchanges 
Board, the Fulbright Educational Exchange Program, the National Academy of Sciences, and the U.S. 
Information Agency’s exchange programs.  This bill explained the intent of Congress that “the President 
should work with Western allies on a proposal for comprehensive economic programs for Poland and 
Hungary.”  H.R. 2550 was passed in the House on June 20, and referred on July 11, 1989 to the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations. Much of this language would appear ultimately in the SEED legislation. 
Sponsors of other similar bills included Tom Lantos (D-CA), Joseph Biden (D-DE), Richard Gephardt (D-
MO) and Dante Fascell (D-FL). 
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way.22 Reminding the subcommittee that Western policy toward economic development 
in the past had been based on pursuing economic and political development 
simultaneously or on economic development to pave the way for “a political institution of 
openness and democracy,” Ambassador Luers suggested that the situation in Eastern 
Europe demanded the opposite.  He felt that “political change is almost a prerequisite for 
sensible economics.  Those countries have to change dramatically before they can deal 
with their economic situation in ways that we cannot even conceive of today.”  He 
recommended that the U.S. have direct discussions with the Soviet Union to be sure that 
events proceeded peacefully in Eastern Europe.23 
Karen Dawisha offered the most specific set of policy recommendations to: 1) 
encourage the East European regimes to be accountable to their citizens for their actions, 
2) adhere to the rule of law and constitutional authority, and 3) allow greater pluralism 
and respect basic human rights as contained in Basket III of the Helsinki Final Act, 
utilizing the International Court of Justice in The Hague as arbiter.  On the security side, 
the U.S. should seek military balance at lower levels, encouraging the Soviets to pull 
their troops out of Eastern Europe and assuring them NATO would not build up or try to 
draw in those countries. She encouraged the U.S. to talk directly with the USSR about its 
 
22 In his written statement, Professor Gati emphasized the importance of how U.S. policy would be 
implemented in the region, especially through the selection of U.S. ambassadors and staff who serve at 
post.  “Our ambassadors and indeed our embassies play a vital role in American foreign policy.  Who is on 
the scene still makes a crucial difference.” He concluded on a note of “caution and encouragement:  Four 
long decades of mismanagement (and worse) in Eastern Europe will not go away in a few months or even a 
year or two.  We must be patient as well as persistent.  Those who tend to be impatient about or are unduly 
skeptical of the promise of democratic change in Poland and Hungary should remember that our own 
democracy took many decades to evolve” (U.S. Congress. Senate. 1989a, 47). 
23 Ambassador Luers stressed the challenge to the U.S. in dealing with these changes and the necessity of 
approaching the region differently than in the past.  In this regard, his strongest recommendation was to 
abandon the policy of differentiation between Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.  He urged U.S. policy 
makers to talk directly with the Soviet Union “on the subject of what we should do together to make sure 
that what happens in Eastern Europe, happens peacefully and for the good of those people” (U.S. Congress. 
Senate. 1989a, 49-52). 
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role in Eastern Europe.  On the economic side, U.S. policies should target those sectors 
pursuing privatization, make arrangements to include them in European economic 
mechanisms and foster creation of an international bank for East European development.  
Finally, she stressed the importance of the free flow of information and peoples, urging 
the U.S. to pursue expanded contacts between U.S. and East European citizens.  “In 
particular, educational exchanges will help to shape the attitudes of future elites, and are 
crucial for overcoming the psychological consequences of 40 years of mistrust” (U.S. 
Congress. Senate. 1989a, 3-5).24 Many of these recommendations appeared in the final 
legislation on East European assistance. 
 
Jan Nowak expressed his dismay and that of the Polish-American Congress as 
well as the East Europeans themselves about the lack of U.S. assistance.  He asked the 
Congress to think about the “right balance between the military and non-military means 
of achieving our main goal, the reduction of the Soviet military threat.”  He urged the 
Senate to redistribute funds to Poland and East Central Europe from high-technology 
military weapons programs (U.S. Congress. Senate. 1989a, 59).  The bottom line for 
these non-governmental witnesses was that the U.S. needed to support actively the reform 
underway in Eastern Europe and to address this support directly with the Soviet 
leadership. 
 
24 Professor Dawisha explicitly incorporated the role of international organizations in her remarks, 
suggesting that the U.S. coordinate its approach to Eastern Europe with the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (now the OSCE), the European Economic Community (now the European Union) 
and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA).  The U.S, also should encourage the East European 
countries to join the IMF, World Bank and General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT).  Likewise, 
Angela Stent emphasized the need for West European involvement and initiative in helping the East 
European countries. 
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The U.S. Congress took up this task in mid-September-October 1989 with a series 
of legislative initiatives in both houses.  Senator Paul Simon (D-IL), who had pushed first 
for recognition and assistance to Poland, introduced S.1582 “to amend the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961 to provide for certain forms of assistance to Poland to ensure the 
success of freedom and democracy in Poland,” by replacing this decade-old language 
regarding assistance only to Poland with the new SEED language that added Hungary.  
This legislation included debt re-scheduling, food aid, stabilization funds, the 
administration’s enterprise fund initiative to develop the private sector, technical 
assistance, and exchanges.25 At the same time, Senator Alan Cranston (D-CA) 
introduced S.1641 “to promote political democracy and economic pluralism in Poland 
and Hungary by assisting those nations during a critical period of transition and abetting 
the development in those nations of private business sectors, labor market reforms, and 
democratic institutions; to establish through those steps, the framework for a composite 
program of support for East European democracy; and for other purposes.”26 
House proposals for East European assistance 
 Congressman Tom Lantos (D-CA) introduced H.R. 3307, “Support for East 
European Democracy Act,” calling for the Congress to take advantage of the new 
opportunities as the Iron Curtain was lifted in Eastern Europe.  He criticized the Bush 
administration for not doing enough to respond to those opportunities.  “Yet at this 
 
25 Senators Claiborne Pell (D-RI), Alan Cranston (D-CA), Thomas Harkin (D-IA), Harry Reid (D-NV), 
Charles Robb (D-VA), Howard Metzenbaum (D-OH), Alfonse D’Amato (R-NY), Donald Riegle (D-MI), 
Joseph Biden (D-DE), Bob Graham (D-FL), Paul Sarbanes (D-MD) and Frank Lautenberg (D-NJ) co-
sponsored S.1582 with Senator Simon (U.S. Congress 1989b, 25960.) 
26 On September 19, 1989, Senators Cranston (D-CA), Simon (D-IL), Mikulski (D-MD), Sarbanes (D-
MD), Robb (D-VA), Graham (D-FL), Lautenberg (D-NJ), Pell (D-RI), and Biden (D-DE) introduced this 
bill, which added the SEED Act to part 1 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended.  The bill was 
referred then to the Committee on Foreign Relations.  Its language was very close to what was passed 
ultimately as the SEED Act. 
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critical hinge of history, Mr. Speaker, the administration sounds an uncertain trumpet.  As 
the whole non-Communist world rejoices in the triumph of freedom and democracy over 
the forces of repression and totalitarianism, the administration shows an excess of 
caution, vacillation, temporizing and timidity, instead of seizing this historic 
opportunity.”  He urged the Congress to do better, to not let “this fleeting moment of 
opportunity pass us by,” and he made clear that the U.S. could not do this alone but 
needed to lead a multilateral approach to assisting reform in Eastern Europe. 27 
These many attempts at legislation came together under the guidance of House 
Majority Leader Richard A. Gephardt (D-MO) who organized an ad hoc group of House 
leadership and committee representatives to create a three year plan for assisting Poland 
and Hungary.  From the work of this group came the “Support for East European 
Democracy Act of 1989” (the SEED Act, H.R. 3402), totaling $930 million over three 
years and sponsored by Representative Dante Fascell (D-FL).  The many pieces of 
legislation that preceded H.R. 3402 allowed many different members of Congress to 
think about and express their views on changes in the Soviet sphere and how the U.S. 
should respond.  Across the board, members agreed that this was an historic opportunity 
and the U.S. had a limited window in which to respond.  Many feared that if the U.S. 
delayed its response and support to the region the window of opportunity to assist reform 
would close.   
 
27 On September 20, 1989, Congressmen Tom Lantos (D-CA), Stephen Solarz (D-NY), Meldon Levine (D-
CA) and Gary Ackerman (D-NY), referred H.R. 3307 jointly to the Committees on Foreign Affairs, Armed 
Services, Agriculture, Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, Education and Labor, Energy and Commerce, 
Public Works and Transportation, Science, Space, and Technology, and Ways and Means because the 
activities contained in the legislation were so wide-ranging, calling on the services of numerous federal 
agencies including the U.S. Agency for International Development, Environmental Protection Agency; 
Departments of Treasury, Labor, Defense, and State, U.S. Information Agency, Peace Corps, and others.  
This bill included provisions from the earlier bills: H.R. 2550, S.1582, and S.1641 and authorized $1.3 
billion in assistance to Poland and Hungary over three years (U.S. Congress.  House.  1989a, E3143).   
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H.R. 3402 was the key piece of legislation to come out of the House of 
Representatives on assistance to the region, allowing for the implementation of a wide 
variety of programs in Eastern Europe with most oriented toward economic approaches to 
democracy building.  It offered to the U.S. public an outline of specific goals for the U.S. 
to accomplish in its relationship with Poland and Hungary, as the primary models for the 
changes taking place in the communist world.  The legislation’s objectives were: (1) to 
contribute to the development of democratic institutions and political pluralism, (2) to 
promote the development of a free market economic system, and (3) not to contribute any 
substantial benefit to Communist or other political parties or organizations which are not 
committed to respect for the democratic process, or to the defense or security forces of 
any member country of the Warsaw Pact.28 
The legislation listed actions the U.S. should take to accomplish these goals 
including: 
 1) taking the lead in supporting loans to the countries from the international 
 financial institutions; 
 2) carrying out specific economic functions for currency stabilization, debt 
 reduction, agricultural assistance, technical assistance, Most Favored Nation 
 status, etc.; and   
 3) engaging in exchange activities, cultural centers, sister institutions, and 
 scholarships. 
 
28 The Warsaw Pact was the military alliance among the countries of East European and the Soviet Union, 
created in the post-World War Two period in defense against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO). 
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The Polish-American Enterprise Fund and the Hungarian-American Enterprise 
Fund were some of the more innovative programs in SEED with the aim to promote the 
development of the private sector in those countries.  U.S. government appropriations for 
these Funds were to be used for such activities as creating indigenous credit unions and 
modernizing telecommunications systems.  The legislation called on USAID to 
implement a technical training program for Poland and Hungary to enable them to 
develop market economies, using the Enterprise Funds as needed.  Many of the efforts 
spelled out in the legislation addressed trade measures, e.g., making available the services 
of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) to support projects in Poland and 
Hungary strengthening the private sector and reducing state involvement in the economy; 
and it authorized the Export-Import Bank to extend financial services to Poland and 
Hungary.29 
Finally, the legislation required the President to designate a SEED program 
coordinator within the Department of State and to report annually to Congress on the 
SEED program.  So far, this broad framework for U.S. assistance programs to the post-
communist world, with its emphasis on economic programs, tracks closely with the 
attributes of democracy as discussed in scholarly writings on the process of 
democratization.    
 
29 The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) is a development agency of the U.S. government 
devoted to economic development in new and emerging markets.  Its mission is to help U.S. businesses 
invest overseas and to support U.S. foreign policy in doing so.  (See http://www.opic.gov.)  The Export- 
Import Bank of the United States (Ex-Im Bank) is the official export credit agency of the United States to 
assist in financing the export of U.S. goods and services to international markets.  It enables U.S. 
companies to take advantage of export opportunities, generating sales and strengthening the U.S. economy 
through maintenance and creation of U.S. jobs. ( See http://www.exim.gov). 
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An invigorated Senate 
 Back in the Senate, Joe Biden (D-DE) urged his colleagues to move swiftly in 
approving S. 1582.  He called for bipartisan cooperation and emphasized the sizeable 
difference between the Administration’s funding level for assistance over a three year 
period and those of various congressional bills for the same period of time.30 S. 1582 
“outline[d] objectives and broad strategies, while allowing the executive branch to 
develop and implement specific plans of action and then to render, within a reasonable 
period, a comprehensive report on what it ha[d] and [would] be doing.”  The sense of the 
Senate in its debate was that if Poland and Hungary successfully reformed their political 
and economic systems, their experience would “change all of Eastern Europe” (U.S. 
Congress, Senate.  1989b, 25965-7).  The clear goal of the legislation was to develop the 
private sector in those countries and to assist the people of the region in securing their 
freedom.  The Senate was focused on the welfare of the people of Poland and Hungary as 
they made their break from Moscow and their Soviet dominated past.  Senator Cranston 
(D-CA), having led a delegation to Eastern Europe in August 1989, identified the benefits 
of assistance in terms of U.S. national security and the peace dividend that would derive 
from successful reform in the region.  “If democratic experiments in Poland and Hungary 
succeed, and military force levels and Warsaw Pact and NATO forces can be safely 
reduced, great savings, incredibly large savings, will ultimately ensue for the American 
taxpayer” (U.S. Congress.  Senate.  1989b, 25972). 
 
30 The Administration had requested funding for $463 million compared to the $640 million authorized in 
H.R. 3402; S.1582 was initially at $1.5 billion and amended to $799 million; and the Dole Bill was at 
$484.5 million.  
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The Senate, which was energized and enthusiastic about the turn of events in 
Poland and Hungary, wanted to respond positively to them.  Senator Cranston (D-CA) 
explained, “The President’s rhetoric has been in support of democracy but the reality of 
his program is that he does not come up with adequate funding for his very modest 
proposals.  Therefore, we had to act in Congress.”  He criticized President Bush for 
failing to lead or to be bold in supporting the sweep of democracy in Eastern Europe.  
Throughout the Senate discussions of S. 1582, members referred repeatedly to their deep 
commitment to democracy and freedom, and expressed their frustration with the 
executive branch for its lack of action.  Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) of the Senate 
Foreign Operations Subcommittee complained that the administration was reluctant to 
commit funds to peace, and was frustrated that the President had not responded to his 
plan to provide emergency food aid to Poland more than a month earlier.  The sense of 
discussion throughout the day was one of urgency in taking immediate advantage of this 
window of opportunity to promote democracy and freedom.31 Senator Edward Kennedy 
(D-MA) spoke pointedly, “The old order is changing.  The Iron Curtain is rising and the 
cold war is thawing.  The forces of freedom and democracy are gaining in every part of 
the Warsaw Pact. . . .Too much is at stake for us to fall short because our aim was not 
high enough.”  Further he asked, “How can an administration that wants to spend $300 
billion in defense against the threat of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact reject the 
idea of spending $1 billion in support of democracy in Eastern Europe?( U.S. Congress. 
Senate.  1989b, 25979-80).  Interestingly, Senator Rudolph Boschwitz (R-MN) declared, 
 
31 These were the voices of an impassioned Senate, speaking just 72 hours after Hungarian Speaker of the 
Parliament, Matyas Szuros, declared the independent and democratic Hungarian Republic.  They recalled 
that two world wars had started in this region; that the US had spent trillions of dollars during the Cold War 
protecting against the Soviet threat.  They did not want to risk losing the opportunity to diminish that threat 
and promote democracy and freedom. 
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“Clearly, the factor contributing to the success . . . for democracy in Poland, will be the 
ability of the Polish economy to make a transition from stagnation of the Communist 
system to free markets.  It is an interesting historic fact that democracy’s political rights 
have never existed without the coexistence of economic rights” (U.S. Congress. Senate, 
1989b, 26001.)  For many in the Senate, U.S. efforts to assist the development of 
democracy should be focused primarily on economic issues.   
The Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989 
 After several days of debate over a period of weeks, the Senate inserted the text of  
Senator Simon’s S.1582 into Congressman Fascell’s H.R. 3402 and proceeded with 
consideration of assistance to Poland and Hungary in that context.32 The resulting 
legislation provided more detailed explanations about what types of programs should be 
implemented to support the development of democratic and market institutions in Eastern 
Europe. 
 The intent of the Congress was “to provide cost-effective assistance to those 
countries of Eastern Europe that have taken substantive steps toward institutionalizing 
political democracy and economic pluralism” (U.S. Congress.  House.  1989b, 2).  In 
other words, countries that pursued democratic and market reform would be rewarded for 
their efforts through assistance from the United States.  As indicators to assess the 
standards for conditionality, the legislation spelled out the benchmarks for the 
development of democracy and pluralism in the objectives of SEED assistance which 
appeared initially in the Senate amendment to H.R. 3402 (November 16, 1989) and were 
 
32 H.R. 3402 was taken up in the Senate on November 14, 1989, with some proposed amendments.  The 
conference report issued on November 17, 1989, was accepted on that day by the House and on the 
following day by the Senate. 
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contained in the final legislation:  “The President should ensure that the assistance 
provided to East European countries pursuant to this Act is designed— 
(1) to contribute to the development of democratic institutions and political 
pluralism characterized by— 
 (A) the establishment of fully democratic and representative political 
 systems based  on free and fair elections, 
 (B) effective recognition of fundamental liberties and individual freedoms, 
 including freedom of speech, religion, and association, 
 (C) termination of all laws and regulations which impede the operation of 
 a free press and the formation of political parties, 
 (D) creation of an independent judiciary, and 
 (E) establishment of non-partisan military, security, and police forces; 
(2) to promote the development of a free market economic system characterized 
by— 
 (A) privatization of economic entities, 
 (B) establishment of full rights to acquire and hold private property,  
 including land and the benefits of contractual relations, 
 (C) simplification of regulatory controls regarding the establishment and  
 operation of businesses, 
 (D) dismantlement of all wage and price controls, 
 (E) removal of trade restrictions, including on both imports and exports, 
 (F) liberalization of investment and capital, including the repatriation of 
 profits by foreign investors, 
 (G) tax policies which provide incentives for economic activity and 
 investment, 
 (H) establishment of rights to own and operate private banks and other 
 financial service firms, as well as unrestricted access to private sources of 
 credit, and 
 (I) access to a market for stocks, bonds, and other instruments through 
 which individuals may invest in the private sector; and 
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(3) not to contribute any substantial benefit— 
 (A) to Communist or other political parties or organizations which are not  
 committed to respect for the democratic process, or 
 (B) to the defense or security forces of any member country of the   
 Warsaw Pact”  (U.S. Congress. House. 1989b, 3).  
 
Many congressional efforts in fall 1989 came together in the solidly bipartisan 
bill, the “Support for East European Democracy Act of 1989,” known as the SEED Act.  
The Senate passed and the President signed the SEED Act (Public Law 101-179) on 
November 28, 1989, with appropriations providing $659 million in loans, grants, and 
credit; making available the services of the Export-Import Bank and the Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation for businesses in Poland and Hungary.  Its objectives were to: 
 
• assist in the development and strengthening of democratic institutions; 
• assist in the transformation of centrally planned economies to market-
based systems; and 
• assist in improving the basic quality of life of these nations while they 
undergo economic restructuring and political reform. 
 
The bill “requires the United States to implement, beginning in FY 1990, a 
program to support East European democracy by providing assistance to Eastern 
European countries which have taken substantive steps toward institutionalizing political 
democracy and economic pluralism” (U.S. Congress. House. 1989b).  The SEED Act 
established the basis for U.S. efforts to promote democracy in the wake of collapsing 
communist regimes across Eastern Europe.  This legislation became the model for 
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assistance programs to follow in the region and it accurately identified and targeted the 
same benchmarks described in the scholarly community.     
The need to expand assistance 
 In the short time that the U.S. Congress focused on legislation to support reform 
in Poland and Hungary, communist regimes continued to unravel across the region.  On 
November 9, 1989, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) opened the Berlin Wall that 
had separated east from west since 1961 to allow its citizens to travel to West Germany.  
This was the symbolic end of the division of Europe.  Shortly thereafter Bulgaria 
replaced its communist leadership and the Velvet Revolution began in Czechoslovakia.  
Citizens in the Baltic states, which had been annexed by the Soviet Union in 1945, also 
began to demonstrate against their communist governments. 
 The communist leadership of the GDR relinquished its role on December 1, 1989 
and on December 3, Presidents Bush and Soviet President Gorbachev met to discuss the 
end of the Cold War.  While the revolutions in Eastern Europe had been peaceful 
throughout summer and fall of 1989, the overthrow of the communist government of 
Nicolae Ceausescu in Romania in December was violent, ending with the execution of 
General Secretary Ceausescu and his wife on December 25.  By the end of the month, the 
Velvet Revolution had succeeded in Czechoslovakia with the election of Vaclav Havel as 
president.  With the collapse of the East European communist regimes throughout the 
region, the U.S. Congress worked during the first six months of 1990 to expand the 
original SEED legislation to include assistance to the other countries of the region.   
 The U.S. Congress had viewed assistance to Poland, the most populous and the 
first of the East European countries to overthrow communism, and Hungary as the model 
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for later aid to the other East European countries in transition.  The need was clear for a 
SEED II to be provided to the rest of Eastern Europe.  The Bush Administration realized 
it needed to take a much more active role working with the Congress to design assistance 
programs. 
Early lessons from SEED I   
 Senator Claiborne Pell (D-RI) introduced S.2040 as the “Support for East 
European Democracy Act of 1990” or “SEED II” to expand the size and scope of the 
original legislation to include Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, 
Romania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia and to extend on a limited basis those SEED 
programs appropriate to assist the establishment of democratic institutions and a market 
economy in the Soviet Union.33 The short experience to date with the original SEED 
legislation had demonstrated that the programs could not keep up with the pace of change 
in these countries.  This new legislation, therefore, allowed the Executive Branch 
“unusual administrative flexibility” to respond to the rapidly changing circumstances in 
the region.  The original SEED legislation had been much more specific about what kinds 
of programs would be conducted where.  The main objectives of the original legislation, 
as stated above, remained in place.  Importantly, S.2040 acknowledged the creation of the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) as a critical source of 
financing for economic development in the SEED countries and called for the U.S. to 
 
33 Senator Pell (D-RI) cosponsored this bill on January 30, 1990, with Senators Biden (D-DE), Cranston 
(D-CA), Dodd (D-CT), Kerry (D-MA), Simon (D-IL), and Moynihan (D-NY), one day after President 
Bush had submitted his FY 1990 budget request with $300 million targeted for Eastern Europe.  Senator 
Pell instead requested $511 million as an “effective response to the revolutionary developments in Eastern 
Europe” (U.S. Congress. Senate. 1990b).  Later that spring, Senate Jesse Helms (R-NC) submitted an 
amendment to S.2040 to prevent any aid to the Soviet Union because it had not moved forward 
aggressively with economic reform and continued to devote large amounts to military spending.  He stated 
that the President also did not want to send aid to the Soviet Union (U.S. Congress. Senate, 1990d, S6258).  
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participate fully in its leadership and funding.34 It stipulated that the U.S. also would 
urge IMF membership for these countries.  The new legislation allowed the President to 
confer most-favored-nation (MFN) trade status on SEED countries “that have 
institutionalized free emigration and taken substantial steps to establish free political and 
economic institutions” (U.S. Congress. Senate. 1990, Sec. 308).  The intent was to 
stimulate normal trade relations between the U.S. and the East European countries, 
including a relaxation of restrictions on exports of high technology.  The refrain became 
“trade, not aid.”  These countries needed a strong private sector that was better developed 
through foreign investment rather than foreign aid. 
On the political side, S.2040 allowed for urgent material and technical assistance 
for the democratic election process to political parties, citizens committees, independent 
media and other organizations involved in the elections in Eastern Europe.  In addition, 
the legislation provided sustained support for the transition to democracy through the 
National Endowment for Democracy and its grantees.  These funds would support: 
(1) institutes for democracy; 
(2) training centers for legislators, judges, and their secretariats; 
(3) regional centers for educating citizens about the workings of democracy; 
(4) long-term support for nascent political parties and citizens committees 
committed to democratic practice, except that no funds shall be spent to support 
existing Communist parties; and  
(5) centers to provide advice and assistance to newly created print and electronic 
media organizations regarding the proper role of a free press in a democratic 
society (U.S. Congress. Senate. 1990a, Sec. 502)35 
34 The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development opened in April 1991 to provide loans to the 
Central and East European countries to assist their transition from a centrally planned to market economy 
and to promote private activity in those economies.  Its first loan was to Poland, a founding member, in 
June 1991.  Countries of the region joined the EBRD, which then developed economic strategy plans with 
them to implement market reform.   
35 The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) is a nonprofit, nongovernmental, bipartisan, grant-
making organization created in 1983 to help strengthen democratic institutions around the world.  Congress 
provides an annual appropriation for its work to encourage democratic political development in three major 
areas—pluralism; democratic governance; and education, culture, and communications.  (National 
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Senator Cranston (D-CA) explained that, “The United States has an urgent need—
a compelling national interest—to promote the process of peaceful change underway 
today in Eastern Europe.  U.S. spending priorities must reflect this need.  . . . While we 
must maintain a stable conventional and nuclear deterrent, new global realities oblige us 
to shift our priorities. . . . to nurture the seeds of democracy” (U.S. Congress. Senate. 
1990b).  He proposed to his Senate colleagues to finance S.2040 from the Department of 
Defense budget and added, “Our goal must be the development of democratic societies 
with market-oriented economies in a stable environment.  Our policy, therefore, must be 
both broad and flexible . . . .  we must reject a piecemeal approach that would stumble 
forward on a case by case basis . . . and must be flexible enough to respond quickly to 
needs and events as they arise” (U.S. Congress. Senate. 1990b).  
Senator Cranston clearly set forth the priorities and conditions for U.S. assistance: 
• to support those countries working to hold fair elections through electoral 
and educational assistance when they are planning upcoming elections—
such funds to be channeled through experienced organizations like the 
National Endowment for Democracy (NED), which was already on the 
ground and operating in Eastern Europe; 
 
Endowment for Democracy. 1998).  S.2040, Section 502 also called on the experience and expertise of the 
Association of Former Members of Congress which “could potentially, under current circumstances, play a 
highly constructive role in advising governments and organizations in Eastern Europe on electoral and 
legislative procedures of constitutional democracy.”  Section 604 set forth that the Secretaries of State and 
Commerce shall assess the personnel and material needs of U.S. embassies, consulates and trade centers in 
the SEED countries in terms of meeting the requirements of the legislated programs.  Finally, Section 707 
called for a report on circumstances and needs in the Soviet Union and whether they warranted U.S. 
assistance under SEED. 
80
• to work with U.S. allies in a comprehensive multilateral effort to assist 
economic reform in these countries; and 
• to assess security and  trade issues in the region in light of the collapse of 
the Warsaw Pact.36 
On February 7, 1990, Senator Dole proposed his version in S.2094, “The Eastern 
European Democracy and Free Market Act of 1990.”  It extended U.S. assistance to the 
countries of Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia, but with no mention of the Soviet Union, in 
order that they may join the international community as democratic, self-reliant, and 
economically secure countries.  The legislation’s primary purpose was to promote 
democracy by fostering political pluralism and establishing the rule of law allowing 
individual liberty and respect for private property and to encourage free market systems 
with sound environmental policies.37 It, too, provided the President flexibility to pursue 
assistance programs as deemed appropriate to events in the region. 
The objective of promoting democracy centered on: 
 “(A) the ability of all citizens to organize and associate freely and independently 
 of government; 
 (B) the ability of all citizens to speak and travel freely; 
 (C) the right to choose freely one’s government, to hold that government 
 accountable, and to participate in political life; 
 (D) the full observance of internationally recognized human rights; and 
 (E) the growth of indigenous nongovernmental organizations which are 
 committed to democratic values and active in the promotion of pluralism” (U.S. 
 Congress. Senate. 1990c). 
 
36 S.2040 never made it out of the Committee on Foreign Relations for consideration on the House floor.  
Senator Pell’s legislation was only the first of another series of bills throughout the winter and spring of 
1990 seeking to expand U.S. assistance to Eastern Europe. 
37 U.S. assistance under S. 2094 would be conditional on these countries’ seeking political pluralism 
through free and fair elections; economic reform toward a market economy; respect for human rights 
including the right to emigrate; and willingness to build a friendly relationship with the United States. 
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This legislation was a bit more specific than earlier versions about what kind of 
democratic support to promote, i.e., democratically elected legislatures and local 
governments, independent judiciaries and unions, indigenous non-governmental 
institutions and professional associations, and independent and pluralistic media.  The 
goals and tools to be used for promoting market economy mirror much of what had come 
earlier in the original SEED legislation – pursuit of macroeconomic stabilization, creation 
of financial institutions, extension of MFN and offers of technical training.38 
Getting the economics right 
 On February 8, 1990, the House Committee on the Budget, chaired by the 
Honorable Leon Panetta (D-CA), convened an important hearing on “Foreign Assistance 
to  Eastern Europe,” drawing on the expert testimonies of Dr. Edward A. Hewett of the 
Brookings Institution, Ambassador Rozanne Ridgway of the Atlantic Council of the 
United States, and Professor Jeffrey Sachs of Harvard University.  Even though this was 
held on the House side, many of its points of discussion were later evident in various 
pieces of Senate legislation submitted over the next few months.  This hearing elicited the 
expert analysis of some of the most influential political and economic scholars of the 
time.  Emerging from this discussion was the clear idea that these countries were 
suffering from an antiquated infrastructure and capital stock and lacking a strong 
pluralistic and economic tradition, neither of which could be created painlessly or 
quickly. 
 
38 The level of funds proposed under S. 2094 matched the Bush Administration request of $300 million.  It 
restated the necessity for effective coordination of assistance programs within the U.S. government and 
among its allies.  As did S.2040, S.2094 stalled in the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. 
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Ed Hewett stressed that the whole region needed restructuring and that reforms to 
accomplish this would result in high unemployment, requiring the creation of a safety net 
and retraining for workers.  He told the committee not to expect stability in the region, 
but to be prepared for the high turnover rate of governments, a process that would act as a 
safety valve for discontented workers.  He put forth an optimistic scenario whereby real 
economic reforms would be enacted, followed by tight fiscal policies, that ultimately 
would attract foreign capital and growth; countered by the pessimistic scenario where 
politics drowns out economic reforms, detracts foreign capital, and nationalist 
demagogues arise pushing out economic concerns.  Hewett called for the U.S. to put as 
much effort into supporting economic reform in Eastern Europe as it had in opposing 
those countries when they were under communist domination.39 
Dr. Hewett was well-respected in government and intellectual circles as a voice of 
reason and clarity.  In his presentation to the Budget Committee, he stated, as he did often 
during the early post-communist period, that the west knows how to run a market 
economy, but not how to create one, especially to replace institutions antithetical to 
market ones.  For those countries pursuing such reforms, however, he stressed the need 
 
39 Hewett was concerned in early 1990 that the U.S. assistance effort already was languishing, and urged 
that the U.S. government “create a body staffed by individuals whose sole responsibility is to conceive of 
and implement a policy toward Eastern Europe and work with our allies to see that that policy is as 
effective as possible.  This might be an organization within the executive branch . . . more likely would be 
an organization that would be bipartisan, between the executive branch, Congress, and the private sector.  It 
would have a small staff of professionals, guided possibly by an advisory group composed of prominent 
Americans” (U.S. Congress. House. 1990a, 5).  The task of this group would be to devise a U.S. assistance 
strategy, including sending American Ph.D. candidates in economics to Eastern Europe to teach basic 
introductory courses, to build an economic profession where none existed.  In his written statement for the 
record, Dr. Hewett elaborated that “we need a separate, identifiable institution to focus on coordinating our 
policy towards Eastern Europe.  Without in any way taking away from the efforts of Deputy Secretary 
Eagleburger and the many people working with him on East European aid, it just is not enough.  We need 
someone with the full-time responsibility to conceive of a coherent approach to this region, and with the 
authority to implement such a policy.  . . . at this extraordinary turning point in history it is woefully 
inadequate to rely on ad hoc committees chaired and staffed primarily by people with a multitude of other 
duties” (U.S. Congress. House. 1990a, 60). 
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for leaders to put in place unemployment benefits and retraining opportunities.  He noted 
that a Marshall Plan would be counterproductive, that the U.S. was not contributing the 
magnitude of resources it had in the post-World War II period, and that Western Europe 
was sufficiently strong to handle the financial risk of assisting its East European 
neighbors.  He warned against the Soviet disengagement from Eastern Europe and the 
impact this would have on their economies, given their reliance on Soviet energy and the 
volume of trade within the former communist bloc.  He urged the Budget Committee to 
think about other potential demands on U.S. resources that Baltic independence or a 
confederated Soviet Union, with potentially several independent republics, would 
present.  He concluded that the main goal of U.S. assistance should be to help develop in 
Eastern Europe markets that could attract private capital and foreign investment, noting 
there were some measures the U.S. could take quickly in this regard like extending most-
favored-nation trade status and eliminating quotas which restrict trade.  Hewett urged that 
U.S. assistance provide emergency food supplies, direct investment in infrastructure, and 
training and exchanges opportunities.  He stressed that Eastern Europe had an educated 
labor force that needed to be retrained. 
 Ambassador Ridgway presented a different emphasis “look[ing] beyond 
traditional programs” to cultural and educational exchanges to take up a real opportunity 
to increase the U.S. presence in Eastern Europe.  She noted “one of our best exports is 
our people” (U.S. Congress. House. 1990a, 20).  She estimated that the U.S. would have 
to be engaged actively with a serious presence in these countries for a decade and a half.  
She called for more people to be on the ground running exchange programs.  She 
reminded the Committee that the U.S. knew from its own historical experience that 
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building a democracy required working from the ground up and that, over a period of two 
hundred years’ participation, U.S. citizens had learned to accept compromise and make 
accommodation because in a democracy one does not always win.  Those skills needed to 
be learned in Eastern Europe where leaders and publics had to build a political process 
that could provide “good candidates running sound campaigns that produce results that 
are credible for a population” (U.S. Congress. House. 1990a, 21).  She agreed with Ed 
Hewett that the Marshall Plan approach was not appropriate to Eastern Europe where she 
saw the challenges as so much more complicated.  Under the Marshall Plan, the U.S. had 
rebuilt economies that had previous experience with the market where there was a 
tradition of investment, banking, and industrial management.  None of that existed in 
Eastern Europe in the immediate post-communist period.  She defined the situation in 
Eastern Europe as a unique and complex challenge for the U.S.  “If you ask me which 
comes first, [democratic political] institution building or the economy, you would like 
them to proceed together, but believe me, I think the political institutions have got to be 
strong and ready for the shock of tough economic programs” (U.S. Congress. House. 
1990a, 31). 
 The final testimony came from Jeffrey Sachs who made clear his belief that the 
U.S. simply was providing neither sufficient resources nor leadership in the assistance 
effort to Eastern Europe.  For him, supporting reforms in the region was clearly in the 
self-interest of the United States, and the key to success of those reforms was free trade.  
He urged the U.S. to provide more money, emergency food aid, technical assistance of 
auditors and accountants, debt relief, and an easing of export restrictions.  In his view, the 
U.S. must help create the economic structure in those countries that would allow U.S. 
85
businesses to invest.  He stated that the U.S. must participate in the newly created East 
European Development Bank and the west must let those countries out of “debtors’ 
prison.”  He anticipated three to four years of a difficult transition process, at the end of 
which there should be working market economies, though they would still be heavily 
oriented toward the state sector and the process of privatizing state assets would continue 
for a long time into the future.  He focused particularly on the issue of debt as the most 
profound barrier to future growth in the region.  When Congressman Frenzel (R-MN) 
asserted that Europe should take the lead in assisting East European reform and the U.S. 
play a supporting role, Sachs strongly objected saying that the U.S. must take the lead 
because it is in the country’s self-interest.  “. . . by being by far the richest country in the 
world and having enormous self-interest in simply commercially if nothing else in having 
our businesses operate there, we will just lose out if we give up all markets of the world 
to everyone else and say we are too tired to really play much of a role” (U.S. Congress. 
House. 1990a, 50).  He called it “stunning” that the U.S. could not come up with $1 
billion, one-tenth of one percent of GNP, to assist these countries in their reform efforts.  
He added that the European Community is “not yet a foreign policy instrument, and the 
United States is the only country that really has global experience in financial 
restructuring in the last 30 years of taking leadership roles in the financing side” (U.S. 
Congress. House. 1990a, 51).  Many of these expert recommendations appeared in the 
proposed legislation for an expanded SEED program. 
 On March 22, 1990, Senator Joseph Lieberman (D-CT) introduced S.2325 as the 
“Eastern European Economic Reconstruction Act,” which sought to establish an “Eastern 
European Economic Strategic Planning Commission” to devise a long-term plan for U.S. 
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assistance to Eastern Europe, utilizing both the public and private sectors in the U.S.  The 
Commission was to be composed of 14 members, a combination of public servants and 
private citizens some appointed by the President, others by the Congress, and 
representing business, academia, and local government.  The purpose of the Commission 
was to assess existing U.S. government programs that could benefit the countries of 
Eastern Europe and the particular needs of each of the countries.  It would design U.S. 
assistance programs in the context of international financial institutions’ and other 
countries’ activities.  The legislation also proposed to create “The Eastern European 
Foundation,” to provide support for small- and medium-sized businesses in the region 
through grants and technical assistance and to help build market economies there.  The 
Foundation would be run by a Board of Directors composed of nine private citizens.   In 
addition, S.2325 sought to establish an East-West Center for Economic Transition 
attached to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), to 
coordinate assistance efforts of the organization to Eastern Europe.  The legislation 
stipulated that payments from the Soviet Union to the U.S. for the lend-lease debt were to 
be contributed to the OECD Center and used for a scholarship fund for graduate and post-
doctoral students from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union for study of democracy and 
free market.40 It called for the Enterprise Funds established under the original SEED 
legislation to focus especially on the development of small- and medium-sized business 
in Poland and Hungary.41 
40 The U.S.-Soviet World War II Lend-Lease Agreement of 1942 stipulated that the U.S. would provide 
military material and equipment for the USSR to pursue its war against Hitler; the USSR in return would 
not provide that material to a third country without the consent of the U.S. president.  Soviet payments to 
the U.S. ceased during the Cold War, but resumed under Gorbachev.   
41 S.2325, as the earlier bills, remained within the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 
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As with the original SEED legislation, the House of Representatives 
simultaneously pursued its own versions of expanded assistance and discussions on the 
state of reform in the countries of Eastern Europe.  Since much discussion had focused on 
the detrimental impact of debt on prospects for East European reform, Representative 
James Leach (R-IA) introduced on March 28, 1990, H.R. 4410, the “Democracy Defense 
Initiative Act” to amend the SEED Act of 1989 to authorize the reduction of official debt 
owed to the U.S. Government by any East European country meeting certain reform 
criteria.  Those criteria were the same used in other pieces of legislation concerning these 
countries, namely:  1) political pluralism and economic reform; 2) respect for human 
rights; and 3) a willingness to build a friendly relationship with the U.S.  The bill 
recognized that the “external debt of the region has been increasing at an accelerated pace 
through 1989 [and that] the United States interest in institutionalizing democracy and 
building market-oriented economies in the region is jeopardized by the financial 
instability associated with high indebtedness and low economic growth” (U.S. Congress. 
House. 1990b. Section 2. Findings)  It called on the U.S. to take a leadership position 
among western creditors to “negotiate, on a case-by-case basis, reductions of official debt 
and official debt service owed to such governments by eligible Eastern European 
countries, provided an international financial agreement . . . is in effect . . .” (U.S. 
Congress. House. 1990b., Section 6 (c) Debt Reduction).42 
Representative Fascell (D-FL) sponsored H.R. 4445, “Emerging Democracies Act 
of 1990,” a multi-faceted bill to authorize assistance for emerging democracies in Eastern 
Europe and Central America, to enact foreign assistance authorization legislation, and to 
 
42 H.R. 4410 was referred jointly to the House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs and the 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs where no action was taken on it. 
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authorize appropriations for the Peace Corps, State Department, and U.S. Information 
Agency. It amended the original SEED legislation to extend SEED benefits to all East 
European countries meeting specified conditions, exactly those cited above, and added 
the objective of the United States “to facilitate the reintegration of the East European 
countries into the community of democratic nations and to end the artificial division of 
Europe,” by providing assistance to governments and private individuals, and to foster 
U.S. commercial activity there (U.S. Congress. House. 1990c, Sec. 2).  Many of its 
directives were assigned to the U.S. Agency for International Development to support 
private sector development, target capital projects, and to establish a “Free Enterprise 
Corps” to provide technical assistance to private enterprises in Eastern Europe.  It 
amended specific provisions of the original SEED legislation for the Organization for 
Private Investment Corporation and other trade programs; declared that the U.S. 
Information Agency Director should establish a program to provide fellowships to U.S. 
citizens for assisting Eastern European countries in acquiring skills of a democratic 
political system and market economy; called for USAID to provide scholarships for East 
European students to study at American institutions of higher education in Europe; urged 
the President to assign more Foreign Service members to Eastern Europe; and notably, 
permitted authorized funds to be appropriated by the annual Foreign Operations, Export 
Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act. 43 
In the end, the Congress did not pass separate legislation to extend assistance to 
the rest of Central and Eastern Europe and added them through the authorization process 
of the original SEED legislation.             
 
43 Introduced on April 3, 1990, the bill was referred the same day to the House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, where it was combined with H.R. 4610, also sponsored by Representative Fascell, as the 
“International Affairs Authorization Act of 1990.” 
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Executive Catch-Up
While the Congress was working in winter 1990 through many discussions and 
pieces of legislation on how to assist and encourage continued reform in Eastern Europe, 
the Executive Branch was better defining for the American public its understanding of 
democracy in the region.  On February 10, 1990, Secretary of State James Baker 
appeared in Moscow before the International Affairs Committee of the Supreme Soviet in 
Moscow, which, through multi-candidate lists, had been genuinely elected for the first 
time by the Soviet people.   
 Secretary Baker presented to the Supreme Soviet his understanding of its role as 
an elected representative body; “. . . a working legislation embodies the basic values of 
democracy: sanctity of the individual; respect for those with different beliefs; the 
supremacy of the rule of law as reason’s triumph over arbitrary rule in political life; and 
the right of the people to determine their fate through their freely elected representatives.  
The free exchange of ideas in an open, public legislated debate tempers political passions 
and encourages the solution of society’s problems through dialogue, not through force.  
In this way, and through its critical oversight function, a legislature holds the government 
accountable to the people” (U.S. Department of State Dispatch, September 3, 1990, pp. 
20-21).  This passage made clear the expectations of the Bush Administration for future 
developments in the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev.   
 Baker explained that in the U.S. the Congress held him, as Secretary of State, 
accountable to the American people.  He repeated strongly that he and President Bush 
wanted perestroika to succeed in the Soviet Union.  He again described U.S. relations 
with the Soviet Union as a search for points of “mutual advantage” through dialogue, 
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rather than the confrontation of the past.  The U.S. wanted to work with the USSR on 
several points: 
• Ending the unnatural division of Europe and creating in its place a Europe that is 
whole and free.  Baker said he would like to see the Supreme Soviet support the 
U.S. suggestion that delegations from the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) be sent to observe the elections in Eastern Europe 
to ensure legitimately elected governments there. 
• Seeking political, not military, settlements to regional conflicts around the world.  
Baker condemned continued Soviet assistance to Cuba and Nicaragua, and noted 
the scrutiny with which the U.S. Congress oversees U.S. foreign assistance 
spending. 
• Controlling nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons through ongoing work on 
START, CFE, and other arms control treaties. 
• Sharing U.S. experience in rule of law, especially on the protection of individual 
rights and institutionalizing pluralist political institutions. 
• Moving toward a market-based economy. 
• Finally, he urged that the U.S. and USSR to put behind them the legacy of 
confrontation and build a new relationship based on cooperation. 
 
Talking to the American public 
 For the Bush administration, 1990 was a very uncertain period.  Gorbachev was 
removing Soviet troops from the region as democratic governments emerged across 
Eastern Europe, but there was no guarantee this trend would continue or that the 
transition would be stable.  In a press conference on March 3, 1990, President Bush 
identified the enemy as “uncertainty, unpredictability” (Bush 1990a).  To counter this 
uncertainty, the President continued to support the presence of U.S. troops in Europe and 
strive for a unified Germany in NATO.  When asked whether he would favor reduction of 
foreign assistance to such traditional recipients as Egypt and Israel, in favor of Eastern 
Europe and others, President Bush noted that he wanted flexibility in providing foreign 
aid.  He spoke out against “earmarking” in congressional budgets, the practice whereby 
Congress identifies a certain amount of funding to be spent for a specific purpose, rather 
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than allowing the implementing agencies to make such determinations.  The President 
wanted the executive branch agencies to be free to direct funds where needed in response 
to trends moving in a democratic direction in a particular country.  He wanted the 
executive branch to have the capability to move quickly on its own to provide assistance 
in a timely manner.   
Beyond containment 
 By winter 1990, the Bush Administration realized that it could no longer distance 
itself from the wave of democratization sweeping Eastern Europe.  The Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union (CPSU) agreed in February 1990 to give up its monopoly on power 
and to withdraw Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia.  Talks on reunification between the 
Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic began in winter 
1990.  In March, Lithuania declared its independence from the USSR, but the Soviet 
Union did not accept it.  Gorbachev was elected president of the Soviet Union on March 
15.  Events across the region were fluid and change happened quickly.  While the 
President remained attentive to Gorbachev, Secretary Baker laid out the administration’s 
thinking on support for democracy.  In a speech to the World Affairs Council in Dallas, 
Texas on March 30, 1990, he identified the promotion and consolidation of democracy as 
the new mission of the United States and eloquently expressed his view on the value and 
power of democracy.  The birth of new democracies around the world presented U.S. 
foreign policy the opportunity to pursue its values and interests simultaneously.  He 
shared the following five observations about democracy.   
• Democracy combines individual rights with individual responsibilities.  
The individual is the essence of democracy under the motto, “Trust the 
people.” 
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• Democracy brings political legitimacy because it infers the individual’s 
consent to the rule of democratic governance.  This consent is reaffirmed 
through regular, free and fair elections.  Democracy is characterized by 
the rule of law, which protects the rights of individuals and the tolerance 
of diversity.  Majority rule must uphold minority rights.  The democratic 
system benefits from “renewable legitimacy” in that it has the capacity for 
self-correction.  Baker presented his vision of the democratic peace theory 
that “free peoples cherishing democratic values are unlikely to go to war 
with one another.” 
• Democracy does not stand alone and needs economic progress and 
security to be sustainable.  “War and poverty are the great opponents of 
democratic rules, democratic tolerance, and individual rights.”  Economic 
progress depends on the freedom of the workplace and the freedom to 
own property.  “Only a strategy that buttresses democracy with economic 
reforms and greater internal security will transform the revolutions of 
1989 into the democracies of the 1990s.” 
• American foreign policy must reflect democratic values.  This is a new 
approach that combines idealism with realism, using the power of the 
United States to spread democratic values and to do good. 
• Democracy promotion is a “force multiplier” that can rally international 
action.  The U.S. could not and should not promote democracy alone.  It 
must work in concert with its allies.  This was not the time for another 
Marshall Plan.  In the 1940s, the U.S. had the resources to “rebuild 
friends” and turn enemies into friends.  A success of the Marshall Plan 
was that, in 1990, the U.S. could turn to those same friends for help in 
dealing with the world’s problems.      
 
Backing up earlier contentions that U.S. resources were limited, Secretary Baker 
suggested that training, advice, and sharing experience “count for more than money.”  As 
such, the U.S. would concentrate on support for free and fair elections; reducing arms and 
armies; and building the free market through private sector development.  He explained, 
“We are tying our assistance to our values and showing how our values can be of 
assistance.  Our support is to be measured by a single test: whether it advances 
democracy and economic liberty.”  Democracy promotion served both American values 
and American interests and was a valuable objective for diplomacy.  Baker noted that 
democracy in the Soviet Union would be the best guarantee that the USSR would play a 
constructive role in the world.  Democracy as a universal aspiration meant trust the 
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people, have confidence in the individual everywhere, not just in certain countries.  “U.S. 
foreign policy must build on that confidence to build a newly democratic international 
society” (State Department 1990a, 22).44 
Active support for East European reform 
 President Bush focused on the new world of freedom in Eastern Europe in the 
commencement speech at the University of South Carolina on May 12, 1990.  He 
addressed the deep scars of the Soviet legacy from 40 years under communist rule when 
all laws and courts were for the benefit of the state, the communist party and its leaders.  
In the wake of this legacy was an absence of trust in post-communist societies, especially 
in institutions, and among citizens as well.  He asserted that the human spirit had 
managed to survive in Eastern Europe, and that an underground civil society had emerged 
to take the reins of government.  He offered America’s help to them to secure their new 
freedoms and become part of Europe “whole and free.”  The key would be the 
establishment of the rule of law.  “We’ve got to help the emerging democracies build 
legal systems that secure the procedural rights that preserve freedom and, above all, a 
system that supports a strict equality of rights, one that guarantees that all men and 
women, whatever their race or ancestry, stand equal before the law” (Bush 1990b). 
 In this speech, he announced four new initiatives for the U.S. to support 
democratic development in Eastern Europe: 
 
44 I have detailed this speech because it so clearly shows how the executive branch was thinking about the 
profound changes in international relations and its understanding of democracy promotion as a foreign 
policy objective.  While the U.S. Congress was engaged actively in drafting legislation to support reform in 
Eastern Europe, the Administration was trying to adjust its response in the context of Soviet security 
concerns.  Contrary to the criticism aimed at President Bush during this period for this cautious approach to 
the East European revolutions, the Administration understood the need to support democracy, but was torn 
on how to do so.   
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• to continue economic assistance, the Export-Import Bank would provide Poland 
new credit guarantees for purchasing machinery, technology, and services from 
U.S. suppliers; 
• to help assure free and fair elections with international observers; 
• to broaden the mandate of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
to monitor human rights, including free elections, political pluralism, and the rule 
of law; and 
• to strengthen the foundation of free society through the newly created Citizens 
Democracy Corps. 
 
The Citizens Democracy Corps (CDC) was designed to support democratic and 
free market change in Eastern Europe by mobilizing the volunteer resources of the 
American private sector.  This was done in response to initiatives in the U.S. private 
sector, which had stepped forward to offer assistance to the countries in transition in 
Eastern Europe.  As a result, the President supported the creation of this new center to 
promote these activities and match them with requests for assistance from Eastern 
Europe.45 The Bush administration found its democracy promotion voice in winter and 
spring 1990.  At the highest level of the foreign policy establishment, public statements 
identified all the appropriate attributes of democracy, including rule of law, plural 
political institutions, free and fair elections, market economy, and civil society.  The 
administration knew what they wanted to see in Eastern Europe.      
 
45 The CDC acted as an information clearinghouse for U.S. private volunteer assistance programs for 
Central and Eastern Europe with an information base of technical services and equipment.  It received 
requests from individual countries in the region for assistance in such areas as constitutional law and 
parliamentary procedures, English-language training, journalism, broadcasting and publishing, public 
health and medical support; market economics, banking, and financial services; business law, commercial 
practices, and agriculture; and environmental protection.  The U.S. needed such an organization because 
the needs of Eastern Europe in 1990 were substantially different from those of Western Europe in 1947.  
Then, the U.S. needed to rebuild the physical infrastructure that had been destroyed by war in countries that 
already had the entrepreneurial expertise, economic infrastructure, and democratic institutions and practices 
to restart their economies and societies quickly.  Those assets simply did not exist in Eastern Europe and 
the U.S. needed to help build them. 
95
Juggling competing priorities 
 President Bush’s comments on events in Eastern Europe often were couched in 
the context of other foreign policy priorities whether relations with the Soviet Union or 
with NATO.  In a May 3, 1990, news conference held in the White House Briefing 
Room, the President attributed the denouement of the Cold War to the strong partnership 
between the U.S. and its European allies in NATO and affirmed that NATO would 
remain vital to America’s role in the new emerging Europe.  He suggested that NATO 
needed to take on new challenges, specifically undertaking the political mission to 
manage and stabilize the changes underway in Europe.  In his view, democracy was on 
the move in Eastern Europe under its own momentum and the U.S. and NATO were 
responding to those changes.  He absolutely made clear that the U.S. would remain 
engaged in Europe and that Europe remained a top U.S. foreign policy focus.   
 One of the most sensitive issues for the President to consider was the call for 
independence within the Baltic republics of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, which had 
been a particular point of disagreement in U.S.-Soviet relations for decades.46 President 
Bush would not take a strong stand on supporting Baltic independence, instead calling 
repeatedly for dialogue between Moscow and the Baltic capitals.  He referred, for 
instance, to Lithuania as “an enormously complicated problem” (Bush 1990b).  While he 
cared about Lithuania’s freedom and self-determination, he was concerned also about the 
continuing and peaceful evolution of democracy throughout that part of the world and did 
not want to risk a Soviet crackdown.  The President did not see a role for the U.S. in 
mediating between Moscow and Vilnius.      
 
46 The United States never recognized officially the Soviet annexation of these territories in 1940. 
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As the Congress increasingly called for shifting funds from the Defense 
Department budget into foreign aid for Eastern Europe, President Bush responded that he 
and Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney wanted to keep sufficient money in the Defense 
budget to respond to a changing world.  President Bush suggested that he be given a 
discretionary fund out of the foreign aid total to accommodate “a person that is trying to 
take his small country and firm up its democracy” and he expressed concern that 
“Foreign aid doesn’t have the constituency out there that domestic programs do” (Bush 
1990b).   
Secretary of State Baker appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
on June 12, 1990, to demonstrate that the administration was engaged with the Soviet 
leadership and making progress on key points in the relationship and on issues crucial to 
U.S. national security.47 He stressed the need for a truly bipartisan foreign policy to 
respond to the dramatic changes of the previous year.  He restated the administration’s 
support for Gorbachev’s policy of perestroika as a move toward more constructive Soviet 
foreign and defense policies, and ultimately a more democratic Soviet Union.  He 
recounted what the administration had done with the Soviets in the first half of 1990, 
working toward “points of mutual advantage.”  First, the administration supported the 
reunification of East and West Germany and its place in NATO, and was working for 
Soviet acceptance of this position in the context of Soviet security concerns.  Second, the 
U.S. continued to deal with the Soviet government on arms control where the objective 
was “to enhance strategic stability and predictability and to preserve deterrence at lower 
levels of arms and with less risk of either misunderstanding or miscalculation.” The third 
 
47 Interestingly, on this same day, the Russian parliament declared its independence from the Soviet Union.   
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area concerned regional conflicts, namely in Africa and Central America, and the final 
point was on U.S.-Soviet trade, tied to the free emigration of Soviet Jews.  This was a 
tricky balancing act for the President as he sought to continue his support to and 
friendship with Gorbachev, while at the same time supporting the process of democracy 
and freedom in Eastern Europe as it broke away from Soviet rule (State Department 
1990e). 
 
Attention in the U.S. government shifted dramatically with the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait on August 2, 1990, and the executive branch devoted its energies throughout the 
fall to building an international coalition of forces against Iraq.  The Bush administration 
engaged closely with its Soviet counterparts on this major security issue.  The disturbance 
in the Middle East, however, did not slow the rapid change underway in Eastern Europe.  
Following lengthy international negotiations, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) 
was incorporated into the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) accomplishing the 
reunification of Germany on October 3, 1990.48 On that day, the GDR became the first 
former communist state to join NATO, even though the Soviet Union had opposed it 
adamantly.  Pressures within the Soviet Union were mounting with hardline disapproval 
of Gorbachev’s policies and actions, acquiescing to a united Germany in NATO and to 
growing demands for independence in the Baltic states.49 A united Germany in NATO 
 
48 Throughout spring and summer 1990, relevant parties were engaged in negotiating the Two Plus Four 
Agreement with would allow for German unification.  The Two were the GDR and FRG and the Four were 
France, the UK, the U.S. and the USSR, which renounced their claims to German territories as provided at 
the end of World War II.  Secretary Baker was a key player, negotiating personally with Gorbachev and 
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze during the Washington Summit in May 30-June 1, 1990, to get them to 
accept German reunification and its place in NATO as it chose. (Baker 1995, 251-2).  
49 Lithuania had already declared its independence and Moscow threatened economic embargo.  Secretary 
Baker pressed for peaceful dialogue between them, (Baker 1995, p. 245). 
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was a particularly hard sell to the Soviet people because of the lasting pain of World War 
II. 
Supporting Gorbachev 
 As people across the USSR became emboldened by Gorbachev’s policy of 
glasnost to speak their minds, the planned Soviet economy suffered from falling 
production and strikes.  President Bush announced initial assistance to the Soviet Union 
to meet immediate food needs and help with economic reform, the first steps to include: 
• waiving the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Trade Act of 1974, making 
the Soviet Union eligible for export credit guarantees provided by the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture to purchase U.S. agricultural products; 50 
• sending a team of experts on food distribution and marketing to the USSR 
to improve the food marketing system; 
• extending medical assistance through U.S. public-private cooperation to 
provide pharmaceutical and basic medical supplies; and 
• proposing a special association of the USSR with the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank giving it access to economic and 
financial expertise. 
 
The President’s intention with this assistance was to move the USSR toward becoming a 
full and prosperous member of the international community (State Department 1990b, 
331).  
 This was a tenuous time in the Soviet Union with growing divisions between the 
center and the republics and between reformers and hardliners.  While the Soviet 
leadership was willing to let the countries of Eastern Europe go their own way, it was 
much less tolerant of such freedom for its own autonomous republics.  At the moment the 
Bush administration finalized coordination of a coalition attack against Iraq, Soviet 
 
50 The Jackson-Vanik Amendment requires that non-market economies must provide for freedom of 
emigration if they wish to have normal trade relations with the United States.  The effect of the Jackson-
Vanik amendment was to secure during the Soviet period the right to emigration for thousands of Soviet 
Jews, evangelical Christians, and Catholics. 
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troops landed in Vilnius, taking over a key television station and subsequently attacking 
Lithuanian citizens who had protested, killing 15 of them.  The troops, however, were 
acting on orders of lower level commanders, not Gorbachev, leading many to worry 
about Gorbachev’s hold on power and the stability of the large and powerful Soviet state.  
The Bush administration needed to send a signal to the Soviet leadership that the actions 
in Lithuania were reprehensible at the same time it needed to keep the USSR on board for 
the attack against Iraq.  Again, the administration, forced to work within these 
constraints, was criticized for being too closely tied to Gorbachev and not forceful 
enough in condemning the attack on Lithuania.             
Explaining U.S. foreign policy goals 
 With the successful execution in early 1991 of Operation Desert Storm against 
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the administration’s FY 1992 foreign assistance request 
centered on five foreign policy challenges: 
• promoting and consolidating democratic values, including free and fair elections 
and respect for human rights; 
• promoting free market principles and strengthening U.S. competitiveness; 
• promoting peace by defusing regional conflicts, pursuing arms control and non-
proliferation; 
• protecting against transnational problems like terrorism, narcotics, and the 
environment; and 
• meeting urgent humanitarian needs. 
 
Secretary Baker proposed five mechanisms the administration intended to use to promote 
this agenda: 
• “more flexible and integrated bilateral assistance authorities,” which would 
allow the administration to transfer funds more easily across accounts.  He 
stressed that world events were moving quickly while resources were severely 
constrained by the budget deficit. 
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• more creative use of multilateral channels like the international financial 
institutions and the United Nations;  
• more “responsibility-sharing” with global partners like the European 
Community, the Organization for European Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), and Japan. 
• “more creative use of trade and investment policies” to promote U.S. interests; 
and a more active diplomacy (State Department 1991a).51 
Lessons learned about democracy promotion. 
 This testimony in support of the FY 1992 budget request reiterated several goals 
and themes that had emerged in the Bush administration’s approach to support for reform 
in the communist world—with particular emphasis that, contrary to the post-World War 
II experience of the Marshall Plan, the U.S. would not go it alone this time.  Other 
countries and international and regional institutions would play significant roles in 
supporting and aiding reform.52 Newly introduced was the idea of flexibility, a lesson 
learned from the short experience to date with the SEED program.  The administration 
did not want the Congress to micromanage the exact amount of funding by activity and 
country, leaving the implementers of assistance programs the freedom to move funds to 
program accounts as opportunities arose within countries to assist reform.  Events were 
 
51 Secretary Baker appeared before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the House Appropriations 
Committee on May 22, 1991 to set forth the Administration’s foreign assistance plans for FY 1992.  He 
gave similar testimony on June 12, 1991, before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and Other 
Programs of the Senate Appropriations Committee, where he explained that the physical status of the U.S. 
Embassy in Moscow was a critical issue in US-Soviet relations.  The partially constructed new American 
Embassy had been stalled for years in stalemate between the U.S. and USSR over security concerns that the 
facility had been compromised, i.e., bugged, by Soviet construction workers.  A fire in the old embassy had 
made it unworkable and Secretary Baker made clear that before the U.S. could undertake serious support 
for Soviet reforms, the embassy issue had to be resolved.  He pleaded for congressional support in the form 
of funding to complete the construction of the new building.   
52 An example of coordinating with regional actors came soon thereafter when Secretary Baker addressed 
the Council of Ministers of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) on June 19, 
1991.  He called for the organization’s help in fostering economic prosperity across Europe, as “an 
essential part of building durable democratic institutions.” He encouraged the CSCE to work closely with 
multilateral economic institutions like the OECD, World Bank, IMF, EBRD, and European Community.  
He called for all members of the CSCE to open up their markets to Central and East European and Soviet 
trade--forcing the Europeans to deal with sensitive trade issues of steel, textiles, and agriculture.  Further, 
he called for each member of the CSCE to provide direct bilateral and technical assistance to promote 
competitive private sectors in the transitioning countries (State Department 1991b. 464). 
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moving too quickly in the region to tie up funds by trying to predict where they may be 
needed.   
 Secretary Baker well appreciated the difficult road of building democracy, and 
sought to strengthen efforts in the U.S. private sector to assist the transitions.  He called 
on U.S. media organizations to help build independent media in Central and Eastern 
Europe by providing materials like newsprint, computers, satellite dishes, and fax 
machines, and financial assistance to sustain independent media until it could become 
self-sustaining; by helping build the legal structure to protect the media’s independence; 
and by training journalists to report objective facts, not ideologies (State Department 
1991b, 464). 
Accelerating change in the Soviet Union 
 On June 12, 1991, citizens of the Russian Federation elected Boris Yeltsin as their 
first president.  In a somewhat awkward moment for President Bush, he met on June 20, 
1991, with Yeltsin as the newly and first democratically elected President of the Russian 
Federation, while seeking to maintain official and close working relations with still 
Soviet President Gorbachev.  One month later, Presidents Bush and Gorbachev met for 
an important summit in Moscow on July 30, 1991.  The goals of this summit were to 
normalize economic relations between the U.S. and the USSR and to overcome fifty 
years of mistrust and Cold War animosity between the two countries. 
 By the time Presidents Bush and Gorbachev met in Moscow, the Supreme Soviet 
had lifted restrictions on free emigration, which in turn allowed President Bush to offer 
most-favored-nation trade status to the USSR.  He also supported “special association” 
status for the USSR with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.  During 
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the summit, President Bush reiterated that Soviet treatment of the Baltic states remained 
an obstacle to improving U.S.-Soviet relations, and he urged Gorbachev to pursue 
peaceful negotiations with the Baltic leaders.  He condemned Gorbachev for his 
continuing aid to Cuba, especially in the face of his request for Western assistance, and 
urged the Soviet leadership to reduce military spending overall.  Soviet aid to Cuba was a 
real obstacle for the U.S. in offering aid to the USSR.     
 In a speech to the Moscow Institute for International Relations during the summit, 
President Bush identified demilitarization of the Soviet economy as the key to economic 
transformation, encouraging the Soviets to devote more resources to civilian output and 
stocking the shelves of Soviet stores.  He called the recent political changes in the 
country unmistakable—with people free to express their opinions, new alliances forging 
new political parties, and the sound of many different voices speaking out across the vast 
territory of the USSR.  He promised that the U.S. stood ready to assist “the forces of 
freedom” in the USSR, but emphasized that the impetus must come from within through 
domestic policy changes, not from an infusion of foreign aid.  He pointed to the IMF and 
the World Bank as the next logical step in constructing a strategy for Soviet 
transformation to a more democratic and market system because such help would attract 
foreign investment.  He promised further that U.S. assistance would keep pace with 
Soviet reform progress and called for more people-to-people exchanges of scientists, 
scholars, and students.  Most importantly, President Bush declared, “Let this Moscow 
summit definitively mark the end of what all of us would agree has been an era of 
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mistrust, and let it mark a new beginning for our two nations: an era of progress toward a 
new world of peace and partnership” (State Department 1991c, 593-4).53 
Sending the wrong message in Kiev 
 During the Moscow summit, President Bush stood squarely with President 
Gorbachev, giving little support to the elected leaders of the 15 republics of the Soviet 
Union who were calling with increasing vigor for their independence from Moscow.  
Following the summit the President make a quick stop in Kiev, capital of the Ukrainian 
Soviet Socialist Republic, where he sought to explain what Americans meant by the 
terms “freedom, democracy, and economic liberty.”  “When Americans talk of freedom, 
we refer to people’s ability to live without fear of government intrusion, without fear of 
harassment by their fellow citizens, without restricting others’ freedoms” (State 
Department 1991c, 597).  He stated that the right to freedom belonged to all men and 
women and required tolerance, openness, and protections.  Then he fatefully added, “Yet 
freedom is not the same as independence.  Americans will not support those who seek 
independence in order to replace a far-off tyranny with a local despotism.”  In this one 
line, the President suggested that the U.S. did not support the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union or Ukraine’s independence.  This speech became known as the “chicken Kiev” 
speech (Hutchings 1997, 329).  It showed that the President remaining firmly committed 
to Gorbachev and the Soviet Union and was reluctant to hear the calls for freedom from 
 
53 Later in the summit the President explained to a group of Russian businessmen that the U.S. did not have 
the answers for how to build a market out of a command economy, and insisted that they “must define 
[their] own brand of democratic capitalism, one that is consistent with Russian culture and values.”  He 
added that creating the market required time and patience.  During this summit, President Bush and Mikhail 
Gorbachev demonstrated a new stage in U.S.-Soviet relations by signing the Strategic Arms Reduction 
Treaty (START), a first in arms control treaties that actually reduced U.S. and Soviet nuclear strategic 
arsenals and put in place monitoring mechanisms for verifying reductions and building trust (State 
Department 1991c, 595).    
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the Soviet republics, as he had been slow to accept earlier calls in Eastern Europe.  As the 
speech continued, he rightfully defined democracy as “a system of government in which 
people may vie openly for the hearts, and, yes, votes of the public. . . . a system of 
government that derives its just power from the consent of the governed, that retains its 
legitimacy by controlling its appetite for power.”  He explained that government must 
understand its proper role and limits.  “In modern societies, freedom and democracy rely 
on economic liberty,” so people can decide how they want to work.  Such economic 
freedom requires freedom of communication and the free flow of information (State 
Department 1991c, 597).  While this speech contained pertinent information on the 
meaning of democracy, its tone—giving so much support still to Gorbachev and 
Moscow—doomed its potential impact.  He made clear that, from his perspective, 
Moscow was still in charge. This approach in August 1991 also showed just how far the 
administration was from being prepared for the quick demise of the Soviet Union that 
was soon to happen.  Just as the President was slow to accept transformation in Eastern 
Europe, he was reluctant to hear that same call for change within the Soviet Union.  
 On August 19, 1991, a group of hardliners in the Soviet leadership carried out a 
coup d’etat against President Gorbachev who was held briefly under house arrest, 
undermining what little legitimacy he had left as President of the USSR.  President Bush 
did not respond forcefully to this act.  Official Washington held its breath and waited to 
see what would happen and who would emerge victorious, Gorbachev or his adversaries.  
Interestingly, Strobe Talbott later recalled that many in Washington attacked the 
President at the time for having staked too much on his relationship with Gorbachev.  
Under advice from Talbott, Bill Clinton, who was preparing to announce his candidacy 
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for President, did not join them.  Talbott told Clinton that the President had been right to 
foster the close relationship with Gorbachev and he should have stood up for him at this 
difficult moment.  Clinton and Talbott decided to pursue the path of “do no harm,” so 
Clinton did not criticize the president (Talbott 2002, 25).  The coup ended days later and 
Gorbachev returned to Moscow politically crippled. 
 During the brief few days of the coup, the G-24 and the U.S. suspended all 
assistance to the USSR in light of these extra-constitutional actions.54 By August 29, 
1991, however, after the coup had ended and Gorbachev had been restored to power, 
President Bush was ready to go forward quickly with aid to the Soviet Union to be 
delivered where people needed it most, in the republics.  Secretary Baker went to 
Moscow as quickly as possible following the failed coup. 
 On September 11, 1991, the Secretary addressed the CSCE Meeting on the 
Human Dimension in Moscow and offered advice to the Soviet peoples in the form of 
five fundamental principles of democracy: 
1) proceed peacefully in accordance with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act, 
swearing off intimidation and violence; 
2) respect existing borders, both internal and external, with any changes 
following CSCE principles, not through use of force; 
3) support democracy and the rule of law, noting particularly the importance of 
elections; 
4) protect human rights based on respect for the individual and equal treatment 
for minorities; and  
 
54 The G-24 was a group of 24 countries whose assistance to Central and Eastern Europe was coordinated 
by the European Commission.  The G-24 held regular meetings in which recipient countries participated.  
The major contributors were Germany, Japan, the European Community (EC), and the United States, and 
they focused on the Polish stabilization fund; delivery of food aid; and technical assistance programs in 
agriculture.  The G-24, which sought not to duplicate the programs of international organizations, 
established criteria for coordinated assistance:  1) adherence to the rule of law; 2) respect for human rights; 
3) introduction of multi-party systems; 4) the holding of fair and free elections; and 5) the development of 
market-oriented economies, set by CSCE. (State Department 1991d).   
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5) respect international law, especially adherence to the Helsinki Final Act  
(State Department 1991f, 679-80).55 
Once it was clear to President Bush that Gorbachev would not forcefully restrain 
the Soviet autonomous republics from going their own way, the President was willing to 
establish diplomatic relations with the Baltic states (State Department 1991e, 647).  As 
Secretary Baker spoke in Moscow, President Bush announced in Washington U.S. 
support for the independence of the Baltic states and their admission into the United 
Nations, the release of Baltic financial assets, which the U.S. had held frozen for over 50 
years, the extension of most-favored-nation and other trade benefits, and encouragement 
to the World Bank to work with these states.  The President promised to extend technical 
and other assistance to the Baltic states under the SEED Act. 
 The political landscape in the United States was changing as the 1992 election 
year drew near.  Within a few weeks of the failed coup attempt in the USSR, William 
Jefferson Clinton announced his candidacy for president of the United States and then 
strongly criticized President Bush for not supporting Boris Yeltsin as Russia’s first freely 
elected president and for the U.S. being the 37th nation to extend diplomatic relations to 
the Baltic states.56 This was a hint at the prominence the region would play in the early 
years of the first Clinton administration. 
 The Bush Administration clearly remained conflicted about the course of events 
in the Soviet Union.  In a lengthy address before the House Subcommittee on Europe and 
the Middle East on October 2, 1991, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Robert 
 
55 The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was signed on August 
1, 1975 and set the precedent for linking the three baskets of interests concerning human rights, economics, 
and security. 
56 Clinton felt the U.S. “should have been the first” to recognize the independence of the Baltic states 
(Talbott 2002, 25).  
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Zoellick expressed the administration’s desire to see some form of the Soviet Union hold 
together (State Department 1991h, 742-3.)  As many of the Soviet republics had 
announced their independence, the Bush administration was very concerned about the 
prospects for complete disintegration of the USSR, arguing the difficulty of small states 
to pursue economic reform and create their own militaries, emphasizing the economic 
cohesion of the Soviet Union, and fearing the threat of ethnic conflict as Russians in 
Ukraine or Kazakhstan demanded their return to Russia proper.  The administration was 
not enthusiastic about the prospect of 15 new states in the place of one Soviet Union.  It 
did not seem at all comfortable with the thought of dealing with the former republics 
individually, noting that cohesion among the republics was conducive to stability and 
security.  It simply could not see how these individual republics would make it on their 
own as sovereign states.  Zoellick identified devolution of political authority and the 
force of ethnic nationalism as threats to political stability, and called for democracy with 
its grassroots participation as the antidote.  He saw the need for democracy to supersede 
ethnic ties among individuals, and recommended the federalist system as a way of 
bringing together democracy and diversity.  
 In the midst of campaign season, the Bush administration courted U.S. public 
opinion actively with a steady stream of high-level policy statements.57 On October 3, 
1991, Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger addressed the Business Week 
 
57 The primary voices to explain the Bush administration’s foreign policy were Secretary Baker and Deputy 
Secretary Eagleburger, both thoughtful, reflective policy makers who articulated U.S. policy at the end of 
the Cold War.  Both regarded this moment as a key decision making period for the U.S. for the third time in 
the 20th century:  the first was at the end of World War I when the U.S. chose an isolationist path; the 
second at the end of World War II when the U.S. chose to be engaged internationally and to make 
democratic partners single-handedly out of former enemies; and finally, at the end of the Cold War when 
the U.S. needed to learn from its previous experience and choose engagement and working actively with 
the commonwealth of democratic nations and institutions. 
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Symposium in Washington, DC to present the Administration’s concerns about public 
calls for U.S. global disengagement at the end of the Cold War.58 To those Americans 
who asserted that the U.S. had won the Cold War and it was now time to go home, the 
administration countered that the U.S. was obligated to play a global leadership role.  
Eagleburger recounted 20th century history when at the end of World War I, the U.S. 
defeated its German enemy and went home, leaving unresolved many of the problems 
that ultimately led to World War II.  Upon the defeat of Germany and Japan in 1945, the 
U.S. changed its foreign policy direction and chose to take an active leadership role to 
build those countries into democratic partners and to extend cooperation multilaterally 
through the many newly constructed organizations like NATO, the OECD, IMF, and 
World Bank.  
 Eagleburger urged that the U.S. accept its responsibility at the end of the Cold 
War to assist Central and East Europe and the Soviet Union in their transitions to market 
democracies.  Most stridently, he warned that to pursue this leadership role, the U.S. 
could not cut back on its defense spending, as many in the Congress were recommending.  
With the collapse of the bipolar international system, U.S. government decision makers 
were unclear what new international order would emerge, and they contended that the 
U.S. had an important role to play in designing that new system through engagement.  
Eagleburger made clear the administration’s position that the well-being and prosperity 
of the U.S. was dependent upon a stable international order, which only could be created 
through strong U.S. leadership.  The administration believed that widening the circle of 
democratic nations was conducive to U.S. security.  He cited “maintenance of the world’s 
 
58 Presumably, the administration chose to address this business audience because 1) the administration 
relied heavily on the U.S. private sector to be engaged actively in the post-communist world; and 2) it 
expected that many of the challenges of the new era would be economic. 
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free trading order” as the highest priority in U.S. foreign policy.  He also stressed that the 
U.S. would look to the West Europeans to carry their fair share of the responsibility and 
cost of assisting the post-communist world during its transition period (State Department 
1991g, 739).   
 On December 12, 1991, Secretary Baker set forth U.S. policy in response to the 
collapse of communism and laid out U.S. plans for assisting reform and providing 
technical assistance to the Soviet republics.59 Baker recounted U.S. foreign policy over 
the previous 40 years, crediting Ambassador George Kennan’s policy of containment at 
the end of World War II for keeping pressure on the Soviet system from the outside, 
leading to the victory over communism.  He described the failed coup attempt of August 
as the final blow to a weakening imperial state in that it signaled the devolution of power 
away from the Moscow center to the republics.  Baker announced the onset of a new 
world and the principles which would guide U.S. policy in it.  Those principles were to 
dismantle and destroy weapons of mass destruction left from the Cold War as an 
investment in U.S. national security and to help the former Soviet areas build 
democracies and free markets.  
 Baker suggested that the best way the West could assist the region was through 
technical assistance experts placed on the ground and to bring citizens from the region to 
the U.S. for training.  The administration would rely on the U.S. Information Agency 
(USIA) to step up its exchange activities.  Baker assigned Larry Eagleburger 
responsibility for coordinating assistance to the former Soviet republics and announced 
 
59 President Bush called a coordinating conference involving the advanced industrial democracies, the 
Central and East European states, members of the Gulf War coalition, and the international financial 
institutions to meet in Washington in early January 1992 to devise plans to assist the transition in the Soviet 
region, including emergency humanitarian and food assistance for the winter months. 
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that the administration intended to propose legislation to Congress to provide technical 
assistance.  “A major aim of this legislation will be to promote trade, business, and 
investment development by American companies in Russia, . . . and other republics” 
(State Department 1991i, 892).60 
The end of the Soviet Union 
 On December 25, 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev resigned as president of the Soviet 
Union, signaling the demise of the superpower and the end of the bipolar geopolitical 
system.  The USSR ceased to exist and the former Soviet republics became 15 new 
independent states.  Boris Yeltsin sat in the Kremlin as President of the Russian 
Federation and, in the United States, the presidential campaign was in full swing. 
 In early 1992, President Bush paid little attention to foreign policy, preferring to 
advance himself as a domestic president, but he did hold an informal summit with Yeltsin 
at Camp David, seeking to build a personal relationship as he had with Gorbachev.61 By 
the spring, U.S. relations with Russia had become a campaign issue with mounting 
criticism that President Bush was not doing enough to support Russian democracy and 
economic reform. 
 Former President Richard Nixon came out strongly calling for an assistance plan 
comparable to the Marshall Plan.  On April 1, 1992, Bill Clinton made a speech to the 
Foreign Policy Association in New York criticizing the president for being “overly 
 
60 He explained that funding for this legislation would not come from domestic programs, but from 
assistance to other nations, and that it would benefit American business as well as the recipient economies.  
Reiterating Eagleburger’s words from two months earlier, he warned against U.S. protectionism and 
isolationism, calling instead for U.S. global leadership.  A second major legislative initiative was the 
Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991, (also known as the Nunn-Lugar Act) which provided U.S. 
assistance in dismantling nuclear and chemical weapons and stemming proliferation. 
61Yeltsin came to Washington for his first official state visit on June 18, 1992. 
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cautious on the issue of aid to Russia” (Talbott 2002, 31).  According to Strobe Talbott, 
with advance notice of the Clinton speech, the Bush White House announced just minutes 
before the speech a G-7 plan to provide $27 billion in aid to Russia.  This closed any 
difference between the two candidates on the U.S. relationship with Russia.  President 
Bush brought the resources of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to 
the assistance of Russia during the spring and summer of 1992.  
The FREEDOM Support Act 
On April 1, 1992, President Bush submitted to Congress proposed legislation that 
became S. 2532, The Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open 
Markets Support Act of 1992 (FREEDOM Support Act).  Following a summer of debate 
in the Congress, this legislation was signed into law on October 24, 1992, as Public Law 
102-511 and became the mechanism through which the U.S. government provided 
assistance to Russia and the other new independent states throughout the rest of the 
decade.62 Following the example of the SEED Act, the legislation established the 
position of an Assistance Coordinator in the State Department with the responsibility for 
overseeing all the assistance programs to the NIS across the U.S. government and 
reporting on them annually to Congress.  The purpose of the FREEDOM Support Act 
(FSA) was to support the development of democracy and market economies in the 
independent states of the former Soviet Union in the interests of U.S. national security 
and economic prosperity.  The legislation described the collapse of the Soviet Union as a 
“historic opportunity for a transition to a peaceful and stable international order and the 
 
62This legislation amended Part I, Chapter 11 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to add “SUPPORT 
FOR THE ECONOMIC AND DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE INDEPENDENT STATES OF 
THE FORMER SOVIET UNION” (FSA, Sec. 201).  
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integration of the independent states of the former Soviet Union into the community of 
democratic nations” (FSA, Section 101 (1). 
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FSA goals 
Title II—Bilateral Economic Assistance Activities, Section 498. Assistance for the 
Independent States established the goals of the legislation and called for: 
(1) URGENT HUMANITARIAN NEEDS.—meeting urgent humanitarian 
needs; 
(2) DEMOCRACY.—Establishing a democratic and free society by 
fostering— 
(A) political, social, and economic pluralism; 
(B) respect for internationally recognized human rights and the rule 
of law; 
(C) the development of institutions of democratic governance, 
including electoral and legislative processes; 
(D) the institution and improvement of public administration at the 
national, intergovernmental, regional, and local level; 
(E) the development of a free and independent media; 
(F) the development of effective control by elected civilian 
officials over, and the development of a nonpolitical officer 
corps in, the military and security forces; and  
(G) strengthened administration of justice. 
 
(3) FREE MARKET SYSTEMS.—Creating and developing private 
enterprise and free market systems based on the principle of private 
ownership of property, including— 
(A) The development of private cooperatives, credit union, and 
 labor unions; 
(B) the improvement in the collection and analysis of statistical 
 information; 
(C) the reform and restructuring of banking and financial systems; 
 and 
(D) the protection of intellectual property. 
 
(4) TRADE AND INVESTMENT.—Creating conditions that promote trade 
and investment, and encouraging participation of the United States private 
sector in the development of the private sector in the independent states of 
the former Soviet Union.  
 
Other authorized activities under the FREEDOM Support Act included food distribution 
and production; health and human services; education and educational television; energy 
efficiency and production; civilian nuclear regulatory safety; the environment; 
transportation and telecommunications; drug education, interdiction, and eradication: and 
migration.   
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FSA conditions 
 The criteria for the U.S. to extend assistance to individual countries (FSA Section 
498A.) were based on the extent to which a country made significant progress toward a 
democratic system based on: 
• the rule of law, individual freedoms and representative government 
selected through free and fair elections; 
• economic reform based on market principles, private ownership and 
integration  into the world economy, including implementation of legal 
and policy frameworks necessary for such reform (including protection of 
intellectual property and respect for contracts); 
• respect for internationally recognized human rights including rights for 
minorities and freedom of religion and emigration; 
• respect for international law and obligations and adherence to the 
Helsinki Final Act;  
• peaceful resolution of ethnic and regional conflicts; 
• pursuit of arms control policies, reduction of military forces and non-
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; 
• protection of the international environment; 
• no support for international terrorism; 
• readiness to pay Soviet-era debt obligations; 
• providing the U.S. government with information on American prisoners-
of-war; and 
• terminating support for Cuba. 
 
Following the SEED model, the FREEDOM Support Act assigned primary responsibility 
for assistance implementation to the NIS to USAID, devoting most attention to 
promoting business and commercial development in the former Soviet republics through 
export promotion and international economic activities founded on mass privatization.  
This indeed was the primary focus of FREEDOM Support programs for the first several 
years.   
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What the experts thought 
 Soon after President Bush announced the FREEDOM Support legislation, an 
international group of sixty experts representing government, business, academia, non-
governmental organizations, lawyers, and journalists convened the 81st American 
Assembly from April 23-26, 1992, at Arden House in Harriman, New York to analyze 
the dissolution of the USSR and its impact on U.S. economic, political, and security 
interests.  Congressional staff and members of the State Department Policy Planning 
Staff participated in the discussions.  The group approached this period as a time of great 
opportunity “to build a community of nations in which values, institutions, and people are 
secure, rather than in fateful confrontation” (American Assembly 1992, 5).  This was a 
window of opportunity as 15 new states made critical choices about their political and 
economic institutions and their constitutions.  The old structures were discredited and 
new ones being designed.  The Arden House group stressed that for the U.S. to influence 
the building of those new structures, “we must free ourselves from an approach that has 
become deeply a part of us over a half-century of cold war.  Over that time we have 
grown accustomed to seeing the world in terms of the threats that it poses, rather than the 
opportunities that it opens” (ibid., 6). 
 The group recognized that what the new states did at that moment significantly 
impacted what would happen in even the distant future, and that the necessary changes 
could only be made by the populations of the region.  The Arden House group took the 
long-term approach to transition.  They saw the potential for former adversaries to 
cooperate with the U.S. in tackling such global problems as poverty, environmental 
threats, and regional instability.  They made clear that “assisting successor states in 
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stabilizing their economies is a task for governments” and called for “rapid bipartisan 
support in the Congress” for the financial aid program for Russia (ibid., 10).  The group 
recommended that along with currency stabilization should come balance of payment 
support, debt relief, and targeted, high-quality technical assistance.  They stressed the 
need to make clear to the new states the importance of accountability and incentives for 
productivity, particularly with regard to private property as the key to economic growth 
and democracy.  “Recognizing that stable political institutions are a precondition for 
successful economic reconstruction, this Assembly calls for increased cooperative efforts 
to strengthen the emerging democratic institutions in the new states” (ibid., 11-12).   
 Most importantly, the group called for the U.S. to take a serious lead in working 
with international partners and through international organizations, including the G-7, 
NATO, OECD, and CSCE, to coordinate assistance and engage in arms control regimes.  
They concluded that “the race goes to those who are patient; there are no quick fixes, and 
one setback in one country does not write if off forever (ibid., 15).  They saw democracy 
promotion in the former Soviet space as a long-term investment for the U.S.  This advice 
from the Assembly matched well the points established in the scholarly writings about 
democracy and additional emphasis of the role of the United States in taking the lead to 
support democratic and market reform in the former Soviet space, with special attention 
to Russia.  
Senate support for FSA 
 In late June 1992, when the Senate debated S.2532 Freedom for Russia and 
Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets Support Act of 1992, senators spoke 
strongly in favor of the bill and called for it to be passed quickly.  Senator Slade Gorton 
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(R-WA) pleaded with his Senate colleagues to make this “small investment for peace” at 
just over $600 million, noting this was less than the cost of one B-2 bomber.  He called 
for leadership and praised the bill for its attention to the administration of justice and the 
rule of law and security of nuclear materials.  He asserted, “Although the administration 
has been slow to awaken to the need for this type of assistance, there is growing 
recognition that without strong justice institutions, democratic governance is virtually 
impossible” (U.S. Congress. Senate. 1992a, S9116).  He reinforced the claims of others 
who had noted this opportunity to promote U.S. values of pluralism and democracy 
peacefully and he warned of the consequences should the U.S. fail to support reform in 
Russia and face a return to the costly dangers of the past.   
 Senator Gorton called the collapse of the Soviet Union the most dramatic and 
profound political and economic event since the end of World War II.  Interestingly, he 
noted that when Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev had requested U.S. assistance to his 
reforms, the Congress had refused to give it, realizing that it would only support the 
continuation of the Soviet system, not genuine reform.  He praised Boris Yeltsin for his 
courage to go beyond the Soviet system, recognizing its complete failure.  Mr. Gorton 
compared Russia to the early years of the U.S. republic, equally as “promising” and as 
“uncertain” (ibid., S9117).  He added that Yeltsin’s address to the U.S. Congress in mid-
June had been a modest request for aid from the U.S. and was profoundly different from 
Gorbachev’s.  It deserved to be approved by the Senate in the interest of the American 
people. 
 Senator Mitch McConnell (R-KY) also called for support of the bill, noting that it 
may be the one piece of legislation the 102nd Congress passed that year with bipartisan 
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support that “would do somebody some good” (ibid., S9117).   He noted a conversation 
with Assistance Coordinator Richard Armitage in which he asked the coordinator what 
the bill was trying to do.  Mr. Armitage responded, “. . . this bill is about brains, not big 
bucks.  What we are trying to offer is our expertise in banking and in business, in 
farming, and in housing, the environment, energy, health care, and education” (ibid., 
S9117).  Senator McConnell described the FREEDOM Support Act as a first step in 
helping with the remarkable transition underway in the former Soviet Union.  He added 
that this was a kind of foreign aid different from the “tradition dam-building aid;” it was 
an offer of “big ideas.”  The U.S. would be the leader of the global effort to promote 
reform.  The former Soviet republics needed help, not charity.  Senator McConnell saw 
the FREEDOM Support Act as an important declaration of U.S. intent to support 
democracy and free markets, and their reformers and entrepreneurs.  He supported seed 
money to encourage the U.S. private sector, businessmen and volunteers to foster free 
markets, promote democracy, and meet humanitarian needs (ibid., S9117). 
 Senator Domenici (R-NM) described the bill as “A Necessary Symbol,” adding 
that its passage could not ensure a democratic and prosperous Russia, only the Russian 
people could do that, but that failure to pass the bill surely would weaken the forces of 
reform in the region.  He feared that such failure would signal a U.S. desire to return to 
the days of the Cold War and would again increase the costs of defense spending and take 
away the promise of future growth in the U.S. energy and agricultural sectors.  He spoke 
of FSA as a program of bipartisan support of the American people, the Congress, and the 
President, and he stressed the unique position of the U.S. as the leader of the Western 
world to have the influence to mobilize international support for Russian President 
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Yeltsin.  Noting the fragility of democracy, Senator Pell added that “We could very easily 
kill that democracy if we do not lend a shoulder to ensuring that the march for democracy 
on the part of the Russian continues.  If we do not pass this legislation, we should well 
put that march to democracy off the rails” (U.S. Congress. Senate. 1992a, S9121).  At the 
end of debate, Senator Richard Lugar thanked the Senators for the “strong bipartisan 
leadership evident on the floor” and the Senate passed its version of the FREEDOM 
Support Act on July 2, 1992.  The House of Representatives debated and passed the bill 
on August 6, 1992 and it became law on October 24, 1992. 
 Upon the passage of the FSA, all sectors of American society—the executive 
branch, the Congress, nongovernmental experts, and businesspeople—were in agreement 
on the goal of promoting democracy and free markets in the former communist world.  
They further even agreed on the attributes of a market democracy, noting the need to help 
create and strengthen rule of law, independent judiciary, plural and representative 
political institutions through free, fair and transparent elections, banking system and 
market institutions, and civil society with independent media.  Finally, they are agreed 
that the collapse of communism presented an unprecedented, and likely limited, 
opportunity to contribute to international stability and strengthen U.S. national security 
and economic prosperity.  As a result, the U.S. had no choice but to take the lead to 
promote reform and the creation of market democracies in that part of the world.  
New Relationships
The relationship between Presidents Bush and Yeltsin strengthened, with Yeltsin 
visiting Washington in June 1992 on a state visit.  According to Strobe Talbott, who 
would take the lead on Russia during the Clinton administration, then presidential 
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candidate Bill Clinton had a brief but difficult meeting with President Yeltsin.  Yeltsin 
reacted negatively to the portrayal of Russian “assistance.”  He made clear that Russia 
was a great state and that what he wanted from the U.S. was “a model of leadership,” that 
would bring the rest of the world to support reform in Russia.  President Yeltsin said he 
was not “looking for handouts” (Talbott 2002, 32).  Yeltsin was invested in his 
relationship with President Bush. 
 As the U.S. presidential campaign progressed, both candidates made recurring 
references to America’s victory in the Cold War, a tact that discomfited Talbott, knowing 
the negative reaction it caused in Moscow and the difficulty it posed for reformers.  The 
reformers felt they had been the ones to bring pressure on the Soviet system, leading to 
its demise.  Talbott, however, reportedly provided little advice to Clinton during the 
campaign, only to suggest that the Russians were interested in continuity and would not 
want any Clinton “surprises” (Talbott 2002, 34).  The Russians wanted the next 
American administration to remain engaged in Russia’s reform. 
New approaches and new opportunities 
 William Jefferson Clinton won the election to become the 42nd President of the 
United States on November 3, 1992.63 According to Talbott, President Yeltsin phoned 
Clinton two days after the election asking him to come to Moscow, indicating that Russia 
needed American engagement.  Bill Clinton was inaugurated on January 21, 1993, and 
inherited a government with severe budget deficits and vast new opportunities as well as 
 
63 On January 2-3, 1993, Boris Yeltsin and George H.W. Bush held their final summit together in which 
they signed START II [The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on 
Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms], as follow-on to START I [The Strategic 
Arms Reduction Treaty] which took 15 years to draft and was signed on July 31, 1991 between Presidents 
Bush and Gorbachev. 
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emerging challenges on the world stage with the demise of the Soviet Union, leaving the 
United States as sole superpower.   
 The new administration came to power with strong ideas of reshaping the U.S. 
government to fit a changed international system.  In his January 13, 1993, Senate 
confirmation hearing, Secretary of State-designate Warren Christopher called for an 
“overhaul” of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which “needs to 
take on fewer missions, narrow the scope of its operations, and make itself less 
bureaucratic” and a reorganization of the State Department and its mechanism for policy 
formulation (U.S. Department of State 1993a, 48).  Shortly thereafter, newly appointed 
Secretary of State Warren Christopher met with State Department employees to spell out 
the changes ahead.  The fundamental thrust of his plans was that the world had changed 
and the old institutions of the Cold War were no longer sufficient to anticipate or manage 
the challenges of the new international situation.64 One of the most important changes he 
made was the creation of a new Under Secretary for Global Affairs who would be 
responsible for environmental and science issues, promotion of democracy, human rights, 
refugees, population, counter-terrorism, and other transnational issues.  Secretary 
Christopher presented a reorganization plan for the State Department, which cut across 
traditional geographic and functional divisions.  He announced the creation of three new 
bureaus streamlining other functions already underway in the Department—the Bureau of 
 
64 The Secretary stated that along with the Deputy Secretary he would designate five Under Secretaries to 
serve as his principal foreign policy advisers--thereby broadening the range of authority in the upper levels 
of the Department.  Responsibility for decision making was to be pushed downward to the level of the 
Assistant Secretary of State, as the leader of the regional and functional bureaus, working with the relevant 
Under Secretary to make decisions and to communicate with the Secretary.  Christopher also sought to 
reduce excessive layering in management by cutting back by 40 percent the number of Deputy Assistant 
Secretaries, who assisted the bureau Assistant Secretaries.  
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Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL), which would serve as the base for 
programs designed to promote democracy; the Bureau of Narcotics, Terrorism, and 
Crime; and the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM).  Interestingly, 
even with the creation of DRL, FSA and SEED continued to be run out of their own 
separate offices and even from different bureaus.  The SEED Coordinator, responsible for 
assistance to Central and East Europe and the Baltic states, was located in the Bureau for 
European and Canadian Affairs.  The FSA Coordinator, responsible for assistance to the 
NIS, was located in a high level and newly created office attached to the Secretary of 
State, as will be described in Chapter Four.  
 Secretary Christopher proclaimed the driving motivations of the Clinton foreign 
policy team: 
• “strengthening democratization efforts in the former Soviet Union and around 
the world, 
• halting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
• strengthening peace-keeping capabilities, 
• dealing more effectively with global environmental problems, 
• elevating concern about the global population explosion, 
• fighting international crime and terrorism, 
• and penetrating new markets for American business” 
(U.S. Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs 1993b, 69).   
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the world of the U.S. foreign policy maker 
changed dramatically.  By 1993, Congress and the executive branch had come together in 
a bipartisan way to support reform in the post-communist world and promote the 
establishment of market democracies in place of shattered communist institutions.  This 
was not an easy task, but throughout the U.S. government, individuals and agencies had 
to adjust to a changed playing field. 
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The SEED and FREEDOM Support Acts spelled out well the necessary attributes 
of a democracy, corresponding with established scholarship on the hallmarks of a liberal 
democracy.  The challenge, however, lay in implementing those democratic ideals of rule 
of law, free market, representative government, independent judiciary, civil society, and 
independent media—tasks that would involve the participation of thousands of 
individuals at all levels from the President through the bureaucracies of the executive 
branch and the annual appropriations process of the Congress to the program officers in 
the field interacting with post-communist officials and citizens.  The Bush administration 
set the design for the FREEDOM Support Act.  The executive branch agencies of the 
Clinton Administration had the challenge of translating its objectives into actionable 
programs producing results.     
 As explained in the Clinton Administration’s National Security Strategy of 
Engagement and Enlargement, promoting democracy is “not a democratic crusade; it is a 
pragmatic commitment to see freedom take hold where that will help us most. . . . we 
must assist states that assist our strategic interest [and] . . . we must focus on nations 
whose people are pushing for reform or have already secured it” (USAID 1999).  In other 
words, there were conditions attached to U.S. technical assistance in promoting 
democracy.  U.S. funds were to target those countries strategically important to the U.S. 
and to invest U.S. efforts only where the recipient population had indicated a desire for a 
democratic transition.  The rationale for assistance was that democratic nations made 
more reliable and prosperous trade partners; stable transitions to democracy were more 
likely to maintain control over weapons of mass destruction and keep them from falling 
into the hands of rogue states and individuals; and peace and stability in homelands 
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would keep potential refugees from fleeing.  USAID noted, “Establishing democratic 
institutions, free and open markets, an informed and educated populace, a vibrant civil 
society, and a relationship between state and society that encourages pluralism, 
participation, and peaceful conflict resolution—all these contribute to the goal of building 
sustainable democracies” (ibid.) 
 The immediate collapse of Soviet institutions, especially in the economy, coupled 
with the holdover Soviet legacy, meant that the 1990s in the Russian Federation were a 
period of political uncertainty, economic chaos, and pervasive corruption.  Institutions 
can be dismantled quickly, political culture changes over the long-term.  The newly 
independent Russia struggled internally between those who sought to establish 
democratic and free market institutions and those who wished to maintain their hold on 
power from the Soviet period.  The next chapter describes the context in which the U.S. 
provided assistance to Russia.  The first part provides an overview of Russia’s fitful 
attempts to create democratic institutions and build a market economy with little 
historical precedence. The second part examines how the Clinton foreign policy team 
interpreted and responded to events in Russia.  Chapter Three, therefore, sets the stage for 
the remainder of this study, which looks closely at specific U.S. programs to promote 
democracy in Russia.      
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Chapter 3: The Context of Assistance  
 Democracy promotion is not carried out in isolation.   It is a complex foreign 
policy objective conducted in the context of real and, often unpredictable, events within 
the target country, the international community and the donor country.  What happens in 
the donor country, on the international scene, and domestically in the target country 
impacts the results of democracy programs.  The turbulent economic and political events 
of the 1990s in Russia influenced the ability of the U.S. government to promote 
democracy there for two reasons; they either strengthened or weakened Congressional 
support to continue funding assistance to Russia and they impacted the extent to which 
U.S. program managers—federal and FSA-funded NGOs—could implement the 
programs effectively on site.  Furthermore, other events in the international arena and 
U.S. domestic scene competed for the U.S. policy makers attention, sometimes pushing 
U.S. assistance to Russia to the backburner.  In other words, regardless of the intention of 
U.S. democracy programs they were sometimes thwarted by events beyond the control of 
the U.S. government or the program officers in country. 
 This chapter highlights key events in Russia and in the U.S., which influenced the 
U.S. democracy promotion programs.  The first part identifies the major events in Russia 
that impacted the assistance programs supported under FSA and addresses the overall 
state of the democratic benchmarks (as indicated in Chapter One) by the end of the 
decade.  It addresses the question to what extent Russia made progress toward democracy 
during the 1990s—most progress in conducting free and fair elections, very little in 
developing market institutions, and some progress in strengthening the rule of law by the 
end of the decade.  The overall characterization of Russia’s political society and economy 
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is drawn primarily from U.S. government assessments over the decade prepared by U.S. 
Embassy Moscow and contained in the annual reports on U.S. Assistance to and 
Cooperative Activities with the New Independent States of the Former Soviet Union, as 
required by the FREEDOM Support Act.  It is supplemented by USIA survey findings 
and scholarly analysis on the benchmarks of democracy.  The second part of this chapter 
then traces the influence of those events on U.S. democracy promotion efforts in the 
context of the relationships between Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton and between 
President Clinton and the U.S. Congress.  This analysis sets the stage for the rest of the 
study to look more closely at the actual implementation of U.S. assistance programs on 
the ground and what role democracy promotion plays as a U.S. foreign policy objective.    
Russia’s First Post-communist Decade
The collapse of communism in 1991 was the starting point of an uncertain future 
for the Russian Federation.  By the time Mikhail Gorbachev resigned as President of the 
Soviet Union on December 31, 1991 and the union ceased to exist, Boris Yeltsin already 
had been elected President of the Russian Federation and had won authority from the 
Russian Congress of People’s Deputies to issue decrees for one year (Remington 1997, 
74).  His immediate concerns upon independence were to secure the borders of the 
Federation and to concentrate on the economy.  He neglected, however, to take important 
political steps to consolidate his new position.  As Goldgeier and McFaul (2003) noted, 
Yeltsin did not hold new “founding” elections nor seek to ratify a new constitution nor 
create a political party representing his views nor dismantle holdover Soviet institutions 
such as the KGB and the Congress of People’s Deputies.  As a result, the new Russian 
government was polarized sharply from the beginning of independence between 
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reformers seeking to create a market democracy and entrenched Soviet elites who had 
much to lose in the transition to an open political and economic system. 
 
Off to a rough start 
 In the early days of Russian independence, President Yeltsin sought to extend his 
extraordinary decree power, but the Congress of People’s Deputies, increasingly 
dominated by a communist coalition, resisted.  With the achievement of independence, 
the glue which had held together disparate interests in the Russian Congress also 
disappeared and relations between the legislative and executive branches grew tense.  
The Congress nearly won support to remove Yeltsin in a vote in March 1993.  As a 
result, Yeltsin and the Congress agreed to put to the public a referendum on April 25, 
1993, with four questions regarding approval for Yeltsin and his government and whether 
presidential and parliamentary elections ought to be held (Remington 1997, 75 and 8n).  
Yeltsin emerged politically stronger from the referendum in which 53 percent of the 
voters approved his economic policies and 59 percent expressed confidence in him 
(USIA 1996b, iv), but he continued to face opposition in the Congress of People’s 
Deputies and Supreme Soviet.  As a result, through a series of decrees in September and 
October 1993, he dissolved parliament, called new elections at both the parliamentary 
and local levels, had a draft of a new constitution put forward for ratification, and 
suspended the Constitutional Court (ibid., 75). 
 
Forces in the Congress of People’s Deputies hostile to Yeltsin refused to follow 
his decrees and in late September barricaded themselves inside the Russian White House 
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where the Congress convened.  On October 2-4, 1993, the standoff between Yeltsin and 
the Congress turned violent, as paramilitary forces loyal to the communist opposition 
sought to take over the Moscow Mayor’s office and a major television tower.  In this first 
challenge to the newly independent state, the Russian army sided with President Yeltsin, 
did not back the communist opposition, and, on Yeltsin’s orders, fired on the White 
House and the paramilitary group supporting the opposition to end the standoff.  The 
communist hardliners were forced to surrender.65
Despite having been called under decree, parliamentary elections and a 
referendum on the constitution were held on December 12, 1993.  As a result, Yeltsin’s 
constitution was ratified in the national referendum and established that Russia was a 
federation comprised of 89 sub-national members, often referred to as “subjects” (Hahn 
1997, 130).  The election results, however, revealed stronger than expected support for 
ultranationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s party, the Liberal Democrats (Remington 1997, 
75).  Russian democracy was off to a rough start as new institutions were established 
under questionable democratic practice, through decrees outside parliamentary procedure, 
and on the heels of violence in the parliament.    
 
Lacking democratic tradition 
 Despite a well-educated work force, Russia had little democratic tradition and 
experience on which to draw.  Dissidents, who had been a source of pressure on the 
Soviet government, had formed a nascent civil society under the old system, but were ill-
 
65Remington (1997) noted that public reaction was one of indifference. 
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prepared to tackle the vast responsibility of designing and implementing a free market 
democracy and robust civil society in the newly independent state.  USIA public opinion 
survey indicated that elites were more supportive of reforms than the broader public, 
which suffered particularly from the economic dislocations of the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. 66 Russian citizens were torn in their support for an independent press and the 
right to express oneself freely on the one hand and the need for stability and to limit 
freedom for expressing “dangerous ideas” on the other hand (USIA 1996b, 7).  Two-
fifths or more supported the latter.  The elite differed considerably on this; a majority of 
56 percent in April 1996 rejected an authoritarian leader and four-fifths rejected 
censorship of the mass media (ibid., 7). 
 
According to USIA surveys covering 1991 to 1995, ordinary citizens grew 
increasingly dissatisfied with the political and economic reforms that accompanied their 
new independence.  At the end of 1991, 41 percent of Russians said things were “going in 
the wrong direction” in Russia.  By April 1995, that proportion had risen to 78 percent.  
Likewise, those who responded that they “regretted the dissolution of the Soviet Union” 
rose from 54 percent in June 1992 to 81 percent in April 1995 (USIA 1996b, 2).  
Russians most often cited economic problems as the most serious problem facing the 
country, including low wages, inflation, and unemployment.  “Since 1991, nine out of ten 
Russians consistently described economic conditions as ‘fairly bad’ or ‘very bad’” (ibid., 
 
66 USIA commissioned national surveys to be conducted by Russian public opinion firms, including the 
Russian Opinion and Market Research Ltd. (ROMIR), the Institute of Comparative Social Research 
(CESSI), the Russian Centre for Public Opinion and Market Research (VCIOM), and the Vox Populi 
Public Opinion Research Service (VP).  These surveys typically identified about 1800 randomly selected 
Russian adults across the Federation.    
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3).  In April 1996, half of respondents said their standard of living had declined in the 
previous year. 
 
Little support for Yeltsin’s war in Chechnya 
 Throughout the decade, President Yeltsin’s health was precarious and his 
behavior often erratic and unpredictable.  Upon the dissolution of the Soviet Union, 56 
percent of respondents in a USIA survey expressed some confidence in the president.  
That proportion dropped to 36 percent in January 1993 and further to 14 percent in April 
1995 (USIA 1996b, 5).  One of his most disturbing actions was the decree in December 
1994 to launch military attacks against the Russian Republic of Chechnya to quell 
separatist claims there.  USIA reported that public opinion had been “consistently critical 
of the government’s handling of the war [in Chechnya]” (USIA 1996b, 15).  In early 
1995, USIA surveys found that majorities considered Russian actions in Chechnya since 
December 1994 ‘unacceptable, no matter what the objective’ with three in ten favoring an 
immediate withdrawal.  In a December 1995 survey, two-fifths of the adult population 
thought that Russia should grant Chechnya independence while the same proportion 
wanted to keep Chechnya in the Federation (ibid., 15).  By February 1996, half the 
Russian public felt Russia should grant Chechnya independence and only 15 percent felt 
Russia should continue fighting until the rebels were defeated.  The conflict lasted nearly 
two years until a peace agreement was signed in August 1996 providing Chechnya 
interim autonomy.  Yeltsin’s approval rating rebounded with aggressive campaigning in 
advance of the summer 1996 presidential election when Yeltsin defeated his communist 
opponent, Gennady Zyuganov, with 54 percent of the vote in the second round in July 
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1996 (USIA 1996b, 1 and 6).  The Chechnya conflict reignited in 1999 when Chechen 
fighters invaded the neighboring republic of Dagestan and Russian armed forces 
intervened to push the Chechens guerillas back into their own territory (Goldgeier and 
McFaul 2003, 139 and 267).  Conflict in Chechnya continued through the end of the 
decade into the Putin Administration. 
 
By the end of the decade, Russia had made only fitful progress toward 
democracy.  During the eight years of his presidency, corruption was high as people 
focused more on private gains than public interest.  The ruble crashed and the economy 
was deemed by outsiders to be a system of “crony capitalism.”  Interestingly, one-third of 
respondents in a late 1998-early 1999 USIA survey blamed the U.S. in part for Russia’s 
economic crisis.  Elections were institutionalized, though laws were unenforceable and 
the judiciary was not independent.  Civil society was strengthening, but still fragile.  
Most importantly, however, the Russian people were disillusioned with the idea of a 
market democracy as their economic hardships worsened by the end of the decade and 
they were tired of the chaos and uncertainty of the Yeltsin years.  The USIA report 
(1996b) speculated that “values and attitudes supportive of a market democracy will 
prevail in the long run,” based on the opinions of the younger generation of Russians and 
the urban elite.  Those two groups, compared with the broader public, were more likely to 
favor private enterprise, oppose dictatorship, and support market reform (USIA 1996b, 
1).   
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Suspicious of Western/U.S. intentions  
 USIA surveys identified ongoing suspicion among Russians about the motivations 
of the United States in offering assistance to the Federation.  In a December 1993 survey, 
51 percent of respondents said that the West wanted to weaken Russia.  That sentiment 
peaked at 71 percent in April 1996 (USIA 1996b, 20).  In the 1998 youth survey, USIA 
found that only 18 percent of respondents felt the west was providing aid to Russia to 
“help it get back on its feet” (USIA 1998b, 5).  According to USIA, this response stood in 
stark contrast to strong Russian support for U.S. lend-lease aid to Russia in World War II 
and suggested that the different of opinion may be due to the intangibility of 1990s aid 
compared to jeeps, fighter aircraft and “K” rations of World War II (USIA 1998b, 5).  In 
a February 1999 USIA survey, three of four Russians believed that the U.S. was trying to 
reduce Russia to a second rate power.  The same proportion answered that the U.S. was 
“too inclined to use force against less powerful nations” (USIA 1999a).   A report on that 
1999 survey noted that “If there ever was a Washington-Moscow ‘honeymoon,’ it was 
brief.  Since 1993, despite official U.S. policy favoring democracy in Russia, elections to 
the Duma and regional assemblies mainly profited foes of Yeltsin’s U.S.-based regime: 
first, Zhirinovksy’s anti-Western populists, then the Communist-“patriot” bloc” (USIA 
1999a). 
 
Weak Rule of Law
Russia did not have a strong rule of law history as both Tsarist and Soviet 
officials treated laws as “mere instruments of rule” (Solomon 1999, 2), not constraints on 
their power.  There were few constraints in Russia on the rule of the autocrat.  According 
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to Sachs and Pistor (1997, 4), “Russia was the very last country in Europe to create a 
parliament as a check on the absolute power of the sovereign.”  That parliament was the 
original Duma created in 1906, but given very little power compared to the Tsar and the 
state bureaucracy.  Under the Soviet system, courts were weak and criminal justice was 
biased in favor of the accuser, the government.  The procuracy was a very strong 
institution in the Soviet period.  After 70 years of communist rule, therefore, the Russian 
public did not have a high regard for the legal institutions of the state to protect their 
rights.  The new Russian state was in need of legal reform in terms of laws and 
institutions. 
 
According to Solomon (1999, 2), legal reform began under Gorbachev’s policy of 
perestroika and moved forward in Russia in the early 1990s.  In 1991, the Constitutional 
Court was created, arbitrazh courts were established to deal with commercial disputes, 
and a paper on the “Conception of Judicial Reform” was prepared by legal scholars and 
approved by the Supreme Soviet to set forth an agenda for reform.  The paper included 
recommendations for the lifetime appointment of judges, empowerment of the judicial 
community and necessary financing for the courts.  In 1992, Russia adopted the Law on 
the Status of Judges, establishing life appointments, and creating institutions for the 
appointment and removal of judges.  In 1993, jury trials were created with pilot projects 
initiated in nine regions.  By the end of that year, the new Constitution gave judges the 
power to determine pre-trial detention, search and seizure, and eavesdropping, though it 
needed implementing legislation for the Criminal Procedure Code to be operationalized.  
At the height of the Yeltsin’s struggle with the Duma in the fall of 1993, he suspended 
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the Constitution Court, but reconvened it in March 1995 (State Department Bureau of 
European Affairs 2000, 8).  
 
While many laws, indeed, were written at that time, there was significant 
confusion about what they meant and whether they needed to be observed.  Many were 
simply ignored (ibid., 3).  Laws were written at both the federal and regional levels, with 
the results that often regional laws were implemented in advance of or in contradiction to 
federal laws, particularly in such areas as property rights, price controls, mobility of 
goods, and labor and social issues (ibid., 8).  It was much easier to pass laws in the 
regions where in most places the governor controlled the legislature.  With regional 
governments establishing their own laws, it was much harder to create at the federal level 
a uniform law that could apply across all regions; hence the confusion over which laws 
were to be observed.  Furthermore, the process of passing laws in the regions was 
inconsistent, sometimes with no agreement on the official version of the law. 
 
According to Solomon (1999) courts suffered under the economic hardships of 
the 1990s.  With a shortfall in tax collection in 1996-1997, the budgets for the courts 
were cut, putting some of them in economic crisis.  A new law on court financing passed 
in late 1998, limiting government cuts in court budgets and requiring the government to 
pay courts on time.  Lack of adequate funding pushed some judges to seek supplemental 
funds from regional governments (ibid., 15).  Others even sought assistance from private 
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sponsors, jeopardizing their impartiality and the critical role of an independent judiciary 
in a democracy.67 
Despite some early successes in strengthening the rule of law in Russia compared 
to the Soviet period, the ongoing disputes between the executive and legislative branches 
led to stalemate.  Laws were passed but not with required implementing legislation.  
USIA surveys traced the rise in the Russian public’s dissatisfaction with the judicial 
system from a 61 percent disapproval rating in September 1993 to a peak of 71 percent 
dissatisfaction in October 1995 to a slight improvement down to 67 percent in April 1996  
(USIA 1996b, 45).  A USIA survey conducted the following year among adults indicated 
that 77 percent of respondents thought that little or no progress had been made in 
achieving the rule of law in Russia (USIA 1998b, 4).  In the USIA Russian youth survey 
of 1998, respondents were less optimistic about progress in the rule of law over the next 
10-15 years than they were about improvements in the economy—48 percent expected 
little or no progress (ibid., 4).  At the end of the 1990s, legal reform and rule of law in 
Russia were fragile, and the implementation and enforcement of laws was inconsistent.  
Because laws were not enforced, corruption was high, corroding citizen’s confidence in 
public institutions.  Neither the collection of laws nor the court system was in good shape 
and Russia needed real political change to sort out the inconsistencies among them.  That 
change came in 2000 with the appointment first as prime minister, then acting president, 
and then election as president of Vladimir Putin, who made legal reform a priority. 
 
67 The 1999 Annual Report on U.S. Assistance to the NIS confirmed that many local courts in Russia were 
reliant on local executive power for operating funds (109).  
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The problem of corruption 
 Russia suffered from a culture of corruption that stood as an obstacle to 
establishing the rule of law.  In a presentation at the Woodrow Wilson International 
Center for Scholars in 1998, David Satter suggested that the Russian state was organized 
around theft rather than production.  Because Russian business was lacking a sense of 
right and wrong, moral reform was of greater urgency than economic reform 
(Aldacushion 1998, 16).  According to Satter, Russian business suffered from the Soviet 
legacy where “right” was determined by what was in the interests of the ruling party.  As 
a result, corruption was pervasive in Russia.  Satter declared that Russia transitioned from 
“criminal communism” to “criminal capitalism” through the process of privatization and 
the creation of new networks of corruption.  “Public” auctions of state-owned resources 
were really controlled by well-placed insiders with links to the government and the old 
system.  Those insiders became important forces in Russian politics.  According to Satter, 
the criminal underworld got much larger in the wake of privatization so it was hard to tell 
the difference between mafia and legitimate businesspeople.  Contract killings of 
businesspeople and bankers peaked in 1993-1994 as organized crime realized the 
business sector represented vast opportunities for gain.  Satter suggested that without a 
shift in business culture and the willingness to operate in a legal business environment, 
reformed economic structures would not take hold in Russia.  USIA surveys indicated 
that the majority of Russian felt that ordinary citizens would not benefit from private 
property and three-quarters of those surveyed in 1994 and 1995 felt that privatization had 
befitted organized crime and former communist officials (USIA 1996b, 13).  In April 
1996, 87 percent of the general public and 90 percent of the urban elite said that “official 
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corruption had seriously undermined economic reform” and the criminal elements 
controlled most private business in their region (ibid., 13).         
 
The Façade of a Market Economy
Yeltsin made economic reform his top priority as the Federation inherited from 
the Soviet Union an economy in sharp decline from years of centrally planned 
inefficiency coupled with the collapse of trade with its former satellite countries. 
 
No market experience 
 The obstacles to Russia’s development of a market economy were profound.  
Historically, Russia was cut off from the economic and political innovations of Europe 
(Sachs and Pistor 1997, 4).  It did not participate in the development of market 
institutions across Europe from the time of the Renaissance.  Transportation of goods 
across the vast expanse of the Russian territory was difficult and costly, so its 
international trade was limited to only the most valuable commodities, such as furs, 
which made the investment in transportation worthwhile.  Russia’s development was 
further constrained under the consolidated leadership of the Tsar, who was 
simultaneously head of state and of the Russian Orthodox Church.  Under the feudalist 
system, the vast majority of Russia’s population was serfs tied to the land with no civil 
rights until their emancipation in 1861.  Even then, individuals were not given the right to 
own property outright and had to work through newly organized communal 
arrangements.  Sachs and Pistor (1997, 6) noted that “Russian reforms stopped half-way 
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between its feudal heritage and modern capitalist practices.”  The Bolshevik Revolution 
eliminated even those few advances and during most of the 20th century, the communist 
party set the rules in Russia.  As with the rule of law, Russia had very little market 
experience upon its independence in 1991 and performance of the Russian economy 
during the 1990s was poor by most standards.  According to GAO (2000, 13), Russia’s 
economic decline during the decade was the most severe and its recovery most limited of 
all the NIS and Eastern Europe.   
 
While Russia needed to pursue economic, legal, constitutional and political 
reform all at the same time, it focused primarily on economic reform.  Sachs and Pistor 
(1997, 2) asserted that “the tension between the need for economic reform on the one 
hand and the weakness of legal and political institutions to implement reform in a 
transparent and equitable manner on the other hand has perhaps been the central problem 
of Russia’s post-socialist development.”  Russia chose rapid economic reform over all 
else, at the expense of not creating a sound legal system with clear property rights and 
administrative structures.  However, the Russian government was not able to implement 
reforms at the outset, absent the constitutional order determining how power was shared.  
According to Sachs and Pistor (ibid., 2), the biggest problem with economic reform was 
the absence of the rule of law to constrain government decision making.   
 
Follow Poland’s lead.  Based on the success of economic reform in Poland, many 
economists at the outset of Russia’s transition recommended rapid economic reform, 
specifically, the need to free prices and remove trade barriers right away.  Opinion was 
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divided, however, on the advisability of moving rapidly in the area of privatization with 
some arguing that new laws and institutions like banks and courts needed to precede the 
privatization of large state enterprises (GAO 2000, 40).  Others assumed that such laws 
would follow the demand of a growing business sector for protection.  Many of the 
recommendations for Poland’s economic recovery, including tightening fiscal and 
monetary policy, liberalizing prices, and privatizing enterprises, were repeated for Russia. 
Russian firms needed to restructured to become more efficient. 
 
Privatization first 
 Russia decided and the international community of donors agreed that it should 
privatize firms quickly, which it did through the voucher privatization program.  
According to GAO (2000, 17), the voucher privatization was conducted quickly and 
efficiently, but had an insider quality that negated its intention to spread wealth across the 
population.68 Instead, the privatization program concentrated wealth in the hands of a 
few and by so doing, undermined the goal of building a middle class—a necessary 
component of a market economy.  The concentration of economic power made it even 
more difficult for the Russian government to collect taxes.    
 
In late 1995, Russia conducted the “loans-for-shares” privatization program, to 
which the international community of donors neither supported nor objected.   The 
Russian government used this program as a way to raise government revenue.  It, too, 
 
68 The Russian privatization law, which was passed in July 1991, was based on breaking up state-owned 
enterprises by giving away shares of them.  Anatoly Chubais, who headed the privatization program, chose 
vouchers as the means for mass privatization, which President Yeltsin confirmed by decree in summer 
1992. 
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was plagued by insider’s privilege and a less than transparent procedure, resulting in a 
small number of financial-industrial groups controlling some of Russia’s most valuable 
enterprises.  These early privatization steps did not set the foundation for a free market 
economy.  The rules of the new economic game in Russia favored those already in 
privileged positions—the many elite holdovers from the communist past, along with 
growing organized crime groups—who were able to enrich themselves further at the 
expense of the ordinary Russian citizen.  Crime and corruption were pervasive.  Not only 
did this occur at the federal level, but locally as well, where in many regions governors 
enjoyed unchallenged power. 
 
The FY 1997 Annual Report on U.S. Assistance to the NIS cited that 70 percent of 
Russia’s GDP and 85 percent of manufacturing output was produced by the “private” 
sector, but this was not a reflection of genuine privatization.  In Russia, economics and 
politics came together in the struggle over state assets.  The state still owned a substantial 
controlling proportion of industries and free market conditions were not wholly in place. 
The agricultural sector was a strong interest group in Russia and lobbied effectively to 
stall land reform and stem agricultural competition.  USIA surveys (1996, 4) indicated 
that “no more than a third have considered developing private ownership of land a very 
important task.”   
 
Only partial economic progress 
 Russia had some early success with macroeconomic policy, but lagged in other 
areas.  At the outset of independence, the economy was plagued by hyperinflation when 
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the Russian government partially lifted price controls on January 2, 1992.  While 51 
percent of Russians surveyed initially supported this move, that proportion fell to a low 
of 24 percent in late 1995.  In the first year of price liberalization, prices rose by more 
than 2600 percent (USIA 1996b, 10).  The Central Bank printed more money to subsidize 
large state enterprises.  Through tight monetary policy, Yeltsin and his economic reform 
team brought inflation under control in late 1995, the ruble was stabilized, and the first 
stage of privatization (1994-1995) was completed, though large stated-owned enterprises, 
especially in the energy sector, which could have attracted much needed foreign 
investment, remained under control of the state.69 USIA surveys indicated that the 
Russian public generally believed that “the state should own a large part of the economy, 
provide free education and health care, and ensure full employment” (USIA 1996b, 11).  
From December 1991 to July 1994, the proportion of respondents that felt the Russian 
should have mainly private ownership fell from 25 percent to 16 percent, while that 
supporting mainly state ownership increased from 19 percent to 29 percent, respectively.  
Those who supported a mix of state and private ownership grew from 40 percent in 1991 
to 47 percent in 1994 (ibid., 11).  Large majorities favored state ownership for such 
sectors as heavy industry, railroads, airlines, banking, health care and the mass media, 
leaving private ownership to small business involved with the services, trade and 
agriculture (ibid., 12).  According to USIA (1996) younger, urban, and better educated 
Russian citizens tended to be more supportive of market reform than the older, more 
rural, less educated population.  Russia joined the international economy through the 
 
69According to the FY 1996 Annual Report, the U.S. government was concerned that Russia lacked the 
legal and regulatory infrastructure to support a market economy, but at that time, Russia still led the way in 
the NIS in terms of democratic reform.     
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IMF, World Bank, and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and 
followed their requirements to secure large international loans.  Those loans, however, 




 Tax collection was a major problem for the Russian government in a culture that 
was accustomed to tax evasion.  The state had a very poor tax collection mechanism, 
which increased arrears in federal wages and pension payments.  Economic reform, 
however, stalled in the middle of the decade as Yeltsin focused on the 1996 presidential 
election, after which he immediately fell ill.  He had heart surgery in late 1996, but 
reappeared in March 1997, reinvigorating attention to economic reform that had slowed 
during his illness.  By 1997, Russia had experienced severe budget shortfalls and 
desperately needed to overhaul its tax system to increase its revenues.  The renewed 
momentum on reform did not last, however, as the Duma failed to pass important 
legislation on a new tax code and a new system of social benefits.  In addition, Yeltsin’s 
lead economist, Anatoly Chubays, was accused of involvement in a financial scandal 
leading to his dismissal from the government.  According to the 1997 Annual Report on 
U.S. Assistance to the NIS (State Department Coordinator’s Office 1998, 36), continued 
economic reform did not look so promising, though the government was able to meet the 
criteria of its IMF program in 1997.  USIA found, in a survey specifically targeting youth 
conducted just two months prior to the ruble crash, that the great majority of young 
Russians felt is was more important for Russia to be prosperous than to be a great 
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military power (USIA 1998b).  Nearly half felt that economic conditions would improve 
over the next 10-15 years and one-third expected progress in the rule of law.    
 
The ruble crash 
 In July 1998, Russia received a large loan package from the international financial 
institutions in an attempt to stave financial crisis, but investors continued to pull money 
out of Russia and the government used the loan to support exchange rates rather than 
servicing its debt.  August 17, 1998 showed clearly the weakness of Russia’s economy 
and sparked grave concern about its political stability.  Suffering from a growing budget 
deficit, only partial structural reform, and global economic problems—specifically, 
financial crisis in Asia with the resultant fall in investor confidence in emerging markets 
and a decline in the world price of oil—the Russian government declared emergency 
measures, devaluing the ruble and placing a moratorium on certain payments. 
 
Unable to make its scheduled debt payments, Russia defaulted on its international 
loans, plunging the economy into chaos.  Macroeconomic stabilization evaporated, 
inflation rose, GDP declined, imports declined sharply, unemployment rose, and as tax 
payments fell, government arrears increased even further.  The domestic banking sector 
collapsed, Russia’s productivity and trade fell, and any confidence the Russian people 
had in the market vanished.  The Russian financial system fell into complete collapse and 
individuals lost all their savings in the devaluation of the ruble, which declined by three-
fourths of its value.  The Russian government had raised revenue by issuing government 
securities with high interest rates, in which Russian banks had invested heavily.  State 
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Department Background Notes on Russia (2000, 3) stated that millions of Russian 
workers were underemployed with unemployment highest among women and young 
people.  One-third of the Russian populations lived on just over $1 a day.  As reported in 
The Washington Post, the financial system “failed to fulfill its main function in the 
market economy--marshaling the savings of households and companies to finance 
productive capital investment in the incipient private sector” (Mufson and Hoffman 1998, 
A34).  
 
Russia looked, on the surface, like it was becoming a market economy, for 
example in its bond and stock markets in which over a three year period (1995-1998) 
billions of investment dollars flowed.  Those investments, however, exited just as quickly 
with the ruble collapse (ibid., A34).  The Russian stock market that peaked at 571 on 
October 6, 1997, crashed just one year later to an all-time low of 37.  The veneer of 
capitalism—“bonds, stock markets, people in business suits, and a boom psychology”—
did not resolve underlying problems of “cronyism, lack of rule of law, and hostil[ity] to 
the long-term direct investment it needed most” (ibid., A34).  Production continued at a 
very low level because profits earned during the boom were not invested back into plants 
and equipment.  Instead, they went to “feather the nests of the well-connected Russian 
managers and owners rather than into equipment that would make the firms more 
efficient. . . . . Their experience and motivation is that building a business is kind of a 
secondary item to building one’s fortune.”  There were many disincentives to foreign 
direct investment including unprotected property and shareholder rights, confiscatory 
taxes, and the absence of rule of law.  One Western fund manager in Moscow reported, 
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“Joint ventures were a joke . . . . They were all collapsing—the property laws, 
contractural obligations—no one really trusted the Russians” (Mufson and Hoffman, 
A34).    
 
Poorly designed and implemented economic reforms throughout the decade 
impoverished the vast majority, including the state, which could not pay its wage arrears 
or service its debts.  Many Russians blamed the United States for its economic problems 
and the ruble crashed discredited the idea of a market democracy.  Fifty-nine percent of 
respondents in a late December 1998 USIA survey believed that foreign investment in 
Russia’s economy “should be discouraged because foreigners might gain too much 
influence over Russian affairs” (USIA 1999a, 3).  The number of respondents who 
expressed the opinion that “the U.S. was using Russia’s weakness to reduce it to a second 
rate power and producer of raw materials” increased from 59 percent in 1995 to 75 
percent in 1998/9 (ibid., 3). 
 
Remarkably, the Russian economy managed to survive the 1998 economic crisis 
and reported a 3.2% increase in the GDP in 1999 compared to 1998 due to the earlier 
devaluation of the ruble, high world oil prices, low inflation, and strict budget control 
(State Department Bureau of European Affairs 2000, 11).  Unpredictable contract 
enforcement and lack of taxation regulation continued to interfere with the market.  The 
government made modest progress on a bankruptcy code in January 1998 (ibid., 12). 
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In USIA-sponsored focus group discussions from March 15-19, 1999, Russian 
citizens at all socioeconomic levels in four cities—Moscow, Nizhny Novgorod (third 
largest city in Russia), Volgograd (representing the strongly communist “red belt”) and 
Kazan (capital of the important ethnic republic of Tatarstan)—were “profoundly 
depressed, fearful of greater political and economic adversity ahead, and deeply 
mistrustful of the authorities” (USIA 1999b).70 These feelings were especially strong 
among middle class (teachers, doctors, lawyers, businesspeople and journalists) and 
working class (skilled and unskilled workers, engineers, army and police officers) 
participants, who expressed little hope for the future.  They had been personally hurt by 
the August 1998 economic crisis through the loss of savings, shrinking living standards, 
rising unemployment and higher prices.  Working class discussants could no longer 
afford commodities to which they had become accustomed like an imported washing 
machine or vacation.  Their greatest fear was of further economic decline, reminiscent of 
Leningrad during the World War II blockade.  Discussants expressed fear of “spreading 
social degradation, crime and corruption,” leading to “apocalyptic fears of civil war, 
interethnic conflict, fascism, military dictatorship, a return to the Communist system, 
and/or disintegration of the Russian state” (USIA 1999b).  Showing little regard for the 
potential political leaders of the day, many hoped for a “new man” to appear as president 
in 2000. 
 
70 Note, these discussions occurred one year after the economic crisis and one week before the March 24, 
1999 NATO bombing of Kosovo in response to Milosevic’s actions there.  The focus groups asked 
participants how life had changed personally and in their region over the past year, who was responsible for 
the economic crisis, what were their greatest hopes and fears for the future, and who did they expect to win 
the upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections (USIA 1999b, 2). 
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Middle class discussants and those from Moscow were particularly affected by 
the ruble crash because the two years prior to the crisis had been a relatively stable period 
(USIA 1999b, 6).  While those in Moscow felt the crisis immediately, workers in the 
provinces experienced the crisis as continuing deprivation of recent years.  “Chronic 
wage delays, low wages, the need to save every kopeck have been permanent features of 
their life for six or seven years” (USIA 1999b, 7).  The psychological impact of the 
economic crisis resulted in “apathy, frustration and depression” among all eight groups.  
This report corroborated USIA’s earlier findings of a nationwide survey in December 
1998 – January 1999 that 82 percent of the Russian public believed Russia was headed in 
the wrong direction (USIA 1999b, 8).  Discussants in the eight focus groups expressed no 
trust in the government.  This lack of trust did not bode well for prospects for democracy.  
One discussant noted that Russians were “tired of experiments on the country and 
ourselves” (USIA 1999b, 8).  Many of the discussants blamed the government and 
Yeltsin specifically for the crisis, saying that they could not rely on “an alcoholic” or a 
president who “rules the country from a hospital bed” (ibid., 9).  Others just blamed 
Yeltsin for “being out of it.”  Some discussants blamed the “oligarchs” citing, for 
example, “seven bankers who had largely financed Yeltsin’s 1996 election campaign” 
(ibid., 10).  The mass media blamed the IMF and U.S. for setting up Russian to collapse 
through loans it could not repay.  Finally, some noted that, 15 years after the exuberance 
of Gorbachev’s reforms and all the hopes they had for the future, they had become 
indifferent to politics. 
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The results of the eight focus groups in 1999 were deeply disturbing and contrary 
to democratic thinking.  By the end of the decade, the ground had not been prepared for 
democracy to take hold.  In short, people were fearful, distrustful, disillusioned, and 
intolerant toward migrants in an atmosphere of tight employment opportunities.  
Corruption was widespread—several participants said they did not know anyone who 
would not take a bribe.  They were not afraid of the mafia, but they were afraid of the 
mafia gaining political power.  They had lost faith in the electoral process, believing that 
one vote gets lost in the mass.  One discussant in Nizhny Novgorod noted, “we have but a 
single aspect of democracy now, freedom of speech.  Everyone is free to voice his 
opinion on TV. . . . If we lose this freedom, we will not have anything at all.”  Another 
added, “It’s a false kind of democracy.  It may even happen in the future that we will not 
be able to influence the outcome of elections because big capital will determine the 
results on its own” (USIA 1999b, 21).  Some discussants even expressed a desire for a 
dictator to help Russia overcome its difficulties.  Few discussants had much hope for the 
future, pinning it on a new leader.  Interestingly, Vladimir Putin was not among those 
listed as the possible next president.     
 
Russia’s Fledgling Political Institutions
In the midst of the tumultuous and chaotic events of the 1990s, some democratic 
institutions and procedures emerged.  The December 1993 elections were Russia’s first 
free and fair multi-party parliamentary elections.  Yeltsin’s new constitution, passed at 
the same time, established three branches of government - the executive as a very strong 
presidency, a bicameral legislative with the lower house Duma and upper house 
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Federation Council comprised of the heads of the 89 subject regions, and a judiciary 
where the Constitutional Court was re-established and finally activated in March 1995 as 
the final word on constitutional issues.  The new constitution provided guarantees of rule 
of law, and freedoms of speech, press, religion, assembly, and movement, many more 
civil liberties than Russians ever experienced under communism.  Despite some 
controversy surrounding the referendum process ratifying the new Constitution, it was 
accepted and has been followed (Remington 1997, 74).  On the surface, Russia appeared 
to be developing democratic political institutions. 
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Little public confidence 
 
In the first half of the 1990s, however, Russian citizens demonstrated little 
confidence in new political institutions or in the president.  In February 1991, 50 percent 
of Russian citizens surveyed supported the Russian parliament.  That proportion fell to 36 
percent in December 1991 and further to 27 percent in June 1992 (USIA 1996b, 6).  
Citizens were even less supportive of the State Duma which replaced the Supreme Soviet 
at the end of 1993 and was dominated by communists and nationalists who opposed 
reform.  In November 1994, 16 percent of respondents had confidence in the Duma; that 
fell to 11 percent by October 1995 and rose slightly following the parliamentary elections 
in December 1995 to 23 percent of the public and 30 percent of elite respondents.  
According to USIA, the institutions in which Russian citizens expressed most confidence 
were the army and the Russian Orthodox Church (USIA 1996b, 6). 
 
In a summer 1998 survey targeting Russian youth (1248 Russian citizens aged 18-
29), USIA found there was widespread disillusionment with current authorities and two 
of three respondents said they had “no” or “not much” interest in national or local politics 
(USIA 1998b, 1).  Those who had completed higher education or had the best grades in 
their last year of secondary school expressed views that were more moderate or more 
liberal.  They overwhelmingly wanted Russia to be a prosperous country where people 
lived well rather than a great military power respected by other countries.  When asked 
what had changed for the better in Russia, 22 percent cited political freedoms including 
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freedom of speech, democracy, and more available information; another 22 percent cited 
economic improvements including the availability of more consumer goods; 31 percent 
there were no changes for the better.  When asked what had changed for the worse, 44 
percent cited economic difficulties including unemployment, declining living standards, 
and unpaid or low wages (USIA 1998b, 2).  Nearly half (44 percent) of the young 
respondents thought Russia’s political system in 1998 was not democratic; only 21 
percent thought it was; and 27 percent found it hard to say.  USIA attributed this high 
percentage of “not democracy” to lack of clarity over the concept of democracy, noting 
that some respondents mentioned, in connection with democracy, such elements as “civil 
liberties, representative government, rule of law, multicandidate elections, approximate 
social equity and mass political participation.”  A majority of respondents agreed that 
they “did not fully understand how democracy was supposed to work in Russia” and 11 
percent said they did not fully understand what a democratic system was (USIA 1998b, 
4).         
 
A strong executive 
 The 1993 constitution created a strong presidency – the prize of the Russian 
political system, a hybrid of presidential and parliamentary forms.  The constitution 
established the presidency as the dominant political institution.  “[T]he president has 
wide law-making powers and authority over the cabinet, while the government must also 
maintain the confidence of the parliament” (Remington 1997, 78).  The president served 
as head of state, commander in chief of the armed forces, and chairman of the Security 
Council, could declare a state of war or emergency on Russian territory with immediate 
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notification of the parliament, and had overall responsibility for foreign and domestic 
policy.  The president was responsible for appointing the prime minister with the consent 
of the parliament, the State Duma.  While Russia’s constitution established a division of 
power between the legislative and executive branches, the presidency was so powerful 
this division lost much of its meaning (ibid., 78). 
 
In practice, the Constitutional Court did not often challenge Yeltsin on his decrees 
and ruled in 1995 that parliament had no authority to block a presidential decree.  It also 
ruled that Yeltsin “did not exceed his constitutional authority in launching military 
operations in Chechnya by decrees” (ibid., 80).  According to Remington, the 
Constitutional Court played a decisive role to play in the consolidation of democracy in 
the extent to which it either abided by the constitution or personalized its relationship 
with the president.  It was within the power of the Russian Constitutional Court to serve 
as a check on presidential power.  The body of opinion from the Constitutional Court 
interpreting the constitution helped establish the rules of the political game and could 
play an important stabilizing role.  “The more the opposing forces adhere to 
constitutional procedures in settling their differences, the costlier it is for any one side to 
be the first to violate it.  In this way a self-enforcing agreement on the institutional 
framework can acquire a binding force” (ibid., 80).  There were additional limits on 
presidential power in that parliament could override a presidential veto by a two-thirds 
vote of each chamber.  Because power was concentrated in the presidency, “a peaceful 
transfer of power from one president to another following a free and fair election is 
therefore a critical condition for a democratic outcome in Russia” (ibid., 70). 
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Heightening the sense of political chaos, Yeltsin had a penchant in the latter years 
of his presidential term for responding to crises or threats by shuffling the leadership 
around him.  Yegor Gaidar was the first post-Soviet prime minister who served briefly 
from June 15-December 14, 1992.  He was replaced by Victor Chernomyrdin, a key 
figure in U.S.-Russian relations from 1992-1998.  In March 1998, Yeltsin replaced 
Chernomyrdin with young reformer Sergei Kiriyenko whom the President then dismissed 
on September 10, 1998, in response to the economic crisis of August 17.  Yeltsin tried 
unsuccessfully to replace Kiriyenko with former Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, but was 
forced by the Duma to withdraw that nomination.  He then submitted former Foreign 
Minister and Soviet holdover Yevgeniy Primakov who was accepted by the parliament 
with strong communist support.  Yeltsin fired Primakov on May 12, 1999 and replaced 
him with Sergei Stepashin who served for three months until Yeltsin replaced him with 
Vladimir Putin on August 9, 1999.  Finally on December 31, 1999, Boris Yeltsin resigned 
as president of the Russian Federation and appointed Vladimir Putin as acting president. 
 
The parliament 
 The 1993 Constitution created the Federal Assembly, a bicameral parliament 
consisting of the State Duma, the lower house with 450 seats, and the Council of the 
Federation, the upper house with two deputies from each of the 89 regions of the 
Federation.  The Duma was a mixed system of proportional representation and single-
member districts with half of the seats allocated proportionately to registered parties that 
received at least five percent of the vote and the other half through single-stage plurality 
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election in single-member districts (Remington 1997, 83).  Parliamentary powers 
included approval of legislation and its confidence in the government as required by the 




 Since its independence, Russia conducted parliamentary and presidential elections 
consistently and on-schedule.  According to Remington (76), these included the Soviet 
election to the Congress of People’s Deputies (1989), Russian republican election making 
Boris Yeltsin the first freely elected president of Russia (1990), presidential election 
(June 1991), parliamentary election (December 1993), parliamentary election (December 
1995), and June 1996 presidential election to re-elect Yeltsin (June 1996).  Those 
elections were followed by parliamentary elections (December 1999) with the subsequent 
resignation of Boris Yeltsin at the end of the month and his appointment of Vladimir 
Putin as Acting President.  Russia held national referenda in March 1991, April 1993 on 
the government, and December 1993 on the constitution.  In the early post-Soviet 
elections, the vote was between communists and anti-communists.  It was easy for anti-
communist groups to unite in this simple dichotomy in support of “democracy.”  
Remington (74) attributed Yeltsin’s remarkable success in winning three successive 
popular elections in three successive years (1989-1991) to his support by “a unique 
coalition of forces” attracted to his simultaneous support for economic reform and 
democratization; stripping privileges from communist elite; and autonomy for Russia 
from the rest of the USSR.  Russian society in the 1990s was remarkably peaceful, 
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despite two attempted coups by hard-line communists in 1991 and 1993 and in the latter, 
the resultant use of force by the Russian President against them. 
 
On December 17, 1995, Russians participated again in parliamentary elections, 
with the communist bloc winning the largest proportion of seats, followed by the 
nationalists.  As described in the 1995 Annual Report on U.S. Assistance to the NIS (State 
Department Coordinator’s Office 1996, 161), this “mark[ed] the first time in Russia’s 
history that two consecutive democratic multi-party elections have taken place.”  Those 
elections were deemed free and fair by international observers.   
 
During June and July 1996, Russians participated in the two rounds of the 
presidential election that was deemed free and fair despite some concern about Boris 
Yeltsin’s use of presidential privileges.  On the heels of the election, President Yeltsin’s 
health declined dramatically, slowing considerably the pace of economic and political 
reform.  By mid-1997, the heads of all 89 subject regions had been elected, as opposed to 
earlier presidential appointment, making the Federation Council a much more 
representative institution.  Parliamentary elections were held again on December 19 
1999, after which Boris Yeltsin resigned the presidency and made Vladimir Putin Acting 
President.  The Communist Party of Russia narrowly gained the largest number of party 
designated seats at 67 with the Unity Party, a new party founded to support Putin and the 
government, a close second with 64 seats (RFE/RL 1999).  Putin subsequently won the 
presidential election in the first round with 53 percent of the vote on March 26, 2000 
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(State Department Bureau of European Affairs 2000, 7).  Both of these elections were 
judged generally free and fair by outside observers (ibid., 8).    
 
A weak party system 
 The design of the constitution with a strong executive marginalized the Duma and 
helped keep political parties weak. The views of the people, therefore, were not being 
channeled to government despite the regular occurrence of elections.  Russian citizens 
did not speak through parties.  Remington (1997, 97) noted that “the structure of social 
influence today is an outgrowth of Soviet-era institutional arrangements, which enabled 
some strategically placed elites to convert productive, ideological and administrative 
resources into assets in post-Soviet society when economic and political controls were 
relaxed.”  Those who were in privileged positions in the old Soviet system continued to 
be so in the new system.  Surveys suggested that Russian citizens felt alienated from their 
political leaders.  There was increasing inequality and widespread corruption throughout 
society.  “The popular wave of enthusiasm for democratic and market reform that 
propelled a new generation of political elites into power in 1989-91 has been spent.  It 
has been followed by a wave of disillusionment with the initial results of change, and 
expressed by voter support for the communist and nationalist opposition . . . The issues 
that helped to bring democrats into power in 1989-91—radical anti-establishment 
egalitarianism, political freedom, economic opportunity—no longer move voters” 
(Remington 1997, 113-114).  
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Building a party system in a post-communist state was especially challenging 
because of the communist legacy with citizens’ high level of distrust of state institutions, 
the perversion of elections that were mandatory and neither free nor fair, and the 
prevalent lack of trust in society for fear of retribution by the state.  In Russia, the 
political party system was weak in the 1990s with many different small parties often built 
around an individual personality.  This was the politics of identity, not interests.  The lack 
of respect for authority hindered political parties from attracting and building 
constituencies.  “The simultaneous admission of all social strata and economic groups 
into postcommunist electoral systems has created an incentive to establish catch-all 
parties that appeal to many different constituencies” (Parrott 1997, 17).  Here lay the 
unique challenge to the postcommunist leaders who were trying to build consensus at the 
center while throwing off the institutional and psychological structure of the communist 
one-party system and dealing with holdover extremist groups. 
 
Many political parties came and went from the Russian political scene during the 
1990s.71 Political parties first appeared in Russia in the late Soviet period with the sole 
purpose of overthrowing communist rule.  Such an explicit goal served to unite the many 
informal groups and developing parties at that time.  They were neither democratic nor 
nationalist groups—they were anti-communist groups with a shared objective.  These 
parties never really had the opportunity to develop even after the fall of communism.  As 
Urban and Gel’man (1997, 184) described the once promising “Democratic Russia” party 
that was formed in the mounting euphoria of 1990, “Eventually, what had been a mass 
 
71 For detailed discussion, see, for example, Michael Urban and Vladimir Gel’man “The development of 
political parties in Russia” in Democratic Changes and Authoritarian Reactions in Russia, Ukraine, 
Belarus, and Moldova (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1997).   
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democratic organization found itself shilling for an increasing authoritarian regime 
pursuing an economic reform impoverishing most Russians while creating a new class of 
wealthy individuals consisting primarily of old communist officials, organized criminals 
and bunko artists.”  Urban and Gel’man (1997, 175-176) called Russia’s democratic 
parties one of the principal casualties of the transition; even in the transition period, “the 
state vastly overshadowed the institutions of political society and drastically inhibited 
their influence on its actions (ibid., 176).”  Upon the collapse of the USSR, Yeltsin did 
not call immediately for new parliamentary elections, so there was no driving force to 
energize political groups to focus on their identities and distinguish themselves one from 
another.  As a result, the groups that had called for parliamentary elections in early 1992 
had all disappeared by 1995.   
 
Remington (1997) identified three distinct groups in Russian politics which 
competed and occasionally worked together in coalition—the liberal democrats or 
reformers, the nationalists, and the communists with the nationalists playing the swing 
role depending on their interests.  Politics in 1994-1995 were characterized by 
compromise and working within the constitution because no group had a majority in the 
Duma.  This changed, however, with the success of the Communist Party in the 
December 1995 parliamentary elections.  With the communist bloc in charge of the 
Duma and in contention with a weak president in precarious health, reforms slowed 
considerably in the latter half of the decade.  The Communist Party continued to play an 
influential role during the rest of the decade.  
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According to Urban and Gel’man (1997, 209), Russian elections were 
characterized by a large number of small parties, e.g., 43 different parties in the 1995 
parliamentary elections.  With the requirement that a party must cross the five percent 
threshold to secure a seat in the Duma, the small parties had little chance of winning seats 
and their supporters went unrepresented.  For the 1995 elections, Russia had 64.5 percent 
voter turnout and 49.5 percent of them voted for parties that did not cross the required 
threshold.  Of the 43 parties, only four gained sufficient votes to obtain seats in the Duma 
(ibid., 209).  For several years, the democratic forces were unable to unite under a 
specific platform. “By 1995 fragmentation of democratic forces reached the point that it 
scattered votes across a half dozen pro-reform parties, none of which except for Yabloko 
then crossed the five percent threshold needed to receive parliamentary mandates” 
(Remington 1997, 72).  Urban and Gel’man (1997, 209) concluded, “With so many 
parties shut out of office and so many voters denied representation, the prevailing 
arrangements do not bode well for the stability of Russia’s party system and, by that 
measure, for Russian democracy generally.”  They were critical of the West for 
supporting Yeltsin’s “authoritarian presidency” during the 1990s and for not providing 
the level of financial support that Russia expected and needed.  Hence, they explained the 
return to power of the communists in the Duma in the middle of the decade. 
 
Regional autonomy 
 The 1993 Constitution declared Russia as a federation, but the distribution of 
power between the center and the regions was not clear.  Not all 89 regions, which 
included the two federal cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg, of the Russian Federation 
160
were equal.  The 21 ethnic republics were allowed to create their own forms of 
government and to write their own constitutions and laws as long as they conformed to 
the federal constitution and law.  Ten of them created presidential systems (Remington 
1997, 79).  Heads of oblasts, on the other hand, were appointed by President Yeltsin.  The 
precedent of a strong executive in the center translated to strong executives in the 
regions.  Many of the presidents elected to the republics were high-ranking holdovers 
from the Soviet era.  In theory decentralized power to the regions should have checked 
central power, but according to Hahn (1997, 131) “[I]n Russia, relations between the 
central government and the regions are still very much in flux; a stable balance of power 
between Moscow and the regions has not yet been achieved.”  This was in part because 
the Kremlin chose to deal individually with the regions, negotiating bilateral agreements 
with them individually so that some paid more taxes, while others got better tax deals.  
Some got benefits from Moscow, others did not.  Moscow’s hand reached into the 
republics as Yeltsin appointed presidential representatives to serve in the regions to 
assure that federal laws were being upheld.  Originally, the heads of the regions in many 
cases were appointed by Yeltsin and did not stand for election. 
 
In the 1990s, most support for democratization lay within the major cities in 
Russia and had only mixed support in the regions outside Moscow and St. Petersburg.   
Democratic institutions were introduced into the regions in 1990-93 with elections to 
local soviets, but political parties were very slow to develop there.  The establishment of 
a strong executive in the constitution gave Moscow significant control over the regions.  
Hahn (1997, 148) stated, “. . .  at least since the coup attempt of August 1991 there has 
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been a growing tendency toward virtually unlimited rule by local executive officials, a 
tendency which has accelerated since the abolition of the soviets in October 1993.”  The 
election of governors and mayors was an important step toward greater regional 
democracy in Russia as it held local leaders accountable to voters rather than to the 
president and should have led to a federalist system. 
 
Moscow stood apart from the other regions as it was much more advanced in 
terms of pursuing economic and political reform.  The 89 regions across the vast Russian 
Federation were at various stages of transition.  Some were more vibrant like Samara 
where the NGO community was growing.  Others were in dismal conditions, like the 
Arctic region of Nickel where whole cities were polluted, but people could not afford to 
leave because they had no where to go.  They belonged to the company town and there 
were no alternatives. 
 
USIA conducted a comparative survey in 1996 among four regions—Moscow, St. 
Petersburg, Ekaterinburg, and Vladivostok—on attitudes toward the United States (USIA 
1996a).72 Moscow, St. Petersburg and Ekaterinburg were considered reformist regions, 
i.e., more open to democratic political and market economic reform.  Vladivostok tended 
to show more support for communist and nationalist forces under Gennady Zyuganov and 
Vladimir Zhirinovsky, respectively (USIA 1996a, 21).  One of the most meaningful 
questions for the purpose of this study was attitudes toward the U.S. as a political and 
economic model, i.e., a market democracy.  In 1995, overall, 43 percent of respondents 
 
72 This survey of about 400 citizens in each region was conducted from March 28-April 15, 1996 by the 
Russian Public Opinion and Market Research.  This survey was a follow-up to one conducted in 1995, 
allowing USIA to track any changes in attitude over the year.    
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agreed and 48 percent disagreed that “American society offers a political and economic 
example for Russia” to emulate.  Of those respondents under 30 years of age, 59 percent 
agreed and of those 50 years and older, 58 percent disagreed that the U.S. was a model 
for Russia.  The 1996 survey took this question a step further, dividing it along political 
and economic dimensions “to see if opinions might differ with regard to democracy and 
capitalism” (USIA 1996a, 16-17).  Overall, a slim majority in Vladivostok and pluralities 
in the other three regions responded that they did not agree the U.S. offered a political 
model for Russia to emulate.  When queried on specific aspects of democracy, however, 
the responses were more positive.  On separation of powers among executive, legislative, 
and judicial branches, 69 percent agreed and 8 percent disagreed in Moscow, 74 percent 
agreed and 6 percent disagreed in St. Petersburg, 66 percent agreed and 15 percent 
disagreed in Ekaterinburg, and 74 percent agreed and 7 percent disagreed in Vladivostok 
that Russia should adopt this principle (ibid., 17).  On division of powers among federal, 
state and local jurisdictions, 58 percent agreed and 19 percent disagreed in Ekaterinburg, 
64 percent agreed and 9 percent disagreed in Moscow, 64 percent agreed and 10 percent 
disagreed in St. Petersburg, and 73 percent agreed and 8 percent disagreed in Vladivostok 
on this principle.  On civilian control of the military, 55 percent agreed and 22 percent 
disagreed with this principle in Ekaterinburg, compared to 61 percent and 18 percent in 
St. Petersburg, 60 percent and 21 percent in Moscow, and 66 percent and 19 percent in 
Vladivostok, respectively.  Finally, the question on freedom of residence and personal 
movement met with overwhelming approval at 81 percent in St. Petersburg, 71 percent in 
Moscow, 75 percent in Ekaterinburg, and 85 percent in Vladivostok.  Overall, 
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respondents were less certain about local control of primary and secondary school, but 
more approved than disapproved (USIA 1996a, 17). 
 
When asked about the United States as an economic model for Russia, 
respondents were united in their rejection of the U.S. system.  The USIA report suggested 
that “this may be partly a result of the identification of the United States with painful 
Russian economic reform” (USIA 1996a, 17).  The report also noted that pervious survey 
showed that “most Russians favored state control of big industry and transport, as well as 
a broad social safety net” (ibid., 17).  Another USIA survey, conducted in April 1996, 
found “overwhelming majorities” agreed that “official corruption undermined reform” 
and “criminal elements controlled most private businesses” (ibid., 18).   
These findings on the U.S. as a political and economic model demonstrate the real 
challenges to U.S. democracy promoters in advancing reforms in Russia, especially in 
light of the relatively reform-minded regions in which these surveys were conducted.  
USIA found, however, that younger Russians in all four regions tended to view the U.S. 
more favorably.         
 
In terms of relations with Moscow, many regions chose to move forward with 
reform, rather than wait for federal law to be passed.  For example, land reform, an 
important step in encouraging market development, was a particularly contentious issue 
between federal and regional authorities.  The December 1993 constitution guaranteed 
the right to own, buy, sell, trade, and use land freely.  Progress on land reform laws 
deadlocked at the federal level, however, between those who supported the constitution 
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(the Yeltsin administration) and those who opposed it (the communist-dominated Duma).  
With the deadlock, Yeltsin instead issued executive decrees piecemeal allowing full 
trading of urban land and small rural plots, but not for land in general.  With the 
executive and legislative branches deadlocked, the regions passed their own laws on land 
ownership, with some regions highly restrictive and others allowing full trading of land 
(Solomon 1999, 10).  This created a widespread sense of instability in Russia with banks 
hesitant to lend money based on land as collateral in the face of possible changes, 
pending passage of a federal law. 
 
Some regions did not respect the rulings of the Constitutional Court, which, for 
example, had ruled that the propiska or residence permit to restrict population movement 
was unconstitutional.  According to the Court, regions and cities could require 
registration, but could not charge excessive fees or deny registration for those who met 
the conditions.  Many regional officials, however, refused to comply.  They wanted their 
own courts and to be involved in the process of appointing judges. 
 
At the end of the Yeltsin administration, the regions had a great deal of autonomy, 
but that changed under Putin who sought to rein in their power and make them 
answerable to the Kremlin.  Most dramatically, Putin replaced elected governors with 
those of his own appointment.  
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Russian Political Culture and Society
At the outset of independence, Russia’s political culture was far from democratic 
and lacked a civic tradition, a major obstacle to the growth of democracy.  The 
communist experience and collapse of the Soviet system had a profound psychological 
impact on the publics of the region.  USIA public opinion polls repeatedly showed a 
populace that wanted an orderly society and state and was decidedly non-violent.  Just as 
Russia needed to create the institutions of a market democracy, it also needed to nurture 
the development of a political culture supporting values of tolerance, diversity, 
compromise, and respect for the individual.  Post-communist political culture had to grow 
beyond its imperial and communist legacies and this only could happen under political 
leadership, which encouraged civil society to grow and deepen.  In the confusion of the 
transition, many, especially older, Russians expressed nostalgia for the stability and 
predictability of the past.  Others searched for security in tightly held, close knit circles, 
not trusting society at large.  Neither of these coping mechanisms was conducive to 
developing an open, democratic society, which could not survive without trust among its 
citizens. 
 
As the Soviet institutions crumbled around them, elder Russian citizens suffered 
the humiliation of loss of empire and global superpower status, the shame and economic 
hardships of unemployment and poverty, and the loss of even their meager social safety 
net.  The communist era may have been stagnant by western definition, but it was stable 
and predictable by Soviet terms.  People had learned how to work the Soviet system.  
They knew the rules and how to get around them as best as possible, mainly through 
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bribery.  With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the familiar and the predictable were 
gone, and the rules changed, though it was not exactly clear to what.  There was 
pervasive uncertainty and confusion.  The new system of glasnost and democracy was 
noisy with many voices and many views, and it was no longer so easy to determine the 
“truth.”  Under the communist system, people generally believed that the truth was the 
opposite of whatever the state proclaimed.  Now there was more than just the one voice 
of the communist party.  Pensioners particularly suffered the hardships of transition. 
 
In Fantasies of Salvation, Vladimir Tismaneanu (1998) suggested that, absent the 
certainties and predictability of the old Soviet system, post-communist publics were 
indifferent, confused, fearful, disenchanted, and disappointed about the events of the 
1990s.  Tismaneanu (1998, 4) saw the main threat to liberal democracy in the post-
communist world as how quickly or successfully a country moved toward “the learning 
of a deliberative procedure, the development of pluralist institutions, and the maturing of 
a political class committed to the values of an open society.”  The democratic experiment 
in Russia in the 1990s could not succeed without the shift to a more open political culture 
which valued tolerance, trust, and respect for the individual.  Simply put, democratic 
political and market institutions were not enough for the consolidation of democracy 
without a shift in political culture, which could take generations to occur.     
 
With nomeklatura elites still in power, there was no decommunization in Russia, 
no deliberate attempt as a society to deal with the Soviet past.  Facing the past and 
making it transparent, however, would have been an important part of the psychological 
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healing of the nation.  Coming to terms with the past is best done within a legal structure 
to build trust among people and to expand civil society in the new system.  According to 
Tismaneanu (1998, 140), "decommunization is a matter of decades.” He added, 
“Although arguments can be made that democratic stability cannot happen without 
massive inflows of Western economic aid, my point is that a lack of capital is not the 
determining factor in the region’s future.  More important is the debility of social capital, 
the loss of emotional ties of solidarity between the members of the political community, 
the weakness, decline, or inertia of civil society, and the overall erosion of any source of 
authority” (Tismaneanu 1998, 145).  The lack of respect for authority hindered, for 
example, political parties from attracting and building constituencies who could then hold 
government accountable.  
 
The communist legacy meant that corruption remained pervasive.  For the middle 
generation of Russians, the persistence of old elites espousing new terms lead to cynicism 
among the people for it suggested that there really had not been much of a revolution.  
There was no consensus in Russian society on the definition of democracy.   
 
Liberal democracy guarantees the freedom and sovereignty of the individual, and 
traditionally, Russia’s political culture was non-liberal.  With the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, Russia was morally wounded, in disarray, and feeling alienated from its place in 
the world.  There was little genuine civil society in Russia upon independence and its 
growth required the political will of the leadership not to construct barriers or obstacles 
that would inhibit individual freedom.  By the end of the decade, many in the West had 
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realized that the transition from state control to private control would take two 
generations.  Tismaneanu noted, “So powerful was the euphoria of the first stage of post-
communism that it made people oblivious of the fact that genuine civil societies cannot 
exist in the absence of market economies and thorough-going guarantees for individual 
rights.  Where civil society exists, even nationalism acquires positive connotations, and 
can thus become a liberal nationalism.  The main thrust of civil society is to diminish the 
role of the state apparatus on the life of the individual” (ibid., 163). 
 
Building civil society 
 Compared to the Soviet past, Russian civil society achieved considerable growth 
throughout the decade, increasing notably the number of non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs).73 These new organizations, however, often relied on federal or foreign 
assistance for meeting and office space, communications equipment, and other essentials.  
As a result, organizations with common interests would have to compete with one 
another for scarce resources, especially in areas outside capital cities.  The process of 
registration and the complicated tax structure constrained the growth of NGOs, too, as 
complying with these procedures and regulations was time consuming, complicated and 
expensive.  Media outlets were independent or at least controlled much less explicitly by 
the state, but they, too, were reliant on government subsidies for production.  The media 
could serve to hold government accountable and in check, but at the same time were 
dependent on the government for resources.  By the end of the decade, Russian civil 
 
73 While this study covers the period of the 1990s, I note that recent moves by President Putin and the 
Duma on legislation to restrict the activities of NGOs is worrisome and does not bode well for civil society.  
I will return to this discussion in the concluding chapter.  
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society was comprised of 65,000 registered NGOs, but was still fragile and learning how 
to operate in relation to the state.   
 
In an early November 1998 visit to Washington, then German Foreign Minister 
Joschka Fishcher noted that “‘Russia must develop a strong civil society’ and that ‘The 
cultural traditions of the free market are needed in Russia’ more than financial techniques 
and loans . . . .” (Hoagland 1998, C7).  A few days later former U.S. Ambassador to 
Hungary Donald Blinken (1998, A23) contrasted his experiences in Hungary with the 
situation in Russia—mainly the lack of direct investment and the warning its absence 
should send.  He advised that “putting the market before the society is an invitation to 
trouble,” and noted, “Societal reform must precede financial opportunity” (ibid., A23).  
He explained that direct investment would come only when the climate was right—when 
investors felt confident that they would be treated fairly and protected within the rule of 
law.  He added that only the Russians themselves could “build law-abiding and 
transparent societal standards and institutions.”  He concluded by suggesting that analysts 
should focus not on “emerging markets” but on “emerging societies.”  “When nations 
achieve acceptably flexible democratic and law-abiding domestic conditions, soundly 
based direct and portfolio investment will follow.  This takes time and perhaps 
generational change” (ibid., A23). 
 
Prospects for democracy in Russia 
Some authors argued that Russia’s authoritarian past made the consolidation of 
democracy there highly improbable because the political culture was accustomed to a 
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strong leader and a subservient public.  Others found elements of a usable past in Russian 
history on which to build a democracy.  Hahn (1997) did not preclude the emergence of 
democracy in Russia for a number of reasons:  1) there was more support for democratic 
values and institutions in the former communist countries than many expected; 2) while 
there was not a strong tolerance for minority rights, survey data was not significantly 
different from some West European democracies; 3) support for democratic values had 
been relatively stable despite economic difficulties; 4) support for democratic values and 
institutions varied in ways similar to findings in the West, especially with respect to level 
of education; and 5) the concept of democracy was more in line with European social 
democracy than democracy in U.S., with expectation of strong social welfare.  Hahn 
(1997, 162) concluded that, compared to the Soviet period, Russia had made great strides 
with real election competition and multiple candidacies the norm.  Popular participation 
was genuine, and election laws were simplified.  Legislatures debated openly.  But there 
were many problems, too.  Political parties were slow to develop in the regions with the 
communist party remaining the best organized in the rural areas.  According to Nicolai 
Petrov, voter turnout was greater in rural areas than urban, and those in rural areas tended 
to be much more conservative, supporting communists and nationalists.  In the regions, 
there was continued growth of the strength of the executive at the expense of the local 
legislature.  In the late 1990s, the system of checks and balances seemed to be shrinking 
rather than expanding.  The December 1996 elections of governors were critically 
important for growth of democracy in the regions, but some became virtual fiefdoms 
regardless of elections.74 
74 Under Putin, governors are no longer elected, but nominated by the President and confirmed by the Duma. 
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Surveys in the late 1990s showed people’s disillusionment with their lives 
(Remington 1997, 114).  They distrusted democratic political institutions, were more 
positive about the Soviet past and critical of the Yeltsin regime with little hope of 
improvement in the future.75 Quite clearly though, they did not want to return to the 
oppressiveness of the past.  There continued to be a detachment between the people and 
the state, as there had been throughout Russian history.  Such a divide runs counter to 
prospects for democracy.  Remington (1997, 115), noting that  “individual civic rights are 
widely valued in Russia, but tend to be accompanied by a strong desire for political 
order,” suggested that Russia was poised to go one of two ways – down the path of 
repression, crime, corruption and popular alienation or toward pluralistic and law-
regulated order.  Which path Russia took depended on the behavior of political elites 
(ibid., 118).  At the end of the decade, that direction was still in question and depended 
on the outcome of the parliamentary and presidential elections in December 1999 and 
March 2000, respectively.  These elections were important to see how specific parties 
fared in the parliament and how the elected president used his powerful position.76 
In a 2001 Brookings Institution report, former U.S. government official Tom 
Bjorkman recounted Freedom House’s ratings of Soviet/Russian democracy where on a 
scale of 1 to 7, 1 represents the most democratic.       
 
Year Political Rights Civil Liberties 
1985-86 7 7 
1991-92 3 3 
75 Survey findings were drawn from Richard Rose, “Russia as an Hour-Glass Society:  A Constitution 
without Citizens,” East European Constitutional Review 4, no. 3 (Summer 1995), p. 37.    
76 By 2005, we now know that Vladimir Putin, elected in March 2000, has taken steps to strengthen the 
state at the expense of civil society.  
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1994-95 3 4 
1998-99 4 4 
2000-01 5 5 
Source: Freedom House website, “Annual Survey of Freedom Country Ratings.” 
(Bjorkman, 2001) 
 
Bjorkman (2001) noted that analysts disagreed on the reasons for Russia’s 
difficulty in making progress toward democracy with some claiming the pull of the 
Soviet legacy and Russia’s lack of democratic tradition, while others faulted Yeltsin’s 
style of rule and inability to build new institutions to replace the collapsed Soviet ones.  
Regardless of the cause the results were the same.  According to Bjorkman: 
 
• “Power remains concentrated in the executive branch and centered on informal 
networks and personal connections. 
• Legislative and judicial institutions remain fragile. 
• Protections for civil liberties are weak, and state harassment of the independent 
journalists and civic activists is on the rise. 
• Official corruption remains pervasive and movement toward a rule of law 
glacial” (Bjorkman 2001, 1). 
 
By the end of the 1990s, Russia had developed some of the institutions of a 
democracy—people came to expect elections as the means for selecting their governance 
at the federal level.  They founded NGOs around their interests, some statistics indicating 
65,000-70,000 registered indigenous NGOs.  The press was relatively free.  Even as some 
of the democratic advances slid back under Putin, the Russian people have seen elements 
of an open society.  Democracy was not consolidated in Russia in the 1990s and its future 
remains unpredictable and uncertain, but it is still early in the independence period and 
democracy is an evolutionary project.  In the Freedom House ratings, Russia ranked as 
“Partly Free” in 2000 and slipped to “Not Free” in 2005 (Freedom House, 2005).  
 
173
Matching U.S. Policy to Local Reality
The chaotic political and economic events of Russia in the 1990s described in this 
section served as the backdrop for the personal relationship that developed between 
Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton through their many face-to-face meetings and for the 
implementation of U.S. assistance programs between U.S. government officials and U.S. 
NGO representatives and their Russian counterparts and citizens.  The first Clinton 
administration was a period of uncertainty in Russia and the administration, viewing 
Boris Yeltsin as politically vulnerable, feared a return to the communist past.  The 
following section focuses on the actions and reactions of the top foreign policy makers of 
the U.S. government as they sought to assist Russia in its transition from communism to a 
market democracy, which would make Russia into a more cooperative and reliable 
partner for the West (Goldgeier and McFaul 2003, 212).  
 
Russia in the eyes of the Clinton Administration 
 In his first congressional appearance as Secretary of State, Warren Christopher 
described the foreign policy priorities of the new administration in the context of 
“preventive diplomacy,” i.e., addressing problems before they become crises.77 He felt a 
special need to define this new foreign policy approach to the American people and to 
reorganize the foreign policy apparatus, which was still based on a Cold War perspective, 
to meet it.  This new foreign policy was focused on revitalizing the U.S. economy, 
updating U.S. security forces, and finally, promoting democracy “as the best means to 
 
77 Secretary Christopher appeared before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and Judiciary 
Committee of the House Appropriations Committee on March 10, 1993. 
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protect our own national security while expanding the reach of freedom, human rights, 
prosperity, and peace” (Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs 1993c, 138).  In the 
Clinton vision, there was little separation between domestic and foreign policy.  The U.S. 
needed a strong economy at home to advance a peaceful world abroad.  “By promoting 
democracy and free markets, we do more to honor the universal values upon which our 
nation is founded.  We must go beyond just the moral aspect of it to ensure our own 
security and prosperity” (ibid., 138).  He repeated the democracy peace theory that 
democracies tend not to make war on other democracies and that they are more reliable 
partners.  Secretary Christopher asserted that democracy cannot be imposed from above 
and must be built from the bottom up.  At the top of the democracy promotion agenda 
were the states of the former Soviet bloc.    
 
For the first 18 months of his presidency, Bill Clinton placed U.S. relations with 
Russia and supporting reform there at the top of his foreign policy agenda.  He was an 
optimist on Russia and developed a close, if sometimes turbulent, relationship with Boris 
Yeltsin through regular face-to-face meetings.  The Clinton Administration pursued a 
multi-pronged approach to promoting democracy and free market in Russia.  “By the 
spring of his first year in office, Clinton had become the U.S. government’s principal 
Russia hand, and so he remained for the duration of his presidency” (Talbott 2002, 5).  
Strobe Talbott, President Clinton’s top adviser on Russia, reported one of his early 
conversations with Clinton, prior to the inauguration, in which the President-elect 
remarked that what was happening in Russia was not about the end of the Cold War, 
which was over, but the “biggest and toughest thing was . . . the stuff starting—stuff 
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that’s new. Figuring out what it is, how we work with it, how we keep it moving in the 
right direction: that’s what we’ve got to do.”  His concern was whether Russia “was 
going to blow up in our faces”(ibid., 42-43). 
 
Awaiting Talbott on his first day on the job in the State Department was a note 
from the previous Secretary of State Larry Eagleburger sharing his view that if reform 
were successful in Russia, there was no guarantee it would be successful in the other 
post-Soviet states, but that if reform failed in Russia, it surely would fail in the other 
states.  His advice was to focus on Russia, stay engaged, and help Yeltsin find a way to 
move forward.  From all directions, the advice was to focus on Russia first.78 Russia 
became the bellwether for democracy promotion in the post-communist world. 
 
According to Talbott, “Clinton wanted a fresh infusion of American assistance as 
a way of priming the pump for a massive international support by the G-7” (ibid., 47).79 
Little of the $24 billion that the G-7 had promised in 1992 had been delivered, pending 
restructuring of the Russian economy.  With the annual G-7 meeting due to be held in 
Tokyo in July 1993, Clinton sought to design an aid package that would reach “real 
Russians” and improve their standard of living (ibid., 47).  Clinton was the driving force 
 
78 Change occurred with such rapidity in this part of the world in the late 1980s and early 1990s that U.S. 
foreign policy decision makers did not even know exactly how to describe the geographic area.  At first, in 
the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the USSR, U.S. decision makers referred collectively to the 15 
new states as the Former Soviet Union or FSU.  When Strobe Talbott came to the State Department, he 
changed the reference to the region as the New (or Newly) Independent States of the Former Soviet Union 
or NIS.  Within a year, Talbott was promoted to Deputy Secretary of State, the number two position in the 
Department.  In the meantime, the states of the region organized themselves loosely into the 
Commonwealth of Independent States or CIS.  For the remainder of the Clinton administration, the U.S. 
government referred to the region as the NIS.  
79 The G-7 was the leading advanced industrial democracies – Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States.  The G-7 became the G-8 with the official inclusion of the Russian 
Federation in 1998.    
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behind Russian aid; no longer was it the Congress as it had been with the SEED 
legislation and assistance to the post-communist states in Eastern Europe. 
 
Russian Deputy Prime Minister Andrei Kozyrev met with Talbott at the State 
Department and stressed that the reformers needed support back in Moscow.  He was 
looking for ways to “institutionalize” the new relationship between Russia and the U.S.  
Talbott and Kozyrev suggested that Clinton propose to Yeltsin the formation of a high-
level commission in which to embed the assistance program.  This would become the 
Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission (GCC), chaired by the U.S. Vice President and Russian 
Prime Minister, which would be the locus of much high level collaboration on a number 
of issues through the end of the decade.   
 
Congress supported the administration’s Russia-first approach.  In a statement on 
March 4, 1993, Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) demonstrated his support for President 
Clinton and especially for assistance to Russia, rallying the Congress to not risk “losing 
the peace” as the U.S. had done following World Wars I and II.  He noted that “Helping 
Russia to make the transition from communism to democracy confronts the West with the 
greatest foreign policy challenge since World War II.  No one needs to be reminded that 
the Russians have thousands of nuclear weapons, making them the only country in the 
world that can totally destroy the United States” (U.S. Congress. Senate. 1993a).  Senator 
Leahy warned that if the U.S. did not find a way to stabilize the Russian economy, the 
American taxpayer would be “holding a $4 billion bag of Russian debt” that would 
continue to grow (ibid.).  He compared the cost of supporting reform in Russia to the cost 
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of the U.S. defense budget if the communists were still in control of the Soviet Union--
$100 billion higher.  Leahy recommended raising the appropriation for assistance to 
Russia to $1 billion, specifically targeting the social safety net, by shifting foreign 
assistance funds from other regions of the world.  He called for better coordination of 
international assistance efforts to Russia, equating the approach at the time to “a group of 
people standing in a room and throwing darts at a dart board from all different 
directions.” He warned that the international community was trying to do “too many 
things in too many places with too few resources” (ibid., 2).  
 
Calling the current approach to assistance a “laundry list of bureaucratic wishes,” 
Senator Leahy urged the Clinton administration to design an overarching strategy that 
would impact the Russian people.  Such a strategy would target: “alleviation of the 
suffering of the poorest and most vulnerable sectors of the population; technical 
assistance in the essential institutions of a free market system especially banking, credit, 
and property rights; modernization of sectors which offer the most immediate prospect 
for foreign exchange earnings on the part of Russia, particularly energy, agriculture, 
natural resources; and, as important as anything else, assistance in the building of a 
democratic society, including the functioning of legislatures and free media, free labor 
unions, and civic organizations” (ibid., 3).  To date, the international community had 
delivered only “backdoor foreign aid,” and Leahy warned that time was running out.  He 
saw assistance to Russia as different from any aid the U.S. had given before.  The U.S. 
could not “afford to treat Russia as a development problem” and needed to come up with 
an innovative approach to help Russian “society recreate itself from ground zero” (ibid., 
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3).  For Leahy, a significant part of this innovative approach would be debt rescheduling.  
We warned that the “standard loans and guarantees on standard terms are not an effective 
way of dealing with the deep economic problems of Russia” (ibid., 3).  He focused his 
plans on the agricultural sector, calling for loans that would lower the cost to Russia; tied 
aid to progress on economic reform; and emphasized barter, for example, food to Russia 
today for oil, timber or other natural resources to the U.S. in the future.  Leahy urged 
President Clinton to begin these discussions with Yeltsin at their first summit.                    
 
Preparing for the first summit 
 President Clinton’s first trip outside the United States was to meet with President 
Yeltsin in Vancouver on April 4, 1993, and he wanted this encounter to be “something 
new” (Talbott 2002, 51).80 As his key adviser on Russia, Talbott wrote for the President 
a memo outlining “A Strategic Alliance with Russian Reform” (ibid., 52), which the 
President subsequently delivered in an address to the American Society of Newspaper 
Editors on April 1, 1993 in Annapolis, Maryland.  Invoking the democratic peace theory, 
the President made the case for why the U.S. needed to invest in Russia’s future by 
supporting Russian reform, specifically Yeltsin and his “fellow reformers” who were 
under assault by the Congress of People’s Deputies (U.S. Department of State Bureau of 
Public Affairs 1993d).  Supporting Russian reform toward democracy was a wise 
investment for the United States because it was an historic opportunity to improve the 
 
80 Vancouver was the first of numerous bilateral and G-7/G-8 summits, an approach to U.S.-Russia 
relations that President Clinton strongly favored.  Each summit was carefully orchestrated to achieve 
specific results.  The State Department Office of the Historian calculated 23 meetings between Presidents 




security of the U.S., would give the U.S. a partner for global problem solving, provided a 
peace dividend to the American public which had spent trillions of dollars during the 
Cold War, and would insert wealth into the global economy through its rich natural 
resources.  The President also proposed how the U.S. should make this investment:  
through assistance widely dispersed from the ground up not just through Moscow; efforts 
devoted to activities with lasting impact such as introducing modern drilling practices to 
halt the leaks in gas pipelines; investing in people-to-people exchanges not just 
government-to-government; partnering with other key players in the global economy to 
stabilize the ruble; pursuing denuclearization; and committing for the long-term (U.S. 
Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs 1993d). 
 
Talbott recommended to the President, “Our objective and our policy can—and 
should—be put more positively. . . Russia is on the path toward becoming a modern state, 
at peace with itself and the world, productively and prosperously integrated into the 
international economy, a source for raw materials and manufactured products, a market 
for American goods and services, and a partner for American diplomacy.  It should be 
U.S. policy not just to prevent the worst but also to nurture the best that might happen in 
the former Soviet Union” (Talbott 2002, 52).  He explained that the Russians “were 
trying to transform their country from a totalitarian system to a democracy; from a 
command economy to a market one; and from a multinational empire to a nation-state.”  
He called the bloodless meltdown of the Soviet system “the greatest political miracle of 
our era” (Talbott 2002, 53).  He continued, “Doing what we can from the outside, 
marginal and modest as it may be, to keep that miracle going constitutes the greatest 
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single task facing American foreign policy in the years to come” (Talbott 2002, 53).  
Even at this early point in the assistance effort, the foreign policy leadership understood 
that their external impact could be only so effective at establishing Russian democracy.   
 
The President’s Annapolis speech was well-received in the Senate, which 
demonstrated bipartisan support for assistance to Russia.  Senator Claiborne Pell (D-RI) 
commended the President for seeking outside advice in preparation for the Vancouver 
Summit, and especially supported the President’s focus of assistance at the grassroots 
level to make a lasting impact (U.S. Congress. Senate. 1993b).  Senator Robert Dole (R-
KS) likewise commended the administration for reaching out broadly in its consultations 
for the upcoming summit.  In sharing his recommendations for U.S. policy toward 
Russia, Senator Dole focused first on offering debt relief and establishing a system to 
trade American grain for Russia’s natural resources.  He voiced strong support for 
President Yeltsin and noted that he “told President Clinton that he has bipartisan support 
in Congress for assisting Russia and neighboring states because it is in our national 
interest. . . .There is a great deal at stake in the Vancouver summit and I want President 
Clinton to know that he goes there with strong Republican backing” (U.S. Congress. 
Senate. 1993c).  
 
As part of a series of expert meetings on Capitol Hill, Paula Dobriansky, then a 
fellow at the Hudson Institute and a member of the National Endowment for Democracy 
(NED), made arguments that Representative Tom Lantos (D-CA) especially wanted to 
share with his congressional colleagues.  Her main points were that democracy promotion 
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in Russia and the rest of the former Soviet Union should be a major organizing principle 
for U.S. foreign policy, and that it will take time to build democracy because the legacy 
of communism looms large (U.S. Congress. House. 1993a).  Russia must “dislodge 
entrenched elites” and empower the people to hold genuine elections at all levels.  She 
recommended that the U.S. help Russia overcome its communist legacy through specific 
steps.  She wanted to offer blueprints and concrete assistance to help Russia lay the 
institutional foundation for democracy in six key areas: 
 
• Structure of the government and governance—establishing limited 
government with checks and balances and holding regular free and fair 
elections; 
• Develop rule of law with an independent functioning judicial system; 
• Focus on education and the promotion of a civil culture and strong civic 
associations; 
• Support free and independent media reflecting pluralism; 
• Support free market reform that coupled with a democratic political 
system promises the best prospects for economic development; and  
• Facilitate competent law enforcement with appropriate civil-military 
relations (U.S. Congress. House. 1993a). 
 
According to Dobriansky, the U.S. should pursue assistance to Russia on two 
tracks: governmental and non-governmental.  While admitting that organizations like 
USIA had important roles to play, she preferred to invest in assistance activities working 
through non-governmental organizations and international organizations, which targeted 
grassroots forces and, therefore, would have a greater impact on developing a democratic 
culture.  She cited the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) as an NGO well 
equipped to deliver direct assistance.  Dobriansky noted that Russia was limited in its 
absorptive capabilities for assistance and stressed the quality of economic and democratic 
assistance over the quantity.  She feared that giving large sums of money to the Russian 
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government would be wasted on subsidizing inefficient state enterprises.  Furthermore, 
assistance should go not just to Moscow, but to local NGOs in villages and cities outside 
the capital (U.S. Congress. House. 1993a). 
 
Most importantly, Dobriansky stressed that democracy promotion should not be 
limited to an isolated activity but should permeate all U.S. dealings with Russia including 
the government, individuals, and the private sector.  She warned, however, against 
“prescrib[ing] precise democracy recipes [because] democracy cannot be just 
transplanted from one soil to another.  We must take into account cultural, geographic, 
and historical differences”(U.S. Congress. House. 1993a).  In hindsight, Dobriansky gave 
advise that would be followed only years later after learning these lessons in light of 
misguided early policies.           
The Vancouver Summit 
 In preparation for the Vancouver summit, President Clinton urged his advisers to 
think big about assistance to Russia.  He wanted to keep Yeltsin’s spirits up and keep him 
moving in the right reform direction.  According to Talbott, the President saw Yeltsin as 
a genuine democrat.  He wanted the U.S. to increase the size and accelerate the delivery 
of assistance.  He told his advisers not to worry about the Congress; it was his job to sell 
a bold package to the Congress.  President Clinton wanted a package that helped 
demilitarize Russia’s economy and included housing for decommissioned military 
officers and provided work for nuclear scientists and assistance in dismantling weaponry 
(Talbott 2002, 58).  The FREEDOM Support Act already called for the U.S. to pursue 
these activities.  The President’s rationale was that “if Russia goes bad—if those guys 
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trying to impeach Yeltsin win—we’ll be back here talking about reversing our defense 
cuts and spending really big money to wage a new cold war” (ibid., 58).  According to 
Talbott, National Security Adviser Sandy Berger encouraged Clinton to support Boris 
Yeltsin because there was no better option.  President Clinton was convinced that Yeltsin 
was the best hope for Russian democracy.   
 
Facing steady challenges at home and the pending April 25, 1993, referendum, 
Yeltsin was looking only for modest U.S. support at the Vancouver summit, so as not to 
give his opposition ammunition that he was a puppet of Washington.  He only wanted to 
demonstrate that the outside world was ready to help Russia in this transition.  His 
greatest interest was in help to build housing for the Russian officers being withdrawn 
from the Baltic states in 1994.  The Russians were interested in stability and at least the 
appearance of parity in relations with the U.S. (ibid., 69).  
 
President Clinton lost no time engaging with President Yeltsin as they met in their 
first summit on April 3-4, 1993, in Vancouver, British Columbia.  The two leaders 
approved a comprehensive strategy of cooperation “to promote democracy, security, and 
peace” including access to each other’s markets and removal of barriers to trade (U.S. 
Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs 1993e).  To assist in the development of 
U.S.-Russia relations, they created a United States-Russian Commission on technological 
cooperation to be chaired by Vice President Gore and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, 
which became known as the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission or GCC.  President 
Clinton announced a $1.6 billion aid package for Russia, which he offered as 
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“cooperation,” not assistance, in the areas of humanitarian needs (57% of the total 
package), private sector development (10%), democracy promotion (3%), energy and the 
environment (2%), officer resettlement (.3%), trade and investment (15%), and security 
(13%).81 The presidents agreed to begin work immediately on establishing two funds to 
accelerate privatization and provide lending to new small private businesses, resuming 
U.S. grain sales to Russia along with loans to purchase American grain, and launching a 
pilot project to help provide housing for Russian military officers as they moved into 
civilian jobs.  They also agreed to expand exchanges between American experts in many 
fields and the Russian people.  The GCC agreed to undertake a special initiative to 
encourage American investment in Russia’s oil and gas sectors.  In the press conference 
immediately following the summit, President Yeltsin noted that “this was the first 
economically oriented meeting of the two great powers,” rather than one focused on 
military issues (U.S. Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs 1993e).   
 
On the flight back from the summit, Talbott reported that President Clinton 
decided to ask Congress for even more than the $1.6 billion in assistance for Russia, 
increasing it to $2.5 billion with two-thirds devoted to Russia on the theory that success 
in Russia would help the other post-Soviet states.  The U.S. package was different from 
the G-7 package, which was aimed at restructuring the Russian economy.  The U.S. 
package “would reach recipients outside the government and to a large extent outside 
Moscow.  It was targeted on those parts of the population that had been particularly hard 
hit by food and medicine shortages; on the private sector, especially small businesses; on 
 
81 The percentages are my figures calculated from the chart on U.S. Assistance to Russia printed on Fact 
Sheets: Vancouver Summit (U.S. Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs 1993e , 7) 
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independent media outlets; on nongovernmental organizations promoting civil society 
and rule of law; on public-interest advocacy groups, stock markets, start-up political 
parties and labor unions.”  These would be delivered through technical assistance “know-
how provided by American experts through the U.S. government—so there would be 
little cash to be siphoned off by corrupt local officials. . .  Another centerpiece was an 
exchange program that would bring tens of thousands of students and young 
professionals from Russia and other new independent states to the U.S. for two weeks to 
two years” (Talbott 2002, 70).  Indeed, assistance programs under the FREEDOM 
Support Act covered all these activities, but exchanges did not become a central focus of 
assistance until later in the decade.      
 
Shortly after the Vancouver summit, the finance and foreign ministers of the G-7 
met in a special gathering in Tokyo to discuss aid to Russia, the first time such a meeting 
had been called to focus on one specific issue, in anticipation of the July G-7 Tokyo 
Summit.  This was an effort on the part of the U.S. to link its bilateral assistance plans to 
multilateral efforts.  The participants focused on exclusively on economic issues, 
reducing inflation, achieving macroeconomic stabilization and a currency stabilization 
fund.  The G-7 based its assistance plans on several assumptions: 
 
• “Progress towards macroeconomic stabilization, especially the reduction 
of Russia’s high rate of inflation by bringing monetary and credit 
expansion under control, is of paramount importance to the success of 
Russia’s economic reforms;”  (The IMF would take the lead.) 
• “Structural reform measures are essential for building a market economy 
and can most effectively be implemented in the context of 
macroeconomic stabilization;” (The World Bank would take the lead.) 
• “Small and medium sized enterprises are crucial for development of a 
private sector in Russia,” (EBRD would take the lead.) 
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• “One of the crucial areas of structural adjustment in Russia is the 
restructuring and the privatization of large scale enterprises,” (The G-7 
would create a working group to pursue this.) 
• Rescheduling the debts of the former Soviet Union “will substantially 
ease balance of payments constraints,” and  
• “Improvement of access for Russian products to international markets 
strongly reinforces Russian structural reform” (U.S. Department of State 
Bureau of Public Affairs 1993e, 16-19). 
 
The G-7 focused its plans on these areas accordingly, working with the Russian 
government to address its highest priorities.  To activate the G-7 support, the Russian 
government had to take certain steps such as controlling inflation.   
 
Secretary of State Warren Christopher announced at the conclusion of the Tokyo 
summit that President Clinton would request an additional $1.8 billion in support of 
Russian reform, including $1.55 billion in grants, all but $300 million to go to Russia.  
This additional amount also included a $500 million grant to begin a new special 
privatization and restructuring fund to be supplemented by funds from other international 
donors to arrive at a $2 billion fund.  Secretary Christopher stressed especially to the 
American people that this was in “no way a program of charity; it is in no way a handout” 
(ibid., 19).  Because the stakes of Russia collapsing into chaos were so high, reform there 
was in America’s self-interest.   
 
Back home, President Clinton faced a tough sell on Capitol Hill for his enlarged 
assistance package to Russia.  According to Talbott, the President realized that the selling 
point would be the potential impact of assistance on the Russian citizenry, combined with 
the need to ensure a substantial G-7 package to show that the U.S. would not be 
supporting assistance efforts alone.  Talbott testified before the Subcommittee on Foreign 
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Operations to justify the administration’s requested funding for bold moves in support of 
Russian reform and reformers, namely Boris Yeltsin, who faced the referendum on his 
government on April 25, 1993.  The Russian people were asked in the referendum to 
express their opinions on Yeltsin’s “leadership, his economic policies, and on whether 
there should be new presidential and parliamentary elections” (ibid., 21).  To strengthen 
Yeltsin’s hand, Talbott asked the U.S. Congress to “do what we can from the outside to 
make the benefits of reform visible and tangible to the people on the inside and to do so 
as soon as possible” and “find targets of support that will last and that represent trends we 
hope will become irreversible” (ibid., 21).82 Talbott reported in his memoir that, 
surprisingly, House minority whip Newt Gingrich came out strongly in favor of 
supporting Russia, describing this as “one of the great defining moments of our time” 
(Talbott 2002, 61).  Yeltsin’s ultimate success in the April 25 referendum boosted 
congressional support for Clinton’s assistance package as the Russian people put their 
support behind Yeltsin and his reforms and called for new parliamentary elections.   
 
The Tokyo Summit 
 The presidents met again just a couple of months later in Tokyo on July 9, 1993, 
when the G-7 announced a $28.4 billion aid package for the new states of the former 
Soviet Union.   According to Talbott, President Yeltsin went to Tokyo seeking a 
substantial amount of money, and he got it.  The package was designed to fight inflation, 
 
82 This theme of the “irreversibility” of reforms was prevalent throughout democracy promotion 
discussions in the 1990s and continues to this day.  The goal of U.S. democracy promotion was to help 
advance reform sufficiently in Russia that the system would not revert back to authoritarianism.  I have not 
found, however, specific definition at which point the U.S. government would consider democracy 
irreversible.    
188
restructure the economies of the region with special programs intended to have “near-
term, high-impact benefit on the lives of citizens” (Talbott 2002, 84).  The package, 
however, was conditional on the lending rules of the International Monetary Fund.  The 
Russian government had to cut spending, control the money supply, create a credible tax 
system, pass laws on private property and get a handle on corruption.  The GCC set up 
working groups to tackle these issues. 
 
Concerns about Russia 
 The U.S. Congress debated President Clinton’s request for $2.5 billion in aid to 
Russia throughout the summer of 1993.  Some in Congress were hesitant to provide more 
assistance through USAID, calling for reform of the agency for its “mismanagement and 
inefficiencies” based on findings of insufficient oversight of development projects (U.S. 
Congress. House. 1993b).  Others in Congress were concerned about the direction of 
events in Russia.  The strong support for Russia in the euphoria of 1992 had evaporated 
in the face of the erratic and unpredictable turns of the Russian government since then, 
from its inability to control hyperinflation to the increasing political struggles between 
Yeltsin and the Congress of People’s Deputies.  Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) led a 
Congressional delegation to Russia in July 1993 and in his trip report noted that 
economic changes had not spread across Russia and were limited to the major cities.  He 
suggested that “the pace and scope of reform needs to be pressed harder once the political 
position of President Yeltsin and the reformers is firmly consolidated” (U.S. Congress. 
Senate. 1993d).  Senator Leahy cautioned for a realistic assessment of what difference 
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Western assistance could make in an economy the size of Russia’s, the transformation of 
which would be the “work of a generation” (ibid., 4). 
 
The growing resistance to Yeltsin in Russia and the attack on the Russian White 
House on “Bloody Sunday,” September 21, 1993, refocused the U.S. Congress.  Yeltsin 
suspended the parliament and called for elections on December 12, 1993.  In response to 
these events, Senator Pell (D-RI) called for Congress’s swift consideration of the 
assistance package to Russia (U.S. Congress. Senate. 1993e).  He felt the reformers 
needed the support of the U.S. and not acting would send the wrong message to Yeltsin’s 
opponents that the U.S. did not find the economic and political transformation of Russia a 
priority.83 Over the course of September 29-30, 1993, President Clinton used the crisis of 
“Bloody Sunday” and threat of instability in Russia to push the bill, which Congress 
approved quickly and Clinton signed on the last day of the fiscal year.  In the Conference 
Report on the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act of 1994, Congressman David Obey 
(D-WI) commended the strong bipartisan conduct of the Subcommittee in addressing the 
issue of aid to Russia (U.S. Congress. House. 1993c).  Support for Russian democracy 
was a rare instance of strong bipartisan agreement in the Congress and of agreement 
between the executive and legislative branches.   
 
83 This is an interesting observation with which I agree.  U.S. policy makers need to be aware not only of 
the impact of U.S. policy action on the international community, but also on those instances where the U.S. 
government chooses deliberately not to act or just does not take any action and how that is read by other 
nations.  In other words, what the U.S. does not do can have as much impact—even unintended—as what it 
actually does.  This was true several times in the story of democracy promotion in Russia in the 1990s—in 
not objecting strongly, for example, to the seriously flawed “loans-for-shares” privatization program or to 
Russia’s attacks on its own Republic of Chechnya.   
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Despite Yeltsin’s unexpected and sometimes questionable undemocratic 
actions—as in ruling by decrees and attacking the parliament—President Clinton 
remained committed to him.  Talbott recommended that, “We should use our public 
statements and the president’s upcoming summit to reiterate long-term goals and to 
encourage overall trends in Russia.  The key fact about Russia in the fall of 1993 was that 
the citizens would be going to the polls to elect a new parliament and approve the new 
constitution.  Russia was still a long way from being a stable, mature democracy, but it 
was also a long way from being a police state, and Yeltsin had been instrumental in 
moving his country in the right direction” (Talbott 2002, 103).  Talbott also noted in his 
memoir that First Lady Hillary Clinton had joined this discussion about democracy in 
Russia, referencing the experiences of Taiwan and South Korea, “which had undergone 
their own long transitions to democracy.  ‘Democracy comes by fits and starts after all 
those years of dictatorship.  Russia’s not doing that badly when you compare it to Asia.  
We’ve got to give them time.”  The President added, “It’s going to be a two-steps-
forward, one-step-backward deal” (ibid., 104).  
 
The December 12, 1993, parliamentary elections did not go well for the reformers 
and signaled support instead for ultranationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky and his misnamed 
Liberal Democratic Party.  This was a blow to democratic reforms in Russia because the 
stalemate between Yeltsin and the Duma would continue.  President Clinton interpreted 
this as a wake-up call to pay more attention to the lives of ordinary citizens in Russia, 
who did not demonstrate support for market reforms.  He called for the U.S. and the West 
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to be generous in their support for Yeltsin, aware of the messages they were sending to 
Russians, and lenient on the IMF terms of conditionality. 
 
At the G-7 Summit in Naples on July 10, 1994, Yeltsin pushed hard for official 
inclusion of Russia, expanding the group to the G-8, but the U.S. Treasury Department 
advised President Clinton against it because Russia’s economy was not sufficiently 
developed and Russia was not living up to the strict IMF conditions.  At a press 
conference following the summit, President Clinton, reflecting pressure from the U.S. 
Congress, called for Yeltsin to withdraw Russian troops from Estonia by the August 31, 
1994, deadline.  Yeltsin publicly responded with a defiant “Nyet.”  Baltic independence 
was an especially sensitive topic with the U.S. Congress, which, upon Yeltsin’s 
declaration, immediately passed legislation to stop all U.S. assistance to Russia except 
humanitarian aid, if Yeltsin did not meet the deadline.  President Clinton gave top priority 
to convincing Yeltsin to reach agreement on the withdrawal (ibid., 128-9).  According to 
Goldgeier and McFaul (2003, 172), President Clinton essentially bought the Russian 
troops out of the Baltics by promising to build them housing, a move not strongly 
supported by some U.S. congressmen.  The Baltic-American lobby, however, helped to 
push authorization through the Congress (ibid., 172). 
 
Assessing Russian progress 
 Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT), chairman of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee 
of the Senate Appropriations Committee, which controls foreign assistance, led a 
Congressional delegation to Russia on September 2-12, 1994, to ascertain progress in the 
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country’s transition to democracy and free market.  The delegation determined that 
Yeltsin had made significant progress in the first two years of Russian independence and 
that American assistance had helped, but that Russia still had a long way to go to 
complete the transition.  Lacking many of the basic institutions of a market economy, the 
delegation feared that if those institutions were not established quickly, “corruption and 
crime rather than competition could become the dominant features of the Russian 
economy” (U.S. Congress, Senate. 1994a).  The delegation saw signs of high 
unemployment in people on the street selling trinkets to make money. 
 
Russian officials repeatedly asked the delegation for technical assistance to 
support their reform efforts and agreed that humanitarian assistance was no longer 
needed.  The delegates were amazed by the rapid privatization of the economy in two 
years.  They identified crime and corruption as the gravest threat to the establishment of a 
market democracy in Russia, noting that “neither individuals nor companies feel secure. . 
. .No element of government is competent at the moment to provide them security (ibid.).  
The delegation recommended adding technical assistance for law enforcement as a major 
element of the U.S. program, in addition to support for “a commercial code, legal 
protection of land ownership, prohibitions against monopoly and other anti-competitive 
practices, and rules to govern corporate issuance of stocks and bonds and trading in such 
securities” (ibid.).  The delegation identified the unpredictable tax structure as a major 
disincentive to foreign investment, supposing that it may not be such a big issue for 
Russians who are accustomed to “evasion of government regulation and taxation” (ibid.).  
The delegates recommended that U.S. assistance give priority to helping Russia draft a 
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tax law and create police and judicial enforcement mechanisms because “the government 
needs taxes to survive” (ibid.) 
 
In addition to Moscow and St. Petersburg, the delegation also visited the city of 
Nizhny Novgorod, where U.S. assistance had allowed Governor Boris Nemtsov to pursue 
new approaches to private sector development as a model for other Russian regions.  The 
congressional delegation strongly supported such targeted assistance to Nizhny 
Novgorod, especially because it helped people at the grassroots.  The delegation 
recommended that USAID continue to encourage entrepreneurship and to monitor such 
programs closely. 
 
Nearly three years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, U.S. officials saw 
increasingly clearly what needed to be done in Russia to support the transition to a 
market democracy, as demonstrated here in the focus on the tax structure for needed 
government revenue and concern over the tipping point for corruption.  Missing, 
however, was the guidance on how to encourage Russia to pursue needed reforms in 
these areas or reflection that perhaps external forces could not convince Russia to take 
these steps.  U.S. officials identified the attributes of democracy with increasing clarity 
and specificity, but did not give specific attention to the process of democratization.  The 
consistent high-level of attention devoted to democracy promotion in Russia in the early 
part of the Clinton administration was notable, but would not be sustainable in the face of 
other pressing foreign policy issues. 
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Democracy Promotion in Russia on the Backburner
Events on the world stage encroached on U.S.-Russia relations.  Democracy 
promotion slid from the top of Bill Clinton’s foreign policy agenda as other events in that 
region and elsewhere brought new demands in the U.S-Russia relationship, particularly 
the issue of NATO enlargement, bringing former Warsaw Pact allies of Russia into the 
western organization.  The business of democracy promotion shifted from the purview of 
the top foreign policy leadership to the organizational level of foreign assistance in the 
Executive Branch, specifically, the Office of the Coordinator for U.S. Assistance to the 
NIS in the State Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the 
U.S. Information Agency.  At this level, federal program officers working with their U.S. 
NGO counterparts determined the detailed designs of assistance programs.  The work of 
democracy promotion in Russia became the usual business of mid-level bureaucrats and 
received attention from higher level officials, e.g., the Congress, when it could be used as 
a weapon or an instrument of policy, for example, when the Congress threatened to 
withhold assistance if the Russian government did not pull its troops out of the Baltic 
states by the July 31, 1994, deadline. 
 
A changing domestic environment 
 Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin both faced political opposition at home, in which 
U.S.-Russia relations played a key role.  First, in November 1994, the Republican Party 
gained control of both houses of the U.S. Congress based on its “Contract with America,” 
spearheaded by Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich.  The contract promised U.S. 
government reform, a balanced budget, and a fight against crime, among other provisions 
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to increase the safety and well being of the American people.  One platform on which the 
Republicans had campaigned was the need to rely not on deterrence, but on defense, 
specifically on National Missile Defense (NMD).  NMD stood in direct contrast to 
President Clinton’s promise to Boris Yeltsin that the U.S. would continue to comply with 
the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, under which NMD would be inadmissible.  
Once in control of the Congress, the Republicans pushed for a national anti-missile 
system and withdrawal from the ABM treaty (ibid., 377).  The new Republican control of 
the U.S. Congress in 1994, therefore, brought a shift in what the Clinton administration 
could pursue in its relations with Russia as the new Congress scrutinized Russian 
behavior much more closely.  While the Clinton foreign policy team was more inclined to 
look for ways to cooperate with Russia, i.e., to offer carrots to entice good behavior, the 
U.S. Congress was more inclined to be punitive, pushing sanctions or holding back 
assistance.       
 
Second, 1996 was a critical year for both Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin when 
both sought re-election as president.  In the first round of the Russian presidential 
election on June 16, 1996, Yeltsin gained a slim margin over his communist opponent 
Gennady Zyuganov and soundly won re-election in the second round on July 3.  Yeltsin 
fell desperately ill, however, immediately after his re-election.  On November 5, 1996, 
the day Bill Clinton won re-election as President of the United States, Boris Yeltsin had 
quintuple bypass heart surgery. 
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In the midst of political challenges at home in the middle of the decade, 
Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin struggled through the most contentious issues in the U.S.-
Russia relationship, including the response to Serbian aggression in Bosnia, Russia’s 
conflict with Chechnya, and Russia’s continued cooperation with Iran in the area of 
nuclear technology.  President Clinton’s approach to dealing with Yeltsin on these issues 
was to meet face-to-face and often. 
 
War in Bosnia 
 At the same time the Soviet Union was disintegrating, so was Yugoslavia, though 
not so peacefully, especially as Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic sought to create a 
greater Serbia by supporting and seeking to unite the Serbs of the former Yugoslavia.  
Violence in the region was already a looming problem at the outset of the Clinton 
Administration.  In the short space of time between the two summits in Vancouver and 
Tokyo, Bosnia-Herzegovina in the former Yugoslav Republic erupted into violence as 
Bosnian Serb forces attacked Muslims in the region.  The conflict lasted four years, 
“claimed some quarter of a million lives, [and] displaced two million people from their 
homes” (State Department Historian Office 2001, 6). 
 
The U.S. wanted to stop the fighting by working through the United Nations, 
likely backed up by the force of NATO (Talbott 2002, 73).  Many in Russia opposed such 
use of force against Milosevic and Serbs in Bosnia.  Under threat at home by the 
communists, Yeltsin was particularly sensitive to the division between U.S. support for 
the Muslims of Bosnian and Russian support for the Serbs.  As Russia sought in the 
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United Nations to defend Serbia from attack, Serbs continued to attack Muslims in 
Bosnia (ibid., 74).  The U.N. passed resolutions and sanctions against Serbia, but this 
need not defer the attacks.  During Senator Leahy’s trip to Moscow in September 1994, 
then Foreign Minister Kozyrev told the congressional delegation that Russia wanted the 
Bosnian Serbs to accept the U.N.-sponsored peace plan and he had invested much energy 
in trying to get the Serbs to do so.  The delegation remained convinced that Russia held 
considerable influence over the Serbs and urged the Clinton Administration to keep 
pressure on Russia to help stop the fighting in the Balkans (U.S. Congress. Senate. 
1994a).  The daily violence against the Muslims continued, however, for two years while 
the international community designed peace plans.       
 
On August 29, 1995, NATO launched air strikes against Bosnian Serb targets in 
response to yet another Serb attack on Muslims in a Sarajevo market.  For two weeks, the 
air attacks targeted Bosnian Serbs that had set up bases near UN-protected “safe areas” 
for the Muslims.  In the midst of election campaigning, Yeltsin reacted strongly against 
the strikes in public display and blamed Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev for not having 
prevented them.  The NATO strikes convinced the Serbs to halt their attacks against 
Muslims.  President Clinton’s attention fully focused on devising a peace plan for the war 
in Bosnia, including Russian participation in peacekeeping operations (PKO) there.  
Russians were willing to participate in PKO as part of a UN operation, but would not 
report to NATO command (Talbott 2002, 174).  U.S.-Russia relations in fall 1995 
centered on finding an acceptable solution that would allow Russia to participate in 
Bosnian peacekeeping.  Russian negotiators threatened that a Russian military contingent 
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reporting to NATO would lead to a communist win in the presidential elections in March 
1996.  Russian Defense Minister Grachev suggested that Russia “was prepared to have a 
Russian general serve as a deputy to the senior American military officer in Europe, 
General George Joulwan [who conveniently] held two positions: commander in chief of 
American forces in Europe and Supreme Allied Commander (i.e., the top NATO officer).  
It was in his U.S. capacity that . . . would make it possible for the Russian military to 
participate, under American command and in cooperation with NATO, as a partner in 
Bosnian peacekeeping” (ibid., 176).  The peacekeeping force was ready, but the peace 
deal with the Serbians needed to be put in place.   
 
Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Richard Holbrooke designed 
“proximity talks, a negotiating process in which a neutral party conducted individual 
talks with the combatants, who were housed in close quarters but separate from each 
other” (State Department Historian Office 2001).   The talks were held November 1-21, 
1995, in Dayton, Ohio at the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base among U.S. negotiator 
Richard Holbrooke, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, Croatian President Franjo 
Tudjman, and Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic.  The agreement provided the future 
structure of Bosnia-Herzogovina where peace would be overseen by a 60,000 NATO 
implementation force, including Russia’s participation.  For the next four years, conflict 
in the Balkans was managed. 
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War in Chechnya 
At the same time the U.S. was trying to work with Russia on constraining Serbian 
attacks in Bosnia, President Yeltsin launched a war with the separatist republic of 
Chechnya in the North Caucasus on December 11, 1994, when Russian troops bombed 
the capital city of Grozny.  Based on an interview with Strobe Talbot, Goldgeier and 
McFaul (2003, 138) claimed that Russia’s attack was a surprise to the Clinton 
administration, which did not have a policy on Chechnya at all.  The State Department 
Background Notes on Russia (2000, 7) indicated that both sides—the Russian troops and 
the Chechen rebels—committed human rights violations against civilians, with “tens of 
thousands killed and more than 500,000 displaced” during the two-year conflict.  In light 
of actions in Chechnya, U.S. decision makers were concerned about the Russian 
government’s commitment to international human rights, but the administration respected 
Russia’s territorial integrity and could not defend the Chechen leader Dzokhar Dudayev’s 
call for separation.  Some, however, were particularly concerned about Yeltsin’s tactics 
in dealing with Chechnya (Goldgeier and McFaul 2003, 139).  Congressman Frank Wolf 
(R-VA) strongly criticized the Clinton Administration for not condemning Russian 
attacks on Chechen civilians, which he deemed “genocide” (U.S. Congress. House. 
1996).  He recommended that the President send a high-level mediator to Russia to 
search for common ground between the warring parties. 
 
The administration continued to view Chechnya as an internal Russian affair, 
despite the disapproval of National Security Adviser Anthony Lake, who was less 
devoted to Yeltsin than others in the administration (Goldgeier and McFaul 2003, 139).  
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Treasury Department officials would not approve economic sanctions against Russia as a 
response, nor did the Defense Department want to jeopardize its progress on nuclear 
threat reduction activities (ibid., 139).  As a result, the administration continued with 
business as usual, turning something of a blind eye toward the ongoing conflict in 
Chechnya and missing an opportunity to explore how a democracy could respond to such 
a threat.  Goldgeier and McFaul (139) noted, “The United States was developing a larger 
foreign policy agenda with Russia that State Department officials did not want derailed 
by Chechnya” on such topics as arms control, cooperative threat reduction, and NATO 
enlargement, as well as Bosnia.  Focusing on this larger agenda, the Clinton 
administration did not know what else to do on Chechnya except to support Yeltsin even 
when it was distasteful to do so.  Furthermore, as Anthony Lake admitted to Goldgeier 
and McFaul (140), “the United States did not have the leverage to make the Russians 
reverse course.”  For his part, Yeltsin explained his actions toward Chechnya in light of 
relations with other regions.  If he allowed Chechnya to go its own way, other regions 
would follow like dominoes (ibid., 140).  President Clinton continued his strong support 
of Yeltsin and for the advancement of Russian reform.  Goldgeier and McFaul (142) 
suggested alternative signals the U.S. and international community could have sent 
Russia, including: the incompatibility of such attacks on Chechnya in the context of 
membership in organizations like the G-7 and as signatories to international treaties like 
the Conventional Forces in Europe; pursuing discussion of Chechnya in a GCC working 
group; and cutting international assistance programs.  Interestingly, Russian reformers 
and human rights advocates like Yelena Bonner, Yabloko leader Grigory Yavlinsky, and 
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original economic reformer Yegor Gaidar criticized the war and the Clinton’s 
administration’s unrelenting, and in this instance, misplaced support for Yeltsin.           
 
Despite the criticism, the conflict in Chechnya had little influence on the U.S. 
foreign policy agenda.  The first Chechen war lasted until August 1996 when authorities 
on both sides, through the assistance of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE),  came to an agreement to withdraw Russian troops completely and hold 
local elections in January 1997.  A peace treaty, signed in May 1997, lasted for two years 
until Chechen rebels invaded the neighboring republic of Dagestan in August 1999 and 
were suspected in two apartment building bombings in Moscow in September 1999 (State 
Department 2000, 7).  Russian troops retaliated against Chechnya, claiming control over 
the republic and initiating a second Chechen war.  Guerrilla attacks against the federal 
troops in the republic continued through the end of the decade.        
 
Partnership for Peace or NATO enlargement? 
 One of the key concerns in U.S.-Russia relations during 1994 was the issue of 
enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), i.e., the prospect of 
former Warsaw Pact countries like Poland and Hungary becoming members of NATO 
and how Moscow would respond.  In the U.S., opinion on the advisability of NATO 
enlargement was sharply divided between notable scholars like statesman George Kennan 
who strongly criticized U.S. support for NATO enlargement and others like then U.S. 
Ambassador to the United Nations Madeleine Albright and, for the most part, the U.S. 
Congress, which supported it.  Albright noted that the Administration developed four 
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principles to “guide [U.S.] policy toward NATO—the institution countries in the region 
most desired to join” (Albright 2003, 167).  Those four principles were: 1) NATO would 
remain at the center of European security; 2) NATO would accept memberships of the 
new democracies based on the same criteria as other members; 3) NATO membership 
would be used as an incentive to promote reform; and 4) NATO enlargement should 
occur gradually.   
 
Russia in the 1990s was something the world had never seen, a large, weak nation 
fully armed with nuclear weapons.  The Clinton Administration sought to sell Russia on 
the idea that NATO enlargement, including the new democracies of Central Europe, 
would lead to a more stable Europe, which would benefit Russia.  In Russia, leading 
scholars and officials, including President Yeltsin, were adamantly opposed to NATO 
enlargement as a direct threat to their security.  Goldgeier and McFaul (2003, 183) 
described NATO enlargement as “underscore[ing] Russia’s decline as a major power.”  
President Clinton remained committed to his relationship with Yeltsin, while Congress 
was much more unsure of the Russian president’s intentions.  President Clinton chose to 
pursue the Partnership for Peace (PFP) program with Russia over NATO expansion. 84 
Clinton pushed for acceptance of the Partnership for Peace (PFP) approach, an interim 
program designed to bring together U.S. military officers, former Warsaw Pact officers 
and NATO officers to consult on security issues and conduct joint military exercises.  On 
 
84 According to Madeleine Albright, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Shalikashvili came 
up with the idea of inviting the emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe and the new 
independent states to join a new organization, Partnership for Peace (PFP), as a stepping stone to 
NATO. NATO leaders approved PFP on January 10, 1994. 
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June 24, 1994, Foreign Minister Kozyrev signed the PFP document, making Russia an 
official member (Goldgeier and McFaul 2003, 187).   
 
In a September 27, 1994, summit in Washington, President Clinton quietly 
introduced to Yeltsin the discussion of NATO enlargement.  On May 9-10, 1995, 
President Clinton traveled to Moscow to meet with Yeltsin and began the dialogue about 
relations between NATO and Russia.  Russia agreed to participate in PFP and President 
Clinton agreed to seek “a special relationship between NATO and Russia” (State 
Department Bureau of Public Affairs Historian Office 2000, 5).  NATO was moving 
toward enlargement in 1995 as Russia was preparing for presidential elections in 1996.  
Clinton promised Yeltsin that enlargement of NATO would be gradual and carefully 
considered and nothing would happen until after the Russian election.   
 
According to Talbott, the Polish-American community encouraged the newly 
Republican-controlled U.S. Congress to put pressure on the President to pursue NATO 
expansion, instead of the Partnership for Peace approach, fearing that this would send 
Russia the message to pursue rebuilding its empire.  Congressional sentiment was 
increasingly anti-Russian.  Talbott noted, “Senator Richard Lugar, an Indiana Republican 
who had been a champion of bipartisan support for assistance to Russia, publicly 
chastised our administration for pursuing a “Russia-first” policy, calling PFP a ‘Band-aid 
offered in place of corrective surgery.”  Senator Lugar saw NATO expansion as 
necessary and Talbott added that he “found it ominous that an influential and moderate 
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member of the Senate would reintroduce the concept of containment” (Talbott 2002, 
110). 
 
Responding to the U.S. push for NATO enlargement, Yeltsin, at a hastily 
prepared summit in Budapest on December 4, 1994, labeled this the era of the “cold 
peace” (Talbott 2002, 140).85 Yeltsin stated, “Europe, even before it has managed to 
shrug off the legacy of the Cold War, is risking encumbering itself with a cold peace. . . . 
NATO was created in Cold War times.  Today, it is trying to find its place in Europe, not 
without difficulty.  It is important that this search not create new divisions, but promote 
European unity.  We believe that the plans of expanding NATO are contrary to this logic” 
(Goldgeier and McFaul 2003, 191).  Yeltsin concluded that it was “too early to give up 
on democracy in Russia” (ibid., 191).  President Clinton was blindsided by Yeltsin’s 
public remarks, which reconfirmed his unpredictable behavior, and U.S.-Russia relations 
took a downturn.  Strobe Talbott, who had become Deputy Secretary of State, had been 
distracted by other demands on a broader foreign policy agenda and had not been closely 
engaged in preparations for this meeting.86 Talbott put himself back firmly in charge of 
U.S.-Russia relations on behalf of the president, placing much of his energy and attention 
toward the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission (GCC) to set the relationship back on track.  
 
85 Talbott (2002, 134) explained that President Clinton rejected the conventional wisdom that the 
Cold War had been an era of stability and predictability, but he envied the simplicity of the American 
public’s perception of it as such.  He was looking for a new way to describe this period of uncertainty 
and complexity that the American people could grasp.  Talbott shared this challenge with George 
Kennan, the father of the concept of containment, who warned against the desire to simplify 
complicated policy.  Clinton, the politician, was looking for a bumper sticker, but he got the answer 
from the wrong place.  His advisers did not produce one, but Boris Yeltsin did with his “cold peace” 
statements at the Budapest Summit .  Yeltsin also was commenting on the recent U.S. invasion in 
Haiti. 
86 This debacle served as a wake up call for Talbott who asserted that he would “never again allow an 
assignment in some other part of the world, no matter how pressing, take [him] out of the center of 
the bureaucratic and diplomatic action of U.S.-Russian relations” (Talbott 2002, 142). 
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The Clinton administration stepped gingerly along two delicate tracks.  On the one hand, 
they wanted to confirm with the Central and East Europeans, who were pursuing 
necessary reforms to become members of NATO, and their supporters that NATO 
expansion was moving forward.  On the other hand, they did not want to jeopardize 
Yeltsin’s re-election. 
 
As Clinton faced the political realities of his own re-election and despite growing 
Russian concerns, he became more and more committed to NATO enlargement, rather 
than risk the criticism of the U.S. Congress.  Goldgeier and McFaul (2003, 197) noted 
that Clinton was clear with Yeltsin—he needed to win Wisconsin, Illinois, and Ohio, 
which had large East European constituencies supporting NATO expansion.  Clinton had 
promised those constituencies that he would proceed steadily with NATO expansion.  
Once Yeltsin had secured his re-election in July 1996, Clinton moved much more 
forcefully.  In September 1996, the U.S. presented Yeltsin with a draft Russia-NATO 
charter, which became stalled another six months as Yeltsin’s health declined quickly. 
 
In a statement before the House International Relations Committee (HIRC)87 on 
February 11, 1997, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright defended the President’s Fiscal 
Year 1998 budget request.  She recounted U.S. assistance to the NIS to date from its first 
phase of establishing the basic institutions of democracy and the free market to the next 
stage of building a partnership with the countries of the region.  She deemed the first 
 
87 In this same address before HIRC, Secretary Albright reconfirmed the administration’s effort to promote 
democracy around the world.  She stated, “Democracy is not only the best guarantee of human rights; it is 
the most fundamental source of peace and prosperity as well.  That is why we must continue to support our 
democracy programs, which are strengthening elections, political parties, governmental institutions, civil 
society, and the rule of law in many developing nations (State Department Dispatch 1997, 9). 
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stage “enormously successful—especially in promoting private ownership, free elections, 
and civil society” and noted that attention had shifted to “boosting trade and investment, 
thereby unleashing the potential for long-term growth that is central to the transformation 
of these societies” (U.S. Department of State Dispatch 1997, 3).  Secretary Albright 
expressed her concern that, for the sake of U.S. national security and human freedom at 
large, Russia and its neighbors needed to emerge as “normal democracies with growing 
market economies that are fully part of the European mainstream” (ibid., 3).  She 
admitted that this was not a choice the U.S. could make, but that the U.S. could help 
those who had made that choice for themselves.  Russia as a “normal democracy” would 
“enhance [U.S.] security, aid in the fight against proliferation, help combat international 
crime, provide new economic opportunities, and create a climate of lasting stability in a 
region as vital to [the U.S.] future as it had been central to [its] past” (ibid., 3).  She 
acknowledged Russia’s disapproval of NATO enlargement and asked the Congress to 
consider Russia’s legitimate security concerns, but fully supported moving forward with 
NATO enlargement, even against Russia’s desires.  The Secretary emphasized that 
delaying NATO enlargement would not make Russia a democracy.  No matter what 
NATO did, Russian democracy depended on what Russia did, specially the ability of its 
leaders to meet the needs of its people.  NATO wanted, however, to make Russia a “full 
partner in building a united and peaceful Europe” (ibid., 3).  To this end, NATO had 
worked with Russia to craft a charter on working together to consult, train, and respond 
to crises.        
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On March 20-21, 1997, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin met in Helsinki to discuss 
NATO enlargement, outline the START III talks, and discuss the impact of an anti-
missile defense system on the ABM treaty.  President Yeltsin sought U.S. agreement that 
NATO enlargement would never include former Soviet states, a commitment that 
President Clinton would not make.  They agreed to disagree over NATO enlargement, 
and continued fashioning a relationship between Russia and NATO (State Department 
Bureau of Public Affairs Historian Office 2000, 6).  NATO enlargement proceeded faster 
than expected. 
 
NATO enlargement remained one of the most difficult issues for Yeltsin to accept 
because it garnered such opposition domestically as the ultimate sell-out to the West.  
Russia saw its former allies from the Warsaw Pact pitted against it right on its borders.  
For Russia, NATO expansion was “zero-sum.”  President Clinton worked hard to get 
Yeltsin to accept the prospect of NATO enlargement, a major part of U.S.-Russia 
relations from 1994-1997, so it was a major accomplishment when Yeltsin signed the 
NATO-Russian Founding Act with NATO leaders on May 27, 1997, in Paris.  This 
signaled Yeltsin’s acquiescence to NATO enlargement and brought Russia directly into 
relations with NATO.  According to the State Department’s Historian’s Office (2000, 7) 
the preamble to the Founding Act established that Russia and NATO no longer saw each 
other as adversaries and they were committed to peace in the Euro-Atlantic area through 
“democracy and cooperative security.”  NATO reaffirmed that it had no intention to 
deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of any new member states (ibid., 7).  In his 
memoir, Talbott said he had predicted that Yeltsin would make a deal on NATO 
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enlargement that allowed it to go forward (Talbott 2002, 232).  The trade-off for Russia’s 
acquiescence was to expand the G-7 to the G-8 to include Russia, and to work toward 
Russia’s membership in the other prominent international organizations of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), the Paris Club, and Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD).  Russia officially became a member of the G-8 in 1998 in 
Birmingham, England and, with the admission of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech 
Republic, NATO accepted its first members of the former Warsaw Pact on April 23-24, 
1999.  
 
President Clinton’s attention to the internal transition in Russia had been pushed 
to the backburner under pressure of the NATO enlargement issue.  He was greatly 
relieved when President Yeltsin signed the NATO-Russia Founding Act that 
institutionalized Russia’s relationship with NATO and created the NATO-Russia 
Permanent Joint Council.  According to Talbott, Clinton wanted to turn his attention back 
to Russia’s democratic transformation.  He wanted to reward Yeltsin for signing the Act 
and give him some concrete payback (Talbott 2002, 246).  According to Goldgeier and 
McFaul (210), rather than the NATO-Russian Founding Act being the beginning of a 
renewed and blossoming friendship, it proved to be the peak before the fall.       
 
Restricting religious freedom in Russia 
 The U.S. Congress reacted strongly against Russia’s new religious law, passed in 
draft in June 1997, as an attempt by the Duma to restrict foreign religious activities in 
Russia.  The law recognized only four legitimate religions in Russia: Russian Orthodoxy, 
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Judaism, Islam and Buddhism.  Talbott reported that “a number of Republican 
congressmen threatened to restrict U.S. aid to Russia on the grounds that we shouldn’t be 
helping a government that engaged in religious discrimination” (Talbott 2002, 253).  
While the administration agreed, it did not want to hold Russia’s progress hostage to this 
one test.  “It would certainly be a mistake to penalize the Russians for their shortcomings 
in guaranteeing freedom of religion by withholding funds for American assistance 
programs that were helping the Russians make progress in other areas, such as 
developing a court system, independent media, labor unions, and a private sector” 
(Talbott 2002, 253).  Many liberals in Russia were not pleased with the religious law, but 
felt that the U.S. Congress was holding Russia “to unreasonably high standards of 
democracy and civil society” (Talbott 2002, 253).  Because the administration had to 
maintain support from Congress, then Secretary of State Albright and Strobe Talbott 
pressured Yeltsin to veto the legislation.  The Clinton administration was faced with the 
difficult balance of pushing Russia forward toward democracy wherever it could, holding 
it to very high standards, while at the same time maintaining support for assistance from 
an increasingly difficult Congress.  At the June 20-21, 1997, summit in Denver, President 
Yeltsin agreed to veto the legislation.  
 
The dispute with Congress over the new religious law was minor, however, 
compared to the much more contentious issue of Russia’s relationship with Iran over the 
development and sale of nuclear technology.   
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Russia’s Support to Iran 
 During the first Clinton administration, the issue of nuclear technology transfer 
was discussed within the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, but Russia had continued its 
relationship with Iran.  The U.S. Congress feared the consequences of the radical Iranian 
leadership with access to nuclear-armed missiles.  The U.S. Congress challenged the 
Clinton Administration on its Russia policy throughout the latter half of the decade, 
especially over Russia’s continued relationship with Iran despite administration pressure 
on Russia to halt its dealings with Iran. 
 
Congressman James A. Traficant, Jr. (D-OH) introduced legislation to “prohibit 
all foreign aid and military assistance to Russia for Fiscal Year 1996, unless the President 
of the United States certifies to Congress that Russia is not exporting any nuclear 
technology, offensive military weapons, or other military technology” (U.S. Congress. 
House. 1995).  He explained that this bill was in response to Russia’s $800 million 
contract with Iran to complete two light water nuclear reactors at the unfinished Bushehr 
nuclear site, which Russia had signed on January 8, 1995. 
 
In support of the President’s planned May 1995 meeting with Yeltsin in Moscow, 
Senator Joe Biden (D-DE) confirmed the Senate’s concern about the “proposed sale of a 
Russian nuclear power plant and delivery of nuclear technology and training to Iran” 
(U.S. Congress. Senate. 1995b).  While admitting that the proposed sale was within 
international guidelines, Senator Biden thought it was irresponsible and stated that the 
President should pressure Yeltsin on specifics like “preventing the sale of a gas 
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centrifuge plant, which would significantly increase the danger of Iran’s [ability] to 
produce weapons-grade enriched uranium” (ibid.)  Biden, however, explained to his 
Senate colleagues, “threatening to curtail economic and technical assistance to Russia 
because of disagreements with Russian policy, as some in the majority party in Congress 
have advocated, would be ‘shooting ourselves in the foot,’ since such a move could only 
serve to harm the transition to a free-market economy and true political democracy . . . 
that are very much in the United States national interest” (ibid.)  At the May 9-10, 1995 
summit in Moscow, conducted on the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II, 
Yeltsin agreed that Russia would not supply nuclear technology to Iran nor would it sell 
additional arms to Iran once current commitments had been fulfilled (State Department 
Bureau of Public Affairs Historian’s Office 2000).  Goldgeier and McFaul (2003, 178) 
suggested that President Clinton was more concerned about supporting Yeltsin that he 
was about the sale of the nuclear reactor to Iran.   
 
Upon the President’s return from Moscow, Senator Mitch McConnell (R-KY) 
was very critical of the summit, claiming that nothing had been accomplished, “no 
stopping the sale of nuclear material to Iran, no apologies about the slaughter of 25,000 
people in Chechnya” (U.S. Congress. Senate. 1995c).  Noting that Yeltsin had replaced 
many of the original reformers in his cabinet, he asserted that Yeltsin’s decisions were 
making it difficult to continue supporting assistance to Russia.  McConnell called 
Russia’s pending sale of nuclear technology the “biggest” issue between the U.S. and 
Russia and nothing was resolved at the summit (ibid.). 
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Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin met on June 20-21, 1997,  with the G-7 in Denver, 
where Yeltsin addressed the problem of nuclear technology transfer to Iran, promising to 
look into accusations that Russian firms were supplying nuclear technology to Iran.  
Progress in the U.S.-Russia relationship rested squarely between the two presidents.  
Talbott described this meeting as “the high-water mark of Clinton’s influence over 
Yeltsin” (Talbott 2002, 257).    
 
Acutely sensitive to the prospects of a nuclear Iran, Israeli Prime Minister 
Benjamin Netanyahu joined the critics in the U.S. Congress, accusing the administration 
of being soft on Russia and insisting that the U.S. impose sanctions on Russia over the 
nuclear technology issue (ibid., 260). Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich was ready to 
comply.  In the meantime, the administration worked closely with Russia through the 
GCC to come to an understanding.  Talbott confided to Foreign Minister Primakov the 
pressure the administration was feeling from the Congress and from Israel and stressed 
they were running out of time.  Talbott reported that he telephoned National Security 
Adviser Sandy Berger from Moscow who responded, “Neither you, nor I, nor our boss is 
ready to shift the paradigm of how we deal with the Russians . . . But there are a lot of 
people on the Hill who are itching to do so.  Even if the Russians give us something to 
work with, it’ll be tough back here (in Washington)” (Talbott 2002, 261).  
 
Talbott expressed his frustration in winter 1998: “Russia’s handling of its 
relations with Iran was venal, devious, dangerous and dumb, and [Prime Minister] 
Primakov was undoubtedly part of the problem.  But until now the Clinton administration 
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had been able to handle its own relations with Russia by its own lights and devices.  I 
hated having to admit to Primakov that we were losing control of our Russia policy to an 
assertive and hostile Congress.  For five years, we’d listened to Russian officials point 
over their shoulders at the Duma and say, ‘Do what we want or you’ll have to deal with 
those crazy people!’ Now we were doing much the same thing” (Talbott 2002, 261).   
 
According to Talbott, Sandy Berger worked Congress hard to avoid the 
imposition of sanctions against Russia.  The administration did not want to back away 
from its cooperative approach to Russia, fearing they would risk all that had been 
accomplished, including the NATO-Russia relationship.  Continuing to work through the 
Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, which had become an institution the Russians took 
seriously, provided enough evidence of progress with the Russians on the Iran issue that 
Congress backed off the immediate threat of sanctions in winter 1998.  Yeltsin, however, 
dismissed Chernomyrdin as Prime Minister, giving way to younger technocrats who saw 
the relationship with Iran as highly profitable (ibid., 264).  This was a blow to the Clinton 
administration’s ability to keep moving forward with Russia. 
 
The President thought that he alone could keep the relationship with Yeltsin on 
track through face-to-face meetings.  While the GCC, under new leadership on the 
Russian side, continued to work issues at a lower level, the most important ones were 
reserved for the two presidents.  They were both facing the threat of repercussions from 
their legislatures and feared that if the U.S. Congress imposed sanctions against Russia, 
the Russian Duma would react viciously and a downward spiral in relations would ensue.  
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Only the personal relationship between the two presidents stood a chance to keep that 
from happening.  Clinton needed to veto the anti-Russian sanctions bill in Washington 
and Yeltsin needed to go after those who were making deals with Iran. 
 
Congress indeed passed the anti-Russian sanctions legislation on May 22, 1998.  
As Talbott reported, “The bill had everything going for it politically: its proponents 
depicted it as a way of saving Israel from its worst enemy, Iran; of thwarting proliferation 
and sending a clear message that the U.S. was no longer going to coddle Russia.  It was 
an opportunity for the more partisan Republicans to add to Clinton’s troubles” (Talbott 
2002, 273).  The Congress overwhelmingly passed the bill (90-4 in the Senate and 
likewise in the House).  President Clinton vetoed the bill on June 23, 1998, and pressed 
Russia for action that would let him sustain it.  Sandy Berger convinced Russia to 
announce major investigative efforts against those who were conducting business with 
Iran; at the same time, the administration imposed trade restrictions on those same 
businesses.  The atmosphere was still primarily one of cooperation in U.S.-Russia 
relations, while appeasing the U.S. Congress with measures close enough to sanctions to 
keep the Congress from overriding Clinton’s veto.  Further trouble was soon to come, 
however. 
 
Crash and scandal 
 The crash of the Russian ruble on August 18, 1998, dealt a blow to Russian 
reform.  Clinton saw this as a “fulcrum moment” for Russia, determining in which 
direction Russian reform would tip.  The Russian government devalued the ruble, 
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defaulted on its bonds, and froze transactions between Russian and foreign banks, all 
against the backdrop of the Monica Lewinsky scandal breaking in Washington as the 
President admitted to having a relationship with her.  In Russia, President Yeltsin was 
nowhere to be found while the banking system collapsed.  Talbott reported, “Much of 
what we wanted to do in foreign policy depended on a degree of cooperation from 
Congress.  That had been hard enough to attain since the Republican resurgence after the 
1994 elections, and it became harder than ever now that those who opposed the president, 
his administration and his party had a sensational issue” (Talbott 2002, 275).  If, indeed, 
progress in U.S. relations with Russia depended almost exclusively on the personal 
relationship of the two presidents as President Clinton reportedly believed, they must 
have seemed doomed with both men under siege – Clinton for Lewinsky and Yeltsin for 
his alcohol addiction, overall poor health and erratic behavior.  In the United States, 
foreign policy concerns gave way to domestic scandal. 
 
War in Kosovo 
 On October 13, 1998, ethnic unrest broke out again in the Balkans, this time in the 
Albanian majority enclave of Kosovo embedded in the Republic of Serbia.  The Kosovo 
Liberation Army fought against the rule of Yugoslav President Milosevic who was 
pursuing ethnic cleansing in Kosovo (State Department Historian Office 2001).  NATO 
again conducted air strikes against Serbia in March 1999, bringing an end to Milosevic’s 
attacks against the Kosovar Albanians.  The strikes continued for 78 days, longer than the 
U.S. expected (Goldgeier and McFaul 2003, 252).   While Yeltsin strongly opposed the 
bombing, Clinton negotiated with him to convince Milosevic to pull Serbian troops from 
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the province of Kosovo.  Yeltsin could not change the President’s mind about NATO 
bombing Serbian aggressors.  Russian public opinion polls showed strong disapproval of 
the NATO bombing campaign and led to the first break in U.S.-Russia relations since the 
end of the Cold War (ibid., 253).  Many were concerned how Russia would respond and 
feared it would assist Serbia.  The impasse between the U.S. and Russia was resolved 
when Yeltsin agreed to take the issue up in the GCC.    NATO established a 
peacekeeping presence and the United Nations an interim government in Kosovo.  
Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin met on June 19-20, 1999, at a G-8 Economic Summit in 
Cologne, Germany, during which they agreed on Russian participation in the Kosovo 
peacekeeping force. 
 
A disappointing end 
 In the midst of the Russian economic crisis and Clinton’s personal scandal, plans 
moved forward on a previously scheduled presidential summit in Moscow on September 
1-2, 1998.  According to Talbott, the Russians desperately wanted President Clinton to 
come to Moscow as scheduled to support the reformers.  Vice President Gore wanted 
Clinton to go ahead with the trip, fearing that to cancel would be seen as admitting defeat 
on the whole of the U.S.-Russia policy.  Clinton agreed to make the trip, reconfirming his 
belief that Yeltsin still remained the best hope for the U.S. in moving Russia toward a 
market democracy.   
 
The Clinton foreign policy team was constrained severely from 1998 through the 
rest of the administration’s term as the Monica Lewinsky scandal in the U.S. demanded 
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attention and dominated the headlines.  Not much went right in the foreign policy arena, 
with little progress in the Middle East peace process, violence in Kosovo, continued 
resistance of Saddam Hussein to UN resolutions, near nuclear exchange between Pakistan 
and India, economic failure first in Asia and then in Russia, and continuing conflict in 
African countries of Ethiopia and Eritrea, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sudan 
(State Department Office of the Historian 2001).  
 
Clinton held his first presidential summit with newly elected President Putin on 
June 3-5, 2000 in Moscow and stressed the need for Russia to address its problem of 
corruption and improve its rule of law “as the underpinning of Russian reform” (State 
Department Bureau of European Affairs 2000, 9). They met again at the G-8 summit in 
Okinawa on July 21, again on September 6 in New York, and for the last time on 
November 15 in Brunei.  On January 20, 2001, George W. Bush was inaugurated as the 
43rd President of the United States and he and Vladimir Putin would go on to establish 
another personal relationship between the presidents of the United States and Russian 
Federation.  
 
Interestingly, Talbott noted that in subsequent talks with former President Clinton, 
the president reflected that he wished he has pushed Russia harder on economic reform 
and had provided more assistance, especially in terms of the social safety net needed to 
protect citizens from the pain of privatization.  He regretted not having had more impact 
on the real people of Russia.  Clinton and Talbott recounted the many still unresolved 
debates about the sequencing of reforms – which should come first, the political or the 
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economic?  “When do the exigencies of electoral and parliamentary politics trump the 
law of economics, and how do you reconcile the two?”  They concluded that no one 
figured out the right mixture of “shock and therapy” (Talbott 2002, 406-7).  Both 
admitted that they had let their hopes get ahead of the reality, but were satisfied that in 
sticking with Yeltsin, Russia and the U.S. were better off at the end of the Clinton 
administration than if Yeltsin had been replaced by the more hard-line opponents who 
had challenged him in 1993, 1995 and at the economic crisis of 1998.            
 
The State Department Office of the Historian (2001) summed up the Clinton 
Administration’s experience with Russia.  “Neither adversary nor global partner, Russia 
combined inconsistent elements of authoritarianism, post-communist reform, neo-Soviet 
hegemonic behavior, and hopeful long-term social transformation.  No one model of 
relations was likely to fit, and the challenge was to maintain a framework for relations 
that allowed the U.S. Government to pursue, as appropriate, cooperation and 
confrontation on issues while pursuing its long-term objectives of support for Russia’s 
long-term democratic transformation. . .”  Throughout the decade of twists and turns of 
events and issues discussed in this chapter, the U.S. government pursued and adjusted its 
objectives under the FREEDOM Support Act to support Russia’s transition to a market 
democracy.  The next chapter explains the structure of that assistance and how the 




Chapter 4: Translating Vision into Strategy 
The decision of the top foreign policy leadership of the United States to assist 
reform in the post-communist world following the collapse of the Soviet Union set in 
motion a broad range of activities across dozens of U.S. government agencies involving 
thousands of individuals inside and outside government.  Chapters Two and Three 
addressed the goals and thinking of the top foreign policy establishment—the presidents, 
secretaries of state, and key members of the U.S. Congress—on promoting democratic 
political and market economic reform in Russia.  The FREEDOM Support Act (FSA) 
established the types of activities to be undertaken and the Congress appropriated annual 
funds to support them.88 The key organizations of the U.S. foreign policy 
establishment—the State Department, U.S. Agency for International Development and 
the U.S. Information Agency—then translated those visions through their regulations and 
traditional operating procedures into actionable democracy promotion programs in 
Russia.   
 
This chapter explains the overall structure of U.S. assistance to Russia from 1992-
2000 to accomplish the main goals of the FREEDOM Support Act: to promote the 
development of the free market and democratic political institutions, and to assist with 
 
88 Funding under the FREEDOM Support Act was only one part of the U.S. government assistance along 
with The Cooperative Threat Reduction program, also known as the Nunn-Lugar program, to dismantle 
nuclear weapons and increase the security of the weapons of mass destruction stockpile in Russia, and food 
aid through the U.S. Department of Agriculture.  Furthermore, the U.S. was only one donor in the 
international effort to assist Russia.  Others included individual European countries acting bilaterally, 
especially Germany, and in concert through the European Community/European Union, and Japan.  As 
bilateral donors, however, these countries agreed to let the international financial institutions, specifically 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), along with the newly created European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), take the lead in stabilizing the Russian economy (GAO, 
2000).   
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immediate humanitarian needs.  Specifically, the aim of economic assistance was to shift 
economic decision making away from the state to the individual who would privately 
own and manage the majority of economic resources.  Democratic political institutions 
were to be based on open, transparent and accountable governance with broad-based 
participation of the individual in the political process and market economy.  Assistance 
funds were to help develop respect for human rights and individual freedom and to foster 
the social services sector suited to a market democracy.  The remaining chapters of this 
study focus exclusively on U.S. government assistance to the Russian Federation under 
the FREEDOM Support Act because the basic assumption of newly elected President Bill 
Clinton in 1993 was that Russia would be the bellwether of reform for the rest of the 
region because of its size and historical reach.  
 
The U.S. goal toward the NIS was “to achieve enduring, normal, and productive 
bilateral relations . . . and to encourage such relations among them and between them and 
their partners in the world community” (State Department Coordinator’s Office 1995, 1-
2).  As stated in the 1994 Annual Report on U.S. Assistance and Related Programs for 
the New Independent States of the Former Soviet Union (1-2), “The United States 
supports each country’s emergence as an independent, democratic, and prosperous 
nation.  We also believe that over the long term, stability and prosperity—and hence 
independence—require broad and enduring progress toward democracy and market-based 
economic management.  Over that long term, each is essential to the other.  Our 
assistance program is therefore geared to support democratic and market reform and 
reformers.”  U.S. assistance focused first and foremost on Russia in the immediate 
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aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union for many reasons.  The humanitarian needs 
there were great in the winter of 1991-92 and the fear in the West genuine that Russian 
society would collapse into chaos, risking loss of control over its nuclear weapons.  
Furthermore, Russia was thought to be more predisposed to U.S. assistance because 
political and economic reform there had advanced further under the leadership of Boris 
Yeltsin than in any of the other former Soviet republics. 
 
Lessons Learned from East European Assistance
The brief three years’ (1989-1992) experience of supporting reform in Eastern 
Europe under the SEED Act of 1989 influenced significantly the shape of assistance to 
the NIS.  In spring 1992, the U.S. Congress debated the FREEDOM Support Act at the 
same time it reviewed accomplishments to date under SEED.  The Foreign Operations 
Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, under the chairmanship of 
Congressman David Obey (D-WI), focused on special issues related to U.S. foreign 
policy and assistance to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.  In monitoring 
progress of this new assistance legislation, the Subcommittee was especially interested in 
the issues of program flexibility, duration of the assistance programs, and the size and 
duties of field staff.  U.S. assistance to the region needed to be sufficiently flexible to 
respond to the rapidly changing situation within countries and differing dynamics among 
them.  To ensure this flexibility, the Congress allowed the assistance funds to remain 
available until expended, meaning the funds were not tied to specific fiscal years, and 
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without earmarks, the funds could be shifted as needed.89 This provision was highly 
unusual for federal funding, which in most cases must be obligated within the fiscal year 
in which it is appropriated.  William Schuerch noted, “These funds have been granted not 
withstanding any other provision of law, without detailed budget justification at the time 
of request, and with liberal transfer authority among assistance subcategories” (Schuerch 
1994, 342).  As a result, the Congress exercised surprising little control over how these 
funds were spent. 
 
The duration of assistance programs was controversial.  Expectations were high 
that the transition period would be relatively brief and progress swift.  Fiscal Year 1992 
budget documents for SEED indicated that “the U.S. Government sees the provision of 
this assistance as a top foreign policy priority during a three-to-four year transition 
period” (ibid., 344).  Assistance was not viewed as a long-term commitment.  In 
Congressional testimony, the State Department Coordinator of East European Assistance 
couched the administration’s request in terms of three to five years.  Congressman Obey 
questioned this reading of the situation in Eastern Europe.  Schuerch attributed the 
insistence of the short-term timeframe to high-level decision makers who wanted to keep 
the decision making authority for the assistance programs in Washington with no on-the-
ground administrators.  As long as the programs were of limited duration, there would be 
little need to set up program administration on site.  The Subcommittee was “highly 
skeptical of the Bush Administration’s idea that the Eastern and Central European 
programs could be run responsibly entirely from Washington, DC without AID staff in 
 
89 Earmarks are funds designated or set aside for a specific purpose, use of recipient (State Department 
Bureau of Legislative Affairs, 2004). 
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the field” (ibid., 345).  In the early days of the SEED program, there was no AID staff in 
the field to oversee projects and provide feedback to Washington—contrary to AID 
procedure in all other parts of the world.  Congressman Obey intervened to insist that 
AID put staff on the ground; USAID was highly reluctant to do so and tried to limit the 
responsibilities of the staff.  Schuerch (1994, 347) noted that in the FY 1993 
Appropriations Act, the Congress took “the highly unusual step of legislating a 
management issue—requiring that AID delegate certain authorities to the field staff.”  It 
was clear that the U.S. government was not efficiently structured to respond to the 
unfolding events in Eastern Europe at the disintegration of the communist system.  In 
addition to deciding what kinds of assistance to provide to Eastern Europe, the U.S. 
government had to design a mechanism to deliver that assistance.             
 
In a June 3, 1992 hearing before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, then Coordinator of East European 
Assistance Ambassador Robert Barry explained that the SEED approach had been 
designed differently from the classical assistance program, which involved government to 
government bilateral agreements made by USAID managers in the field.  Eastern Europe 
presented a new assistance challenge to USAID and required a new approach.  Unlike 
traditional USAID target countries, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe were not 
underdeveloped, they were “misdeveloped” (U.S. Congress. House. 1992a, 38).  USAID 
targeted programs that could be funded quickly and could make an immediate impact.  
Ambassador Barry noted that “[USAID] reduced the time from conception to delivery 
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from an average of 22 months in other parts of the AID program to 8 months in the case 
of the East European programs” (ibid., 4). 
 
SEED programs proffered many lessons learned for assistance to the NIS, 
including the following: 
 
• Work through the private sector to speed up receipt of aid.  The U.S. discovered it 
could disperse aid quickly through the private sector and left the government 
programs to the World Bank and then European Community. 
• Hold regular coordination meetings among donors in country.  Working with the 
European Community, the U.S. learned that programs were coordinated more 
effectively in-country than at large donor conferences, for example, in Brussels. 
• Focus on trade, not aid.  The SEED program shifted focus to public 
administration, having found that trade and investment were more important than 
aid for economic recovery. 
• Go regional.  USAID designed programs that could aid a number of countries at 
one time by facilitating trade with the U.S. and providing technical assistance.  
For this reason, USAID chose to develop regional programs, rather than 
government to government programs because regional programs allowed the U.S. 
to respond quickly to changing circumstances on the ground. 
• Find the expertise.  Washington was committed to pursuing an interagency 
approach to program design whereby numerous U.S. government agencies with 
specialized expertise would be involved in a particular assistance program. 
• Washington-based.  Design of the programs was based in Washington, contrary to 
traditional assistance programs.  This allowed the U.S. to design programs for 
countries where there were only a couple of USAID employees on-site (ibid., 5). 
 
During the June 3, 1992, hearing, AID Deputy Assistant Administrator of the 
Bureau for Europe David Merrill explained that they had developed the non-traditional 
assistance delivery method of the Washington-based regional model and were now ready 
to switch to long-term institution building focused on such issues as commercial and real 
estate law, privatization, and development of a securities market.  He explained that 
running the AID mission from Washington was about one-half to one-third the cost of 
posting personnel overseas and allowed the designs to move more quickly.  USAID was 
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able to sign one contract for the whole region and shift funding as new opportunities 
arose.  In this way, Washington could reward forward movement on economic reform by 
providing additional funding to a particular country.  This flexibility to shift funds gave 
further leverage to conditionality and allowed for performance-based budgeting.  As 
such, the U.S. could avoid locking into bilateral agreements with specific governments, 
especially where holdovers from the Soviet period remained in power (ibid., 35).  Merrill 
also noted that the time devoted to program design had been shortened considerably in 
SEED programs by obligating funds through U.S. intermediaries such as Private 
Voluntary Organizations (PVOs), universities, and other U.S. government agencies (ibid., 
35).  He explained that the “key fact of [the SEED] program is that the money goes to the 
U.S. based contractors, grantees and PVOs, not to the countries themselves,” and 
suggested that this same approach could apply to assistance to the NIS (ibid., 38). 
 
There was a great deal of dissatisfaction in the Congress with these approaches to 
assistance.  They did not like the regional approach because it ignored the histories, 
cultures, and languages of the individual countries and, having been part of the Soviet 
bloc, those countries no longer wanted to be seen as part of that region.  They set their 
eyes on the European Community instead.  Ambassador Barry admitted that they had 
learned many lessons in the three years of administering SEED:  there had been too many 
short term advisers and not enough long-term planning for the transition needs; too many 
new programs initiated at the requests of the recipients, the Congress, and U.S. 
government agencies with no coherent plan organizing them; and insufficient attention to 
cultivating the climate in-country to be hospitable to foreign investment.  Merrill added 
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that they had underestimated how difficult it would be to build the institutions that 
Eastern Europe needed.  “We thought because the countries were so relatively 
developed—or more misdeveloped than underdeveloped—and had a very educated 
population, that somehow the institutions were there, but they ran off in the wrong 
direction for a number of years, and with a slight little spin they could be spinning well 
again” (ibid., 53).  The mistake was that the institutions were not there at all—not the 
banking institutions, commercial legal institutions, housing laws, or regulations.  
Everyone underestimated the amount of time it would take to put these institutions in 
place. 
 
The Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East was 
particularly critical of USAID managing the assistance programs from Washington.  
Ambassador Barry explained that the Assistance Coordinator set policy directives from 
Washington, while the day to day implementation of assistance programs rested with 
USAID in the field.  The General Accountability Office (GAO) earlier also had 
questioned the efficiency of managing the programs from Washington instead of 
delegating it to the appropriate USAID mission in the field.  USAID explained that the 
mission in Washington (USAID/W) included input from the field and insisted that it 
provided flexibility to maintain and expand successful programs or to modify less 
effective ones through its regional scope.  USAID also suggested that the Washington-
based approach freed USAID field personnel and embassy staff from bureaucratic work, 
giving more time for consultation with aid recipients.  USAID field personnel were 
responsible for “ground truthing” policy decisions taken in Washington (ibid., 147).  
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Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, who was then responsible for 
assistance to the former Soviet Union, planned to rely on USAID and other U.S. agencies 
to carry out assistance programs, according to the model established under SEED.  The 
assistance mechanism inherited by the new Clinton Administration in early 1993 was 
USAID’s attempt to modify its traditional approach to development to meet the needs of 
the unprecedented circumstances of the fall of communism.  There were no blueprints on 
how to create a market democracy.    
 
Reorganizing the Institutional Mechanism for Assistance
The new Clinton foreign policy team took office with big plans to reorganize the 
foreign affairs structure of the U.S. government to meet the changed demands of the end 
of the Cold War.  In his first congressional appearance, new Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher noted, “The State Department as we know it, the U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID), the U.S. Information Agency (USIA), and the Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) are all creatures of the Cold War period.  
They evolved during an era when our nation was facing a single, overwhelming 
challenge—that is, the challenge of containing the communist threat.  With the demise of 
communism, that threat is passed. . . . yet our foreign policy institutions continue in large 
measure to mirror the Cold War imperatives” (U.S. Department of State Bureau of Public 
Affairs 1993c, 137).  As the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia gave way to independent 
states, the U.S. created and staffed 20 new diplomatic posts in two years.  In Washington, 
President Clinton created in the State Department the position of the Ambassador-at-
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Large and Special Adviser for the new independent states of the former Soviet Union 
(S/NIS) to which he named his friend and Time correspondent Strobe Talbott.  This was 
the point position on Russia in the State Department.  After explaining his detailed plans 
to the Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State and Related Agencies, Secretary 
Christopher asserted, “In short, we must remake the State Department” and USAID and 
USIA (ibid., 140).  These institutions were the three key organizational players in the 
FSA democracy assistance programs during the 1990s. 
 
State Department 
 The mission of the U.S. Department of State, as embodied in the International 
Affairs Mission Statement, is to “create a more secure, democratic, and prosperous world 
for the benefit of the American people and the international community.”90 This mission 
is based on the understanding that the freedom, prosperity and security of the American 
people are best preserved through the freedom, prosperity and sense of security of the rest 
of the world.  The U.S. government, particularly the State Department, working with 
USAID, seeks to meet these ideals through “diplomacy, development, and defense” 
(ibid.).  Two of the goals of the International Affairs Mission Statement relate directly to 
U.S. assistance to the NIS:  1) to expand exports, open markets, assist American business, 
foster economic growth, and promote sustainable development; and 2) support the 
establishment and consolidation of democracies, and uphold human rights (ibid.).  To 
meet the first objective of economic prosperity, the U.S. needs to open foreign markets to 
increase trade and the free flow of goods; expand U.S. exports; increase global economic 
 
90 See www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/dosstrat/2004/23503.htm., specifically Summary of the U.S. Department of 
State Strategic Plan. 
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growth and stability; and promote broad-based growth in transitional economies to raise 
standards of living, reduce poverty, and lessen disparities of wealth within and among 
countries (ibid., 11).  To meet the second objective of democracy, the U.S. is to “open 
political systems and societies to democratic practices, the rule of law, good governance 
and respect for human rights.”  This was the context in which the State Department 
conducted assistance to the NIS.      
 
To carry out the U.S. assistance goals toward the NIS, the State Department 
created, under authority of FSA, another new position, reporting to the Ambassador-at-
Large, that of the Coordinator of Assistance to the former Soviet Union (hereafter 
referred to as “the Coordinator” and designated in the State Department as S/NIS/C).  
This position was established in the FREEDOM Support Act, modeled on this same 
position in the SEED Act.  (See Appendix One for the history of NIS Coordinators.)  
GAO (2000, 166) described the responsibilities of the Coordinator:  “(1) design an 
overall assistance and economic strategy for the former Soviet Union; (2) ensure program 
and policy coordination among U.S. agencies and foreign governments and international 
organizations; (3) ensure proper management, implementation, and oversight by U.S. 
agencies; and (4) publish an annual report on U.S. assistance for the former Soviet 
Union.”  As such, the Coordinator wielded wide influence over the U.S. government’s 
assistance program to the New Independent States (NIS). 
 
The new position of Coordinator had to establish its authority over the many 
agencies and programs already involved in activities with the new states.  As a result, its 
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influence shifted over time, gaining more legitimacy as it adjusted to this new priority of 
democracy promotion.  The GAO (2000) found that early in the assistance effort there 
were significant problems coordinating FSA programs across the broad range of 
government agencies involved in implementation.  “We found that there were frequent, 
sometimes bitter, disputes among U.S. agencies over how the program should be 
structured and implemented and that other agencies and departments resisted, hindered or 
overruled the State Department Coordinator’s efforts” (ibid., 63).  In particular, the early 
regional approach to designing assistance as opposed to a country specific approach 
worked against the efforts of the Coordinator’s office to control assistance programs 
because program officers in implementing agencies decided which projects to support 
where (ibid., 172).  The relationship between the Coordinator’s Office and USAID was 
especially problematic.  USAID received the FSA appropriation from Congress and had 
to serve as banker to the other agencies, transferring funds over which it had no control.  
Based on the GAO finding of internal U.S. government disputes over assistance, the 
Coordinator’s position was restructured.   
 
On April 4, 1995, President Clinton signed a new mandate for the Coordinator’s 
position, expanding its purview and giving it additional responsibilities for resource 
allocation and oversight of all U.S. government bilateral assistance and trade and 
investment programs aimed at the NIS.  The mandate stated that the United States has a 
“vital stake” in the success of reform in the NIS and put support for reform in the NIS as 
one of the top foreign policy priorities of the nation.  It recognized that the success of 
reforms was not assured and that U.S. government assistance funds were limited by 
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competing budget demands in the U.S.  The purpose of the mandate was to ensure that 
those expenditures were “as targeted, relevant, and efficient as possible” (State 
Department Coordinator’s Office 1996, 7).  The White House Memorandum elevated the 
position of Coordinator and named Richard L. Morningstar as Special Adviser to the 
President and to the Secretary of State on Assistance to the New Independent States of 
the former Soviet Union and Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to the NIS in accordance 
with Section 102 of the FREEDOM Support Act.  Morningstar also was named chairman 
of the interagency NIS Assistance Coordination Group to preside over the allocation of 
U.S. assistance funds and to direct and coordinate the interagency process. 
 
The memorandum clearly stated the authority of the new position to approve all 
U.S. government assistance activities.  It directed the numerous federal agencies to “bring 
all programs and budget plans for such assistance programs to Mr. Morningstar for 
review before submission to the Office of Management and Budget and before 
implementation” (ibid., 8).91 It was Ambassador Morningstar’s responsibility to ensure 
those programs met with the administration’s priorities and policies.  The memo also 
called for U.S. Ambassadors to the NIS to “strengthen coordination mechanisms in the 
field and to increase the effectiveness of our assistance and export and investment 
programs on the ground” (ibid., 8).  This involved the U.S. embassies more directly in 
democracy promotion than they had been previously as the President made the 
 
91 This mandate established much closer scrutiny of programs conducted by the following agencies: the 
Departments of Defense, Treasury, Justice, Commerce, Agriculture, Health and Human Services, and 
Energy, Agency for International Development, United States Information Agency, Peace Corps, 
Environmental Protection Agency, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Overseas Private Investment Corporation, Trade and Development Agency, and Export-
Import Bank, and any other Executive departments and agencies with activities related to bilateral 
assistance to the NIS.  Each agency was instructed to name someone at the level of Assistant Secretary 
(three levels below the Secretary of State) to work with Mr. Morningstar.     
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Ambassadors responsible for coordinating assistance activities in the field.  In order to be 
sure that assistance activities met with overall foreign policy objectives in the region, 
Ambassador Morningstar was directed to coordinate with the Gore-Chernomyrdin 
Commission and the high-level Policy Steering Group for the NIS.  Finally, the memo 
instructed him to report to the President through the Assistant to the President for 
National Security Affairs and the Secretary of State. 
 
U.S. Agency for International Development 
 Since 1961, The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has 
worked to help the peoples of developing nations around the world improve their lives, 
focusing its mission in four areas: 1) improving health and population conditions; 2) 
protecting the environment; 3) promoting economic growth; and 4) supporting 
democracy (USAID Brochure 1994).  Like its experience in Eastern Europe, the collapse 
of the Soviet Union presented the U.S. Agency for International Development with the 
challenge of assisting development in an industrial setting with an educated workforce, 
quite the opposite of its traditional work in the underdeveloped world.  To meet the new 
development requirements of the “Second World,” USAID created the Bureau of Europe 
and the New Independent States (ENI).  The Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the 
House Appropriations Committee was responsible for overseeing the FSA assistance 
funds, the vast majority of which were appropriated annually to USAID from 1992-2000 
to be implemented either by the agency or transferred to another federal agency for its 
NIS assistance programs.  The State Department was responsible for the overall 
coordination of U.S. government assistance programs to the NIS and USAID was the 
233
primary implementation agency for the funds.  As of April 1, 1999, the USAID 
Administrator began reporting to and came under the direct authority and foreign policy 
guidance of the Secretary of State, who now coordinated development and other 
economic assistance (White House 1998).       
 
USAID began its assistance to the NIS in 1993 and sought to shape its programs 
in support of the three U.S. objectives of “fostering the emergence of a market economy, 
supporting democratic transition, and strengthening the capacity to manage the human 
dimension of the transition” (State Department Coordinator’s Office 1995, 29).  Through 
its Democratic Pluralism Initiatives, USAID set out to help strengthen democratic 
institutions at all levels—local, regional and national—and to support the development of 
political parties, civic organizations and independent labor unions and the establishment 
of free and fair elections. 
 
USAID’s Strategic Plan for the NIS, constructed in ENI in FY 1997, targeted 
broad goals for the agency broken down into specific objectives: 1) to foster the 
emergence of a competitive, market-oriented economy through transfer of state-owned 
assets to the private sector; sound fiscal policies and management practices, accelerated 
growth of private enterprises, a more competitive and market-responsive private financial 
sector and a more economically and environmentally sound energy system; 2) to support 
the transition to transparent and accountable government and empowerment of citizens 
through a democratic political process by strengthening the rule of law and human rights, 
placing checks on the executive and legislative branches, and setting the stage for free 
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and fair elections, establishing credible and competitive political processes, encourage a 
dynamic and politically active civil society, and helping government institutions to be 
transparent and accountable; and 3) to respond to humanitarian crises and assist the 
human dimension of the transition to democracy (State Department Coordinator’s Office 
1998, 66-71).  In a June 1998 address at the Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, USAID Administrator Brian Atwood made clear the inherent connection between 
economic growth and democracy.  He noted that USAID’s work is to help set conditions 
for private sector development, stating that economic development must go “hand-in-
glove” with the political development of democracy. 
 
USAID provided grants to such organizations as the International Republican 
Institute (IRI), the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the Free Trade Union Institute of 
the AFL-CIO, and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) to help 
meet FSA goals.  These organizations worked with Russian officials and civic groups to 
rewrite electoral laws, train poll workers, and conduct voter education.  As a result, 
political parties, candidates, independent trade unions and civic organizations participated 
increasingly in political processes.  In the run-up to parliamentary and presidential 
elections, USAID-funded programs trained parliamentarians to function more effectively 
as members of political parties and coalitions, helped develop political parties and civic 
organizations, and assisted in planning for national and local elections.  Other programs 
under USAID Democratic Pluralism Initiatives focused on the Rule of Law (ROL) to 
develop and strengthen laws, legal institutions, and civic structures that support a market 
democracy; local governance to assist municipal governments to become more 
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transparent and accountable to their citizens; strengthening civil society and NGOs to 
meet social needs of the most vulnerable segments of society; and independent media 
(State Department Coordinator’s Office 1995, 53-54).  Details of these USAID-funded 
programs are analyzed in Chapters Five and Six, on rule of law and market reform and on 
democracy and civil society, respectively.    
 
U.S. Information Agency  
 The United States Information Agency (USIA), an independent federal agency 
until October 1, 1999, when it was integrated into the U.S. Department of State, was 
charged with promoting information about the United States and its foreign policy around 
the world.  The agency sought to foster mutual understanding between the United States 
and other nations through the free exchange of information and ideas.  Its broad mission 
was to support “U.S. public diplomacy—to understand, inform and influence foreign 
audiences and broaden the dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their 
counterparts abroad” (White House 1998).  USIA’s Strategic Plan of 1997 explained that 
“public diplomacy fosters an appreciation of our nation’s ideas and ideals, our institutions 
and culture, as well as our national goals and policy priorities” (USIA 1997b).  Overseas, 
USIA was known as the United States Information Service (USIS), which was 
responsible for conducting public diplomacy.  Exchanges, an important part of FSA 
activities, were the primary vehicle for USIA to meet its objectives of promoting mutual 
understanding, economic prosperity and democracy. 
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Unlike its impact on USAID, the FREEDOM Support Act did not present USIA 
with new tasks as the agency had been conducting exchange programs under the well-
known and highly respected Fulbright-Hayes Act for many years.  The mechanisms were 
the same.  USIA programs in the NIS “promote the development of free-market 
economies and democratic institutions” through exchange visits (U.S. Information 
Agency 1997a).  The exchange programs involved short-term professional visits to the 
U.S. or longer-term academic degree programs, bringing together current and potentially 
future leaders from the NIS with their U.S. counterparts and acquainting them with life in 
an open, democratic society.  Exchange programs targeted a broad range of students and 
professionals from high school students to parliamentarians.  Funding for exchange 
programs in Russia was targeted specifically to regions outside Moscow and St. 
Petersburg, where such opportunities were more limited, and was intended to build 
synergy among the participants upon their return to the Federation.  
 
Importantly, all USIA academic programs were conducted through geographically 
broad, merit-based competitions, which was a new concept in the post-communist world 
accustomed to selection through personal connections and bribery.  “USIA also seeks to 
support the development of the concept of citizenship in a democratic society with 
exchanges and programs demonstrating the active role of the citizen, the role of civic 
organizations, and the rule of law as a basis for governing society” (U.S. Information 
Agency 2000).  Thousands of Russian citizens traveled to the United States annually on 
USIA exchange programs.  While these were called “exchange” programs, typically, the 
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flow of participants was much higher from Russia to the U.S. than from the U.S. to 
Russia.      
 
USIA took a hands-on approach in implementing its exchange and training 
programs through intermediary organizations with which it maintained a very close 
working relationship and fostered collaboration among them on the ground.  USIA 
supervised closely the recruitment process for these exchange programs to ensure 
widespread selection across Russia and placement in the United States.  Beginning in 
1992, USIA supported the Russia programs of the American Councils for International 
Education/American Council of Teachers of Russian (ACIE/ACTR), the Institute for 
International Education (IIE), and the International Research and Exchanges Board 
(IREX), through FREEDOM Support Act funding coupled with traditional USIA 
appropriations.  ACTR and IREX had been conducting exchange programs in the region 
reaching back well into the Soviet period. 
 
USIA was creative in designing its assistance programs to the NIS, for example, 
utilizing the “homestay” feature as way to further mutual understanding.  The vast 
majority of Russians visiting the U.S. under USIA programs stayed with American 
families, which met USIA’s goal of telling America’s story.  Through the “homestay,” 
Russian citizens could live the American story.  USIA also devoted attention to programs 
that supported the alumni of its exchange activities, such as creating electronic networks 
to keep them connected to one another and their U.S. contacts and maintaining a database 
of exchange alumni.   
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The U.S. Embassy relied on U.S. NGO program managers to conduct their 
democracy promotion programs with little intervention from the embassy, which had 
neither the staff nor the time to be as deeply involved in activities as they may have 
wished.  At the same time, the embassy wanted to ensure that the NGOs did not take on 
an official role, for example, by arranging public or high profile meetings with Russian 
officials without notifying the Embassy.  There needed to be fairly close communication 
between Embassy Moscow and the NGOs.  To this end, USIS held monthly meetings to 
bring together the NGOs it funded to announce upcoming activities and to discuss any 
problems, e.g., with obtaining visas for Russian participants on U.S. exchange programs, 
or addressing legal issues.92 
Congressional-Executive Relations and Foreign Assistance
Providing assistance to the post-communist states faced a number of obstacles 
including traditionally strained relations between the executive and legislative branches, 
the lengthy appropriations process, the lack of a strong constituency for foreign affairs in 
the American public, and Congress’s general displeasure with the structure of foreign 
assistance in the executive branch.    
 
92 Based on interviews for this study, there seemed to be easy and open communication between USIS and 
its programs managers at ACIE, IIE, and IREX, among others.  Interestingly, there appeared to be 
disconnect, however, between the USIA- and USAID-funded programs on the ground with little 
information shared between the two sets of NGOs about the others’ activities.  In other words, ACTR, IIE 
and IREX knew little about the programs and day-to-day activities of IFES, IRI, and NDI, and vise versa, 
despite their mutual goals of building democracy in Russia and their U.S. government support.  For 
example, as ACTR planned a conference for its Muskie alumni on the upcoming presidential and 
parliamentary elections in 1999, it would have been valuable to involve IFES, IRI, and NDI, all of which 
were working on the elections. 
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The U.S. Constitution assigns authority for foreign policy to both the executive 
and legislative branches, first to the President to make policy and then to the U.S. 
Congress to oversee it.  In the foreign policy realm, the President has a few broad powers 
as Commander-in-Chief and the authority to make treaties and appoint ambassadors, 
subject to the approval of the Senate.  The Constitution gives Congress many 
responsibilities to provide for the common defense, regulate commerce with foreign 
nations, punish piracy on the high seas, declare war and raise an army (Lindsay 1994, 12-
13).  Most important for foreign policy, however, is Congress’s power to approve 
government spending and cabinet officials.  This is especially true with regard to foreign 
assistance where the Congress exercises powerful influence over the President.  Congress 
constitutionally controls dispersal of funds to the government, while the executive branch 
holds policy making responsibility and often these responsibilities do not work in unison 
(Bacchus 1997, 5).  Congress’s active and bipartisan support for the FREEDOM Support 
Act at the outset of the Clinton Administration was an anomaly that was short-lived.  
Relations between the legislative and executive branches over issues of foreign affairs 
became more strained from the middle of the 1990s until the end of the decade. 
 
History of strained relations 
 Historically, the relationship between the executive and legislative branches was 
tense with the exception of the immediate post-World War II up to the Vietnam War 
period when the branches shared the goal of creating the Marshall Plan and the Atlantic 
Charter followed by concern over the rising communist threat (Lindsay 1994, 12).  
Lindsay noted that for most of this period (16 out of 24 years) the same party controlled 
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both houses of Congress and the presidency (ibid., 25).  With the expression of strong 
public sentiment over the Vietnam War, the Congress became more active in foreign 
policy and more willing to be at odds with the President.  At the same time, the rules of 
the Congress changed.  According to Lindsay, prior to 1970, committee chairmen in the 
Congress exercised strict power “in a closed system, where major decisions were made 
by a relatively small number of senior members (ibid., 27).  Those senior members 
controlled agendas, decided when bills went to the floor, and created subcommittees.  In 
the early 1970s, Congress adopted rules that “diminished the power of the committee 
chairs, leading to the creation of new subcommittees with permanent staffs” (ibid., 27).  
Members of Congress had many opportunities thereafter to express their views on foreign 
policy in floor debate and on the appropriations committees, which became the primary 
tool for influencing U.S. foreign policy.  Both houses of Congress became equally 
involved in congressional decision making on foreign policy. 
 
For that brief period from the beginning of the first Clinton administration until 
November 1994 when the Republican Party gained control of the Congress, there was 
strong bipartisan support within the Congress and between Congress and the executive 
branch to assist political and economic reform in the NIS, particularly in Russia.  Such 
harmony was an anomaly.  The tone after November 1994 changed quite dramatically, 
reverting to the more typical tense relationship between the two branches of government.       
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The lengthy budget process 
 Typically, the administration drafts a policy driven budget, attaches a funding 
request to it, and submits it to the Congress, where the Appropriations Committees of the 
two houses often come up with a budget of their own, usually lower than the original 
request.  The lead up at the working level to this process can stretch out over years. 
 
Eight foreign policy committees are assigned to review budget requests and 
oversee executive branch agency decisions on foreign policy.  Those committees are: 
• Senate Foreign Relations (SFRC) 
• House International Relations (HIRC and formerly House Foreign Affairs) 
• Senate and House Armed Services 
• Senate and House Appropriations 
• Senate and House Intelligence  
 
The most important committees for the FREEDOM Support Act were the Senate and 
House Appropriations Committee, before which executive branch officials testified 
annually in support of continued funding for assistance to the NIS.  “Unlike other 
congressional committees, the appropriations committees rely almost totally on their 
subcommittees, which are essentially autonomous actors.  Five appropriations 
subcommittees in each chamber lay claim to some aspect of foreign policy” (Lindsay 
1994, 61).  The Commerce, Justice, State, and Judiciary subcommittees, for example, 
handle funding for the Department of State.  “But the most important subcommittees by 
far are the defense subcommittees, which oversee the Pentagon, and the foreign 
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operations subcommittees, which oversee foreign aid programs” (ibid., 62).  This was 
especially true for FSA where the Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related 
Programs Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee under the leadership of 
Congressmen David Obey (D-WI) was the determining factor in instructing the 
Coordinator’s Office at State on the level of funding for specific FSA programs.  
Traditionally, the House has taken the lead on appropriations followed by the Senate. 
 
While funds are appropriated on an annual basis, the process of drafting the 
budget request is lengthy, often longer than two years from the time the drafting process 
begins until the funding actually arrives in the agency.  This makes planning for 
anticipated needs particularly difficult.  Federal agencies must compile and coordinate 
budget internally requests from the various bureaus and organizations within the agency 
and submit a complete budget request for the agency in draft to the White House Office 
of Management and Budget (OMB).  OMB reviews and provides feedback to the federal 
agencies with approvals and disapprovals of requested funding.  OMB then prepares the 
entire federal budget for submission to the Congress on the first Monday of February.  
During February and March, executive branch officials testify in support of the budget 
request to their appropriate subcommittees in the Congress.  Congress deliberates on the 
budget until both houses meet in conference to resolve any difference and agree on a 
level of funding.  Congress approves the 13 regular appropriations bills either one by one 
or combines several or all in an omnibus appropriation bill.  Often Congress has not 
reached agreement by the beginning of a fiscal year on October 1 and federal agencies 
must operate on a Continuing Resolution, i.e., an established proportion of the previous 
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year’s budget, until their budgets are approved.  For a federal program office 
administering a specific program, it may be well into the fiscal year before funding to run 
the program is actually available.  This lengthy budget process contains substantial lag 
and it is difficult to predict what funding level will actually be needed so far in advance 
of its expenditure.  It was in this context, for example, that Embassy Moscow had to 
anticipate what the needs on the ground in Russia might be to support reform there under 
the FREEDOM Support Act.  This was particularly challenging given the unpredictability 
of events in Russia during the 1990s.    
 
Little constituency for foreign assistance 
 The challenge of working the FSA foreign assistance request through Congress 
was deepened by the traditional lack of interest on the part of the American public in 
foreign policy issues.  The Congress, reflecting the general attitude of the American 
public toward foreign assistance, historically was reluctant, with the exception of the 
Marshall Plan years, to fund foreign affairs agencies at the requested levels and sought 
greater involvement in how those funds were spent.  Bacchus (1997, 5) noted, “The 
general trend has been one of more and more direct congressional involvement at every 
stage, accompanied by less willingness to allow the executive branch to manage 
programs without constraints and close guidance.”  Funding for foreign affairs declined 
from about five percent of the total federal budget in 1962 to less than one percent of the 
budget in 1996.  While the largest share of the foreign affairs budget went to foreign 
assistance, that amount accounted for less than one half of one percent of the total gross 
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domestic product.  Despite this low percentage, the public perception was that as much as 
15 percent of the federal budget was spent on foreign assistance (Bacchus 1997, 11). 
 
The annual foreign affairs budget is identified as the Function 150 account in the 
federal budget.  President Clinton’s request for his account in FY 1995 was about 1.3 
percent of the federal budget.  Appearing before the Subcommittee on Foreign 
Operations of the Senate Appropriations Committee, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe 
Talbott noted, “since 1984, the international affairs budget has been reduced by 45 
percent in real terms.  . . . we believe the resources we are requesting for the Function 150 
account in fiscal year 1996 are the rock-bottom minimum that we need to maintain our 
commitments and to defend and advance our interests” (State Department Bureau of 
Public Affairs 1995a).  Talbott testified in support of funding for FSA programs 
explaining that they had become even more important than before.  “By far the largest 
and most powerful of the New Independent States, Russia has the most influence, good or 
bad, on its neighbors.  The fate of reform in Russia will be a major factor in determining 
the fate of reform in neighboring states” (ibid.)  Talbott cited the Russian invasion of 
Chechnya as a potent reason for providing continued funding for FSA, to support the 
humanitarian needs there and to push forward reform in Russia.  Again in FY 1999, the 
Function 150 account comprised only “one percent of the total federal budget—about one 
penny of each tax dollar” (State Department Office of Resources, Plans, and Policy 
1998).  While polls indicated that 66 percent of the American public believed the U.S. 
should take an active role in the world , “The U.S. continues to rank last among the 
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world’s 21 wealthiest nations in the percent of its Gross National Product provided to 
foreign assistance” (ibid.). 
 
Lindsay (1994) noted that, as Congress became more active in foreign policy after 
the Vietnam era, the numbers and level of activity of special interests groups increased, 
too.  “The interest groups most visible on foreign policy are those dedicated to advancing 
economic and ethnic interests. . . . Today nearly every major ethnic group in the United 
States has a sizable organization representing it in Washington” (ibid., 28).  Beyond 
special interest groups, however, public interest in foreign policy issues was not 
widespread (ibid., 45).  In sum, funding to support a high priority foreign policy objective 
was always contentious and never a high-priced line item in the federal budget.  It 
seemed particularly difficult to make the case to the U.S. taxpayer that providing 
assistance to foreign countries was in the U.S. interest.      
 
Congressional displeasure with USAID 
 The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 created the U.S. Agency for International 
Development and the requirement of foreign assistance authorization in the Congress.  
There have been several efforts to reform foreign assistance in general, including in 1994, 
resulting from “increasing displeasure with Aid’s performance . . . voiced by 
appropriators on the Foreign Operations subcommittee” (Lindsay 1994, 65).  The FY 
1991 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act had created a “Commission on Management 
of the Agency for International Development Programs,” which called for a new Foreign 
Assistance Act as well as the integration of USAID into the State Department.  After a 
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series of proposals on USAID’s future from within the executive branch and in the think 
tank world, a broad set of strategies was devised defining the new Clinton 
Administration’s approach to global issues, focusing on: “environmental problems, 
population and health, broad-based economic growth, humanitarian assistance, and the 
promotion of democracy—all under the rubric of sustainable development” (ibid., 68).  J. 
Brian Atwood, who became USAID Administrator in 1992, sought to exercise greater 
control over what programs would be proposed for which purposes in supporting the 
Administration’s policy of sustainable development around the world. 
 
Redefining the USAID mission  
 On September 21, 1993, Congressman Lee Hamilton (D-IN) convened a meeting 
of the foreign assistance leaders including Secretary of State Warren Christopher and his 
Deputy Clif Wharton, USAID Administrator Brian Atwood, National Security Advisor 
Anthony Lake, Foreign Operations Chairman David Obey, Speaker of the House Thomas 
Foley, and Senator Paul Carbines.  This group undertook a substantial re-write of the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to reflect the Clinton Administration’s new thinking on 
development.  The revised legislation was introduced subsequently on February 2, 1994, 
as H.R. 3765, the “Peace, Prosperity, and Democracy Act of 1994 (PPDA).”  H.R. 3765 
set out USAID’s new mission.  Its “strategic objective [is] the transition to and 
consolidation of democratic regimes throughout the world . . .through the establishment 
of democratic institutions, free and open markets, an informed and educated populace, a 
vibrant civil society, and a relationship between state and society that encourages 
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pluralism, inclusion, and peaceful conflict resolution” (U.S. Congress. House. 1994a, 
235). 
 
USAID acknowledged the importance of local involvement in these new efforts 
and the need to develop democracy programs that showcased “participation, 
transparency, and accountability” and the many paths to democracy allowing countries to 
design institutions befitting  their history, culture, and society—as long as they displayed 
“certain fundamental characteristics: respect for the rule of law, accountable government, 
and an environment that encourages participation by all sectors of the population” (ibid., 
236).  USAID’s democracy programs were designed to support constitution writing, 
democratically elected legislatures, legal systems, local governmental institutions, 
credible and effective elections, organizations protecting human rights, non-governmental 
organizations working in the area of democracy building, a plural political party system, 
independent media, civilian control of the military, organizations providing oversight for 
governmental accountability, and educational programs at the community level targeted 
at participation and tolerance.  PPDA clearly reflected USAID’s adjustment to a new 
mission of promoting democracy in the Second World. 
 
Bacchus (70) noted, however, that “By early 1995, faced with a new Republican 
Congress much less amenable to the new foreign assistance strategy outlined by Atwood 
and his colleagues, the administration decided not even to resubmit the PPDA for 
congressional consideration.”  Atwood successfully defended USAID against its harshest 
opponent, then Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Jesse Helms, and 
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protected the agency against its dismantlement and integration into the State Department.  
The same was not true for the U.S. Information Agency was disassembled and integrated 
into the State Department in 1999. 
 
As described in the preceding chapter, relations between the Republican-
controlled Congress and the Clinton White House were tense and sustaining support for 
democracy assistance in Russia was difficult.         
 
The Funding Mechanism for FSA
Based on the president’s annual requests for funding, the Congress deliberated on 
the total package to be appropriated under the FREEDOM Support Act.  From 1992-
2000, all FSA funds were appropriated to USAID either to be implemented in the agency 
(75% of total FSA appropriations from 1992-2000) or transferred to the relevant federal 
agency for implementation.  The State Department Coordinator of Assistance to the NIS 
determined the breakdown of funding, how much would be directed to which activity.  
Drawing on the SEED model, U.S. assistance under FSA was designed at first on a 
region-wide basis.  The individual federal implementing agencies—numbering as many 
as 23 conducting over 200 programs in the NIS (180 of them in Russia)—were then 
responsible for the design and implementation of the assistance programs.  After 1993, 
the Coordinator’s Office required agencies to prepare individual country strategies and 
budgets.  Russia was the recipient by far of the largest share of FSA funding and its first 
country strategy was published in 1994. 
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Total FSA appropriations peaked in 1994 at $2.5 billion and steadily decreased to 
$850 million in 1995; $641 million in 1996; and $625 million in 1997.  With Ambassador 
Morningstar’s shift in emphasis, he was able to increase the 1998 appropriation to $880 
million to cover his Partnership for Freedom initiative.  The 1999 appropriation was $847 
million.   
 
Levels of FSA funding for Russia 
According to GAO (2000, 165), “Nearly half of all expenditures related to the 
FREEDOM Support Act for the former Soviet Union from 1992-1999 or $2.26 billion, 
went to programs with Russia.”  These funds were awarded to U.S. federal agencies and 
U.S. organizations to assist Russia’s transition to a market democracy by proving 
technical assistance and advice to the Russian government or conducting exchange 
programs to bring Russian citizens to the United States.  The $2.3 billion in grants that 
the U.S. expended to support the Russian transition was a fraction of the $22.2 billion 
provided by the IMF, followed by the World Bank at $7.5 billion, in addition to other 
bilateral donors (GAO 2000, 10).  The IMF focused first on macroeconomic stabilization 
and controlling inflation then shifted to structural reforms in the tax system and financial 
sector.  The World Bank focused first on investment in Russia’s private sector, assisting 
the poor of Russian society, and later on strengthening economic institutions through 
assistance at the federal level (GAO 2000, 11-12).  The United States conducted its 
assistance programs primarily through the instruments of technical assistance, i.e., 
providing direct support to Russian government entities through experts on the ground, 
and of grants to nongovernmental organizations and individuals.  The FSA legislation 
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encouraged assistance to be provided through NGOs and the newly created Enterprise 
Funds to support development of the private sector. 
 
FSA Funding for Russia peaked in 1994 at $1.0 billion, as a one-time 
appropriation under the assumption that Russia’s transition would be quick and funding 
not needed after that.  (See Table 2 for a history of FSA funding to Russia.)  In fact, the 
Coordinator’s strategy included no new funding for Russia after 1998.  The significant 
drop in funding to Russia in 1995 coincided with significant increases to other New 
Independent States (NIS), especially Ukraine (GAO 2000, 57). 
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Table 2:  FREEDOM Support Act Funding Levels Budgeted for Russia by Year 
 (in billions of dollars) 
 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
FSA 0.09 0.31 1.00 0.36 0.22 0.14 0.21 0.16 0.18 
Source: GAO 2000, 164 
 
As indicated in Table 3, the largest amount of assistance funding for Russia in 
1992 was directed at meeting immediate humanitarian needs at over $44 million.  The 
priority shifted from meeting humanitarian needs to promoting market reform from 1993-
1995 at $988 million.  While the program emphasis shifted again in 1996-2000 to 
grassroots efforts to promote democracy and develop civil society with funding at almost 
$283 million, the largest amount of funding continued to go to promote market reform at 
about $414 million though with shifting proportions so that funds to civil society 
continued to increase through the end of the decade.  By 1999, more FSA funds targeted 
democracy building programs than programs for economic reform (by $24 million).  
 
Table 3:  FREEDOM Support Act-funded Activities Budgeted for Russia by U.S. 
Objectives 1992-2000 and Grouped in stages of assistance 






1992-2000 % of 
total 
Promote market reform $17.58   $988.22  $413.93 52% 
Promote democracy and rule of 
law 
 $8.05 $340.19 $282.94 24% 
Address urgent humanitarian 
needs 
$44.86 $231.31 $113.82 15% 
Nonproliferation/security needs $16.14 $114.03 $104.35 9% 
Source: GAO 2000, 58 
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The competitive bid process 
Individual U.S. federal implementing agencies and their program offices were 
charged with running their assistance programs and reporting annually (now quarterly) to 
the Coordinator’s Office on the activities and results of their efforts.  Depending on the 
specifics of the program, many agencies ran competitive programs by preparing a 
Request for Proposals (RFP) that was published in the Federal Register and called for 
U.S. institutions to submit proposals on how they would design an assistance program to 
meet the stated goals in the RFP.  Those proposals were then evaluated within the agency 
based on a document accompanying the RFP, the “Project, Objectives, Goals and 
Implementation (POGI),” which contained the statement of work, eligibility and 
monitoring guidelines, and evaluation criteria for the program.  Those proposals then 
deemed eligible and competitive were awarded grants.  USIA often designed its RFPs 
through a collegial group process involving the Washington program office, U.S. 
Embassy Public Affairs Officers (Paso) and Cultural Affairs Officers (Coos), and the 
Coordinator’s Office in Washington.93 In many cases, the USIA program office prepared 
one broad RFP per year (usually in the fall with a December deadline) calling for the 
wide variety of democracy promotion programs—for example, on women’s leadership, 
curriculum development, distance learning, environment and health, political 
participation, civic education, and civil society—to be proposed and implemented by 
U.S. 501c(3) organizations, including NGOs and institutions of higher education.  One of 
the first steps in drafting the RFP was to canvass the appropriate NIS posts, i.e., the U.S. 
embassies, to ask what they thought was needed in country and to set priorities.  The draft 
 
93 This discussion is informed through an interview with a former USIA program officer who previously 
also had run exchange programs for ACIE with USIA/FSA funding, thereby understanding well the 
perspectives of both the funding agency and the recipient.  
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RFP then would be cleared with the Coordinator’s office.  USIA purposefully wrote the 
RFPs broadly to leave room for the applicant organizations to design programs according 
to their experiences and ideas.  One RFP often would generate 80-100 proposals for 
USIA to review.   
 
Channel (2005) noted that “One might expect this competition to inspire 
creative, innovative offerings that challenge and advance industry knowledge as lessons 
learned from past projects are incorporated into bids for new projects.  Unfortunately, this 
is frequently not the case” (13).94 He suggested that, too often, those applying for funds 
were more likely to submit to the funding agency exactly what the RFP called for, even if 
they had learned otherwise from experience on the effectiveness of a particular focus or 
approach.  “It is an open secret among contractors that a proposal should not challenge or 
contradict any significant assumptions incorporated into the request for proposal or 
espoused by those likely to be involved in awarding the contract.  Instead, the recipe for 
success is to slavishly give back what is asked for in order to win the bid, then negotiate a 
different approach at the contracting stage, or simply implement based on the contractor’s 
approach, not on the award” (Channell 13).  The counter-argument, however, is that 
many of the NGOs, which received FSA funding, were already present in Russia 
conducting democracy building programs and were not responding to RFPs as start-up 
operations.  The lesson here is that the process needed to include a point, after the 
 
94 I concur to a degree with this analysis based on my experience running a grant program that applicants 
are hesitant to propose something new and innovative, even when the RFP calls for innovation, and are 
reluctant to explain lessons learned from past mistakes.  Counterintuitively, the competitive process in this 
situation can stifle innovation.  Conducting off-line conversations about past experiences and thinking 
creatively about the future with grantees and contractors, outside the competitive process, has proven to be 
an effective way for a funding agency to discuss what works and what doesn’t in program implementation.       
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competition was concluded, at which the U.S. funding agency and implementing 
organizations came together to have a discussion about what works and what does not on 
site.95 
The U.S. Assistance Strategy
The FREEDOM Support Act established the three primary objectives around 
which assistance programs were designed for the U.S. to support reform in the New 
Independent States.  Those objectives were to: 
 
• Foster the development of a competitive, market-oriented economy in 
which the majority of resources are privately owned and managed. 
• Support the transition to transparent and accountable governance and the 
empowerment of citizens, working through their civic and economic 
organizations and democratic political processes that ensure broad-based 
participation in political and economic life, and respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms. 
• Strengthen the capacity of these states to manage the human dimension of 
the transition to democracy and a market economy, and help sustain the 
neediest sectors of the population among the transition period (State 
Department Coordinator Office 1995, 7). 
 
Initial assumptions  
 The assumption of a natural progression toward democracy in the newly 
independent states was evident in the first days of FSA programs.  The introduction to the 
1994 Annual Report stated, “By strategic design, NIS assistance is a high-impact 
program for the decade of the 1990s.  With a limited investment of time and assistance on 
our part, many of our assistance and cooperation partners are capable of becoming full, 
 
95 The federal program officer must be very careful in his/her deliberations with potential applicants during 
the competition out of concern for fairness.  The program office cannot or cannot be seen as giving an 
advantage to one applicant over another.  For this reason, program officers tend to be conservative in their 
discussions with applicants. 
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democratic, prosperous members of the international community in the short or medium 
terms” (State Department Coordinator’s Office 1995, 2).  Supporting that development at 
the time seemed relatively straight forward.  While acknowledging that the transitions 
may not be completed for decades, the Coordinator’s Office expected that “reform and 
reformers can make [the transition to a market democracy] irreversible within years” 
(ibid., 2).  This idea of the “irreversibility” of trends toward democracy continues to be a 
recurrent theme in FSA documents a decade later.  The Coordinator’s Office as a new 
institution, however, had no experience in building a democracy or market economy from 
scratch.  It saw the U.S. responsibility as helping the reformers in the former Soviet 
Union without fully appreciating how difficult and unnatural the transition would be. 
 
While the top foreign policy leadership set forth the grand vision of U.S. 
assistance to support reform in the NIS, translating that vision into actionable assistance 
programs fell to the mid-level managers in the State Department, USAID and USIA.   
Those programs managers recalled to GAO their initial assumptions in designing 
programs at the end of the 1990s.  They believed that: 
 
• Russia was “misdeveloped, not undeveloped.”  It had a productive workforce on 
which to build a market democracy.  Its resources just needed to be redirected 
toward the institutions and political culture of a market democracy. 
• Assistance needed to be provided quickly to avert a return to communism.96 
96 Congress put pressure on the federal agencies to expend assistance funds quickly in the region.  In an 
October 7, 1994, statement, the Honorable Lee Hamilton (D-IL) of the House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, expressed his concern about the slow rate of expenditure of assistance funds to Russia and the NIS.  
He noted, “That assistance has been authorized by the Congress for the explicit purpose of facilitating the 
process of economic and political reform.  If the money is not spent, it cannot assist reform” (U.S. 
Congress. House. 1994b).  Congressman Hamilton received a written explanation from the administration 
(it was not clear who had prepared it, likely the Coordinator’s Office) citing the delays of the lengthy 
competitive bid process, and the need now to prepare long-term contracts for technical assistance, a lesson 
learned from the SEED and early FSA experiences of short-term advisers who were widely criticized in the 
region for their “fly in and out” approach to assistance.  Despite some improvements in speeding up 
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• U.S. assistance programs would not succeed without the support and political will 
of Russian society to make the transition to a market democracy. 
• U.S. assistance would be required only for a relatively short time because Russia 
had so many natural resources and an educated workforce.  U.S. programs, 
therefore, would be designed for a limited duration. 
• Aid should be conditional on progress in reform, i.e., aid should be directed where 
evidence of reform was already underway. 
• Assistance projects would be designed from Washington in the regional context, 
not country by country.  This meant fewer and much larger projects, which were 
assumed to be easier to manage.  The Coordinator would be responsible for 
designing assistance projects and managing them through a few USAID missions 
on the ground in the region (GAO 2000, 168). 
 
Several of these initial assumptions proved unfounded.  The transition to 
democracy was not as natural, smooth, and quick as expected.  Assistance to the NIS was 
designed to be transitional, including “firm plans to end most assistance by the end of the 
[1990s],” with 1998 as the final year for new obligations to be extended to Russia.97 In 
1994, the Coordinator’s office stated, “By the dawn of the new century, therefore, private 
sector trade and investment should be the normal basis for U.S. economic relations with 
all or most New Independent States” (State Department Coordinator’s Office 1995, 3). 
 
expenditures in the region, Hamilton was not satisfied with the response and recommended that the White 
House create its own assistance coordinator, suggesting dissatisfaction with the performance of the 
Coordinator in the State Department.  I note that shortly thereafter the coordinator’s position was 
restructured within State to report to the President, as well as to the Secretary.    
97 SEED and FSA programs were designed to be of limited duration.  By the end of 2000, the countries of 
Central Europe and the Baltics—Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania—had been “graduated” from SEED assistance, meaning that they were deemed to have progressed 
sufficiently far in reform to no longer require U.S. assistance.  USAID developed four measures, which the 
State/USAID Joint Policy Council, in consultation with the Coordinator’s Office, used to determine when a 
country should be graduated.  Those indicators measured 1) economic reforms (based on EBRD’s Transition 
Report; 2) democratization (based on Freedom House ratings); 3) economic performance (utilizing EBRD’s 
measurements of GDP, direct foreign investment rates, and the small- and medium-sized enterprise (SME) 
sector; and 4) human capital/social conditions (drawing on per capita income, infant mortality, life expectancy, 
and public health expenditure rates).  In 2005, the Joint Council used the ratings of Romania and Bulgaria from 
2001-2002, i.e., the point at which they were admitted to NATO, as comparison for determining the phase out 
schedule for other SEED and FSA funded countries.  Findings suggested in 2005 that Russia would be 
graduated in 2011 (USAID 2005).         
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Most importantly, designing programs from Washington did not work.  Programs 
needed to be designed from the field in the context of political and economic realities on 
the ground (as will be addressed in more detail in Chapters Five and Six).  Another 
assumption had been that because all these new states were part of the Soviet Union their 
needs were similar, so once designed, assistance programs should be transferable among 
the various new states.  Some of the initial assumptions were correct, however, 
particularly the assertion that the Russian people fundamentally needed to support and 
want democratic and market reform.     
 
Annual reports to Congress on FSA 
The FREEDOM Support Act required the Office of the Coordinator to submit an 
annual report to the U.S. Congress on the activities and accomplishments of U.S. 
assistance programs.  These reports provided a comprehensive historical record of the 
broad range of assistance activities and, more importantly, revealed the thinking of the 
administration, from the perspective of the Coordinator, about democracy promotion 
opportunities and challenges.  While sections of the report were prepared by the relevant 
implementing agencies, such as USAID and USIA, the Coordinator was responsible for 
the coherence of the U.S. assistance effort and the report was submitted to Congress 
under his signature. 
 
In addition to overseeing government-wide assistance activities to the NIS, the 
Coordinator’s Office devoted significant resources and effort to preparing the annual 
report as required by the FREEDOM Support Act, Section 104.  The annual reports on 
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U.S. Assistance and Related Programs for the New Independent States of the Former 
Soviet Union explained the State Department’s priorities for assisting reform in the New 
Independent States and assessments of results to date.  The summary analysis of these 
reports provided a broad picture of U.S. government assistance to the NIS, and 
specifically to Russia, tracking progress or changes in program goals throughout the 
decade.  (See Appendix II on organization of the annual reports.) 
 
Several of these sections in the annual reports—the Introduction; Assessment on 
Russia; description of programs conducted by USAID, the Treasury Department, and 
USIA; and the final financial appendix—provided meaningful insight into understanding 
the organizational framework for promotion of democracy in Russia.  The Coordinator’s 
Office compiled the data contained in the Annual Reports from the relevant federal 
agencies implementing the assistance programs, the U.S. Embassy in each of the New 
Independent States, and assistance providers in the field, including NGOs conducting 
assistance programs. 
 
The Annual Reports changed over time, becoming more detailed, better at 
explaining the goals, and adjusting program goals as necessary to incorporate the lessons 
learned from past experience into plans for the future.  These reports served as the public 
record accounting for how billions of U.S. taxpayer dollars were spent on assistance 
programs over the course of the 1990s and increasingly refined the rationale for certain 
programs.  It was through these reports that the Coordinator’s Office rationalized the 
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expenditure of and requested future funds for support to political and economic reform in 
the NIS. 
 
Analysis of the annual reports from the 1990s clearly demonstrated the lack of 
precedence for these types of democracy and market building activities in any U.S. 
government agency.  The primary federal agencies involved in assistance programs, i.e., 
the State Department, USAID, and the USIA, had no blueprints in the early years of the 
FREEDOM Support Act for creating a democracy, building a market economy from 
scratch or developing a civil society.  They relied on their traditional development 
methods and tried to draw lessons learned from the brief period of SEED Act experience.  
Program managers in these agencies, working with NGOs on the ground, had to learn on 
the job.  The annual reports demonstrated how the U.S. government interpreted events in 
Russia from year to year and assessed its progress in assisting democracy there. 
 
Shifting Assistance Priorities over Time
The introduction to The 1994 Annual Report on U.S. Assistance to the NIS 
recounted the U.S. struggle against the Soviet Union during the Cold War and proclaimed 
U.S. victory over communism with the collapse of the USSR.  In the wake of the Cold 
War, the Coordinator explained, the U.S. was “embark[ed] on great new national 
endeavors once the Soviet Union had collapsed and the Cold War ended.  Among these 
endeavors is our national effort to help and encourage the New Independent States (NIS) 
of the former Soviet Union to transform themselves into partners in the international 
community.  Fitfully, painfully and in dispersed order, one after another of these 
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emerging new nations has chosen the historic path from dictatorship to democratic 
governance; from state-owned, and state-run command systems to market economies 
where individuals make their own economic decisions; and from over militarized, 
arbitrary foreign and national security policy-makers to reliable partners in expanding 
structures of international peace” (State Department Coordinator’s Office 1995, 1).  
Herein lay the broad initial assumption of U.S. assistance that the new states almost 
automatically would pursue a democratic and free market path.  The report then made 
clear that the success of the transformation, however, lay with the countries themselves, 
and that the U.S. “ow[ed] it to ourselves to do what we sensibly can, within our limited 
resources, to help make their transformations a success.  This is what the NIS assistance 
program has sought to do—to make a critical difference at a crucial moment in a historic 
transition that is in our national interest” (ibid., 1). 
 
U.S. assistance to Russia over the course of the 1990s can be divided into three 
stages, which emerged as successive Coordinators and program managers employed their 
learning curve to future plans.  Those stages were first, 1992-1993, when the focus was 
on meeting humanitarian needs; the second, 1993-1995, with the focus on building a 
market economy, and finally, 1996-2000, with the focus on building civil society.  
 
Stage One (1992-1993): Meeting humanitarian needs 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, there was genuine 
concern that Russia was facing famine as its productivity fell and trade relations with its 
former communist partners disintegrated.  Politically, the Russian government was torn 
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between reformers and hard-line communists who remained in positions of power from 
the Soviet period.  Russia’s stability was of particular concern to the U.S. government 
because of its vast nuclear weapons arsenal.  The old institutions of the planned Soviet 
economy disappeared with no new market structures to put in their place.  The newly 
independent Russian state, with no past private market experience, was in the midst of 
“severe economic recession” (GAO 2000, 25).  Secretary of State James Baker called an 
international coordinating conference at the Foreign Minister level in Washington in late 
January 1992 to respond to the “emergency” in Russia.  Through a series of working 
groups, 54 donors (47 nations and seven international organizations) crafted a series of 
first steps with detailed action plans to distribute food and medicine, and provide for 
shelter, energy, and technical assistance to Russia (U.S. Department of State 1992).  
Thus, the first stage of U.S. assistance to Russia focused squarely on humanitarian needs, 
what was perceived as the emergency needs of the country, through Operation PROVIDE 
HOPE98 (ibid., 171).  This first phase of humanitarian assistance was short-lived as the 
feared famine and dissent into chaos at the collapse of the Soviet system fortunately did 
not materialized.  The assistance program shifted quickly into support for building a 
market economy and democratic political institutions.   
 
Stage Two (1993-1995): Building a market economy  
 Fulfilling President Clinton’s campaign promise that Russia would be his top 
foreign policy priority, the new administration invigorated assistance efforts to Russia.  
 
98 Most of the medical and food supplies provided under Operation PROVIDE HOPE came from the U.S. 
Department of Defense surplus inventory and private donations.  FSA covered the transportation cost of 
getting those supplies to Russia. 
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As economic activity gained momentum in Russia, the need for humanitarian assistance 
lessened and the U.S. shifted into stage two of technical assistance to help “create the 
laws, regulations and institutions necessary for a democracy and market economy to 
function” (State Department Coordinator’s Office 1995, 5, 55 and 167).  At the bilateral 
Vancouver (April 1993) and multilateral G-7 Tokyo (July 1993) summits, the U.S. 
pledged a total of $2.5 billion (FSA plus additional U.S. programs) to work with the 
Russian government on market reform and some continuing humanitarian assistance.  In 
late 1993, the Coordinator’s office shifted its approach from regional programs (as 
implemented under SEED) to country specific ones.  Russia’s country strategy and 
budget was the first to be completed and its implementation was assigned to the USAID 
mission on site.  GAO (2000, 174) noted that “because of the Russia program’s 
sensitivity, it would always receive more scrutiny than other country programs.”  Within 
the Russia strategy, the Coordinator’s Office concentrated efforts on those regions in the 
country most likely to use U.S. assistance productively. 
 
The 1994 Annual Report on U.S. Assistance to the NIS described the year as the 
point at which the “$2.5 billion in new multi-year funding provided by the Congress in 
September, 1993, began to roll out and demonstrated serious impact in support of reform.  
The accent was on technical assistance, the offer of the best of American know-how and 
expertise in field after field to reformers willing and able to use it” (State Department 
Coordinator Office 1995, 5).  Embassy Moscow established an assistance unit attached to 
the Ambassador’s Office in 1994 to improve issue management of the Russia assistance 
program.  “Training and exchange programs exploded, toward Marshall Plan proportions, 
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and began to put in place the solid underpinning in human experience and contact that 
sound future U.S.-NIS relations will require” (ibid., 5).  The approach in stage two was to 
fund a few very large contracts to support market reform in Russia–specifically, eight 
U.S. firms had contracts targeting privatization and the development of capital markets at 
about $60 million (ibid., 172).   
 
1994 was an active year for assistance programs in the Russian Federation.  U.S. 
assistance to Russia focused on three general areas: private sector development through 
support for trade and investment; development of democratic institutions and political 
processes; and “capacity to deliver social services in ways that are fiscally sustainable 
and compatible with a market economy, with particular attention to vulnerable groups” 
(ibid., 20).  The 1994 Annual Report stated that since reform was taking hold in Russia 
and U.S. assistance beginning to achieve its objectives there, the U.S. would start to shift 
resources away from Russia toward other new states.   
 
The 1994 Annual Report referenced mounting criticism from some U.S. 
embassies that they were not being sufficiently consulted in the formulation of assistance 
program design and consequently were the target of criticism in their host countries for 
lack of follow-up after assistance efforts were completed.  In other words, the U.S. was 
criticized for being too short-term in its approach to reform assistance with little thought 
given to next steps.  Embassies also reported to the Coordinator that technical assistance 
providers—the technical experts—often were not sufficiently knowledgeable in the 
history, culture, and language of the people they were assisting.  The report also noted 
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that many assistance programs were designed purposely to minimize the well-known 
problems of crime and corruption in the NIS by executing contracts with U.S. firms and 
NGOs rather than grants to the governments of the region.  “For the most part, programs 
underway are helping achieve the primary U.S. strategic goal—to establish enduring, 
normal and productive bilateral relations with each New Independent State and to 
encourage such relations among them and between them and their partners in the world 
community” (State Department Coordinator’s Office 1995, 7). 
 
By the middle of the decade, the U.S. Congress became concerned about the 
effectiveness of U.S. assistance and the direction of political events in Russia—the 
growing stalemate in fall 1993 between Yeltsin and hard-liners in the Duma and Yeltsin’s 
subsequent attack on the Russian White House against his opponents, Russian troops 
invading Chechnya in 1994, and in 1995, the communist party’s strong showing in 
parliamentary elections.  With growing concerns about stability in Russia, Congress 
began earmarking funds for the other NIS states.  Promoting democracy in Russia was at 
the top of President Clinton’s foreign policy agenda for the first 18 months of his 
administration, but was overtaken by other competing foreign policy demands. 
 
According to the 1994 Annual Report, the U.S. planned to continue assistance to 
democratic and market reforms in FY 1995 as long as the Russian government and 
Russian NGOs wished to continue to move in that direction.  The report suggested that 
technical assistance programs and training and exchanges would continue to be the main 
vehicle through which the U.S. would provide support to Russia.  The section on Russia 
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concluded, “In developing an assistance strategy, therefore, we have sought to focus 
limited U.S. resources on key areas that can contribute directly to systemic change and 
support reform efforts already underway within various levels of government (both 
central and local), the business community and non-governmental organizations” (State 
Department Coordinator’s Office 1995, 23).            
 
The U.S. intended its approach to Russia to be one not of donor-recipient, but 
more toward pursuit of normal bilateral relations.  FY 1995 was the height of FSA 
activities in terms of levels of funding and breadth of activities conducted under 17 U.S. 
government agencies and 12 embassies in the former Soviet Union.  It was also the point 
at which several forces came together to forge a critical change in U.S. assistance 
programs to the NIS.  FY 1994 was a peak year of funding, so while activities were in 
full swing from the previous year’s funding, the Coordinator’s Office faced new 
challenges with reduced funding in coming years.  Under the direction of a new 
Coordinator, Richard Morningstar, the Office of the Coordinator was much more active 
in looking critically at how programs were run in the first three years and how they could 
be streamlined to meet new conditions.  The tone of the 1995 Annual Report was more 
confident, clearly describing the programs supported by FSA and explaining why they 
were important. 
 
The 1995 Annual Report stated, “The political, economic and security benefits of 
this transition are as enormous to the people of the United States as they are to the people 
of the NIS countries” (State Department Coordinator’s Office 1996, 1).  The purpose of 
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U.S. assistance to those states was to establish “normal, enduring and productive bilateral 
relations” with each one and to foster such relations among them.  The intent was for this 
effort to be temporary as donor-recipient relationships gave way to cooperation and 
partnership.  With anticipated declines in FSA funding in coming years, U.S. assistance 
efforts in FY 1995 focused more directly on three core objectives, with less emphasis 
than in the past on humanitarian assistance and social sector reform: 
 
• To promote democratic institution building and the rule of law, and to 
establish a civil society; 
• To establish open and competitive market economies, and expand 
opportunities for trade and investment; and 
• To enhance international security through cooperative threat reduction and 
non-proliferation efforts.  
 
Drawing on past experience, the Coordinator’s office noted that the varying pace 
of reform from country to country in the NIS called for continued flexibility in 
responding to opportunities across the region as they arose.  In some countries where 
reform had progressed sufficiently, assistance programs transitioned from technical 
assistance to more normal bilateral trade and investment relations; in other less reformed 
states, assistance moved from the humanitarian aid level to the technical assistance phase 
to lay the groundwork for a market economy and democratic political system. 
 
To meet the core objective of democratic institution-building, rule of law and civil 
society development, the Coordinator’s Office focused efforts on long-term activities, 
specifically the development of democratic parliamentary and judicial systems, 
independent media and nongovernmental organizations to help move reform forward.  
The Coordinator’s Office introduced a new mechanism in late 1995, “the embassy-based 
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Democracy Funds Small-Grant Program, modeled after the highly successful Democracy 
Commissions program for Eastern and Central Europe” (State Department Coordinator’s 
Office 1996, 2).99 Emphasis also was on moving assistance activities out of capital cities 
into the regions. 
 
Facing reduced funding, the Coordinator’s Office in 1995 undertook a review of 
the U.S. assistance program and identified four specific areas where the U.S. approach 
needed to be changed with the following results: 
 
• Cost-Effectiveness, Timing Issues – Because the Congress had made so much 
assistance funding available at the outset, the focus was on expending the money 
quickly, i.e., getting it out the door and off the books, in ways that were not 
always the most cost-effective.  The shift in strategy would require that each 
program be looked at carefully in terms to cost-effectiveness, with special 
emphasis on funds that had already been appropriated but not yet expended.  In 
other words, funding made available would be appropriate to the rate of funding 
required for each program. 
• Cost-Sharing with U.S. and NIS private entities became a critical element of 
program planning, meeting two objectives: to reduce the cost of programs and to 
ensure that the recipient had a real stake in the program.   
 
99 The Democracy Funds program provided U.S. embassies in the NIS with the capability to assist modestly 
and with flexibility indigenous grassroots organizations engaged in democracy initiatives such as 
independent media and the free flow of information.  Awards were made by the embassy-based Democracy 
Commission comprised of the ambassador, USIA public affairs officer, USAID representative and others 
deemed appropriate by the ambassador. 
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• Program Implementation Mechanisms – The 1995 Annual Report was critical of 
past methods of implementing assistance programs.  It stated, “During the first 
several years of providing assistance to the NIS, the desire to start up programs 
as quickly as possible, in combination with the need to ensure strict control over 
program implementation, resulted in the heavy reliance on large contracts for 
program implementation.  Similarly, the difficult and rapidly changing 
environment in the NIS, as well as the region’s need for outside expertise, led to 
the predominant use of U.S., rather than indigenous contractors in the early 
stages of the program” (State Department Coordinator’s Office 1996, 5).  The 
new mechanism was to rely more on alternative funding mechanisms like small 
grants rather than large contracts even if this meant relinquishing some control.  
The effort was to be on creating a broader diversity of assistance providers and 
putting in place the means to hand over activities to indigenous players as U.S. 
assistance programs were phased out. 
• Increased Role for Multilateral Assistance – As the international community 
through bilateral relations and multilateral development mechanisms became 
more involved in activities in the NIS, the U.S. could turn over some of its 
bilateral assistance programs to other multilateral entities like the banks. 
 
In a personal interview in June 1999, Ambassador Morningstar explained that 
upon his arrival at State, he directed his office (S/NIS/C) to scrutinize the efficiency of 
the whole range of NIS assistance programs.  He targeted most directly those large, 
omnibus Requests for Proposals (RFPs) that sought to undertake the whole range of 
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democratization and marketization activities.  Some years of experience showed that no 
one organization could undertake effectively $800 million worth of programs on topics 
from privatization to political party development to academic exchanges.  To 
Ambassador Morningstar, these large contracts to certain contractors, as part of the 
USAID traditional mechanism for development programs, were subject to inefficiency 
and waste.  He criticized particularly the tendency to award contracts to those same 
organizations that had received funding in the past.  Ambassador Morningstar’s 
preference was to make the contracts smaller and much more focused on special areas of 
need, and to avoid large programs aimed at broad systemic reform like restructuring 
whole sectors of the economy.  He felt this was particularly true of the large ($8-10 
million) USAID contracts.  Ambassador Morningstar explained that little was 
accomplished through these large contracts because conditions on the ground were not 
yet ready to absorb such large amounts of assistance.  He noted this was especially true in 
the agricultural sector, which saw little reform during the decade. 
 
S/NIS/C, in its role of overseeing USAID program management, also sought to 
change the traditional USAID procurement process by insisting that USAID obligate 
most of the appropriated funds it had received before adding new monies into the 
pipeline.  USAID, at that time, was under pressure both from the White House and from 
the Congress to expend the NIS assistance money as quickly as possible.  According to 
Ambassador Morningstar, S/NIS/C worked to slow this down so awards could be made 
with deliberation and purpose.  He was involved personally and deeply in directing this 
broad review of NIS assistance programs.  His priority was to get a handle on the vast 
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number of programs underway through many different government agencies.  For 
example, both USAID and USIA ran professional exchange programs, though USIA did 
so more cost effectively.  Ambassador Morningstar, therefore, consolidated the exchange 
activities into USIA.      
 
In 1995, the Coordinator’s Office, at Ambassador Morningstar’s direction, fashioned 
a new set of questions to help it examine on-going activities and make funding decisions: 
 
• Is the recipient country ready for and open to the type of change that the 
assistance activity is designed to facilitate, and are there willing and 
appropriate interlocutors who can be full partners in the endeavor? 
• Does the assistance activity have a clear objective that is consistent with 
FSA’s core assistance objectives, as well as with U.S. foreign policy? 
• Is the assistance activity able to demonstrate results, measure progress 
toward its intended objective, and, ideally, produce systemic change? 
• Does the activity take advantage of cost-sharing (if feasible) and/or other 
mechanisms to improve cost-effectiveness? 
• Is U.S. assistance focused on areas where the U.S. has special expertise? Can 
U.S. participation help leverage funding from other donors?  The U.S. should 
encourage a division of labor among other donors, including multilateral 
development banks. 
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• Given the transitional nature of U.S. assistance, are activities easily 
replicable or self-sustaining, so that the impact extends beyond the life of the 
NIS assistance program? 
 
The flip side of Ambassador Morningstar’s reluctance to support large-scale 
systemic projects was his preference for projects committed to the long-term perspective 
and aimed at assisting the individual.  After years of decline since the 1994 peak funding, 
he was able to increase the overall funding for assistance and for exchanges in particular.  
Ambassador Morningstar was proactive in seeking new ideas and convincing the 
Congress to support them.  He wanted to obtain new money for NIS assistance and 
change the direction of the assistance program.  Specifically, the FY 1997 funding 
increased to support his new concept of Partnership for Freedom, which re-oriented 
assistance to long-term benefits, establishing partnerships, and focusing on the micro-
level and small business. 
Stage Three (1996-2000): Nurturing democratic institutions and people 
U.S. assistance to Russia entered a third phase in 1996 shifting its focus from 
market reform to building democratic institutions and from implementation at the federal 
level to the grassroots level, following an intensive review of the Russia program.  To 
move away from the large contracts of the past, Ambassador Morningstar revised the 
strategy for Russia, creating the “Partnership for Freedom” initiative aimed at supporting 
Russian society at the grassroots level.  In the first two stages of assistance, the U.S. 
targeted its assistance efforts primarily at the federal government in Russia, working 
through U.S. contractors to provide technical assistance to Russian government entities, 
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particularly in advising on market reform.  That approach shifted in 1996 under 
Morningstar’s direction, as he believed that the federal government in Russia had been 
reluctant to take necessary institutional reforms.  Morningstar believed that more could 
be accomplished by dealing directly with Russia’s regions at the regional, local or 
individual level than with the central government.  The priority for this third stage (1996-
2000) focused on the development of civil society with emphasis on people-to-people 
exchanges and investment-led economic growth (GAO 2000, 55).100 Specifically, 
activities in the third stage targeted small- and medium-sized enterprises and civil 
society, emphasizing partnerships between U.S. and Russian universities, hospitals, 
NGOs, cities, and business/professional associations and student and professional 
exchanges.  The purpose of these partnerships was to demonstrate to Russian citizens the 
values of the democratic culture.  “Connecting Russians with the world beyond their 
borders is supposed to encourage pressure for reform from below” (GAO 2000, 177).  
According to GAO (177), the hope was that the growth of small- and medium-sized 
business might offset the influence of the large enterprises controlled by oligarchs.   
 
Ambassador Morningstar stated in the opening paragraph of The FY 1996 Annual 
Report that trends in political and economic reform were encouraging.  The Introduction 
set forth the foundational assumption of U.S. assistance that if Russia and the other New 
Independent States were stable, market-oriented democracies, the security of the U.S. and 
the rest of the world was “immeasurably enhanced” (State Department Coordinator’s 
Office 1997, 1).  The 1996 Annual Report differed from earlier ones as it provided much 
 
100 GAO (176n) noted that “in FY 1997, people to people linkages included low-cost, high impact activities 
such as community-based exchanges and training, and U.S.-NIS institutional partnerships which were 
designed to be increasingly self-sufficient and ultimately self-sustaining.”    
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more detail in mapping the array of assistance programs underway in the NIS.  It much 
more clearly explained which U.S. government organization was running what specific 
program.  Still missing in this report, however, was analysis of exchange activities or 
explanation of program changes from one year to the next.  The report was strictly an 
exercise of recounting what had happened during the year. 
 
According to The 1996 Annual Report, democratic values and reform expanded 
steadily during the year in Russia, especially in comparison to some of its neighbors in 
the former Soviet space, notably Belarus and Armenia.  The focus in the U.S. government 
was on achieving long-term results in democratic institution-building, focusing 
particularly on those which provided a check on centralized power, i.e., “independent 
legislature and judiciaries, independent media, transparent and responsible local 
governments, and extensive networks of nongovernmental organizations providing a 
channel for public involvement in the reform process” (State Department Coordinator’s 
Office 1997, 1).  This “long-term” perspective was a notable change from the early days 
when the transition was expected to be completed quickly.  U.S. assistance agencies 
directed less attention to technical assistance overall, but continued in high priority areas 
of legal reform, law enforcement, independent media, and NGO training and 
development.  More attention was directed to “expanding linkages through low-cost, high 
impact activities such as community-based exchanges and training, and the promotion of 
partnerships and other institutional relationships designed to be increasingly self-
sufficient and ultimately self-sustaining” (State Department Coordinator’s Office 1997, 
1). The report recognized the creation of two new programs in support of democracy 
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reform and evidence of the shift away from large-scale contracts to smaller community 
based efforts, specifically the Democracy Funds Small-Grants Program established in FY 
1995 and expanded in FY 1996 to include a major new small-grants program in Russia 
and USIA’s new Community Connections program modeled on USIA’s previous 
Business for Russia program.  The latter program sought to build relationships among 
reformers in the public and private sectors of Russia, Ukraine, and Moldova. 
 
1996 was the five year mark since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
Annual Report acknowledged the “radical reorientation” in the countries of the NIS over 
that time.  Those countries had no historical basis for a market economy, no tradition of 
democracy, and no experience in citizen participation.  The report declared that “For 
most of the NIS, as well as for U.S. foreign policy and technical assistance to the NIS, the 
post-Soviet transition has been an extraordinary success” (ibid., 3).  According to the 
report, 60 percent of GDP in Russia came from the private sector.  The report cited the 
importance of privatization and economic reform because their “combination offers the 
best prospects for achieving economic prosperity—a cornerstone for building a stable 
democracy” (ibid., 3).  Russia’s presidential and gubernatorial elections had been 
“reasonably democratic.”  The number of non-governmental organizations, which had 
been nonexistent in the Soviet era, continued to grow across the NIS.  The report declared 
the first phase of U.S. engagement in the NIS could be considered successful and 
complete with the basic institutional transition from the Soviet system to a market 
democracy.  Furthermore, Russia was making good progress in that transition.  The next 
phase would be focused on sustaining the transition and the U.S. approach would shift 
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away from advising on structural change toward developing normal, mutually beneficial 
bilateral relations.  For the State Department, this would be shift to business-as-usual 
mode, interacting with Russians, for example, through exchanges, partnerships, joint 
ventures and cooperative projects.  The 1996 report explained that the first stage of 
assistance (skipping over the early humanitarian assistance stage) had involved creation 
of market mechanisms like the privatization system and the creation of non-governmental 
organizations.  These were seen as ends in themselves, something to be accomplished and 
completed.  As the U.S. moved toward the next phase of assistance in Russia, the focus 
would be on investments and putting to use the mechanisms that had been established 
earlier.  The next phase was to begin in FY 1997 and would represent the bulk of the 
funding request to the Congress in FY 1998. 
 
The FY 1996 Annual Report summarized Russia’s political progress in two 
paragraphs noting that most attention was on the June-July 1996 presidential election and 
on President Yeltsin’s health.  The election were deemed fair and competitive though 
many felt Yeltsin had used his presidential prerogatives to excess and the media were 
clearly on the side of a Yeltsin re-election.  In August 1996, Russian Secretary of the 
National Security Council Alexsandr Lebed concluded a peace agreement with the 
Chechen separatists, moving toward an end to the war in Chechnya.  Through the fall, 
gubernatorial elections continued in those regions where the leaders were still those 
whom Yeltsin had appointed.  The Coordinator’s Office expected the approach to reform 
in Russia to be slow and cautious in FY 1997, due mainly to the serious health issues of 
President Yeltsin. 
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In the Foreword to The FY 1997 Annual Report, Ambassador Morningstar 
described U.S. assistance to reform in the NIS as an “historic endeavor” in which the 
U.S. was pleased to play a role.  The Report’s Introduction embedded U.S. assistance 
programs in the overall policy of the United States toward the NIS.  That policy was “to 
foster security, stability and prosperity; to develop constructive relationships with the 
region; and to prevent the emergence of another significant threat to U.S. national 
security” (State Department Coordinator’s Office 1998, 1).  1997 marked a shift in the 
U.S. government’s assistance approach to the NIS from technical assistance to 
cooperation in trade and investment and expanded exchange opportunities linking people-
to-people. 
 
This new approach was labeled the “Partnership for Freedom” initiative.  
Declaring that the first stage of technical assistance had helped put in place the building 
blocks of market economies and democratic governments—notably a constitution, laws, 
courts, and capital markets—the Coordinator’s Office wanted to move on to cooperative 
activities in which U.S. companies would invest in small- and medium-sized enterprises 
in the regions and U.S. and NIS institutions like universities, professional associations, 
and NGOs would establish partnerships.  The Coordinator’s Office noted that “because 
economic and democratic reform . . . is a generational process, we need to maintain our 
presence and influence” so more attention was given to exchange programs for students, 
professionals and entrepreneurs.101 Another major shift was to move these activities out 
of the capital cities into the regions, under the Regional Investment Initiative, the 
 
101 Ambassador Morningstar provided this background on “Partnership for Freedom.”  
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cornerstone of the new approach.  The RII was created under the GCC in February 1997 
to foster regional success stories by attracting investment.  The annual report called the 
RII “a key test of the overall assistance strategy of emphasizing trade, investment, 
partnerships, and exchanges” (ibid., 37).  The hope was that these pilot projects would 
serve as models to be replicated elsewhere in Russia.   
 
The 1997 Annual Report noted that the trend toward democracy in the NIS 
continued to gain momentum as U.S. assistance was directed toward democratic 
institution-building, particularly those institutions that provide checks and balances on 
state power like independent legislatures and judiciaries, independent media, transparent 
and accountable local governments, and extensive networks of NGOs that involved the 
citizenry.  The report recognized organized crime and corruption as a primary obstacle to 
reform and foreign investment and expressed hope that community-based programs 
would help to fight against it.  On economic reform, the report noted that having 
completed the first stage of privatization—that of small- and medium-sized enterprises—
Russia was moving into the second phase, privatizing the large state-owned enterprises, 
primarily in the energy sector. 
 
The “Regional Investment Initiative” (RII) under the “Partnership for Freedom” 
approach was the brainchild of Ambassador Morningstar working with program 
managers in USIA and USAID, based on the assumption that the regions, as compared to 
the central government in Russia, were more open to reform.  RII concentrated all 
assistance activities, i.e., technical assistance, partnerships, small business training, and 
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finance programs, within a few regions where reform was deemed most promising.  
Specifically, assistance to Russia targeted three regions—Novgorod Oblast, Samara 
Oblast, and the Khabarovsk Krai and Sakhalin Oblast in the Far East—where leaders 
were open to investment and reform.  Novgorod had some historical experience with self-
government.  Before Muscovy overtook it in the 16th century, the Novgorod Republic, 
including most of northern Russia to the Urals, was governed by an assembly (veche) of
its inhabitants (USIA Office of Research and Media Reaction 1998, 2).  Samara, an 
industrial city of defense plants on the middle Volga, had been closed during the Soviet 
period (ibid., 2).  RII’s purpose was to build a climate attractive to foreign investment, 
including a legal framework where laws were enforced.  It also supported the 
development of NGOs, creating cites for public Internet access and assisting independent 
media.  This was a new approach to assistance that had never been tried before.     
 
In a June 1998 memorandum to his colleagues in USAID, USIA, Commerce, and 
Embassy Moscow, Ambassador Morningstar emphasized the importance of the RII as the 
highest priority in the U.S. government assistance program to Russia, enjoying the strong 
support of Vice President Gore and the Russian government.102 RII made most progress 
in Novgorod where oblast and city government officials were cooperative and open to 
new ideas and local entrepreneurs committed to improving the business climate.  
Ambassador Morningstar was more concerned about RII’s lack of progress in the other 
selected regions and felt the RII Resident Coordinators, who were hired by S/NIS/C and 
worked for the U.S. Department of State in Russia, needed to take a the lead on the 
 
102 Ambassador Morningstar provided a copy of this memo during our interview as background information 
on the RII. 
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ground, working with local authorities and overseeing the implementation of all U.S. 
government assistance programs in their regions.  The regional coordinators were 
responsible for monitoring assistance programs and making adjustments as necessary and 
bringing the many U.S. government assistance players into contact with each other.  
Importantly, they were charged with sharing lessons learned from their RII experiences 
with other regions in Russia.  Morningstar was concerned that it was taking too long to 
get programs up and running in the other RII sites and he feared losing the regional 
governments’ attention and commitment.  He wanted RII activities to receive the highest 
priority over other assistance programs in Russia and expected that while his office had 
funded RII the first two years, other U.S. federal agencies would incorporate the program 
in their base-line budget requests from 1999 forward.     
 
Richard Morningstar departed the position of Coordinator in 1998, which was 
assumed by his deputy Bill Taylor.  In a statement to the House International Relations 
Committee in June 1999, Taylor explained his approach to assistance to Russia – first as 
a balance between meeting immediate threats and promoting lasting generation change; 
and second as selective engagement, differentiating aid for regions actively seeking 
reform from those that did not (Moffett 1999).  For Taylor, short-term goals included 
humanitarian aid and programs to promote non-proliferation.  The U.S. also needed to 
invest in long-term political and economic reform “by supporting academic exchanges, 
non-governmental organization, Internet access and business” (ibid.)      
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GAO (2000, 100) cited several reasons for this shift to stage three, including the 
significant reduction in Congressional appropriations and the difficulty in spreading those 
diminished amounts across the vast Russian Federation, the lack of progress within the 
Duma to pass reform legislation at the federal level, and the need for demonstrable results 
for the Congress and the White House.  U.S. federal implementing agencies could work 
directly with regional governments and avoid the federal bureaucracy in Moscow.  More 
importantly, Morningstar realized that the transition in Russia would not be as quick and 
smooth as conceived originally, and likely would take generations to accomplish, 
certainly beyond the deadline of 1998 as established earlier in the assistance program.  
His approach was to look to the future and invest in young Russians through exchanges 
and programs like Junior Achievement.  Interestingly, the U.S. Embassy and USAID 
Mission in Moscow became much more active in implementing the programs in Russia’s 
regions.  Morningstar focused his attention on local success stories rather than national 
reforms with the idea that a critical mass of success stories would spread across the 
nation. 
 
In an interview with GAO, the Coordinator explained that if the Russian 
government asked for specific assistance, the U.S. would be willing to help on certain 
conditions, if: “(1) a significant opportunity exists to advance reform; (2) the U.S. 
government has a comparative advantage in providing assistance in the requested sector; 
and (3) the Russian government is judged not to have sufficient resources to purchase 
assistance from private sources (GAO 2000, 178).  In 2000, the U.S. government had 
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adjusted its expectations to be involved in supporting economic and political reform in 
Russia for generations.     
 
In conjunction with the Coordinator’s changes to the U.S. approach to assistance, 
USAID/ENI designed a strategic framework in 1997 with 11 objectives divided into four 
areas of assistance to conduct its assistance program toward the NIS.  Those four areas 
were: 
• “economic restructuring to foster the emergence of a competitive, market-oriented 
economy in which the majority of economic resources is privately owned and 
managed,” 
• “democratic transition to support the transition to transparent and accountable 
governance and the empowerment of citizens through democratic political 
processes,” 
• “social stabilization to respond to humanitarian crises and strengthen the capacity 
to manage the human dimension of the transition to democracy,” and 
• “cross-cutting programs/special initiatives” for activities that fell outside the other 
three categories (State Department Coordinator’s Office 1998, 66-71). 
 
To meet the second objective on democratic transition, USAID set several goals: 
 
• to develop a better informed citizenry through open information and active 
involvement in the political process; 
• to develop the rule of law through independent judiciary, uniform procedures, 
effective legal representation, and professional and honest prosecutors; and 
• to make local government more effective and accountable through 
decentralization of authority to the local level and better mechanisms for citizens 
to interact with local authorities. 
 
To meet these goals, USAID conducted assistance programs that sought to: 
• support free and fair elections, 
• strengthen political parties and labor unions, 
• develop independent media, 
• improve access to government information, 
• increase the capabilities of NGOs, 
• establish constitutions and civil codes, 
• strengthen parliamentary processes, the judiciary, and law enforcement 
procedures, and establish organizations to combat corruption, 
• create laws and regulations enhancing local authority, 
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• improve mechanisms for revenue sharing between central and local governments, 
• improve the delivery of urban services such as water and waste management, 
• encourage private contracts to manage municipal housing, and 
 make information on local government actions accessible and encourage citizen 
 participation in planning boards (ibid., 68-69). 
 
This was the first time in the FSA Annual Reports submitted to Congress that USAID 
had set forth so clearly its thinking on what it sought to accomplish through its assistance 
programs and how it planned to do so.           
 
Looking ahead to FY 1998, The FY 1997 Annual Report concluded that the U.S. 
government would emphasize increasingly the Partnership for Freedom approach to 
assistance programs in the NIS to promote economic and civil society linkages, 
especially to trade and investment and exchanges in Russia’s regions through the 
Regional Investment Initiative.  No one foresaw the coming crash of the ruble in August 
1998.  In the midst of this economic and political crisis, the Coordinator’s office re-
examined its assistance priorities and restructured to focus on investment-led economic 
growth, people-to-people linkages, and the development of civil society.  It blamed the 
crisis on the “slow pace of structural reforms” in Russia (State Department Coordinator’s 
Office 1999, 42).  In the immediate aftermath of the crisis, the U.S. reverted to providing 
humanitarian assistance, including food aid, which it had not done since the very first 
days of the transition in 1992.  In the longer term, U.S. investments targeted small- and 
medium-sized business; partnerships between U.S. and NIS universities, hospitals, 
NGOs, cities, business and professional associations; and exchanges between students, 
professionals and entrepreneurs.  Over time, assistance administrators became convinced 
that democratic reform was a generational process and that U.S. assistance efforts needed 
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to be focused on building a cadre of young leaders with understanding of the day-to-day 
activities of a functioning market democracy. 
 
Many credit Ambassador Morningstar with making U.S. assistance to the NIS 
significantly more effective and efficient.  In a much more hands on and analytic 
approach, he shifted the emphasis of assistance away from the large privatization projects 
of the early years of the transition to investment in people and indigenous organizations.  
In the beginning, the U.S. government assistance program to the NIS was comprised 
entirely of technical assistance to support privatization of the economy, regularization of 
elections, and the creation of laws.  In the first years, the push was to get the money out 
the door and into the countries of the former Soviet Union, but with very close oversight 
of program implementation through a handful of contractors.  Ambassador Morningstar 
moved the assistance program into the next phase with less reliance on those few, large 
contracts and more on smaller contacts even with the risk of less control over program 
implementation.  He sought to diversify the spectrum of assistance providers.  The 
approach to assistance changed noticeably throughout the decade as implementers 
learned what worked and what did not and as events on the ground dictated or permitted.  
Flexibility in assistance programs was key to making adjustments along the way.  One of 
the greatest challenges was convincing Congress that this was a worthwhile investment in 
the U.S.-Russia relationship, when, in fact, the U.S. could not control the final results of 
its investments.  External support to the process of democratization was marginal and 
depended on the will of the recipients to reform. 
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With the end of the Clinton Administration and the beginning of the George W. 
Bush Administration in January 2001 the State Department was reorganized again, 
dismantling S/NIS, the office that Secretary of State Warren Christopher had created and 
Strobe Talbott had directed in 1993 to coordinate relations with the NIS.  This 
restructuring signaled that Russia would not retain its place of priority in the foreign 
policy agenda of the new administration.  The duties of that office were relegated to the 
Bureau of European Affairs as the Office of Assistance Coordination in Europe 
(EUR/ACE), which now manages both the SEED and FSA programs.  Shortly before the 
end of the Clinton Administration, the U.S. Information Agency was dismantled and 
many of its personnel dispersed to Public Diplomacy (PD) positions throughout the 
regional bureaus in the State Department.103 USIA ceased to be an independent federal 
agency and became the Bureau for Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA) in the State 
Department, administering the traditional academic and citizens exchange programs, and 
reporting to the newly created Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public 
Affairs (R).  The dismantlement of USIA dealt a severe psychological blow to its career 
officers and relegated the exchanges portfolio to a much lower profile and priority at 
precisely the moment when those programs were receiving well-deserved attention from 
the FSA Coordinator’s office. 
 
103 As part of the Clinton administration’s efforts to restructure the foreign affairs community, the unlikely 
combination of Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee Jesse Helms (R-NC) worked together from the mid-1990s in the attempt to abolish USAID, 
USIA, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and centralize those responsibilities under 
the Secretary of State.  In spring 1995, former Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger, Alexander Haig, 
George Shultz, and James Baker supported Helms’ efforts to abolish those agencies (U.S. Congress. 
Senate. 1995a).  Senator Helms succeeded in eliminating USIA and ACDA.        
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Challenges to Assistance
U.S. government agencies faced many obstacles in providing assistance to the 
NIS and specifically to Russia.  The United States, along with the international financial 
institutions and other bilateral donors, faced similar problems in the early days of 
assisting the transition in Russia.  First, they had little experience with the special 
challenges of transition economies, shifting from a centrally planned economy to creating 
the institutions of a market economy.  Those accustomed to working in the development 
environment were faced with a new kind of recipient—a literate, educated populace with 
needs quite different from the usual less-developed recipient.  The traditional aid entities 
did not have on staff the substantive knowledge of Russia, a part of the world where they 
had never worked before.  According to GAO (2000, 79), “the [U.S. assistance] program 
failed to adequately take advantage of expertise within the U.S. government on the 
unique political context of Russia’s economic transition, and relied too much on 
personnel whose experience was primarily in poor developing countries.”  This lack of 
substantive knowledge was particularly problematic in terms of communication—donors 
and recipients did not speak the same language at first.  This improved over time, 
however, as U.S. agencies acquired in house expertise on the region. One of the most 
immediate obstacles to implementing assistance programs was the difficulty in securing 
such necessities as office and living space at an affordable price and establishing the 
infrastructure to run an office from phone lines to staff.  Russian laws and regulations 
were arbitrary, non-transparent, and subject to frequent change. 
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Moving the money fast 
With the perceived urgency of conditions on the ground at the collapse of the 
USSR and a rapidly declining Russian economy, the U.S. Congress put pressure on 
federal implementing agencies to move money quickly to meet emergency needs and to 
minimize impact on the U.S. budget.104 The intent initially was to demonstrate quick 
action to the Russians.  GAO (2000, 174) noted that the purpose for quick delivery 
shifted in Stage two under the assumption that quick reform produced genuinely better 
and longer-lasting reform.  In many cases, the federal agencies implemented the 
assistance programs through outside contractors, often through a few large umbrella 
contracts that were quicker to put in place.105 Russian government officials complained 
about these outside contractors who were highly paid and would come to Russia for short 
periods of time, give advice and recommendations for what the Russian government 
should do, and then disappear with no oversight or follow-up (GAO 2000, 79).  
Furthermore, Russians were insulted to be treated like a developing nation when they had 
been a superpower.  According to GAO (2000, 16), pressure to disburse funds quickly 
did not allow sufficient time to actually study the conditions on the ground in Russia.  
Many suggested that because assistance to the post-communist world covered such a 
broad range of activities, their impact was diluted.  As a result, there was a broad gap 
between heightened expectations in Russia of what the U.S. would deliver and the reality 
 
104 At the outset of the transition in the early 1990s the U.S. economy was in recession and the U.S. 
government ran a significant budget deficit.  The Bush Administration, which felt it did not have the 
resources to greatly expand its presence in the region, tried to run as much of the assistance program from 
Washington as possible to keep costs to a minimum. 
105 One of the most infamous contracts was with the Harvard Institute for International Development 
(HIID), which came under harsh criticism by the GAO for its implementation of a $300 million contract 
with little USAID oversight.  That contract concluded in 1997 with key HIID personnel under investigation 
(GAO 2000, 80). 
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of achievements, to the detriment of Russia’s perceptions of assistance programs (GAO, 
80). 
 
So big and the needs so great 
A significant obstacle was the sheer size of the Russian Federation and the extent 
of its needs in the transition process across that broad territory.  Because Russia had so 
far to go to become a market democracy, the needs simply dwarfed the level of assistance 
the United States could provide, especially given U.S. budget constraints early in the 
transition period.  Furthermore, Russia did not do a good job implementing needed 
economic reforms from the start.  GAO found that the partial economic reforms created 
hardships that further undermined any improvement in the economy or delivery of social 
services.     
 
Lack of indigenous support  
The lack of political will and consensus in Russia to create a market democracy 
was perhaps the most significant obstacle.  Assistance implementers expected the central 
Russian government to institute recommended reforms that would set the stage for 
economic growth.  A growing middle class was to continue the push for reform from the 
grassroots.  Just a this necessary middle class began to emerge, the ruble crash wiped it 
out because the elite had not put in place the necessary structural reforms for a market 
economy and rule of law.  According to GAO, the United States underestimated the 
division between the reformers and the holdovers from the old Soviet system.  The 
needed consensus and political will in Russia society did not exist to push reform 
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forward.  Russians did not agree on the transition, the type of society in which they 
wished to live.  GAO learned in its review of the assistance program that when vested 
status quo interests remained in power at the federal level, reform needed to be 
undertaken where possible at the regional or local level.   
 
Taxing assistance 
 Another major obstacle to the assistance program in Russia was the issue of 
taxation of assistance in that the entitled tax- and duty-exempt status was extremely 
difficult for assistance providers to obtain.  A 1992 bilateral agreement provided 
exemption from Russian taxes and customs duties to all U.S. assistance activities in 
Russia, but this agreement never became legislation.  In practice, U.S. assistance 
programs operated under the “Panskov-Pickering” Agreement signed in 1996 and 
extended several times thereafter.  The State Duma failed in 1997 to pass the necessary 
legislation on clarifying that U.S. assistance funds were not to be taxed.  In June 1998, 
Russia’s Finance Minister instructed tax and customs officials that the agreement had no 
legal basis, so they should begin collecting taxes and customs duties from US assistance 
providers.  This order later was rescinded but U.S. assistance providers continued to 
suffer from the ambiguity about their tax exempt status.  The problem was especially 
acute in dealing with local officials.  In December 1998, the Duma finally agreed upon 
assistance legislation, but President Yeltsin vetoed it in January 1999 (State Department 
Coordinator’s Office 1999, 43).   
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The difficulty of measuring progress  
One of the greatest challenges to U.S. assistance efforts was measuring success, 
determining if programs were effectively designed to accomplish their goals.  While it is 
possible to check the box about the existence of certain attributes of democracy—a 
constitution, free and fair elections, plural political parties—it was much more difficult to 
determine the strength of rule of law or the development of civil society, aside from 
counting the number of laws on the books or number of registered NGOs. 
 
Obviously, the NGOs receiving FSA funding needed to prove their effectiveness 
in hopes of securing future funding.  With the implementation of the Government 
Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) and Vice President Gore’s reinventing 
government initiative of the 1990s, results-oriented programs became the trend of federal 
funding.106 Understandably, NGOs reported only their program successes because future 
funding of these programs depended on their demonstrated effectiveness--and the 
embassy and funding agencies knew this.  And yet, when asked to quantify these 
accomplishments there was a great deal of uncertainty on all fronts about the indicators of 
performance.  How to measure incremental progress toward or digression from 
democracy is not an exact science.  Some assistance programs like the Enterprise Funds 
indeed were quantifiable--they either were profitable or not--but it was very hard to 
measure the impact of academic exchanges, alumni activities or other investments in 
human capital.  So there was the potential for disconnect between the Hill and the field.  
 
106 According to GAO (2004, 28), under GPRA (Pub.L. 103-62, 197 Stat. 285, as amended).  “executive 
branch performance management efforts are intended to inform Congress and the public of (1) annual 
performance goals, (2) measures that will be used to gauge performance, (3) strategies and resources 
required to achieve those goals, and (4) the procedures to be used to verify and validate progress.  These 
plans are to provide a direct linkage between longer-term goals and day-to-day activities.”  
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In making appropriation decisions, Congress wanted the hard numbers of what had been 
accomplished with FSA funds in the past years.  The evidence, however, tended to be 
anecdotal.  Tracking alumni of U.S.-funded academic exchange programs, for example, 
showed where those participants had established themselves in their societies after they 
returned from the U.S.  Across the board, younger alumni were participating actively in 
society, and older alumni in their professions, leading a new generation of Russian 
professionals.  It was difficult to measure, however, the contribution of the exchange 
experience to their future accomplishments. 
 
As priorities and approaches to assistance shifted during the 1990s, so did the 
attempts to get a better handle on assessing progress to date.  The annual reports from the 
early years of the transition in Russia relied primarily on anecdotal evidence.  The section 
of the annual reports that assessed conditions in Russia every year credited the Kremlin 
with passing the new constitution in 1993, conducting relatively free and fair 
parliamentary and presidential elections, and completing the privatization program by 
1994.  From all accounts, however, it was clear that the rule of law remained weak in 
Russia and that corruption was an ongoing problem.  USAID, for all the criticism it has 
received about its overabundance of regulations, took deliberate steps to design a 
strategic plan, setting goals and devising indicators to measure them.  In 2001, USAID 
conducted a Results Review and Resource Request (R4) in which the agency asserted 
significant results in its Russia program.  The report noted “Solid economic growth and 
advances on economic reforms underpinned vibrant small and medium business growth 
and improvements in living standards.  A burgeoning civil society, greater judicial 
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independence and the second presidential election since the fall of the Soviet Union 
provided optimism for Russia’s democratic transition. . . Many of these achievements in 
2000 were the realization of past USAID interventions and reaffirmed changes in 
USAID’s approach in recent years, adapting to changing needs and improving program 
effectiveness” (USAID Development Experience Clearinghouse 2001, 5).  To back up 
these claims, the R4 document detailed each strategic objective by drawing on indicators 
available from a variety of sources.  For example, the strategic objective “Accelerated 
development and growth of private enterprises” drew on several different indicators, 
including the gross number of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Russia 
registered by local government registration bodies or departments as of the end of the 
year.  It tracked those registered SMEs from 1992 through 2000, based on statistics 
provided by the Russian Resource Center for SMEs (ibid., 14).  USAID assessed that 
same strategic objective also by looking at the number of jobs created and/or sustained 
and the number of loans made by USAID-supported microfinance organizations as 
collected from a number of Russian and U.S. sources.  These efforts to capture and 
measure USAID activities through available statistics was a step forward in tracking 
progress of U.S. assistance programs.  
 
Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Pablo Zoido-Lobaton (2000) of the IMF 
suggested a similar approach to measuring progress in governance among countries, 
drawing on available data and adding to that survey data.  Noting that most assessment on 
governance relied on anecdotal evidence, they sought to develop a systemic approach to 
measuring governance as a means to influence policy choices on institutional and civil 
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society change.  They turned to survey data as a means to provide improved quantitative 
governance indicators, reflecting the views of stakeholders on the quality of governance.  
The authors first drew on the wide range of statistical data available on indicators related 
to governance:  voice and accountability, political stability and violence, government 
effectiveness, regulatory burden, rule of law and control of corruption.  By looking at one 
indicator, control of corruption, across a large number of countries, for example, the 
authors were able to break the countries out into three large categories:  those countries in 
which corruption was worst were in a “governance crisis,” those where corruption was 
somewhat of a problem were “at risk,” and those where corruption was not a problem 
were “not at risk.”  While acknowledging that these indicators were still imprecise, the 
authors claimed they could help policy makers identify countries facing major 
governance challenges, but did not provide real policy guidance (Kaufmann et al. 2000, 
4).  Kaufmann et al. noted “Aggregate indicators based on existing sources of governance 
data are a powerful tool for drawing attention to relevant issues.  They are also 
indispensable for cross-country research into the causes and consequences of governance.  
But they are a blunt tool to use in formulating policy advice” (ibid., 5).  The authors 
recommended using “in-depth, country-specific surveys—carried out by domestic 
nongovernmental organizations—of thousands of households, enterprises, and public 
officials that gather specific information about vulnerabilities within the country’s 
institutions” (ibid., 5).  They particularly noted the utility of anonymous surveys of public 
officials who can candidly describe the operations of their agencies.  Armed with survey 
data, stakeholders can then convene workshops to present findings, have policy 
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discussions, and make policy recommendations to improve governance and promote 
reform. 
 
The point of sharing these examples is to demonstrate the challenge of measuring 
progress in assisting political and economic reform.  Donor agencies like USAID and 
IMF are thinking creatively about how to work with available data and gather survey data 
to assess assistance programs.  The difficulty in measuring democracy promotion is 
particularly acute because the components are inter-related and progress in one area, for 
example, holding free and fair elections, may not translate into progress in another.  
Finally, as stressed before, progress in democratic and market reform is most reliant on 
the consent and will of the targeted recipient.  Even when there is obvious progress, one 
cannot be sure to what extent external assistance may have contributed to it.107 
Beyond the institutional view 
The various U.S. government agencies charged with conducting democracy 
promotion programs in Russia developed those programs in the context of their 
organizational cultures and agency regulations.  The annual reports prepared by the 
Coordinator for Assistance to the NIS in the State Department recounted for the U.S. 
Congress the Embassy’s assessment of political, economic, and social conditions on the 
ground in Russia and the federal agencies’ efforts to conduct their respective program 
 
107 In GAO’s (2004) review of the 1999 FSA Russian Leadership Exchange Program, GAO was at odds 
with the program’s implementers, the Open World Leadership Center, over the need to measure results to 
determine that the program was selecting the appropriate participants for its fellowships.  Open World 
rejected GAO’s recommendations to create measures claiming that the results of its efforts were 
measurable only “in the medium or long term.”    
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activities there—USAID’s rule of law, privatization, and market reform programs; 
USIA’s professional training and academic and cultural exchange programs; and the 
Commerce Department’s business development programs.  These institutional views, 
however, did not capture the complete story of democracy promotion as conducted by 
individual program managers of U.S. nongovernmental organizations on the ground in 
Russia. 
 
By the end of the decade, op-eds on Russia were not very encouraging.  Market 
and democratic political institutions, civil society, and the rule of law in Russia remained 
underdeveloped, casting doubt on the effectiveness of U.S. assistance efforts.  The shift 
from the Soviet system to a market democracy was profound, requiring entirely new 
institutions and new approaches.  Pervasive corruption remained a major constraint to 
reform in Russia where those with vested interests in the status quo blocked reforms.  The 
next two chapters examine specific assistance programs intended to promote the rule of 
law and market reform, and the development of democratic political institutions and civil 
society from the perspective of those U.S. organizations on the ground conducting the 
assistance programs.  These examples provide a closer look at how programs were 
implemented to explore to what extent they were able to meet their intended goals.  
While not denying the disappointments about Russia’s progress toward democracy, the 
view from the grassroots level suggests more positive accomplishments, especially in 
longer-term payoffs to U.S. investments in democracy promotion.   
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Chapter 5:  Implementing Rule of Law and Market Reform 
Assistance  
 
The rule of law and a market economy, essential components to democracy, were 
primary goals of the FREEDOM Support Act (FSA), but in practice much more attention 
was devoted to market reform than to developing the rule of law.  The scholarly literature 
suggests that the linkages between rule of law and market reform are vital.  Market 
transactions require the predictability that rule of law brings through enforcement of 
laws.  Establishing the rule of law is fundamental to successful economic and political 
reform toward democracy because it serves as the basis for influencing the behavior of 
individuals and enterprises.  Rule of law helps to build the trust that holds society 
together in a democracy.  
 
At the end of the Cold War, foreign policy elites in the United States spoke 
eloquently about the need for rule of law in the former Soviet space, recognizing its 
centrality for creating market democracies in place of collapsed authoritarian systems.  
Yet, for all their deference, there was little explanation of exactly what U.S. government 
officials meant by this phrase.  “Rule of law” seemed to be part political culture, where 
the people of the target country would obey written laws, which were enforced by an 
independent judiciary, and part legal institution, i.e., an independent judiciary, the body 
of written laws, and the professional associations of the legal field.  The implicit 
understanding was that the U.S. officials knew rule of law when they saw it, knew it was 
important to democracy, but did not necessarily know how to build it.  As a result, rule of 
law received neither priority attention nor much funding among democracy promotion 
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efforts in Russia during the 1990s.108 The task of designing rule of law programs was left 
to U.S. federal agencies with apparently no guidance.  This chapter examines specific 
programs and their accomplishments, as funded through U.S. government agencies and 
implemented by U.S. nongovernmental organizations, first in support for rule of law and 
then for market reform.  
Promoting the Rule of Law
Strengthening rule of law in the NIS stood as one goal among many in the 
FREEDOM Support Act, with no differentiation in importance among them.  Rule of 
law, however, is integral to the other goals of promoting democracy.  An independent 
judiciary protects citizens against the arbitrary actions of the state, while at the same time 
strengthens the state to carry out its duties.  Market mechanisms rely on rule of law to 
create conditions of confidence that contracts will be enforced or disputes adjudicated 
fairly.  Rule of law protects the free speech of independent media.  It ensures that 
elections are conducted freely and fairly.  For all these reasons, rule of law is the 
foundation for a market democracy.   
 
A review of FSA rule of law programs implemented across federal agencies, 
however, suggested that the goal of strengthening rule of law did not receive sufficient 
attention nor was there apparent coordinated planning on how to accomplish it.  USAID 
took lead responsibility under FSA for creating programs to help strengthen the rule of 
 
108 For example, USAID’s proposed budget for democracy promotion programs in Russia in Fiscal Year 
2000 was about $3.5 million (USAID 1999b).  When combined with support for building democratic 
political institutions, the proportion of funds to Rule of Law and Democracy together from 1992-2000 was 
24 percent (GAO 2000).  The total U.S. government funds devoted to rule of law in Russia from 1992-2000 
was $77 million or 35 percent of the total rule of law support for the whole NIS of $216 million (GAO 
2001a).    
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law in Russia, giving special attention to the judicial sector.  The State Department 
Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs focused on law 
enforcement training and the Department of Justice Office of Overseas Prosecutorial 
Development, Assistance and Training targeted criminal justice system reform.  A 2001 
GAO review of FSA rule of law programs suggested that they had had limited impact and 
insufficient sustainability (GAO 2001b).109 For its review, GAO drew on USAID’s 
definition that “the rule of law is premised on a government being able to provide a 
predictable and transparent legal system.  Fair and effective judicial and law enforcement 
institutions to protect citizens against he arbitrary use of state authority and lawless acts 
are also a basic part of such a system” (GAO 2001b, 1).  Interestingly, GAO noted that 
support to build rule of law under FSA was “envisioned by the U.S. government to be a 
short-term program to jump-start the countries of the strategically critical region on their 
way to political and economic transition” (GAO 2001a, 7).  While this was certainly true 
at the outset of FSA assistance, it is surprising to see such an assumption perpetuated in 
2001 at the time of the GAO review.  It was quite clear by then that the initial 
assumptions of how smooth and quick the transitions in the former communist world 
would be were overly optimistic.       
 
Judicial reform 
Focusing on support to the judiciary, the highlight of USAID’s work in Russia 
was its partnership with the American Bar Association’s Central and East European Law 
 
109 I note that GAO reviewed the various goals of FSA individually, i.e., a report on rule of law, another on 
market reform, but never addressed how these goals related to one another in the overall effort to promote 
democracy in the NIS. 
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Initiative (ABA/CEELI).  In 1994, USAID created the Rule of Law Consortia to work 
with CEELI to train the next generation of legal professionals including judges, defense 
attorneys and prosecutors and to create legal associations promoting the independence of 
the judiciary.  It also worked with law schools in Russia to develop new curricula.  A key 
activity was to promote the spread of jury trials across Russia through a pilot project in 
1994 in nine regions.  The aim was to create a criminal justice system that could fight 
crime and corruption, protect human rights, and give the public confidence in the legal 
system.  CEELI opened its Moscow office in 1992.    
 
ABA/CEELI was a public service project of the American Bar Association, which 
made pro bono legal expertise available to the emerging democracies of the former 
Soviet Union.  It took special care to ensure that its advice was neutral and without 
conflict of interest.  Thousands of volunteers shared their legal expertise with the 
countries of the region from 1990–2000.  Co-founder of CEELI Homer E. Moyer, Jr. 
noted in 2000 that the goals in transitioning from a communist system to a market-
oriented democracy included “freedom from corruption, accountability for atrocities, 
ethnic and gender equality, environmental protections, transparency in government, open 
market economies, a free and critical press, and the changes in attitudes, expectations, 
and culture that create public confidence in democratic processes. . . ” (American Bar 
Association 2000, 5).  He concluded that “market economies, enduring political reform, 
and peace cannot be achieved without an underlying legal system that embodies and 
assures the rule of law” (ibid., 5).  CEELI made clear that an effective system of law was 
essential for political and economic reforms to last.  For the first five years of the decade, 
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CEELI’s efforts were devoted to drafting laws; the second half of the decade to 
strengthening the long-term capabilities of its indigenous partners, like lawyers’ and 
judges’ associations, to prepare them to continue reform on their own.  USAID response 
to GAO’s review emphasized its cooperative agreement with ABA/CEELI “which 
directly addresses the problem of ensuring sustainability by placing regional institution 
building advisers in the field to better assist organizations to become self-sustaining” 
(GAO 2001a, 59).  
 
USAID also supported the creation of non-governmental organizations to serve as 
advocates for human rights, the development of participatory legal and legislative 
processes, and the free flow of legal information (State Department Coordinator’s Office 
1996, 77).  USAID supported judicial reform through the work of the Associates in Rural 
Development/Checchi Consortium (ARD/Checchi) with the Ohio and Vermont Supreme 
Courts and Bars and the National Judicial College.  This program trained all of Russia’s 
commercial law judges in market-oriented legal reform. 
 
In response to the Russian economic crisis in 1998, USAID took special efforts to 
re-examine its programs and more clearly define its goals and objectives including those 
on rule of law to identify what types of legal reform were most necessary.  Under the goal 
of Democratic Transition “to support the transition to transparent and accountable 
governance and the empowerment of citizens through democratic political processes,” 
USAID established the strategic objective to promote “legal systems that better support 
democratic processes and market reforms” (State Department Coordinator Office 1999, 
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83 and 85).  USAID took steps in its new strategic plan in 1997 to define its approach to 
strengthening the rule of law.  It stated, “The fair, objective and consistent rule of law 
requires the development of an independent judiciary, professional and honest 
prosecutors, effective legal representation, and well-defined legal procedures that help 
ensure uniform and timely enforcement of laws” (ibid., 85).  USAID expected to 
accomplish this objective through support for drafting civil codes, building institutional 
capacity of parliaments, programs aimed at the judiciary and its associated organizations 
like bars, and establishing procedures for limiting government corruption and human 
rights violations (ibid., 85).       
 
In the early 1990s, the U.S. was focused on economic reform—with advisers 
sitting in governmental ministries helping to draft specific legislation on privatization and 
macroeconomic policies.  These efforts kept the Russian government focused and 
engaged on economic reform.  Lacking similar U.S. attention to legal reform, the Russian 
government put it on the back burner.  According to Spense (2005, 11), U.S. policy 
makers did not give a high priority to rule of law assistance.  Only $15 million was 
devoted to Rule of Law assistance in the early-mid 1990s for training seminars and 
logistical help for the courts.  Assistance to jury trials was slow to start because U.S. 
federal regulations prohibited the use of assistance funds to pay the salaries of foreign 
officials, including jurors.  Spense (ibid., 10) noted that the U.S. was not involved in the 
early stages of drafting the criminal code because the attitude of the U.S. government at 
that time was to remain at arm’s length from such internal affairs, not wanting to be seen 
directing the domestic affairs of another country.  U.S. officials in the early days of 
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Russian independence did not want to actively lobby Yeltsin on criminal justice.  The 
U.S. government took a hands-off approach to rule of law assistance in the early stages of 
the transition.  With the economic collapse of August 1998, any progress that had been 
made in legal reform came to a halt.  The 1998 Annual Report on U.S. Assistance to the 
NIS described the critical obstacles to legal reform in Russia as “corruption, inadequate 
institutional capacity, inadequate commitment of government resources, and limited 
cultural and political will to reform” (State Department Coordinator’s Office 1999, 85).  
In 1998, Russia was only one of four NIS countries where USAID pursued rule of law 
programs because it was seen as further along in reform than other states.  By then, 
USAID had adjusted its expectations, planning that development of rule of law in Russia 
was a long-term generational process.    
Strengthening law enforcement 
The 1994 Annual Report on U.S. Assistance to the NIS recognized the danger of 
rising crime to the reform process in Russia.  One year later, the annual report stated that 
“since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, a sharp increase in organized crime and 
other types of criminal activity has led many NIS citizens to equate the transition to a 
democratic, market-based system with an overall breakdown in law and order” (State 
Department Coordinator’s Office 1995, 80).  In response to this problem of crime, 
USAID designed training and technical assistance for law enforcement agencies and for 
reform of the criminal justice system in Russia.  The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation 
conducted the first training program on fighting financial crimes in Moscow in November 
1994.  Beginning in 1995, courses were offered at the International Law Enforcement 
Academy in Budapest.  Special courses were designed for the Russian Ministry of 
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Internal Affairs (MVD) on such topics as combating cyber crimes and violations of 
intellectual property rights, public corruption, and internal investigations.110 
In 1995, U.S. assistance efforts to strengthen law enforcement were consolidated 
under the State Department’s Anti-Crime Training and Technical Assistance (ACTTA) 
program to teach law enforcement agencies in the region how to deal with crime while at 
the same time strengthening the rule of law and protecting individual rights (State 
Department Coordinator’s Office 1996, 28).  During 1995, various U.S. government 
entities trained more than 1,000 law enforcement officials through 40 courses (15 in the 
U.S. and 25 in Russia) on such topics as organized crime, financial crime, and narcotics 
trafficking.  Resident U.S. advisers in Moscow provided their assessments on criminal 
reform for inclusion in legislation on organized crime, money-laundering, and corruption.  
The 1995 Annual Report noted that “key recommendations from their analyses were 
incorporated into the pending legislation” (ibid., 28).  Cooperation between U.S. and 
Russian law enforcement agencies spread beyond Moscow and St. Petersburg in 1995 to 
regional centers of Chelyabinsk, Khabarovsk and Nizhniy Novgorod.  In 1997, ACTTA 
added new courses on community policing and on demand reduction and drug-abuse 
awareness.  It undertook also a comprehensive program to address violence against 
women.  With the identification of corruption as a major obstacle to reform, the State 
Department funded training on combating corruption among public officials and police 
forces.  ACCTA trained law enforcement officers throughout the Russian government, 
including the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Tax Police, Border Guards, Immigration 
 
110 By the end of 1997, over 3300 Russian law enforcement officials had taken 150 law enforcement courses 
(State Department Coordinator’s Office 1998, 111). 
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Service, Customs Service, and the Central Bank in such areas as post-blast investigation, 
drug enforcement, narcotics interdiction, advanced economic crime, homicide 
investigation, crimes against children, and human dignity and policing (State Department 
Coordinator’s Office 2000, 160).  The Eurasia Foundation awarded grants to 23 
organizations in seven regions in 1998 under its newly created Rule-of-Law Grant 
Program to deal with corruption, including fostering transparency in local government 
and crime prevention.  The Department of Justice Office of Overseas Prosecutorial 
Development, Assistance and Training (OPDAT) and ABA/CEELI trained over 2,500 
Russian professionals involved in prosecutorial activities, focusing at the end of the 
decade on the problem of organized crime and corruption.   
 
USAID started a training program in 1998 for Russia’s new Bailiffs’ Service in 
the Russian Ministry of Justice to enhance capabilities to enforce court decisions (State 
Department Coordinator’s Office 1999, 47).  The 1999 Annual Report noted that the 
Bailiff’s Service had hired more personnel and was ready to assume court security 
functions (State Department Coordinator’s Office 2000, 109).  USAID, however, dropped 
this activity in 2001 due to lack of funding.  
 
To improve the investment climate for business, increasingly more attention was 
devoted to fighting commercial crime.  In a July 1996 meeting of the Gore-Chernomyrdin 
Commission, the U.S. and Russian governments agreed to work together on fighting 
crime, beginning with preparation of a white paper on impediments to trade and 
investment in Russia.  They also agreed to organize seminars on crime for the business 
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community throughout Russia (State Department Coordinator’s Office 1997, 38).  The 
GCC undertook a separate initiative to combat money laundering which identified the 
passage of anti-money-laundering legislation in the Duma as the highest priority. 
 
GAO (2001b) criticized government agencies, more so State and Justice than 
USAID, for not effectively designing program goals and objectives and measurements for 
success.  GAO found the number of police officers trained, for example, to be an 
insufficient measurement of the progress in the rule of law, and would have preferred 
programs be designed, instead, to “reform national law enforcement practices” (ibid., 3).  
 
Passage of the Civil Code 
One success in the area of rule of law was the civil code, with increasing evidence 
at the end of the decade that people were turning to the courts to resolve civil suits.  As 
part of its economic restructuring assistance, USAID funded technical advisers in 1994 to 
work on President Yeltsin’s commission to draft the new Civil Code.  Part I of the code 
which established the fundamentals of civil and commercial law, addressing contracts, 
secured transactions, and property rights, went into effect on January 1, 1995 (State 
Department Coordinator’s Office 1996, 52).  Part II, which was passed in 1996, dealt 
with individual obligations like banking transactions, leases, sales and purchases.  Part III 
included sections on inheritance, property law, intellectual property rights, private 
international law and ownership and sale of land.  The Coordinator’s Office expected that 
the new code would help deter financial crime, which had jeopardized people’s 
confidence in the market economy (ibid., 56).  USAID’s Congressional Presentation for 
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2000 stated that all 1600 commercial court judges had received Parts I and II of the new 
civil code and 40 percent of them had received substantive training on the code and other 
newly enacted laws (U.S. Agency for International Development 2000, 9).  The GAO 
review (2001b) noted the passage of the civil code and commercial laws, but faulted 
Russia for not having passed a new criminal code (which it did shortly thereafter). 
 
Commercial law program  
From 1992-2000, ABA/CEELI trained thousands of Russian lawyers on-site in 
commercial law and took the lead in providing up-to-date information on commercial law 
and the tax code (American Bar Association 2000, 37).  USAID contracted with 
Harvard’s Institute for International Development (HIID) to work closely with Russia’s 
Commission on Securities and Capital Markets (CSCM) to strengthen its institutional 
capacity to meet criteria for a significant World Bank loan to develop Russia’s capital 
markets.  The Duma passed a Law on Securities in March 1996, which President Yeltsin 
signed in April.  The new law formalized many of the president’s earlier decrees on 
securities rules and procedures and established the role of the CSCM.  USAID concluded 
its contracts with HIID in 1996 over concerns with HIID conduct in Russia’s voucher 
privatization program, as will be discussed later. 
 
In 1995, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) through an 
interagency agreement with USAID and in collaboration with ABA/CEELI provided 
technical assistance in drafting securities laws and regulations.  It advised on such issues 
as U.S. corporate governance practices, principles of self-regulation, ethics and conduct 
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rules for SEC commissioners, and the process of public issuance, as well as the SEC’s 
organization and budget (State Department Coordinator’s Office 1996, 57).         
 
Criminal justice reform 
 Programs to address criminal justice reform began in 1996 under two projects, 
one sponsored by the U.S. Department of Justice in conjunction with ABA/CEELI and 
the second funded by USAID through the Associates in Rural Development/Checchi 
Consortium (ARD/Checchi).  Both projects sought to reintroduce jury trials to Russia and 
draft new criminal codes.  In preparation of the new Criminal Procedure Code, CEELI 
supported numerous training seminars to assist the design and innovative public meetings 
to help build support for the code.  These public meetings were especially well timed 
between the two Duma readings of the draft legislation, working to ensure its passage.  
CEELI’s collaboration with the Justice Department importantly targeted assisting Russia 
in the battle against organized crime and corruption.  CEELI devoted special efforts to 
support a national anti-corruption strategy by building coalitions among law enforcement, 
government officials and civil society.  
 
Russia’s passage of the Criminal Procedure Code in 2001 was a rare example of 
successful U.S. efforts to assist the development of the rule of law in Russia in the 1990s.  
Notably, the Criminal Procedure Code passed about a decade after the initiation of U.S. 
assistance efforts because the legislation was stalled in the Duma through much of the 
1990s.  This code represented an important element of democracy promotion because it 
provided protection against human rights violations like arbitrary arrest and show trials 
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and other due process issues, which had a painful historical precedent in the Soviet 
Union.  The new code re-introduced the practice of jury trials from the pre-Soviet period.  
 
Importantly, these legal reforms were grounded in Russian history and not the 
sole product of U.S. assistance.  According to Spense (1998), they were reflective of 
Russian culture with roots back to its 19th century legal reform and the right to jury trial 
under Czar Alexander II.  More recently, Gorbachev was the driving force behind the 
initial push to reform the Soviet legal system, building on those earlier efforts.  The 
Criminal Procedure Code, which passed in 2001 had legitimate Russian roots. 
 
The reforms of the early 1990s put new protections into the 1978 Soviet 
constitution that “required judicial approval for arresting a suspect, searching a private 
home, intercepting mail, eavesdropping, or telephone tapping” (Spense, 5).  These rights 
were then transferred into the new Russian constitution of December 1993 along with 
“the presumption of innocence; protection against double jeopardy; right to remain silent; 
right to exclude evidence gathered illegally; right to defense counsel upon arrest or 
detention; prohibition against ex post facto laws; right to trial by jury to the extent 
provided by law; and requirement of a jury trial for death penalty cases” (Spense 1998, 
5).  The 1993 constitution provided that the Russian judiciary would guarantee these 
rights.  The design for this legal reform was good and a positive step forward for the rule 
of law in Russia.  Its limitation, however, was that it needed implementing legislation 
passed by the Duma to put it into effect. 
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Unfortunately, the political will to move the reform to that next step had 
disappeared by the mid-1990s, bogged down in bureaucratic obstacles and the ongoing 
political tensions between President Yeltsin and the Duma.  The window of opportunity 
to enact implementing legislation was much abbreviated as a result of growing discontent 
in Russian society from high inflation and resulting hardships under Yeltsin’s “shock 
therapy” approach to economic reform.  As a result, little progress was made on putting 
the new code in place because there was no political will in the Russian government to 
move it forward and no demand from below to make the government take action.  Spense 
(1998) suggested that the Russian government simply could not afford to implement 
these new constitutional provisions.  He explained that implementing reform was costly 
and transitioning governments usually had severe budget constraints.  A dilemma often 
developed when a reform-minded government placed new provisions in the constitution, 
like jury trials, but could not afford to pay for them because they required remodeling 
courtrooms, paying jurors, and training defense attorneys.  As a result, the inability to 
implement constitutional guarantees inadvertently would put the new government in 
illegal status of not upholding the constitution.  Ironically, therefore, the new provisions 
of the 1993 Constitution did not really provide new protections.  Consequently, the 
Russian government delayed the Criminal Code implementing legislation until resources 
existed to pay for them.  That delay lasted through the latter half of the 1990s.  
 
While legal reform stalled in Russia, the U.S. redirected its assistance efforts to 
supporting more grassroots activities, a shift the U.S. government adopted throughout its 
overall democracy promotion strategy.  In the latter half of the 1990s, the U.S. conducted 
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legal seminars and exchange programs, bringing judges and lawyers and civil society 
groups to the U.S. to observe the legal system in action.  It printed legal manuals on 
running jury trials and information about the benefits of a modern criminal code (Spense, 
9).  The U.S. hoped to build a constituency of support for legal reform within Russian.  
These activities, however, did not play a key role in creating the political conditions that 
allowed legal reform eventually to move forward.   
 
Despite some positive steps, rule of law was not strengthened in Russia over the 
course of the 1990s.  Only when Vladimir Putin became president in December 1999 and 
made legal reform a priority was reform reinvigorated.  Putin created a commission on 
judicial reform, of which Duma Deputy Elena Mizulina took the lead and made it her 
primary objective to get the new Criminal Code passed (Spense 1998, 8).  As an 
innovative concept, she created a working group composed of 40 members, some 
supporting and some opposing the draft criminal justice legislation and covering the 
broad range of stakeholders.  By offering them the opportunity to participate in reviewing 
the draft legislation, she gave them a vested interest in the final outcome and held them to 
an ambitious schedule to get the implementing legislation passed in 18 months.  
Interestingly, she had written her doctoral thesis on modernizing the Russian criminal 
justice system (Spense 1998, 8).  The new code increased the responsibility of the judges 
and shifted power from the procuracy to the judiciary.  Under the code, defense lawyers 
gained more rights to speak up in courts, to gather evidence, and to cross-examine 
witnesses.  Prosecutors used to hold all the power in the courtroom.111 
111 See ABA/CEELI website (Buchanan).  
http://www.abanet.org/ceeli/countries/russia/scucess_story_rus_crim_code.html.  
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Once the political environment was sympathetic to legal reform, U.S. assistance 
could be effective.  It was instrumental in lessening the transaction costs of the reform 
and U.S. advisers recommended substantive changes to the draft, which were accepted.  
The U.S. government’s approach to supporting legal reform in Russia was much different 
in 2000 than it had been at the beginning of the 1990s.  Working through the U.S. 
Embassy Law Enforcement Section and ABA/CEELI, the U.S. provided two dedicated 
experts on comparative criminal procedure to Mizulina’s Duma working group to help 
with specific language and track changes as the drafting process progressed.  Specifically, 
this was language on plea-bargaining—an essential requirement for jury trials in the U.S. 
to manage the trial load on the courts—and rules of evidence, as well as other rights of 
the accused.  The U.S. also sponsored conferences specifically for the Duma working 
group.  Dedicated to the needs of the group, the Department of Justice and ABA/CEELI 
were involved in the details of the implementation legislation, yet gave the Duma full 
credit and ownership of the legislation.  The new code met international legal standards.         
 
The ultimate passage of the Criminal Procedure Code exemplified the complex 
pieces that needed to come together for reform to happen.  First, the design of the Code 
was legitimate as an indigenous effort from the start.  Then the political environment 
needed to be conducive to legal reform.  Under Elena Mizulina’s leadership, the work on 
the Code was able to move forward.  Her working group served as a good model for 
future efforts.  In fact, following passage of the Code, the working group stayed together 
to become an implementation group, taking their message on the road across Russia to 
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build societal support for such legal reform and explain its place in the daily life of 
Russians.  Contrary to U.S. expectations, the demand for legal reform did not come from 
the grassroots level, but was driven by the vision of one individual in the political 
hierarchy with assistance from the U.S.  Spense (1998, 16) called this approach to rule of 
law assistance “catalyzing reform.”  He claimed “this approach suggests that Western 
efforts can influence legal reform when two conditions are present: first, a policy 
entrepreneur who favors reform and some domestic political space to make her efforts a 
reality; and second, the need for legislation or a plan to implement reforms that are 
already part of the policy debate.  When those conditions hold, the West can help bring 
about reforms by offering logistical and monetary support, without claiming credit.”112 
Consistent with the findings of this study that the primary component for 
democracy to take hold is the consent of the people, Spense (14) cites the reflections of 
one coordinator of U.S. assistance in Moscow: 
 
You find people who are good, focused, and committed, and you support them.  But the 
will needs to be indigenous.  The ideas that underpinned what they [the Russians] were 
trying to do were already consistent with what the U.S. would support, and consistent 
with European norms.  It was more that the Russians didn’t have the resources to do what 
they wanted to do. 
 
Other participants in the U.S. assistance efforts noted the value of Russian legal 
professionals traveling to the United States to see the democratic system at work. 
 
112 Spense (17) noted that the cost of U.S. assistance efforts to passage of the Criminal Procedure Code was 
about $1 million over three years (1999-2001), the period in which U.S. assistance was most influential.  
Therefore, it was not about the amount of assistance provided, but about its form when the U.S. 
government was much more intimately involved in the details than it had been previously. 
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Interestingly, Spense (1998, 18) pointed out tension between the push for 
democratic reforms and development of the rule of law, citing the evidence that legal 
reform did not progress under Yeltsin’s more open society, but did under Putin’s 
subsequently more closed society.  He recommended approaching democracy and rule of 
law as two distinct goals, not combining them as does conventional thinking.  Promoting 
democracy and promoting the rule of law may require different strategies.  Interestingly, 
in its overall review of democracy promotion, GAO (2000) combined its findings on 
democracy and rule of law into one category.          
 
Decrees, not laws  
Because of the tense relationship between Boris Yeltsin and the communist-
dominated Duma, much legislation in the 1990s was stalled.  As a result, Yeltsin resorted 
to executive decrees to make changes in the economy, political structure, and society.  
According to Belton (22), relying on executive decrees to implement rule of law reform 
does not strengthen the rule of law.  Carothers (2004, 126) agreed, suggesting that rule of 
law was the weakest link in Russia’s post-communist transformation.  Rule of law was 
undermined by the executive’s willingness to go around the law, as Yeltsin did repeatedly 
through executive decrees, and “by the private sector’s troubling lawlessness” (ibid., 
126).  
 
Belton (2005, 26) noted that, under Putin, Russia had more predictable and 
efficient justice than it did under Yeltsin because the central government—the Kremlin—
ruled.  Under Putin’s leadership regular businesses operated and local government 
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officials were accountable to the Kremlin.  These gains of predictability, however, came 
at the price of more power to the center at the expense of the Duma.  Comparing the two 
regimes, Belton determined that under Putin, the level of law and order in society and the 
predictability and efficiency of the legal institutions were higher, yet the state was less 
bound by law than under Yeltsin.  Human rights stayed about the same though the 
sources of threat changed from general anarchy under Yeltsin to the state under Putin 
(Belton 2005, 26).  Under Yeltsin, Russia’s rule of law was weak and unpredictable and 
he sought to control and make changes through decrees.  Rule of law was a higher 
priority for Putin and was strengthened, but to the end of consolidating power in the 
Kremlin. 
 
Challenges to rule of law assistance 
According to The 1998 Annual Report, legal reform in Russia depended on the 
willingness of the leaders and the public to accept fairness, transparency, accountability, 
and legal predictability as the norms.  The 1999 Annual Report identified significant 
obstacles to reform:  “corruption, organized crime, and the overall lack of an effective 
and comprehensive legal system that can ensure the rule of law (State Department 
Coordinator’s Office 2000, 66).  USAID stated “corruption . . . remains systemic at all 
levels of society, with deleterious effects on the economy as well as corrosive effects on 
public confidence in government institutions.  In addition to corruption, main obstacles to 
furthering the rule of law include inadequate institutional capacity and insufficient 
commitment of government resources to this area.  Ultimately, the effectiveness of legal 
reform efforts depends on the will of institutions and citizens to adhere to concepts of 
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fairness, transparency, accountability and legal predictability” (ibid., 108).  Likewise, the 
GAO (2001b, 10) found that U.S. rule of law assistance was constrained by: “(1) a 
limited political consensus on the need to reform laws and institutions, (2) a shortage of 
domestic resources to finance many of the reforms on a large scare, and (3) a number of 
shortcomings in U.S. program management.        
 
Assessing Progress in U.S. Assistance to Rule of Law in Russia 
Chapter One referenced the work of Karen Kleinfeld Belton (2005) for a clear 
definition of the rule of law.  As noted there, she proposed a definition based on the end-
goals of the rule of law where: 1) the state abided by law; 2) there was equality before the 
law; 3) there was law and order in society; 4) justice was exercised efficiently and 
impartially; and 5) human rights were upheld.  Achieving these goals often requires 
reform across many institutions—the courts, the police, and the judiciary—and success in 
one area alone does not bring rule of law because the goals are inter-related.  Belton 
claimed that democracy promoters tended to define rule of law based on institutions:  1) 
the laws, which were publicly known and accepted; 2) a judiciary that was trained and 
knowledgeable about the law and independent of political power; and 3) an enforcement 
mechanism that could enforce laws, executive judicial judgments, and keep the peace and 
security in society.  According to Belton, reforming institutions was a means to an end, 
not an end in itself, but it had become so in democracy promotion efforts. For Belton, the 




Carothers (2004, 128) criticized the U.S. government for not coordinating its 
various programs to strengthen rule of law into a coherent strategy.  Russia was the 
largest recipient of U.S. rule of law aid, and, yet, according to Carothers, made little 
progress.  One of the major obstacles was the lack of support among the Russian public 
for rule of law, though they clearly wanted to reestablish law and order after the 
turbulence of the Yeltsin years.  Stephen Holmes argued that only strong demand for law 
would make a difference, particularly strong demand at the elite level.   
 
Rule of law is fundamentally about instilling certain values in society—
efficiency, transparency, accountability and honesty—not about a certain institutional 
model.  These values needed to be developed in Russian society and government.  Rule 
of law could not be transplanted simply through institutional models.  Leaders had to be 
willing to submit to the law.  It was easier to focus reform efforts on rewriting laws and 
building institutions and much more difficult and time consuming to build internal 
support for the rule of law.  According to Carothers (2004, 129), building this support 
would require “a level of interventionism, political attention, and visibility that many 
donor governments and organizations cannot or do not wish to apply.  Above all, it calls 
for patient, sustained attention, as breaking down entrenched political interests, 
transforming values, and generating enlightened, consistent leadership will take 
generations.”  Carothers complained that U.S. assistance programs gave primary attention 
to judicial reform without evidence supporting that judicial reform was more important 
than the executive branch agencies or legislatures in their role for passing laws.  For 
Carothers, the law was more than institutions and written codes; it was also what people 
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thought and how they behaved.  Aid providers, he suggested, needed to understand how 
law operated in a society. 
 
• Rule of law is not about a set of specific institutions, but about a set of inter-
related goals that are complementary and in tension.  Rule of law is not a single 
goal; there is much more to it than that.  Think about the difference in strategies 
for promoting rule of law versus those for promoting democracy. 
 
Despite efforts to create rule of law societies, results throughout the former Soviet 
space, including Russia, were mixed.  Channell (2005) argued that often societies had 
plenty of good written laws, but they were not enforced.  Early in the transition period, 
donors focused on rewriting commercial laws to foster the growth of a market economy, 
often pulling laws directly from best practices around the world.  Donors and indigenous 
reformers assumed that with good laws in place the forces of the market economy would 
ensure their implementation and enforcement.  That was not the case in a number of 
transitioning countries, including Russia, for many of the same reasons: 
 
1) Because the laws were transplanted from other markets and not indigenous, 
they often did not reflect the culture and commercial history of the recipient 
country.  Those who were most impacted by the reforms—government 
institutions, the private sector, and NGOs—were not involved in the drafting 
process, which usually was carried out by a small number of outside experts 
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and a parliamentary committee.  The people did not own the new laws, so had 
no stake in ensuring their successful implementation. 
2) Too often, law reform efforts have been constrained to too short of a time 
frame and with insufficient resources.  Time is important to build support for 
reform within society and that means getting out to the people broadly through 
publications and public discourse, both of which cost money.   
3) Reform efforts tend to be too narrowly focused and miss the systemic impact 
of reform.  As a result, segmented projects do not add up to a whole rule of 
law system. 
 
Channell particularly made the point that these were not new lessons, having been 
learned, but not adequately captured, by the international community during the 1960s 
and 1970s.  Participation in the drafting process by the broad range of stakeholders sets 
the stage for a more sympathetic public.  Reformers needed to invite public comment to 
get buy in for reform.  Borrowing from existing law worldwide was not the problem; 
neglecting public review of draft law was a problem and worked against the 
consolidation of the rule of law. 
 
Channell (2005, 7) argued for the systemic approach to rule of law reform, 
meaning pursuing reform across all sectors of society and the economy, because reform 
targeted specifically in one area could create dangerous loopholes in another.  He cited as 
an example the early bankruptcy laws, i.e., how an organization legally declared its 
inability to pay its creditors, in Russia, which neglected to recognize the need also for 
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company law reform that governed the creation and regulation of business organizations.  
As a result, directors of newly privatized enterprises could move corporate assets directly 
to themselves or through shell companies to the loss of shareholders and creditors.   
 
Creating new laws alone was not sufficient to build the rule of law because the 
new laws needed to be accepted and upheld in society.  Passing laws and implementing 
laws are two separate and necessary steps that involve “research, debate, negotiation, 
public education, outreach, institutional capacity building in parliament, development of 
skills in translating policy into legislative drafts, revision of drafts based on local political 
compromises” (Channell 2005, 9).  To enhance the legitimacy of new laws, government 
should engage with the public in dialogue to come to agreement about the laws so they 
can be enforced and serve the purpose for which they are intended. 
 
Given such criticism, what does this review of rule of law assistance to Russia in 
the 1990s say about U.S. efforts to promote democracy?  The foreign policy elite 
recognized rule of law as an essential component of democracy.  Rule of law appeared in 
the FSA legislation and nearly all of the policy statements on promoting democracy in 
Russia upon the collapse of the Soviet Union.  The term, however, was undefined, taking 
on concrete meaning only as it was designed and operationalized by the U.S. government 
implementing agencies—USAID and the Departments of State and Justice.  Through its 
grants to ABA/CEELI, USAID focused on training the judiciary.  ABA/CEELI also 
worked directly with the parliamentary working group to draft the Criminal Procedure 
Code, which greatly improved the rights of the accused.  The State Department programs 
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trained law enforcement officials to fight crime while respecting the rights of the 
individual.  The Justice Department through ABA/CEELI trained prosecutorial 
professionals.  I would suggest that by working so closely with, for example, 
ABA/CEELI volunteer lawyers who were in country working pro bono, Russian legal 
professionals were exposed first hand to the values of transparency, predictability, and 
efficiency that are prevalent in the U.S. legal tradition.  Those who served as dedicated 
advisers to certain legislative actions built relationships with Russian lawyers and 
legislators.  Creating judicial organizations builds a community of judges.  Also, where 
possible, USAID made efforts to distribute newly passed laws as widely as possible, 
contributing to the uniformity of law across regions. 
 
Despite these efforts, however, rule of law in Russia remained weakly developed 
by the end of the century.    At the end of each Annual Report on U.S. Assistance to the 
NIS is a section on “Criteria for U.S. Assistance,” which recommends whether the United 
States should continue providing assistance to a particular country.  The FSA required 
that the President “take into account not only relative need but also the extent to which 
[Russia] is acting to make significant progress toward, and is committed to the 
comprehensive implementation of, a democratic system based on principles of the rule of 
law, individual freedoms, and representative government determined by free and fair 
elections” (State Department Coordinator’s Office 2000, 269).  As in earlier reports, The 
1999 Annual Report indicated concern about the independence of the judiciary in Russia 
and called “Russia’s progress towards building a society governed by law-based, 
democratic institutions . . . uneven and beset by serious challenges, often due to 
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significant limitation on the state’s financial resources (ibid., 269).  While acknowledging 
that the Constitution provides for an independent judiciary, the report found that “in 
practice, the judiciary remains subject to political influence, particularly in high-profile 
cases.  The government’s inability to provide sufficient resources to the courts has also 
compromised the judiciary’s freedom of action, and the judiciary—including the 
constitutional court—has not yet established effective mechanisms to enforce its rulings” 
(ibid., 269).  It noted that the Duma had not enacted anti-corruption legislation nor had 
the government taken steps to address it.  Such statements did not indicate much progress 
in the area of strengthening the rule of law in Russia, but there were significantly fewer 
assistance programs devoted to the area, as compared to those promoting other attributes 
of democracy such as market reform. 
 
While everyone acknowledged the importance of rule of law in a democracy, its 
development in Russia did not seem to receive a high priority on the assistance agenda.  
USAID conducted a Results Review and Resource Request (R4) document in 2001 that 
presented accomplishments to date in its democracy promotion programs.  The review 
included measures of performance for each objective, for example, on the uniformity and 
predictability of judicial court decisions based on the results of an annual ABA/CEELI 
survey.  With these measures, USAID could track progress over time.  The 2001 R4 
document concluded that significant progress had been made in the area of rule of law.  
The legal framework provided judicial independence based on a new law implemented in 
2000 for funding the judiciary.  From an exchange program of 20 top Russian judges, 
USAID helped create a Judicial Department in 1998, which worked to secure funding for 
321
the courts and hire personnel for the court system.  The Judicial Department was modeled 
on the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (USAID 2000, 9).113 As President Putin 
took office, he raised the salaries for judges by 20 percent on December 1, 2000 (USAID 
Development Experience Clearinghouse 2001, 48).  It appeared that progress was being 
made in strengthening the judiciary, but, according to USAID, the prevalence of 
corruption continued to work against the confidence of the Russian people in legal 
institutions.  For this reason, USAID expected to support indigenous NGOs that had 
taken up the fight against corruption at the grassroots level (ibid., 49).  In fact, GAO 
(2001b, 12) credited USAID for including in its strategic plans sustainability of its rule of 
law programs, i.e., creating mechanisms to carry on its work after assistance had stopped.  
GAO criticized the State and Justice Departments for doing little more than counting the 
number of justices or police officers it had trained.  GAO called for all federal agencies 
involved in rule of law programs to improve mechanisms for measuring results.  USAID 
countered GAO’s criticism by claiming that USAID had measured and monitored rule of 
law programs from strategic planning through implementation, with special attention to 
lessons learned from past efforts.   
 
The reading of these two U.S. government assessments suggests that rule of law 
was weak in Russia during the 1990s but making progress with the help of U.S. 
 
113 In response to GAO’s (2001a, 63) criticism, USAID Acting Assistant Administrator Nygard noted that 
“rule of law assistance . . . has had substantial impact in shaping the direction of law reform, even though 
the job is far from finished.  In Russia, a great deal of political will for legal reform has been mustered, 
both in the early years of perestroika and through the Yeltsin and Putin administrations.”  He cited passage 
and implementation of the Civil Code and the Constitutional Law on the Judicial System in 1996, which 
freed courts of general jurisdiction from executive branch control.  USAID-funded assistance was a 
significant factor in the establishment of the Judicial Department, which has given the courts more budget 
clout with the Russian government and positioned them for further growth and change” (GAO 2001a, 63).  
He also noted that USAID has set in motion a process to integrate the Russian judiciary into international  
bodies, where world human rights and standards prevailed.  
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assistance programs by the end of the decade.  In terms of the overall U.S. government 
assistance program to Russia in the 1990s, rule of law was not a high priority item and 
was not viewed as a linchpin for success in other areas of assistance.  While rule of law 
received higher priority by the end of the decade, overall FSA funding for Russia had 
decreased by then.  GAO (2000) statistics showed that rule of law and democracy 
building programs combined represented 24 percent of total assistance to Russia from 
1992-2000, and there were many more democracy building programs than ones devoted 
specifically to the rule of law.  USAID’s budget request for rule of law programs in FY 
2000 was about $3.5 million out of a total assistance budget of nearly $300 million. 
 
Absent an overall plan for strengthening the rule of law in Russia, the FSA 
programs seemed to have been designed ad hoc, left to the priorities and agendas of the 
implementing agencies.  USAID was most diligent in designing and evaluating its rule of 
law programs, but while USAID programs may have been more effective, there was little 
connection across programs implemented by State and Justice toward the overall goal of 
rule of law.  In fact, that was President Clinton’s wish from the beginning, according to 
Strobe Talbott (2002), that the U.S. government would devote the specialized expertise of 
the various agencies to promote democracy in Russia.  This was the reason so many U.S. 
government agencies were involved in carrying out FSA-funded programs.  As a result, 
only certain aspects of rule of law were strengthened like judicial training and criminal 
procedures, but not enough to make Russia into a law-based society.  By many accounts, 
pervasive corruption was the most significant obstacle to the rule of law in Russia and in 
2002 USAID began to work with Russian NGOs, which were combating corruption.  
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Promoting Market Reform
The largest portion of U.S. assistance to Russia over the course of the 1990s was 
devoted to developing the free market, first focusing almost exclusively on privatization, 
then by mid-decade targeting the growth of small and medium-sized enterprises.  At the 
outset of Russia’s independence, U.S. economists and economic reformers in the Russian 
government looked to Poland as the model for market reform, pursuing rapid and 
widespread privatization.  As described in Chapter Three, the privatization program was 
carried out in less than transparent procedures to the benefit of insiders, managers and 
employees held over from the Soviet period, and to the detriment of Russian society at 
large.  The U.S. government’s expectation early in the decade was that the transition 
period would be short and relations with Russia would quickly progress from aid to trade. 
This section explores the primary programs in market development supported under the 
FSA in Russia, mainly through USAID and the Commerce Department.  Those programs 
were designed to meet the following FSA goals.    
 
Under Title II—Bilateral Economic Assistance Activities, Section 498. Assistance 
for the Independent States, the FREEDOM Support Act (FSA) called for: 
(3) FREE MARKET SYSTEMS—Creating and developing private enterprise 
and free market systems based on the principle of private ownership of 
property, including—  
(A) the development of private cooperatives, credit unions, and 
labor unions; 
(B) the improvement in the collection and analysis of statistical 
information; 
(C) the reform and restructuring of banking and financial systems; 
and  
(D) the protections of intellectual property. 
(4) TRADE AND INVESTMENT.—Creating conditions that promote trade 
and investment, and encouraging participation of the United States private 
sector in the development of the private sector in the independent states of 
the former Soviet Union.   
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Establishing the baseline 
Well before the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Group of Seven (G-7) leading 
industrial nations called in July 1990 for a study on the Soviet economy, which was 
conducted by the IMF, World Bank, EBRD and OECD, in response to a request from 
Mikhail Gorbachev for assistance.  The report, published in February 1991, 
recommended “decontrol of prices, privatization of enterprises, and liberalization of trade 
and investment, consistent with ‘the Washington Consensus’” (GAO, 39).  It also 
stressed the importance of a social safety net to temper the economic hardships that 
would result from these recommendations.  As such, the approach to economic 
development rested with the “Washington Consensus”—commitment to free markets, 
private property, and individual incentives through freeing prices, removing trade 
barriers, and privatizing enterprises.  While the international community agreed on these 
economic principles in general, countries did not collaborate extensively on their design 
and implementation. The international financial institutions provided loans, while the 
U.S. government provided grants and technical assistance.  It was difficult for the G-7 to 
plan how these recommendations would be implemented because it was still unclear what 
the political structures an independent Russian Federation would choose.   
 
A late start  
Goldgeier and McFaul (2003) claimed that, during the final year of the Bush 
Administration, the U.S. lost a critical first year in supporting Russia’s economic 
transition.  President Bush’s announcement of the FREEDOM Support Act in April 1992 
raised the expectations of leading economic reformers in Moscow, including Yegor 
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Gaidar, for significant amounts of foreign aid to stabilize the Russian economy 
(Goldgeier and McFaul 2003, 66).  The potential for American “engagement and 
influence” at this stage was substantial as the reformers needed and wanted American 
advice.  Jeffrey Sachs of Harvard University insisted that large scale assistance was 
necessary for economic reform (ibid., 67).  Goldgeier and McFaul (2003, 71) suggested 
that the West missed an especially important opportunity to improve the Russian 
economy in its handling of the Soviet debt owed to the West, a total of $65 billion, with 
$2.8 billion of that to the U.S.  The Treasury Department, which was responsible for this 
issue, was not much interested in assisting Russian reform at the end of 1991 and the 
Bush Administration was reluctant to shift its loyalty from Gorbachev to Yeltsin.  This 
hesitancy cost valuable time in making decisions promptly that could have made a 
difference later.  With the U.S. slow to act, economic assistance to Russia had to wait for 
the G-7 (Goldgeier and McFaul 2003, 71). 
 
Expectations for a quick transition  
Because Russia, compared to the rest of the NIS, was more advanced in its 
political and economic reform in 1992-3, expectations in the West were high that Russia 
would progress quickly and smoothly to a market democracy.  The most dramatic event 
in Russia’s economic reform was the rapid mass privatization program of 1992-1994 in 
which more than half of Russian industry was transferred to the private hands of more 
than 40 million Russians.  This effort was accomplished through “corporatizing the 
[state]enterprises as joint stock companies; distributing vouchers to the entire Russian 
population; creating investment funds to channel purchases of larger firms; and 
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organizing a system of auctions throughout Russia through which shares in the 
enterprises were distributed” (GAO 2000, 91). 
 
The FY 1994 Annual Report on U.S. Assistance and Other Cooperative Programs 
in the NIS predicted that an assistance program to Russia would no longer be needed after 
1998, which was anticipated to be the final year of funding.  Assistance administrators 
expected to move quickly from humanitarian assistance to reform assistance to normal 
bilateral economic relations between the U.S. and Russia.  That path, however, was not 
smooth nor the pace quick.   
 
One of the three key objectives of the FREEDOM Support Act was to help 
establish an open and competitive market economy and expand opportunities for trade 
and investment (State Department Coordinator’s Office 1996, 1).  USAID took the lead 
in supporting economic reform with the objective to train a cadre of skilled market 
participants. 
Private Sector Development Programs 
In 1994, USAID sought to produce a “private sector founded on the principles of 
private ownership and the free exchange of goods and services” (State Department 
Coordinator’s Office 1995, 43).  The goal was to help move state-owned assets to private 
owners.  USAID assisted in the privatization voucher distribution programs, auctions of 
large enterprises, small-scale privatization, disassembling monopolies, and public 
education programs.   
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According to the 1994 Annual Report (State Department Coordinator’s Office 
1995, 20), the Russian State Property Committee completed a mass privatization program 
that privatized 71,000 small state enterprises and over 16,000 medium and large state 
enterprises, or about 70 percent of Russian industry and 40 percent of the work force.114 
Under the mass privatization program, 144 million vouchers were distributed to 
individuals; 22,000 medium-to-large companies became joint stock companies, and over 
40 million Russians received shares in the privatized enterprises, with the intent of giving 
them a direct stake in the success of Russia’s emerging market economy (State 
Department Coordinator’s Office 1995, 43 and 1996, 54).  Eighty-six Russian regions 
participated in the privatization program, which was completed on July 30, 1994.  The 
1995 Annual Report estimated that almost half of Russia’s workers were employed in 
private firms, about a three fold increase since 1992 (ibid., 54).  USAID also supported 
privatization by cash auctions.  The rationale for the privatization programs was to 
depoliticize the enterprises so their managers would stop looking to the state for 
subsidies.   
 
Much of The 1995 Annual Report focused on economic development, noting that 
the U.S. government expected the pace of reforms to slow in Russia with the communist 
victory in the parliamentary elections, but acknowledging that the Russian government’s 
stabilization plans seemed to have been effective.  In 1995, inflation declined, the budget 
deficit decreased, and the ruble exchange rate was maintained within its expected limits.  
GDP began to grow after four years of decline and Russia entered into an agreement with 
 
114 Small enterprises were those with less than 200 employees; medium enterprises had 200-1,000 
employees; and large enterprises exceeded more than 1,000 employees (GAO 2000, 91) 
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the IMF in April 1995.  The 1995 Annual Report expressed concern that Russia still 
lacked the necessary legal and regulatory framework to attract investment and noted that 
President Yeltsin replaced some of the reformers in his administration with more hardline 
officials to appease the conservative Duma.   
 
By 1996, Russia had completed its mass privatization program and achieved 
macroeconomic stabilization (State Department Coordinator’s Office 1997, 2).  The 
private sector in Russia comprised over 60 percent of GDP.  Once privatized, focus then 
turned to restructuring those enterprises to make them more efficient and competitive on 
the world market.  The monopolistic structure of industrial production and trade under the 
Soviet system was an impediment to market transition and there were few Russian 
analysts trained in market economics.  As The 1996 Annual Report (4) noted, “economic 
stabilization and structural change do not automatically translate into investment and 
growth.”  The report praised USAID for designing innovative “toolkits” for enterprises 
seeking to restructure themselves.  The toolkits contained information on marketing, 
financial management and management support (State Department Coordinator’s Office 
1997, 34). 
 
In the first two years of assistance to Russia, USAID played the largest role in 
economic support through its private sector development programs.  Following 
successful privatization, USAID assisted Russia in building the business and legal 
infrastructure to help newly privatized enterprises operate and grow.  This involved local 
efforts to affect legal reform, create systems of financial intermediation such as stock 
329
exchanges, strengthen essential free market institutions such as independent anti-
monopoly, securities and trade commissions, and develop private sector capacity to 
service private firms.  USAID supported a team to oversee the Russian Privatization 
Center and encouraged the development of Russia’s capital market and its supporting 
institutions.  USAID expanded the Russian Privatization Center to the regional level 
through ten privatization centers.  It conducted training in accounting standards and 
regulations for privatized enterprises.  By the middle of the decade, the lead in U.S. 
economic assistance seemed to shift from USAID to the Commerce Department, as did 
the focus on assistance to trade and investment.  U.S. economic assistance focused on 
systemic change and targeted areas where reform was already underway.         
U.S. Trade and Investment Programs
One of the main rationales of U.S. policy makers for assisting market reform in 
Russia was the potential opening up of new markets for the U.S. economy.  The 1994 
Annual Report recognized the critical role of U.S. foreign investment in furthering U.S. 
foreign policy goals, creating U.S. exports, jobs, and economic growth, and making the 
U.S. more competitive in the global economy (State Department Coordinator’s Office 
1995, 95).  Despite some successes, the 1995 Annual Report (State Department 
Coordinator’s Office 1996, 26) stated that “trade and investment programs were 
hampered by a lack of investment-encouraging policies and legal recourse for resolving 
commercial disputes, unpredictable taxation, and rampant crime and corruption.”     
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Insuring investment  
 To encourage and support U.S. investment overseas, the FSA provided funding to 
the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) to reduce the risk of such 
investment for U.S. companies.  OPIC provided direct loans to U.S. small and medium-
sized businesses to invest in Russia and insurance against three political risks: political 
violence that would affect assets and income; expropriation; and the inconvertibility of 
currency.  In 1994, OPIC led an investment mission to Siberia and the Russian Far East 
focusing on telecommunications, mining, manufacturing, energy and pharmaceuticals 
and medical equipment (State Department Coordinator’s Office 1995, 96).  The purpose 
of the program was to introduce American business executives to business leaders in 
Russia, in hopes of developing joint-ventures.  OPIC supported for example: 
 
• Pratt & Whitney Group of United Technologies Corporation for an aviation 
project in Russia in 1994 to establish a joint venture with Perm Motors, with the 
expectation that the project would create 200 Russian jobs and would generate 
about $65 million in U.S. exports. 
• U.S. West International Holdings, Inc. for a Russian telecommunications project 
with the Russian Telecommunications Development Corporation, focusing on 
Moscow and St. Petersburg. 
• Snyder Oil Corporation to develop and produce oil in the Urals region with 
Incorporated Works Permneft, employing advanced Western drilling technology. 
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• All Alaskan Seafoods, Inc., a small U.S. company, with Damoreproduct in 
Vladivostok, to employ modern deep-water fishing techniques rather than the 
environmentally unsound dragging method traditionally used by Russians.       
 
By 1997, many OPIC projects were energy focused; one of its most important 
loan guarantees was to the Sakhalin Energy Project sponsored by the Marathon Oil 
Company, Mitsui & Company, Mitsubishi Corporation, and the Royal Dutch/Shell 
Group, an example of a sharing contract as allowed under Russia’s new Law on 
Production Sharing Agreements.  The hope was that this collaboration would serve as a 
catalyst attracting other such investment arrangements to Russia (State Department 
Coordinator’s Office 1998, 74). 115 
The U.S. Russia Investment Fund (TUSRIF) 
The most visible investment program from the start was the enterprise fund, a 
model, which had proven popular and successful in Eastern Europe.  Based on its success 
under the SEED Act, the authority for enterprise funds was extended into the FREEDOM 
Support Act to support the indigenous private sector.  The funds were designed “to 
stimulate the creation and expansion of newly privatizing businesses in the emerging 
market economies of the NIS” (State Department Coordinator’s Office 1995, 102).  Each 
fund was governed by a Board of Directors, which hired experienced staff to conduct 
daily operations.  While USAID monitored the fund, the U.S. government kept its 
distance to demonstrate that such activities were best conducted by investment 
 
115 Interestingly, subsequent annual reports to the Congress did not include such details on programs and 
end-users, i.e., those participating in OPIC programs.   
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professionals. The 1995 Annual Report (State Department Coordinator’s Office 1996, 40) 
noted that the enterprise funds “provided venture capital in situations where financial 
markets are still evolving and the business environment so fragile that foreign investors 
are reluctant to commit funds to emerging small and medium-sized enterprises.”      
 
In 1994, Gerald Corringan, former President and CEO of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York, became Chairman of the Russian American Enterprise Fund (RAEF), 
which had offices in New York, Moscow, and Khabarovsk in the Russian Far East.  
RAEF’s first investments came in 1994 in a women’s clothing factory outside Moscow 
and a wood veneer plant in Archangelsk (State Department Coordinator’s Office 1995, 
102-3).  At the same time, USAID created the Fund for Large Enterprises in Russia 
(FLER) with OPIC to meet the special needs of medium- and large-sized firms (those 
with 1,000-10,000 employees) in reform-oriented areas of Russia.  FLER provided those 
firms with loans as they emerged from the mass privatization process, with special 
attention to those, which would be considered too risky for other private investors.  Its 
first deal was with U.S. Global Health for a western style outpatient clinic in Moscow, 
supported jointly with PepsiCo and Columbia-Presbyterian. 
 
In April 1995, the new FSA Coordinator Richard Morningstar consolidated the 
RAEF and FLER into a new U.S. Russia Investment Fund (TUSRIF) to save on operating 
costs (State Department Coordinator’s Office 1996, 40).  TUSRIF was registered as a 
not-for-profit corporation in Delaware.  The new entity retained the three offices of 
RAEF and placed more attention on joint ventures.  TUSRIF provided funding in 1995 to 
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the New Russia Small Business Investment Fund (NRSBIF), a subsidiary of the 
Washington, DC-based Fund for Democracy, “which has a solid track record of 
providing technical assistance and training to Russian bankers” (ibid., 40-41).  NRSBIF 
worked with Russian commercial banks to make funding available for small- and 
medium-sized enterprises in Russia.  TUSRIF also established a micro-enterprise lending 
program with two pilot projects in 1995 in Rostov-on-Don and Nizhny Novgorod (ibid., 
41).  In 1996, TUSRIF was in negotiations with USAID to establish a venture capital 
subsidiary. 
 
In 1999, TUSRIF launched Delta Capital Management, a private company to 
manage the Investment Fund and promote private equity investment in Russia (State 
Department Coordinator’s Office 2000, 57).  The financial crisis of 1998 limited the 
amount of private investment TUSRIF made in 1999.  It decided to focus its future 
investments on Russia’s financial sector; leasing—first in the Rostov area; and consumer 
lending for mortgages and automobiles—a concept new to Russia.  The mortgage 
programs operated through partner banks in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Sakhalin Island 
(ibid., 57).  TUSRIF also focused its investments on micro, small- and medium-sized 
enterprises and sought to “brand” its enterprises through the “Delta” name including 
Delta Leasing (for commercial equipment) and Delta Bank to lend to small and medium 
sized enterprises.  It targeted its investments in telecommunications, media, and 
technology companies (USAID 2002).116 
116 A data sheet for 2004 from the USAID Mission in Moscow indicated that TUSRIF continued to focus its 
investments on consumer goods, telecommunications, media, technology, and financial service sectors 
through its Delta subsidiaries, with profitable results.  The data sheet also noted the management buyout of 
Delta Leasing with a 40 percent internal rate of return. 
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Public-private partnership to address trade issues 
The U.S Department of Commerce’s Business Development Committee (BDC) 
became the primary vehicle to accelerate U.S. trade with and investment in Russia, in 
addition to assisting with the transition to a market economy.  The purpose of the BDC 
was to eliminate barriers to trade and investment, share information for developing 
business, and facilitate the conclusion of commercial deals on an official level.  The BDC 
was the place to address official problems in trade.  The 1996 Annual Report deemed the 
BDCs effective “because they are joint efforts which facilitate interagency coordination 
on both sides, and because they provide an opportunity for active participation by private-
sector companies and organizations” (State Department Coordinator’s Office 1997, 68).  
The U.S.-Russia BDC gave a presentation before the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission in 
1997 stressing the need for Russia to adopt a fair tax regime, enact production-sharing 
legislation in the energy sectors, and adhere to the rule of law in commercial 
transactions.117 The GCC agreed to pursue dialogue on market access issues working 
through the BDC.  The BDC also worked with the Regional Investment Initiative 
beginning in 1997, to coordinate trade and investment consultations with local 
governments.   
 
See www.usaid.gov/poicy/budget/cbj2005/ee/pdf/118-00410.pdf.  
117 Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs) are a mechanism to improve the investment climate and attract 
foreign investment, particularly in the mining and oil sectors, by establishing the rules for developing those 
sectors.  PSAs require first a legislative regulatory base on taxation and cost recovery.  In an interview for 
Russia & CIS Energy Magazine pro-PSA Yabloko party leader Sergei Ivanenko explained that the 
administration supported PSAs but the Duma had failed to create legislation establishing “how loans would 
be repaid, when and on what terms.”  Absent these laws and a tax code, much needed foreign investment 
would not be forthcoming.  See article “Government and Duma still don’t see eye to eye on how PSAs will 
work” at http://www.eng.yabloko.ru/Press/2002/2/ivanenco0202.html.    
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The U.S.-Russia BDC prepared “Guidelines for Voluntary Codes of Business 
Conduct” for Russian companies and made them widely available at conferences and on 
the Internet in 1999.  The governor of the Novgorod Oblast used the guidelines in a pilot 
project for local companies to improve their operations and enhance their business 
reputations (State Department Coordinator’s Office 2000, 124).  The U.S. government 
used the BDC to address the difficult issue of taxation policy, seeking to resolve the tax 
legislation stalemate between the Duma and the Russian government.  The BDC sought 
to lower profit taxes from 35 to 30 percent in 1999 and to introduce regional tax credits 
(ibid., 124).     
 
Supporting commerce through American Business Centers 
The Commerce Department administered the American Business Centers (ABC), 
as established in Section 301 of the FREEDOM Support Act, from the U.S. Commercial 
Service in the Embassy to promote the rapid expansion of U.S. trade and investment, 
with special emphasis on small and medium-sized businesses.  The first ABCs were 
established in St. Petersburg and Vladivostok, followed by Nizhny Novgorod, 
Yekaterinburg, Volgograd, Chelyabinsk, Nizhnevartovsk, and Novosibirsk in Russia.  
These centers supported American businesses on the ground by providing international 
telephone and fax, short-term office space, seminar and exhibition space, assistance with 
arranging meetings, interpretation and translation, photocopying, counseling on local 
market conditions and business practices.  To Russian firms, the ABCs offered business 
training and technical assistance and a commercial library. 
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The 1994 Annual Report (State Department Coordinator’s Office 1995, 110) 
noted significant progress of the ABCs, despite difficulties in dealing with the Russian 
government, segments of which arbitrarily levied taxes on ABCs that should have been 
exempt per U.S.-Russia agreements.  Four more ABCs opened in Russia in 1995, 
including Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk and Khabarovsk in the Russian Far East.  The ABCs 
published articles in Russian trade journals and major newspapers and established an 
ABC homepage on the Internet.  The Commerce Department designed an expenditure 
and revenue profile sheet for each ABC to monitor their progress toward becoming self-
sustaining, a key goal for the ABC program.   By the end of the decade, administration of 
ABCs switched to USAID.     
 
The goal of WTO accession  
A key goal for both the U.S. and Russian governments to improve trade was 
Russian accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO).  In 1995, USAID placed an 
advisor in the Russian Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations to assist with issues 
relating to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (State Department Coordinator’s 
Office 1996, 26 and 1997, 69).  In 1996, USAID supported the training of Russian 
officials on GATT procedures at the GATT Secretariat in Geneva.  The Commerce 
Department’s Commercial Law Development Program also supported the goal of Russian 
accession to WTO by helping Russia strengthen its capacity to sign and abide by the 25 
agreements required under GATT.  Assistance covered such issues as tariff concessions, 
agricultural subsidies, import-licensing requirements and protection of intellectual 
property rights (State Department Coordinator’s Office 1997, 76).  In 1997, the 
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Commerce Department made a special effort to train Russian officials on WTO’s anti-
dumping rules.  Russian efforts to join the WTO continue today.       
 
Business Development Programs 
Meeting the needs of small business  
The 1994 Annual Report stated, “We believe that the establishment of a thriving, 
broad-based small business sector in the NIS could play a key role in the economic 
reform process.  Private, small businesses can provide jobs for many of the workers 
displaced as a result of the restructuring of large, inefficient former state-owned 
enterprises” (State Department Coordinator’s Office 1995, 123).  USAID focused on the 
needs of small businesses because they were an important source of new jobs and 
income.  Small business development in Russia was hampered, however, by the limited 
availability of capital and lack of entrepreneurial skills. As a result, FSA programs to 
support market reform were based on the “incubator model” of fostering 
entrepreneurship.  In 1994, USAID supported several projects—many individual 
partnerships and small programs:   
 
• New Business Development Activity to provide advice to local governments on 
improving the legal and regulatory framework for business development.  
Through six offices across Russia in Yekaterinburg, Novosibirsk, St. Petersburg, 
Smolensk, Vladivostok and Voronezh, USAID provided training to local business 
associations and training institutes.  Deloitte and Touche operated the offices 
which became known as Business Support Centers (BSCs).  In 1995, this program 
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supported the establishment of Russia’s first independent national women’s 
business and professional association involving 5,000 members (State Department 
Coordinator’s Office 1996, 50).  The BSCs were instrumental in simplifying the 
registration process for businesses in the cities where they were located.  USAID 
completed its support for the BSCs in 1997 as the World Bank provided funding 
for the Business Support Center Foundation, a Russian organization.     
• The Enterprise Development Project (EDP) established five Local Business 
Centers in Russia to provide consulting services to small businesses on planning, 
financial analysis, and compliance with local and federal regulations. 
• The Technology Management and Transfer Group of Virginia Polytechnic 
Institute developed a business incubator for technology commercialization at the 
Academy of National Economy in Moscow.  It helped scientists remain at their 
home institutes to conduct research and become viable business entities.  Other 
incubator activities helped small businesses obtain scarce office space. 
• The Morozov Project provided management education through a network of local 
business training institutions giving managers the skills they needed to succeed in 
a market economy.  Local institutions were teamed with Western business 
consultants and Russian curriculum development teams were paired with Western 
professors and faculty.  By 1995, the training network had spread to 36 regions in 
Russia.  It relied on the “train the trainer” methodology to bring teachers to 
Moscow for training at the Project’s headquarters then they resumed their 
teaching responsibilities using new knowledge back home.     
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• The Citizen Democracy Corps’ Business Entrepreneur Program provided 
American volunteers who were experienced entrepreneurs for on-site assistance to 
private small- and medium-sized enterprises and NGOs over a two-three month 
timeframe.  In 1995, a CDC volunteer developed a manual to teach Russian 
accountants and bookkeepers principles of cost accounting and how to convert 
Russian accounts to Western standards (State Department Coordinator’s 
Office1996, 50). 
• Junior Achievement International provided economic education and 
entrepreneurship programs to over 1 million high school and college students in 
Russia in 1994-1996. 
• The Fund for Democracy and Development (FDD) established a $10 million 
credit/equity fund to cover start-up expenses, investment in new technology, and 
upgraded equipment to entrepreneurs and small businesses.  It also created a 
complementary program for bankers to instruct them how to lend to small 
business. 
• Center for Citizen Initiatives’ Economic Development (EDP) supported local 
entrepreneurs and new business owners with business training, services, 
consultants and media education in the U.S. and in Russia—St. Petersburg, 
Rostov-On-Don, Volgograd, Yekaterinburg, Voronezh and Moscow. 
• Technical Assistance Center for Market Economy, established by the University 
of Alaska, trained Russians in modern business methods and focused on the 
Russian Far East.   
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• Opportunity International began operating in Nizhny Novgorod in 1991 and 
created an independent local NGO, Vozmozhnost (Opportunity) in 1994 to 
provide micro-lending and leasing to small businesses and entrepreneurs.  By the 
end of 1996, it made loans ranging from $300 to $20,000 to 690 entrepreneurs 
and had a repayment rate of 93 percent (State Department Coordinator’s Office 
1997, 32).118 
The 1995 Annual Report noted that “an important component of business training 
in Russia was the process of helping many Russians change their negative attitudes 
toward business and entrepreneurship. . . .[USAID’s] New Business Development 
Program is showing would-be entrepreneurs and others how small businesses—not just 
big factories—contribute to a strong economy.  By spreading small-business success 
stories, the media campaign has demonstrated how Russian entrepreneurs are breaking 
their dependency on government institutions and are making it on their own” (State 
Department Coordinator’s Office 1996, 50).  The 1995 Annual Report also noted that the 
head of the newly created Russian State Committee for Small-Entrepreneurship 
Development and Promotion was selected immediately upon return from a USAID-
funded training program, for which USAID already had recognized him as a key reformer 
in the area of small business (ibid., 51).  Prior to the establishment of this Committee, the 
Russian government had given no special attention to the needs of small businesses.     
 
118 As noted earlier, subsequent annual reports did not contain such detailed end-user information, which 
provided informative and valuable context to implementation of the assistance programs.  
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Business for Russia/Community Connections  
USIA administered the Business for Russia program through which Russian 
entrepreneurs conducted short-term (3-5 weeks) internships with U.S. companies.  The 
program proved popular and grew rapidly during the decade.  In 1995, 600 Russian 
entrepreneurs interned with U.S. small businesses, bringing the total at that point to 1000 
since its inception.  USIA established alumni associations of past program participants in 
St. Petersburg, Moscow Oblast, Samara, and Nizhniy Novgorod and introduced six 
videotaped business management courses into several Russian universities with a total of 
20 business departments participating (State Department Coordinator’s Office 1996, 25). 
 
The Business for Russia program was so successful it was expanded and renamed 
“Community Connections.”  In 1996, it selected an additional 190 Russian entrepreneurs 
and included 9 local government officials for the first time to pursue internships in the 
U.S.  The 1996 Annual Report noted that, as a result of these internships, 2,500 new jobs 
had been created in Russia in 1995 (State Department Coordinator’s Office 1997, 32).  
Exchanges programs in general expanded notably in 1997 with 450 entrepreneurs and 22 
officials from 11 Russian regions selected to participate specifically in the Community 
Connections program.  In addition, USIA created the Productivity Enhancement Program 
for entrepreneurs who could pay their own way to the U.S., bringing the total number of 
participants to 750 for fall and winter 1997. 
 
USIA expanded the Community Connections Program again in 1998 to include 
the Presidential Management Training Initiative (PMTI), at the request of President 
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Yeltsin to train Russian mid-level managers.  PMTI was a cooperative project between 
the U.S. and Russian governments.  Interestingly, the Russian government established a 
federal organization to screen and select participants who were then interviewed by 
USIA, which was responsible for final selection of participants from the pool of 
applicants submitted by the Russian government.  Prior to departure for internships in the 
U.S., Russian participants received in-country training from one to three months on 
management and language skills.  Contrary to common practice, the Russian government 
provided cost-sharing for this program, covering the international airfare of the Russian 
participants.  By the end of 1999, 260 Russian business managers had participated in 
PMTI.  
 
The Community Connections program was very popular and included 880 
participants from Russia for these “community-based, . . . practical training opportunities 
with home-stays in the U.S. for entrepreneurs, local government officials, legal 
professionals, NGO leaders and other professionals” (State Department Coordinator’s 
Office 2000, 139).  Participating U.S. businesses ranged from small family operations to 
Fortune 500 companies.  Aside from the PMTI, selection of participants for Community 
Connections was conducted through an open, merit-based competition, a very important 




Business Information Service for the NIS (BISNIS) 
The Commerce Department’s International Trade Administration created BISNIS 
in 1992 as a clearinghouse to assist U.S. companies conducting business in the NIS by 
offering information about business opportunities, developments and strategies.  Its goal 
was to bring together buyers and sellers in the U.S. and Russia.  By 1995, it had assisted 
in helping companies transact more than $1 billion in exports and investments (State 
Department Coordinator’s Office 1996, 43).  Due to such a high volume of requests for 
information by the middle of the decade, BISNIS was one of the first assistance efforts to 
turn to the Internet to disseminate its publications and make them widely available on its 
homepage.  BISNIS created a ListServ of over 500 U.S. companies to allow trade 
specialists to be more proactive in obtaining and sharing information.  In 1996, BISNIS 
deliberately focused more attention on investment opportunities outside of Moscow and 
St. Petersburg.  Its top priority was sharing information effectively both through 
individual consultations and widely distributed publications.  The Commerce Department 
expanded BISNIS throughout the decade adding specialized publications, for example on 
the banking sector, and pursuing new approaches to get the information out in the 
interested public as widely as possible.  The goal was to provide U.S. businesses with the 
best analysis of Russia’s economic system to inform their investment decisions. 
 
The Russian Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations asked the U.S. Department 
of Commerce to create a Business Information Center within the Ministry, entitled the 
Business Information Service for Trade with America (BISTA) (State Department 
Coordinator’s Office 1996, 45).  BISTA was a counterpart to BISNIS, helping Russian 
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companies find appropriate partners in the United States.  Working through a contract 
with Deloitte and Touche, the Commerce Department staffed BISTA with trained 
personnel to answer questions about exporting and market opportunities in the U.S.  
BISTA was very active in 1996 taking over the U.S. Commercial Service Library in 
Moscow.  The 1996 Annual Report noted that BISTA’s grand opening in February 1996 
was featured in Moscow Business News and on radio.  In April 1998, BISNIS posted a 
“Search for Partners” page on the Internet notifying U.S. businesses of Russian 
businesses looking for partners.  While BISNIS was noticeably active at the end of the 
decade, BISTA on the Russian side had become decidedly less so and much less 
information was available about its activities.        
 
Special American Business Internship Training Program (SABIT) 
Beginning in 1992, the Department of Commerce awarded small grants to U.S. 
companies through a competitive process to help pay for the costs of housing Russian 
managers and scientists for six weeks to six months while they pursued hands-on training 
at the American companies.  SABIT placed mid- to senior-level managers, scientists, and 
engineers with U.S. businesses and organizations of all sizes so they could be exposed 
first hand to market fundamentals and the basics of Western management practices.  In 
1994, priority fields included: agribusiness, defense conversion, energy, environment, 
financial services, housing, health case, product standards and quality control, 
telecommunications and transportation.  The 1994 Annual Report called SABIT a “win-
win” opportunity for U.S. and NIS companies by establishing long-term business ties. 
Importantly, SABIT provided follow-up assistance to the Russian interns once they 
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returned to their home companies by creating a network, hosting alumni workshops, and 
publishing an alumni directory of contact information and a quarterly newsletter.  The 
1994 Annual Report stated that the “SABIT program has been very effective in 
supporting the NIS’s transition to a market economy while fostering long-term U.S.-NIS 
business and scientific collaboration” (State Department Coordinator’s Office 1995, 117).  
Often, after the interns returned to Russia, their home companies entered into business 
deals with the U.S. internship company.      
 
By the end of 1996, 588 Russian interns had participated in the SABIT program.  
According to The 1995 Annual Report, more than 60 percent of the U.S. participating 
companies maintained their ties with former interns (State Department Coordinator’s 
Office 1996, 26).  SABIT created a web-based homepage to widen distribution of its 
program materials.  The popularity of this program grew throughout the decade as it 
created specialized programs targeting specific industries including environmental 
technology, standards, and defense conversion training, based on the model of the 
original.  SABIT increasingly shifted its focus away from Russia to the rest of the NIS.  
By 1999, 204 Russian managers and scientists participated in the SABIT program around 
four areas in merchandising—apparel, food marketing, automotive markets and tourism 
(State Department Coordinator’s Office 2000, 154).  SABIT also targeted training 
programs in the Russia Far East addressing customs, port development, and timber/wood 
processing.   
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SABIT seems very similar to USIA’s Community Connections Exchange 
program with the exception that it targeted specific business sectors.  The 1999 Annual 
Report suggested that Russia’s 1998 economic crisis negatively impacted the number of 
commercial ties cemented between a participant’s home company and U.S. internship 
company, contrary to the program’s results in the rest of the NIS where it was active 
(ibid., 154).  An evaluation of the SABIT program in 1999 showed that Russia’s 
economic situation “reduced the number of promotion and job transfers for SABIT 
alumni in Russia, compared to their counterparts in Central Asia and Ukraine.  In 
addition, access to micro-credit for small businesses continued to be a problem in Russia.  
SABIT alumni returned home with good ideas from their U.S. experience, but often faced 
lack of capital at home  (ibid., 155).           
Economic Restructuring and Development 
A key focus in promoting market reform in the early days of the transition was on 
economic restructuring and reform of the financial sector, carried out by USAID and the 
U.S. Department of the Treasury.  The programs sought to assist governments in 
“rationalizing” their revenues and expenditures to control budget deficits and keep 
inflation in check by addressing tax policy and administration.  These U.S. government 
programs worked directly with the Ministry of Finance and Central Bank by providing 
advisers on the ground to assist with “budget policy and management, financial 
institutions policy and regulation, government debt management and issuance, 
macroeconomic policy, and tax policy and administration” (State Department 
Coordinator’s Office 1995, 60).  USAID and Treasury gave special attention to tax 
administration in Russia in coordination with international donors.  USAID also 
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supported the development of market-based financial services, for example, training 
several hundred bank supervisors from the Central Bank in Russia on the fundamentals of 
on-site supervision of commercial banks.   
 
The 1994 Annual Report noted that a major obstacle to market development was 
the monopolistic structure of industrial production and trade left over from the Soviet 
period.  USAID programs sought to reduce those monopolistic structures and to train a 
new cadre of market economists.  USAID provided restructuring assistance to over 200 
enterprises in Russia during 1995 to help them make major changes in their management 
structure, marketing practices, financial management and quality control.  Through 
USAID support, the Russian Privatization Center established local counterpart centers to 
assist individual enterprises with their restructuring challenges (State Department 
Coordinator’s Office 1996, 56).  The Russian Privatization Center, however, was at the 
center of a controversy surrounding Russia’s voucher privatization program, administered 
with assistance from the Harvard Institute for International Development under contract 
with USAID, as discussed at the end of this chapter. 
 
The Coordinator’s Office gave special attention to tax reform in 1996 based on 
the assumption of “two major prerequisites for an improved foreign and domestic 
investment climate in Russia:  a sound tax code and appropriate enforcement 
mechanisms” (State Department Coordinator’s Office 1997, 33).  While USAID-funded 
advisors had assisted in drafting a new tax code, it had not been passed by the end of 
1997 because of differences between the executive and legislative branches.  The 1996 
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Annual Report noted that during this period of stalemate, new procedures were put in 
place through executive decrees, including changes in accounting procedures from a cash 
basis to an accrual basis, allowing local governments to implement property tax 
initiatives, and organizational changes at the State Tax Service.  USAID provided tax 
advisors from the U.S. Internal Revenue Service and local-level tax services to regional 
and city tax services in Russia, including in Nizhny Novgorod.  USAID worked with the 
Russian government on many other efforts designed to improve tax collection and 
analysis and taxpayer education.  The 1997 Annual Report noted that many of Russia’s 
regions moved forward with their own economic reforms to attract investment.   
Shifting the U.S. Approach to Assistance  
As the euphoria of the collapse of communism faded and the challenge of 
nurturing the transition to democracy in post-communist societies became clearer in the 
middle of the 1990s, U.S. assistance programs came under scrutiny from many different 
directions.  Executive-legislative relations in the U.S. grew tense and the Congress less 
supportive of funding assistance to Russia.  Policy makers’ early expectations of a 
smooth and quick transition were dashed.  The Coordinator’s Office, first under 
Ambassador Morningstar then under his deputy Bill Taylor, shifted the focus of U.S. 
assistance from providing technical know-how to building cooperative activities between 
U.S. and NIS counterparts under the Partnership for Freedom program.  The new focus 
was to create linkages between people in all areas of assistance.  In the midst of this 
shifting approach, the Russian economy collapsed, triggering a re-examination of U.S. 
programs.         
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Targeting Russia’s regions  
At the direction of Ambassador Morningstar, the U.S. assistance program toward 
Russia took a marked shift in approach in 1997 away from technical assistance and 
toward partnership and more normal bilateral relations between the United States and 
Russia.  This new strategy was deemed the “Partnership for Freedom” and was designed 
to increase the level of trade and investment in Russia’s regions and to strengthen civil 
society through support for NGOs and exchanges of individuals (State Department 
Coordinator’s Office 1998, 1).  Economic assistance programs needed to encourage 
investment-led economic growth.  As part of this new strategy, Ambassador Morningstar 
created,  and the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission announced in February 1997, the 
Regional Investment Initiative (RII), which sought to concentrate all assistance activities, 
i.e., technical assistance, partnerships, small business training, and finance programs, in a 
few regions where reform seemed most promising.  In Russia, those regions were 
Novgorod Oblast, Khabarovsk Krai and Sakhalin Oblast in the Far East, and Samara 
Oblast, where the regional leadership was seen as reform-oriented and most hospitable to 
investment.  RII’s purpose was to build a climate attractive to foreign investment by 
removing obstacles to trade and investment and including a legal framework where laws 
were enforced.  The program in Novgorod focused on developing land and real estate 
markets through land auctions, supporting small- and medium-sized businesses, 
developing business and law degrees at Novgorod State University with the University of 
Rhode Island Business School and Cleveland State University, developing tourism 
potential, and creating a website to attract investors. 
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RII resident coordinators were installed in each region in 1998 to work with local 
officials, Russian and U.S. businesses, and NGOs.  These coordinators focused on the 
fundamentals of a market democracy, helping to set up financial institutions for small 
business loans, training women in business and computer skills, and instilling 
international accounting standards.  The FY 1997 Annual Report called the RII “a key test 
of the overall assistance strategy of emphasizing trade, investment, partnerships and 
exchanges.  It is hoped that the RII will create models of success in four target regions, 
which can then be replicated in other Russian regions” (State Department Coordinator’s 
Office 1998, 37).  The American Business Centers collaborated with the resident 
coordinators in Novgorod and Khabarovsk.  Resident coordinators worked as well with 
local companies in their region to establish joint ventures and help make them eligible for 
loans from international financial institutions like the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development or from the U.S.-Russian Enterprise Fund. 
 
Beginning in 1998, the established assistance programs, Business for 
Russia/Community Connections, Junior Achievement, and Internet Public Access, among 
others, all targeted the RII regions.  This was the first attempt to operationalize the 
approach to assistance in a broader, coherent purpose by pulling together efforts at 
building the market economy and strengthening civil society.  RII was designed as a 
model concept to show other Russian regions techniques for improving their investment 
climate.  The Coordinator’s Office suggested in its fourth RII Update that this 
demonstration effect was happening spontaneously.  One resident coordinator noted that 
when the Governor of St. Petersburg announced a package of tax breaks in February 
351
1998, he described them as better even than “incentives currently offered in Novgorod 
Oblast, considered the leader among Russian regions in providing investor tax breaks” 
(State Department Coordinator’s Office 1998b).  Drawing on other examples, one 
resident coordinator found that competition and cross-fertilization among Russia’s 
regions was underway as the regions looked to each other for experience on improving 
their investment climate.  Just as this new approach was gaining momentum, the Russian 
economy fell into crisis. 
 
The ruble crash 
The 1998 Annual Report (State Department Coordinator’s Office 1999, 1) stated, 
“Especially in Russia, the basic institutional building blocks of market economies and 
democratic governments are becoming known and understood.  Technical assistance 
provided by the U.S. government and other donors has played an important role in this 
process.”  Having completed the technical assistance phase, the Coordinator’s Office 
moved to the next phase to build cooperative relationships between Americans and 
Russians.  The ruble crash of 1998 accelerated that shift from central government 
assistance to investing in individuals.  The 1998 Annual Report blamed the crisis on the 
Russian government’s “failure to adopt critical measures needed to improve investment 
opportunities and combat corruption” (State Department Coordinator’s Office 1999, 3).  
The report found the Russian government’s ongoing budget deficits and incomplete 
structural reforms, coupled with falling world market oil prices and economic instability 
in Asia, the reason for Russia’s economic problems.  The Duma failed to enact much 
needed measures to ensure a flow of sufficient revenue to the government.  The absence 
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of tax reform was a major problem.  The economic crisis of August 17, 1998, was made 
worse with President Yeltsin’s decision to shuffle his administration, adding political 
uncertainty to the economic chaos.  The 1998 report stated that “foreign companies cited 
the lack of a solid business environment based on the rule of law as a key impediment to 
foreign investment in Russia.”  Crime and corruption, wages arrears, and rising 
unemployment hindered economic growth (ibid., 42).  Despite the efforts of U.S. 
assistance programs, domestic politics—e.g., the lack of ability to implement needed 
economic reforms—thwarted Russia’s progress toward a market economy.  Without a 
willing Russian political elite and social consensus on economic reform, U.S. efforts to 
improve the business climate met with limited results.    
 
In response to Russia’s economic collapse, USAID undertook a major re-
evaluation of its assistance programs.  Subsequently, it changed its focus from the 
quantity of enterprises privatized to the quality of the privatization and attention to 
restructuring.  In the wake of the ruble crash, USAID gave renewed focus to fiscal reform 
and the inability of many post-communist governments to raise sufficient revenue.  
Concerned over Russia’s budget deficits, USAID continued to address tax policy, tax 
administration, budget formulation and execution, pension reform, and inter-
governmental fiscal relations in its assistance programs (State Department Coordinator’s 
Office 1999, 76).  USAID provided assistance to the Russian government and Duma to 
evaluate the proposed tax code and analyze the impact of tax changes on individuals.  It 
also worked with the Russian State Tax Service on tax collection from large enterprises 
and implementing a tax system in Tver and Novgorod.  Because of the economic crisis, 
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most reform efforts slowed and the banking system collapsed.  USAID began work 
immediately with the World Bank and other donors to develop a bank restructuring plan 
and strengthen economic policy think tanks in Russia (ibid., 80). 
 
With the economic crisis of 1998, U.S. economic assistance to Russia focused 
most heavily on the Regional Initiative, which consolidated the FSA objectives of 
“building the infrastructure of a market-based economy, attracting foreign and domestic 
investment, addressing the social costs of transition, and strengthening civil society” 
(State Department Coordinator’s Office 2000, 3).  By 1999, the technical assistance 
programs were completed and phased out in Novgorod, but the local administration was 
so supportive of reform and partnership with the U.S. that the Coordinator’s Office, under 
new leadership of Ambassador William Taylor who had served as deputy to Morningstar, 
extended the RII programs there (State Department Coordinator’s Office 2000, 55).  New 
programs focused on international accounting standards, public finance reform, 
registering small- and medium-sized businesses, and development of NGOs.  The 
Novgorod Administration made special efforts to share its lessons learned under the RII 
program with other regions in Russia through participation in regional conferences.  The 
RII program in Samara created a Foreign Investment Advisory Council, composed of 
foreign business representatives, the local administration and legislature, and the RII 
resident coordinator, to advise on local legislation and help local businesses.  As 
elsewhere in the Federation, the financial crisis of 1998 limited new investment in 
Samara.  The RII in the Far East facilitated relations between Sakhalin and Alaska to 
discuss the Russian Far East’s infrastructure development plans to reinvest oil profits into 
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the infrastructure.  The RII also strengthened the Far East’s weak banking sector by 
introducing a credit union and bank association (ibid., 55-56).  The 1999 Annual Report 
concluded that the regional initiatives were “beginning to demonstrate that assistance at 
the local level can achieve tangible, positive results, and can do so in a way that 
encourages replication by other regions” (ibid., 3). 
 
The most significant adjustment in U.S. assistance programs in response to 
Russia’s economic collapse was the decision to curtail direct assistance to the Russian 
government where there was lack of will to pursue needed structural reform and focus on 
the Regional Initiative where local governments already had been identified as reform-
oriented.  The 1999 Annual Report admitted that the “transition to market-based 
economies will be a long-term process and may require generational change” (State 
Department Coordinator’s Office 2000, 3).  The report noted that “The Coordinator’s 
Office concluded that it should therefore accelerate a shift already under way toward 
building constituencies for long-term change.  This requires directing assistance to 
genuine reformers, whether they be central government ministers, regional and municipal 
officials, entrepreneurs, small business owners, or private farmers” (ibid., 3).  While it 
was not clear how to distinguish a “genuine reformer,” the idea was to support reform 
wherever it was evident and, most importantly, to focus on the individual. 
 
The unresolved issue of taxes 
At the same time the U.S. government attempted to assist economic reform in 
Russia, it also had to work within the structure of the Russian government to implement 
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its assistance programs.  U.S. NGOs funded under the FREEDOM Support Act faced 
many of the same problems as the individuals and indigenous NGOs they were trying to 
help.  At the June 1993 presidential Summit in Tokyo, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin 
agreed to establish a Support Implementation Group (SIG) to assist in the provision of G-
7 assistance to the Russian government.  The U.S. Treasury coordinated SIG through a 
resident director in Moscow.  The SIG addressed such issues as taxation of grant 
assistance, a particularly contentious issue; facilitating the execution of assistance 
programs, for example, by monitoring the processing of visas and entry of program 
participants; setting up a procurement mechanism; examining the social welfare 
implication of reforms; and disseminating information about assistance activities.  When 
the Treasury Department completed its two-year commitment to run the SIG in 1995, the 
U.S. Ambassador to Russia Thomas Pickering agreed to have the U.S. embassy assume 
its management (State Department Coordinator’s Office 1996, 57-58). 
 
By 1997, difficulties with local taxation and customs regulations had become a 
significant impediment to implementing U.S. assistance programs in Russia, which were 
entitled to tax- and duty-exempt status under a 1992 bilateral agreement.  The Duma, 
however, failed to pass legislation supporting the agreement.  Pending passage of 
legislation, the Pickering-Panskov Agreement was signed in 1996, which prohibited the 
Russian government from taking any action on taxation policies against U.S. assistance 
providers until the issue was settled in law.  Regional authorities, however, did not 
enforce this agreement made in Moscow.  The Commerce Department reported, for 
example, that lack of taxation policies interfered with operation of the American Business 
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Centers (ABCs).  The legislation on taxation and customs duties failed a third reading in 
the Duma in 1997 and was sent back for re-drafting.  It passed the Duma finally in 1998, 
but was vetoed by President Yeltsin.   In June 1998, the Russian Finance Minister 
instructed tax and customs officials that the Pickering-Panskov Agreement had no legal 
basis and that they should collect taxes and duties from U.S. assistance providers.  This 
thorny tax issue remained an unresolved problem throughout the decade. 
 
Assessing Progress in Economic Reform   
Reporting to Congress 
As required by the FSA legislation, the annual reports to Congress rated Russia’s 
eligibility for continued assistance against Section 498A(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act 
of 1961 as amended.  This section provided an understanding of how the State 
Department Coordinator’s Office and the U.S. Embassy assessed progress in its 
assistance programs to Russia and how it they viewed political, economic, and social 
developments in the country.  This section of the Annual Report continued to be the most 
revealing as it clearly showed what U.S. government thinking was on Russia’s big picture 
accomplishments to date and the specifics of what happened in Russia over the previous 
year.  Each year the U.S. President was to “take into account not only relative need but 
also the extent to which [Russia] is acting to make significant progress toward, and is 
committed to the comprehensive implementation of economic reform based on market 
principles, private ownership, and integration into the world economy, including 
implementation of the legal and policy frameworks necessary for such reform (including 
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protection of intellectual property and respect for contracts)” (State Department 
Coordinator’s Office 1995, 192). 
 
In 1994, President Yeltsin was committed to market reform with progress made in 
the area of structural reform and especially in privatization.  While The 1994 Annual 
Report noted that about half of Russian GDP came from the private sector, control of 
large former state enterprises remained in the hands of Soviet era managers.  The report 
expressed concern about Russia’s monetary policy, a growing budget deficit due to the 
war in Chechnya, and rising inflation.  Russian had joined the IMF and World Bank in 
1992 and was in negotiation in 1994 for IMF funds (ibid., 192-3).  Interestingly, the 1994 
report noted a growing criminal problem that had not yet directly impacted U.S. 
assistance efforts, but created a negative business climate. 
 
The 1995 Annual Report (State Department Coordinator’s Office 1996, 161-2) 
credited the Russian government with continuing its stabilization program through a tight 
budget, lowering inflation, and trade and energy-sector liberalization.  Russia entered into 
a $6.5 billion Standby Agreement with the IMF with a follow-on $10.2 billion for 
structural reform and macro-economic stabilization.  Russia’s budget deficit came in 
much lower than anticipated.  Progress in privatization, however, was not seen as 
successful as it had been in 1993 and 1994, but the report noted that two-thirds of the 
economy was now in private hands.  Not all state-owned enterprises had made the switch 
from central planning to operating on the basis of market principles.  The report gave a 
fairly positive assessment of Russia’s economic progress, but noted that the lack of laws 
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on copyright, intellectual property rights, and criminal code constrained economic 
progress (ibid., 162-3). 
 
Again, The 1996 Annual Report (State Department Coordinator’s Office 1997, 
189-91) reiterated earlier assessments that Russia’s economic reform had made progress 
in its stabilization program through a tight budget, lowering of inflation, and energy 
sector liberalization.  The report noted the problem of tax nonpayment in Russia, which 
caused a problem of revenue shortfall for the government.  As Russia pursued tight fiscal 
policy to hold the budget deficit down, it neglected to pay wages and pensions owed to its 
citizens.  The report noted that legislative work on economic reform had slowed in Russia 
in 1996 due to the parliamentary elections and the president’s poor health.  Privatization, 
too, lagged in 1996 as no new large stated-owned enterprises were sold, diminishing 
revenue for the government even further.  The report expressed concern that the Russian 
government was moving to reorganize and privatize its telecommunications industry by 
selling it to a group of Russia banks with no foreign competition.  The report feared that 
this trend would be replicated in coming years.  Russia addressed protection of 
intellectual property rights (IPR) in its new Criminal Code signed by the President in 
June 1996 and requested technical assistance in IPR.  The report noted that adherence to 
contracts continued to be an area of difficulty due to court backlogs, lack of contract law, 
and corruption.     
 
Russia’s economy improved somewhat in 1997 as the steady decline of GDP 
since the fall of the Soviet Union seemed to bottom out.  Many were cautiously optimistic 
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about a small gain in growth, but Russia’s greatest economic obstacle continued to be its 
inability to collect taxes due to problems with the tax code and a culture of nonpayment.  
Lack of contract law and corruption continued to hinder progress in the private sector.  
The 1997 Annual Report noted that one of Russia’s highest priorities was accession to the 
World Trade Organization (State Department Coordinator’s Office 1998, 204-5). 
 
Naturally, The 1998 Annual Report focused on the collapse of the Russian 
economy and the resulting slowdown in the pace of reform.  Yeltsin announced a new 
economic plan for Russia that included more involvement of the state in the economy, 
particularly to protect industry, contrary to the restructuring it really needed.  The report 
noted a 9.9 percent decline in GDP from September 1997-1998 with unemployment 
rising 4.7 percent from October 1997 to October 1998 to the rate of 11.5 percent.  
Foreign investment was down by about 50 percent (State Department Coordinator’s 
Office 1999, 243-4).  Where earlier reports had been supportive of Russia’s 
accomplishments in privatization, by 1998 it was clear that “federal or regional 
governments [held] influential minority stakes in many firms” (ibid., 244).  The 1999 
Annual Report was a bit more positive, giving the Russian government credit for selling 
some of its remaining share in oil and gas companies and passing legislation on 
“production sharing agreements (PSAs) aimed at providing a secure legal framework for 
oil and gas investments” (State Department Coordinator’s Office 2000, 270).  The 
Russian economy experienced setbacks as it tried to transition from a centrally-planned to 
a market economy without taking the difficult but necessary reform steps.   
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The auditors  
 The U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) conducted an extensive review of the 
market reform programs supported by the U.S., EU, and international financial 
institutions in Russia from 1992-2000 focusing specifically on: 
 
• macroeconomic stabilization to bring inflation under control, develop effective 
monetary policy and reduce the budget deficit;119 
• social safety net protection to soften the economic hardships of transition 
resulting from necessary restructuring of enterprises which had sustained the 
people in many ways during the Soviet period through subsidized housing, child 
care, health care, and baseline food goods;120 
• privatization conducted through the mass voucher privatization program (1992-
1994), of which the loans-for-shares program was a critical part not supported by 
the international community;121 and  
• banking sector reform to create a viable private banking sector in Russia.122 
119 The IMF was the lead donor agency responsible for macroeconomic stabilization programs (GAO 2000, 
82). 
120 By default, the World Bank assumed responsibility for supporting the social safety net, which the G-7 
countries neglected to include and coordinate in their assistance plans (GAO 2000, 88).  According to 
Goldgeier and McFaul (2003, 107) “Clinton believed that he could not ask the American people to pay for 
a social safety net in Russia, when many Americans needed more support.”       
121 The World Bank and EBRD took responsibility for assisting with the design of privatization in late 
1991, but were delayed in implementation.  As a result, USAID became the primary international source of 
funding for the privatization program (GAO 2000, 91). 
122 Several international donors provided some banking reform assistance, but not in a coordinated fashion, 
until the economic crisis of August 1998 decimated Russia’s weak banks.  Up to that point, Russia’s 
banking laws had led to the creation of a number of small commercial banks, 2,000 by 1993, and a few 
large banks at the center of industrial groups (GAO 2000, 95).  At the end of the decade, the U.S. 
Coordinator’s Office increased priority to assistance for banking sector reform.  
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GAO (2000, 77) determined that a significant obstacle to economic reform in 
Russia was the concentration of economic power in the hands of a few, leading to the rise 
of powerful interest groups that influenced the political process.  In particular, early steps 
that did not fully liberalize prices and make privatization open to the public allowed well-
placed insiders to benefit from these partial reforms.  Corruption was especially 
problematic at the local level where officials unevenly enforced licensing requirements 
and tax collection.  GAO cited reports that small businesses in Russia had to spend 10 
percent of their income paying off corrupt officials (GAO 2000, 77).  In its review of 
assistance programs, GAO found that Russians had become weary of and cynical about 
reform, which they associated with a declining standard of living and loss of global 
status.  Russia’s biggest problem was its inability to collect taxes, especially from large 
enterprises, to finance its expenditures.  Pervasive corruption hampered the government’s 
ability to enforce tax collection.  In fact, in a 1999 testimony, Coordinator Bill Taylor 
stated that U.S. assistance had backed away from targeting the tax issue where it felt it 
could make little impact (State Department Coordinator’s Office 1999b, 11). 
 
GAO declared that the privatization of enterprises was the most controversial 
aspect of Russia’s economic transition, with the privatization of over half of the state-
owned enterprises carried out quickly from 1992-1994 (GAO 2000, 90).  Privatization 
was conducted quickly for a number of reasons—out of fear that communists could 
regain power, to bring order to a process that started spontaneously under Gorbachev, and 
to remove the cost of maintaining state enterprises from the government budget.  GAO 
(2000, 92) identified as particularly damaging the option in the privatization program 
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allowing workers and owners to acquire a majority stake in an enterprise, thereby lending 
an insider quality to the transaction.  As a result, managers of enterprises were able to 
wield considerable influence on the privatization program.  Under special national 
voucher auctions, more than 300 of the largest state-owned enterprises, which were to be 
exempt from the privatization program, were included and privatized as a result of 
effective pressure from their managers on government authorities.  The result of this 
manager-employee ownership was reluctance to undertake necessary downsizing and 
restructuring to make the enterprise more efficient.  GAO (2000, 92) found that many 
analysts felt, after the fact, that privatization of the largest and, therefore, most valuable 
state enterprises happened too quickly, with disappointing results. 
 
Within the privatization program, the most controversial action and damaging to 
Russia’s economic transition, was the “loans-for-shares” program, which followed 
voucher privatization in late 1995.  Through this program, “a handful of financial-
industrial groups in Russia became controlling shareholders in some of the country’s 
most valuable assets, including several large oil and metals companies” (GAO 2000, 93).  
The Russian government auctioned off large shares of these enterprises to banks in return 
for loans or payment of the firm’s tax arrears.  The Russian government desperately 
needed the $1 billion this program generated to meet the financial targets it had set with 
the IMF.  GAO reported that the loans-for-shares auctions were rigged to benefit only a 
small group of banks.  While they were supposed to be open, the auctions in fact were 
closed to foreign investors and held in a less than transparent manner.  “The winners were 
generally the banks who were managing the auctions” (GAO 2000, 93).  This program 
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consolidated the power and fortunes of Russia’s oligarchs.  The international donor 
community was little involved in the program and did not strenuously object to it at the 
time.  Privatization should have been conducted transparently to give all parties equal 
access.  Goldgeier and McFaul (2003, 148) noted that the Clinton Administration was 
focused on other issues like Bosnia at the time the loans-for-shares program was 
implemented.           
 
While assistance efforts were directed at strengthening the banking sector, 
progress was limited, especially with the crash of the ruble in 1998.  Banks did not make 
many loans for small and medium-sized businesses, but neither was the demand there for 
the loans.  One of the major problems in Russia’s banking sector was its reliance on its 
own, instead of international, accounting standards.  According to GAO (2000, 97), 
Russian authorities agreed to introduce international accounting standards for the Central 
Bank of Russia by the end of 2000 and a year later for commercial banks.  The GAO 
report also noted that Russians did not trust the private commercial banks and were more 
likely to deposit their money in state banks.   
 
GAO stated that the Russian economy recovered from the 1998 economic 
collapse because high world oil prices brought in more revenue and, with the devaluation 
of the ruble and floating exchange rate, domestic goods became more attractive and less 
expensive, increasing domestic production and decreasing imports. 
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An anthropological view  
Much has been written criticizing western, especially U.S., efforts to assist 
Russia’s transition.  Anthropologist Janine Wedel (1998) explained that, despite the 
coming together of East and West in the euphoria of the collapse of communism, there 
was a disconnect between western aid donors and eastern recipients.  She noted that the 
good, but naïve intentions of the donors overlooked the pervasiveness of the communist 
legacy—the distrust of foreigners and government, the holdover powers of former elites 
who remained in place, the reliance on personal contacts and networks, and the lack of 
respect for an official post.  Aid recipients and donors held different perceptions and 
interpretations of the terms defining their new relationship—like democracy and free 
market (Wedel 1998, 6-7). 
 
Wedel contended that the United States decided to support one group of reformers 
in Russia—specifically, Anatoly Chubais and his “St. Petersburg clan”—to the exclusion 
of others who needed to be part of the reform process.  Chubais, working closely with the 
Harvard Institute for International Development (HIID) led by Harvard Professor Jeffrey 
Sachs, chose to pursue economic reform through rapid privatization, as had been done in 
Central Europe.  USAID awarded substantial funding directly, not through the usual 
competitive bid process, to HIID beginning in 1992 to give advice, on the one hand, to 
Russian authorities on specific economic reforms and, on the other, to USAID on 
implementation of assistance programs.  Wedel (1998, 149) claimed that HIID and the 
Chubais Clan had a near monopoly on U.S. aid to support market reform in Russia.123 In 
 
123 Interestingly, there was little mention of HIID and no specifics of its program activities in the 
annual reports to the Congress.   
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1996, GAO undertook a review of this relationship and its work in Russia and concluded 
that there had been lax oversight on the part of USAID in monitoring the program.  GAO 
(2000, 175n) determined USAID had given HIID too much leeway in making decisions 
on U.S. government assistance programs, at the same time it was benefiting richly from 
the assistance and giving advice to the Russian government on actions it should pursue.  
The decision to rely so heavily on a private contractor, i.e., HIID, likely was a 
consequence of the assistance environment in the U.S. where Congress pressured 
implementing agencies to get the funds out the door quickly and make a noticeable 
difference in the region.  The rapid privatization process supported by Chubais and the 
HIID group further deepened the environment of corruption in Russia.  Wedel (1998, 
132) noted “privatization processes shaped the distribution of wealth in Russian society 
as well as citizens’ perceptions of democracy and capitalism.  Part of the public came to 
associate the terms ‘market economy,’ ‘economic reform,” and ‘the West’ with dubious 
activities that benefited only a few people while others experienced a devastating decline 
in their standard of living.”  Here was the real consequence of a poorly designed 
privatization procedure, further alienating the support of the people, which was vitally 
necessary to the consolidation of democracy in Russia. 
 
The Duma did not support Chubais’ reform program, which, therefore, was 
implemented by presidential decree.  Wedel (1998, 135) leveled harsh criticism at 
USAID for allowing reform to be implemented by decree, circumventing democratic 
processes in the parliament.  Relying on the decree method left out key stakeholders in a 
new system, rather than giving them incentives to be part of it.  Wedel emphasized that 
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while U.S. assistance was intended to help those who had already demonstrated reform 
orientations, the act of identifying reformers was a political decision.  USAID officials 
responded to her criticisms by stating that if substantial U.S. support had not been 
targeted at Chubais and his associates as the key reformers, Chubais would not have 
survived as a political actor and privatization, therefore, would not have been carried out 
in Russia.  According to Wedel, USAID took this approach of supporting a select few 
because disbursing limited funds across a broader field would have diluted the effect.  
USAID’s support for Chubais and his rapid privatization program early in the decade 
underscored how vulnerable donors and reformers felt about a communist resurgence.  
As noted earlier, there was genuine concern in the U.S. government that the gains made 
in ending the Cold War could quickly be reversed.  Wedel contended, however, that 
picking one group to support “does not advance the building of institutions that are 
transparent and unaligned with any one clan.  The goal of working toward such 
institutions is critical in structuring a democratic political and economic system, even if 
the goal is virtually impossible to achieve” (Wedel 1998, 139).  From the Russian 
perspective, U.S. assistance supporting one particular group was viewed with distrust and 
suspicion.   
 
Wedel (1998, 141-143) was especially critical of the Russian Privatization Center 
(RPC), a Russian NGO, designed and founded by HIID with USAID funds and later 
supported by other international donors.  It was staffed with notable reformers like 
Chubais and his associates who simultaneously held positions in the government, causing 
confusion about whether RPC was a governmental or private organization.  Those who 
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benefited from the actions of the RPC were friends of the St. Petersburg Clan.  There was 
sufficient concern about HIID’s activities in Russia and potential conflicts of interest that 
USAID’s Office of the Inspector General opened an investigation in early 1997 and 
USAID subsequently canceled its remaining contracts with HIID.  Two of its U.S. 
advisors were accused of “activities for personal gain.”124 According to Wedel, Chubais 
also directed the loan-for-shares program, which she described as turning “lucrative state 
monopolies into lucrative private monopolies” (1998, 152). 
 
Wedel’s strongest criticism of western donors was the practice of playing 
favorites, of supporting a select few in Russia to receive aid to promote market reform.  
Following in the patterns of the communist legacy, Western aid gave the selected few 
much needed resources to trade for influence in the political process, just as the 
communist apparatchiks had controlled state resources during the Soviet period.  It 
allowed new leaders to keep the patronage system in place (Wedel 1998, 156).  USAID 
program managers did not see this; they saw only individual market reformers and not a 
connected, coordinated clan deepening its power and influence to its own benefit.  The 
greatest consequence of aiding this select group was the alienation of non-Western 
oriented groups who were suspicious about Western motives for supporting reform in 
Russia (Wedel 1998, 158).  The mistake was in relying on individuals with vested 
interests to build institutions rather than establishing transparent and impartial processes 
and the rule of law that applied to all groups. 
 
124 See Wedel (140-147) for complete discussion of the accusations against HIID. 
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In 1997, as the Russian economy appeared to be stabilizing before the crash of 
August 1998, USIA, in collaboration with the Moscow sociological service, Validata, 
conducted eight focus group discussions in four “liberally minded” cities—the two 
former and current capital cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg and the two historical 
trading centers of Samara and Novgorod (USIA Office of Research and Media Reaction 
1998a).  USIA attempted to capture a view of the new emerging middle class in Russia 
by surveying about 250 entrepreneurs (ages 23-32) and professionals—sociologists, 
economists, journalists, doctors, teachers, and businesspeople—mainly in their 40s.  
While unsure of themselves as a class, respondents recognized that they were better off 
than peasants, workers, and pensioners, but not as wealthy or powerful as “the political 
and criminal ‘upper classes’” (ibid., i).  USIA suggested the new middle class was 
emerging from the fourth of Russia’s work force employed in private enterprise, 
cooperative or joint ventures and the 14 percent in trade, commerce, banking and 
financial services (ibid., i.).  Respondents noted that a strong middle class would not 
emerge until such professionals as doctors, teachers and engineers were paid “what they 
deserve.”  While supportive of civil liberties, the rule of law, and democratic values, 
respondents were critical of democracy in Russia and the government’s lack of attention 
to social problems.  A Moscow economics professor stated, “Democracy is impossible in 
a state in which 85 percent of the people are poor” (ibid., 25).  The respondents were in 
agreement that the growth of the middle class depended on political stability.         
 
At the end of the 1990s, prospects for Russia’s transition to a market democracy 
were uncertain at best.  The economy had crashed, corruption was rampant, and the rule 
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of law was weak.  After a decade of lessons learned, U.S. assistance shifted to focus more 
on the development of civil society and connections between peoples through exchanges.  
Large contracts to a few organizations (mainly under USAID) were replaced with grants 
to diverse non-governmental organizations or institutes of higher education to support 
many Russian students and professionals with the anticipation that they would take what 
they learned first hand in the U.S. and apply it at home. 
 
With the collapse of the ruble in 1998, it was hard to make the case that U.S. 
assistance got it right on economic reform, though some elements of the assistance 
programs were successful – mainly, those that invested in individuals, such as the 
exchange programs—SABIT supported by the Commerce Department and Community 
Connections supported by USIA.  Ambassador Morningstar’s Regional Initiative (RI) 
was an innovative approach that made sense – consolidating widely spread programs to 
target limited resources on regions already open to reform.  The experience with 
Novgorod shows the difference an individual can make.  Novgorod benefited from U.S. 
assistance from the first days of Russian independence and long before it was selected for 
RI because its governor, Boris Nemtsov, was proactive on reform and attracted 
investment and attention.  RI’s approach of bringing all the assistance programs together 
in one place especially makes sense for democracy promotion because characteristic of 
democracy itself are the linkages among all the attributes.  As established at the outset of 
this study, democracy needs rule of law and an independent judiciary, a market economy, 
representative government selected through free and fair elections, and civil society with 
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independent press.  Nizhniy Novgorod provided a laboratory to experiment with how 
those elements worked together.           
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Chapter 6:  Implementing Democracy and Civil Society Assistance  
In the midst of the political, social, and economic chaos of the 1990s in the newly 
independent Russian Federation, the U.S. government implemented programs to help 
build democratic political institutions and strengthen civil society.  From the visions of 
democracy of the U.S. foreign policy elite through the organizational mechanisms and 
traditions of the federal bureaucracy, the task of promoting democracy in Russia actually 
rested in the hands of U.S. non-governmental organizations, which mainly were managed 
on site by a few dedicated Americans and Russian staff.  This chapter analyzes the 
assistance programs implemented by several of those U.S. NGOs from 1994-2000 to 
promote free and fair elections and develop political parties and civil society.  This 
analysis draws on the annual reports to the U.S. Congress supplemented with reports 
from and interviews with program officers in U.S. NGOs that were awarded U.S. 
government grants to conduct their programs.  This chapter focuses specifically on those 
programs created to build democratic political institutions and strengthen civil society, 
including independent media.      
U.S. Goals for Democracy Promotion
Under Title II—Bilateral Economic Assistance Activities, Section 498. Assistance 
for the Independent States, the FREEDOM Support Act (FSA) called for: 
(2) DEMOCRACY—Establishing a democratic and free society by 
fostering— 
(A) political, social, and economic pluralism; 
(B) respect for internationally recognized human rights and the rule 
of law; 
(C) the development of institutions of democratic governance, 
including electoral and legislative processes; 
(D) the institution and improvement of public administration at the 
national, intergovernmental, regional, and local level; 
(E) the development of a free and independent media; 
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(F) the development of effective control by elected civilian 
officials over, and the development of a nonpolitical officer 
corps in, the military and security forces; and  
(G) strengthened administration of justice. 
 
The assumption was that by pursuing these goals, the United States could assist 
the New Independent States of the Former Soviet Union in becoming market democracies 
and reliable partners for the U.S.  Beyond identifying these broad objectives, however, 
the U.S. Congress gave little definition or direction to federal agencies charged with 
implementing programs to achieve them.  This varied mix required many different kinds 
of assistance programs. 
 
USAID and USIA conducted competitions to make awards to U.S. NGOs and 
educational institutions to implement their democracy promotion programs in Russia.  
The personal interviews in this section highlight the valuable insights of the U.S. NGO 
program managers who worked on-site in Russia in the 1990s to help build democratic 
political institutions and develop civil society.  Specifically, they were programs 
managers with the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), International 
Republican Institute (IRI), and National Democratic Institute (NDI) funded through 
USAID and the American Councils for International Education/American Council of 
Teachers of Russian (ACIE/ACTR), International Research and Exchanges Board 
(IREX), and Institute for International Education (IIE) funded through USIA.  These 
program managers represented a relatively under-recognized resource for understanding 
Russian civil society and political culture. Tapping into their experience and expertise 
opened another window into Russian society at the grassroots level, especially in areas 
outside Moscow, for help in assessing Russia’s prospects for democratic consolidation.  
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These program managers witnessed firsthand the impact of U.S. foreign policy on 
Russian society through their assistance programs.  They often were challenged to make 
those programs work in an unpredictable legal environment, and reported that, while 
Russian authorities did not interfere directly with their work, burdensome legislation 
often posed tough legal challenges to getting their jobs done. 
 
These NGOs worked at the grassroots level of Russian society, beyond the realm 
of official U.S. representation, where they were exposed to trends below the elite level.  
They dealt face-to-face with Russian political culture, and were attuned to whether 
democratic values were taking root in Russian political culture.  In their day-to-day 
business, they demonstrated important lessons about democracy as they carried out their 
programs.  Several, for example, noted the impact of genuine open, merit-based 
competition on Russian educational administrators and students and their families, who 
came to realize that selection for a U.S. exchange program could not be bought.  Those 
who wished to participate in an exchange program learned first hand that all were 
welcome to apply and those who did apply had an equal opportunity to be selected based 
on merit.  Much of the work at this grassroots level involved creating a climate of trust, 
overcoming suspicions of American intentions, and learning to abide by and respect 
written rules. 
 
Building Democratic Political Institutions
USAID’s work in the post-communist world focused on its four traditional areas, 
recognizing the intrinsic links among them in the overall goal of expanding the 
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community of democratic nations as a key U.S. foreign policy objective.125 USAID’s 
Strategic Plan targeted four objectives to promote democracy:  1) strengthening the rule 
of law and human rights as fundamental to providing the legal framework for a 
functioning civil society, placing checks on the executive and legislative branches, and 
setting the stage for free and fair elections; 2) establishing credible and competitive 
political processes through short-term efforts aimed at voter education, training of 
election workers, and equitable treatment of minorities in the political process; 3) 
encouraging a dynamic and politically active civil society where people are free to 
express their views and debate public policy and petition their government; and 4) 
helping government institutions to be transparent and accountable, instruments of “good 
governance” which maintain social peace, guarantee law and order, and create the 
conditions for economic growth.  As discussed in Chapter Five, however, USAID’s 
primary focus in the early years of reform in Russia was on establishing a market 
economy where assistance was provided directly to the central government in Russia.  As 
a result, its programs to strengthen democratic political institutions and civil society in 
Russia received much lower priority early in the decade. 
 
Under its Democratic Pluralism Initiatives, USAID supported democratic 
processes and institution-building to strengthen the rule of law, local governance, civil 
society, and independent media.  By supporting such organizations as IFES, IRI, and 
NDI, USAID targeted programs which sought to build links between the state and the 
 
125 Since 1961, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has worked to help the 
peoples of developing nations around the world improve their lives, focusing its mission in four areas:  1) 
improving health and population conditions; 2) protecting the environment; 3) promoting economic 
growth; and 4) supporting democracy. (USAID 1994). 
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people through political institutions, activating political society, and shifting political 
culture to one that is more participatory and based on greater responsibility of the 
individual.  These three organizations worked in the 1990s to strengthen local, regional 
and national democratic institutions and processes by supporting political parties, civic 
organizations and independent labor unions and fostering free and fair elections.  IRI and 
NDI worked with democratic reform-oriented parties to strengthen their political skills 
and capacity to serve constituents and to improve communication and coordination 
within the parties at the local and regional levels.  They also trained poll workers and 
election monitors.  IFES worked with government officials, central election commissions 
at the federal and regional levels, and NGOs to help make the electoral process 
transparent and accountable to voters.  Overall, USAID seemed to give these U.S. NGOs 
considerable leeway to conduct their programs as they deemed most effective.  USAID 
was concerned with the end goal of building democracy in Russia and relied on the 
expertise of the NGOs to accomplish that goal. 
 
IFES, IRI, and NDI were in the nuts-and-bolts business of designing electoral 
procedures and strengthening democratic political parties.  The 1996 Annual Report cited 
the work of IRI, NDI, and IFES, which promoted the development of political parties and 
civic organizations and the promotion of free and fair elections.  IRI and NDI specifically 
worked with democratically-oriented parties to help them build constituencies, improve 
communication between the local and national levels, and train poll workers and 
monitors in Russia.  IFES worked with government officials and central election 
commissions and NGOs on electoral laws and transparency and accountability of 
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elections.  All three organizations conducted extensive voter- and civic-education 
programs during 1996 (State Department Coordinator’s Office 1997, 100).  At the end of 
the 1990s, with the approach of parliamentary elections in December 1999 and the 
presidential election in 2000, IFES, IRI, and NDI were working to make the electoral 
system more trustworthy and to enhance the organizational and membership skills of 
democratic-oriented parties.  Their organizations offered to Russian officials and activists 
technical assistance and a wide range of information on electoral procedure and party 
building. 
Making elections trustworthy 
The International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES) provided world-wide 
comparative data and experience on issues critical to the development of a free and fair 
elections process in emerging democracies.  Assisting over 100 countries, its goal was the 
professionalization of and widening participation in the electoral system.  IFES was 
founded in 1987 by F. Clifton White on the premise that it was in the U.S. national 
interest that other nations had the same rights as Americans, freedom of choice and 
movement.  IFES traced its lineage to President Ronald Reagan’s June 8, 1982 “Evil 
Empire” speech before the British House of Commons from which emerged the creation 
of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and the pursuit of worldwide 
democratization as a foreign policy objective.  From the NED were created the National 
Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), the National Republican Institute for 
International Affairs (later called the International Republican Institute, IRI), and other 
related institutions.  These organizations were charged to support non-governmental 
organizations, labor unions, free enterprise, independent media, political party 
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development, and election monitoring, all in the pursuit of promoting open, democratic 
systems.  Discussions in 1985 initiated by then USAID Administrator M. Peter 
McPherson identified the need for an NGO to provide technical assistance on elections to 
emerging democracies.  F. Clifton White created IFES to meet that need and in October 
1987, IFES received seed money from USAID’s Office of Democratic Initiatives (IFES 
1998a, 5 and 8). 
 
In a 1992 interview (IFES 1992, 7), White explained, “We do not present any one 
system as the ideal, we recognize that democracy is a constantly growing and moving 
project. . . . I believe that only if people have confidence that their election system is 
honest and open will they participate in it.”126 IFES stressed in its programs that with 
freedom and the right to choose came real responsibilities--to be informed, to participate 
in the election process, and most importantly to vote.  Through IFES, elections processes 
around the world served as models for emerging democracies to use in designing 
systems, which culturally met their needs.  IFES did not promote, for example, particular 
election rules on method of registration or voter eligibility, but it sought to instill the 
fundamentals of free and fair processes—the secret ballot and its integrity, how votes 
were counted and reported, and supervision of the process.  IFES was staffed by elections 
experts, many with U.S. presidential campaign experience.  They taught candidates how 
to articulate clearly their positions to the electorate in the campaign period.  It saw its role 
as the provider of information and base of resources on election processes around the 
world, drawing on case studies and an elaborate data base of electoral information.  IFES 
 
126 In summer 1999, I met with the IFES program manager in Moscow and visited IFES/Washington office.  
My interview in Moscow suggested that IFES indeed remained true to that vision to provide many models 
of democracy.   
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served as a resource to provide details of election procedures worldwide, demonstrating 
what methods worked and in what circumstances they failed.  IFES offered a wealth of 
information about its activities and findings, including a valuable monthly report with 
details on activities by country.  These reports included not only what IFES was doing in 
country, but information on new laws and pending problems.  IFES provided valuable 
insight into often complex legal and political workings in the host country. 
 
IFES initiated its activities in the Soviet Union in 1989 through the US/USSR 
Election Official Exchange Project, an exchange program between the United States 
Federal Election Commission and the Central Election Commission (CEC) of the USSR.  
Members of the Soviet CEC visited the U.S. to observe the 1990 mid-term elections in 
Chicago in preparation for the Soviet Union’s first multi-party elections.  IFES began its 
work in Russia in 1990 at the invitation of the Central Election Commission of the 
Russian Federation (CEC RF) and opened an office in Moscow in 1993.  IFES’ goal was 
to work with the CEC RF to develop an electoral process and system.  The organization 
worked closely with the CEC in formulating the draft Voting Rights Act, and laws 
governing parliamentary and presidential elections.  As stipulated by the Voting Rights 
Act, the CEC was comprised of 15 members appointed to a four-year term with the State 
Duma, the Federation Council, and the President each appointing five members.  IFES’ 
relationship with the CEC RF was formal and bureaucratic.  According to the IFES 
program manager in Moscow, the CEC RF viewed IFES as a consultant, not an observer 
of its practices; as working in the arena of exchanges, not training; and as providing 
information, not assistance.  According to IFES/Moscow, the only time the CEC RF 
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asked directly for help was with regard to the “Y2K” problem, i.e., concerns about the 
technical impact of the year 2000. 
 
USAID’s submissions to the Annual Reports on U.S. Assistance to the NIS under 
its Democratic Pluralism Initiatives did not adequately reflect the work that was 
conducted and accomplished on the ground.  The 1995 Annual Report, for example, 
included only a brief mention of USAID democracy programs in Russia, noting that IFES 
worked with Russia’s Central Election Commission to develop methods ensuring the 
transparency, accuracy, and accountability of the country’s electoral processes (State 
Department Coordinator’s Office 1996, 75).  USAID stated in the report, “While it is 
impossible to establish a direct causal link with any particular democratization program, 
the fact that an increasing number of political parties, candidates, independent trade 
unions, and civic organizations participated in political processes was an encouraging 
sign that democratic reform was making process in the NIS (ibid., 75). 
 
In addition to working with the CEC RF in Moscow, IFES also worked closely 
with the Subject Election Commissions (SECs) in the 89 regions. Working with the 89 
SECs varied depending upon the personalities of the local executives and how open they 
were to transparent democratic procedures.  For example, IFES/Moscow reported 
productive relations with the SECs in Irkutsk, Saratov, Rostov and Nizhny Novgorod and 
more problematic relations with Kalmikia and Buryatia where the local leadership was 
less open to outside involvement.  In its work with the CEC and SECs, IFES dealt 
primarily with older elites, primarily ethnic Russians, and a mix of male and female. 
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IFES staff traveled from Moscow out to the 89 SECs to consult with them, and to 
conduct seminars on election issues.  For example, in September 1998, IFES met with the 
Nizhny Novgorod Oblast SEC prior to and during repeat elections for the mayor of 
Nizhny Novgorod.  Elections held in March 1998 were annulled “after heavy pressure 
from federal authorities . . .  based on allegations that the winner of the elections, Andrei 
Klementiev, had made false declarations on his candidacy statement, among other 
charges” (IFES 1998b, 10).  In the end, Klementiev was convicted and sentenced, 
highlighting the problem of criminal participation in the election process in Russia.  In 
this regard, IFES worked closely with the SEC to review the annulment, how the Voting 
Rights Act was applied, and how the CEC worked with the Nizhny Novgorod SEC 
during the process.  The voter turnout for the repeat elections was low, about 37 percent, 
and IFES noted that people were not much interested in the results.  Such examples 
suggested to IFES that its services were most needed in the regions where the capacity to 
conduct free and fair elections was much less developed than in the major cities.    
 
According to IFES/Moscow, many from the SECs traveled to Moscow to visit its 
Election Resource Center, which made available to visitors 3000 documents and an 
extensive database.  The Elections Commissions of the subject and federal levels had 
access to the database.  State Duma staff frequently visited the IFES Moscow office to 
seek information, and IFES worked on election law reform with the State Duma 
Committee on Legislation and Judicial Reform.  IFES also provided technical assistance 
to the legislative branch on electoral law through comparative advice explaining how 
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other countries modeled electoral systems and handled issues of campaign finance, 
corruption in the political process, and ballot access.     
 
Assessing public attitudes toward elections and democracy 
In preparation for its activities related to the December 1995 parliamentary 
elections and as a framework for recommendations to a newly created indigenous NGO, 
New Perspectives Foundation (NPF), IFES conducted in mid-1995 the Russia National 
Survey (IFES 1995).  Based on 4,070 interviews throughout the regions, the survey 
identified those geographic areas where people were most and least interested in politics, 
intent on voting, and optimistic about political and economic situations.  Half of the 
respondents were not aware of the existence of the Central Election Commission and 
slightly more knew nothing of new election laws.  The survey demonstrated that while a 
majority of voters voiced support for a plurality of political parties as an essential element 
to democracy, few were active members of parties and many could not distinguish among 
party platforms.  Survey findings presented a confusing picture for IFES to unravel--
supporters of “pro-reform” parties like Yabloko, Our Home Russia, and Russia’s 
Democratic Choice were split on support for continued market reform or a return to state 
control of the economy.  Survey results showed glaringly that lack of knowledge about 
the electoral process and voters’ rights led to widespread skepticism about the integrity of 
elections.  Consistent with other surveys, the Russian electorate showed a low level of 
interest in government and politics with only 30 percent expressing interest and 66 
percent not.  Respondents were concerned primarily about the economic situation and 
expected no improvement or even worsening of both the political and economic situation 
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in Russia.  At the time of this survey, 47 percent (mostly young people) viewed Russia as 
a democracy and 41 percent (mostly 45 and older) did not.  IFES concluded that there 
was a clear need in Russia for voter education that would become the focus of their 
efforts.  IFES also determined that Russia’s future democratic direction lay in the hands 
of the young (17-35 years old).  Disturbingly, the survey indicated that just 29 percent of 
the young were certain to vote while 55 percent of those 55 years and older were certain 
to vote.  IFES concluded, “Low turnout by young voters will result in higher percentages 
for the Communist and Agrarian parties while higher turnout would likely benefit 
Russia’s Democratic Choice, Yabloko, and Women of Russia” (IFES 1995).  Armed with 
this information, IFES was then able to assist NPF in developing voter education 
materials tailored to younger voters.  As noted earlier, however, the communists made a 
strong showing in the December 1995 parliamentary elections, consistent with IFES’ 
survey findings and expectations.   
 
Building indigenous capabilities for youth 
Much of IFES’ effort in Russia was devoted to creating and making self-
sustaining the indigenous non-profit NGO, New Perspectives Foundation (NPF), to 
conduct voter education and mobilize young voters.  As follow-on to this effort, IFES 
also created a second NGO in its own image to conduct election related support, e.g., 
providing electoral assistance to local polling stations and conducting oversight 
initiatives.  Funded by USAID, IFES created the Institute for Electoral Systems 
Development (IESD) to assume responsibilities for the activities IFES had conducted 
earlier in the decade in preparation for when IFES would depart Russia.   
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IFES worked at the grassroots level in Russia on such basics as how to fill out the 
ballot on election day.  Realizing in 1995 the need to attract young voters into the 
political process, IFES helped build NPF, which was based in Moscow and grew into 50 
affiliate organizations across Russia by the end of the decade.  According to IFES, 
“Significantly reduced government investment in education, conditions faced by military 
conscripts, disillusionment over the Chechen conflict, pressures stemming from the 
economic crisis and sense of alienation from elected officials and political entities have 
contributed to an increasingly apathetic youth constituency” (McDonald and Barnes 
1999).  The authors cite as evidence low voter turnout (about 20 percent of those who 
have the right to vote); lack of youth participating in public service organizations; lack of 
interest among young people about events in Russia; and increased anti-social behavior 
and criminal activity among the young.  Russian youth were faced in the 1990s with 
challenges that their parents did not have.  For example, educational curricula had to be 
revised to meet the requirements of Russia’s new economic system, and because many 
teachers had left their jobs in search of higher pay in the marketplace, there was a 
shortage of qualified teachers.  Under the Soviet system, youth had access to a number of 
state-sponsored organizations like the Octobrists, Pioneers, and Komsomol, but such 
organizations disappeared with the collapse of the Soviet Union and few private ones 
emerged in their place.  NPF sought to provide direction to Russian youth and to channel 
their energies into the political process. 
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Commenting on a September 1998 USIA survey suggesting that youth were 
unlikely to participate in volunteer organizations, IFES program managers noted that 
election campaign positions, which in other countries are usually filled through 
volunteers, had to be paid positions in Russia.  NPF, which attempted to assist the youth 
during the difficult social and economic transition, listed as its goals: developing young 
leaders, encouraging policies for the benefit and development of youth; developing civil 
society in Russia; improving voter education and election observer training; working 
more with national political parties like Nash Dom Rossiya (Our Home Russia) and 
Yabloko; and improving the political culture of young people by getting out the vote and 
sponsoring youth events.  In 1999, NPF was Moscow-based with an eight member Board 
of Directors including representatives of the State Duma Committee on Women, Children 
and Youth; the Russian Youth Union; the National Council of Youth Organizations; and 
the Youth League of Businessmen.  NPF grew out of the constitutional requirement and 
Presidential decree (No. 558) on Increasing the Legal Culture of Voters for election 
commissions at the local, regional, and national levels to undertake voter education 
programs.  Consultation among Russian youth leaders, the Central Election Commission, 
and IFES led to the creation of NPF, which was registered officially as a Russian NGO in 
June 1995.  “The primary focus of the organization was to turn out informed young 
voters in large numbers” (McDonald and Barnes 1999).  To attract the 18-30 year old 
cohort, NPF combined popular culture with voter information using multimedia—
television, radio, and print—and special events like rock concerts, campus rallies, and 
cookouts at the national and regional levels.  Russian citizens were eligible to vote at 
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eighteen and automatically were registered, so they needed to be informed about 
upcoming electoral events and how to participate in them. 
 
Beginning in 1995, IFES regularly surveyed NPF regional affiliates on local 
elections to assess needs and determine what information it could provide to improve the 
election process.  In response to regional affiliates’ requests for information and training 
on methods to increase voter turnout, fundraising, developing communication skills, and 
protecting voters rights and interests, IFES developed appropriate materials adapted to 
the regions.  From the surveys, IFES learned that poll workers of local elections needed 
training on how to deal with common problems like voters trying to cast votes for absent 
family members or not understanding how to fill out the ballot.  Working with the CEC 
RF, IFES created an easy reference rulebook for poll workers covering about 20 of the 
most frequent problems that arise on election day at the polls, for example, how to issue a 
replacement ballot if the original one is spoiled. 
 
IFES also learned from the NPF affiliates that the youth were interested in 
developing civil society more than political society, not appreciating the linkage between 
the two in a democratic system.  They wanted to focus their efforts more on elections and 
the legal culture surrounding the election procedure than on the political parties at the 
heart of an election.  The youth wanted to participate in elections, but not in partisan 
activities.  This posed a substantial challenge to developing a democratic political culture 
in Russia.  The youth did not see political parties as a means to organize and express their 
interests and they did not understand the role political parties play in a democracy.  The 
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party system in Russia was still very weak and political parties did not do well in Russia 
what they did in advanced democracies, i.e., present platforms of ideas to attract a basic 
constituency of supporters.  Russian political parties instead were organized primarily 
around the personality of a leader.  This lack of interest in political parties among the 
youth of NPF supported the findings of IFES’ 1995 survey that Russian citizens in 
general were not interested in political parties and that they tended to be apolitical. 
 
By the end of the decade, NPF had separated itself from IFES, competing for and 
receiving on its own efforts funding from the Mott and Ford Foundations and the British 
Know-How Fund.  It purposely avoided Russian government support, which was 
considered too conditional and interfered with its activities.  NPF worked through its 
regional affiliates to inform and activate the Russian electorate in preparation for the 
federal elections in 2000.  It put together a coalition of youth to monitor elections - led by 
the National Democratic Institute.  NPF focused on such issues as voter education, young 
conscription rights, women’s issues, and, until the bombing of Serbia in March 1999, 
NATO.  NPF attracted many youth through its opportunities to travel abroad to Youth 
Congresses and World Exchanges of Youth.  According to IFES, the participants 
genuinely were dedicated to their work and built vital networks linking youth throughout 
Russia.  The size and independence of NPF was a positive addition to civil society in 
Russia.  Once NPF and its affiliates were well established, IFES no longer conducted 
voter education activities.  IFES described NPF as “the only NGO of its kind conducting 
non-partisan civic and voter education initiatives in over 50 regions across the 
Federation” (IFES 1998b, 6). 
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IFES’s other NGO endeavor at the end of the 1990s, the Institute for Electoral 
System Development (IESD), was different from NPF.  It evolved late in the decade as a 
think tank and focused on establishing the capability to provide training on election 
policy in Russia--to replace IFES when it departed Russia.  The August 17, 1998, 
devaluation of the ruble had a direct impact on IFES’ NGO development efforts, leading 
to delays in initiating IESD.  According to IFES, Russians were so focused on assessing 
damage and trying desperately to get their funds out of failing banks that no one had the 
energy or interest to devote to the upstart of the new institute.  Those involved in 
conducting elections, primarily the CEC, were even making preliminary plans for 
potential early elections that were feared to be called in response to the economic 
collapse.  Early elections never materialized and the delays, in the end, were relatively 
limited.  State Duma Deputy Viktor Sheynis, representing Yabloko in the Committee for 
Legislation and Judicial Reform, was a board member of the Institute and was 
“considered by many as ‘the Thomas Jefferson’ of electoral laws in Russia” (IFES 1999, 
7).  The Director of the new NGO, Alex Yurin, who was also Deputy Director of 
IFES/Russia, was “well-known and respected by the representatives of the State Duma, 
the CEC RF, and various SECs” (IFES 1998b, 3).  At the end of the decade, IESD was 
registering officially as a Russian NGO.   
 
IESD focused on issues of ethics in the election process and campaign finance.  
IFES was slated to depart Russia in March 2000, oddly before the presidential elections 
scheduled for June 2000.  IFES hoped to be able to extend its presence in Russia until 
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after the presidential elections and sometime up to the date that its contract with USAID 
expired, September 30, 2000127. The plan was for IESD to receive funding directly from 
USAID.  Interestingly, the CEC RF said very little about IESD, expressing only some 
concern about IESD’s analysis mission, but it did not block the organization’s formation.  
According to IFES, there were only about 20 experts on election processes and laws in 
Russia qualified to work in IESD at the end of the 1990s.  IESD would become the new 
home of IFES’ Russia Election Resource Center and would transform itself from an 
American-based project to a Russian NGO. 
 
IFES was devoted to bringing clarity to the evolving electoral process in Russia as 
guidance for Russian organizations as well as information for westerners.  For example, 
in April 1999 IFES prepared an informational document about the implications of early 
elections in Russia should the President leave his position before the end of his term.  
This was work undertaken initially in the aftermath of the August 1998 devaluation of the 
ruble, and completed in light of pending impeachment proceedings against President 
Yeltsin in spring 1999.  Drawing on the Constitution of the Russian Federation and the 
Voting Rights Act, the document highlighted who would assume the duties of President, 
how and when elections would be called, the sufficiency of the legal framework to 
conduct early elections, and the role of political parties in such elections, etc (IFES 
1999b).  The fear of early elections dissipated, and IFES turned its attention to media 
issues in preparation for the parliamentary and presidential elections in December 1999 
and June 2000, respectively.  IFES conducted seminars in ten regions to train journalists 
 
127 IFES closed its Moscow office in 2000 and turned its activities over to IESD.  USAID awarded a grant 
to IESD for a project on Strengthening Democracy through Improved Public Awareness from 2000-2004.  
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and election commissioners on the legal framework for reporting on elections, including 
journalistic techniques and ethics issues.    
 
Comparative advantages 
 Promoting U.S. foreign policy goals through partnership with NGOs held 
significant advantage for the U.S.  IFES earned legitimacy from indigenous counterparts 
by directly addressing election issues on a non-partisan basis.  IFES could be flexible and 
quick in its operations, responding to unfolding events and requests in a quick 
turnaround.  IFES noted in its second semi-annual 1998 report to USAID, “IFES’ close 
relationship with its domestic partners and its status as an independent, non-partisan 
organization have proven essential to its ability to consult and advise. . . .IFES staff and 
experts held on-site consultations with officials, lawmakers, and other experts involved in 
Russia’s electoral process.  These consultations allowed IFES to track the reform process, 
identify key problems, and address relevant issues related primarily to election law 
reform” (IFES 1998b, 7). 
 
Challenges to assistance 
IFES reported that the biggest obstacle to getting its work done was the formal 
bureaucracy of the CEC RF, specifically with delays in getting through the International 
Department of the CEC, which was IFES’ sole window of entry.  Access to the SECs 
tended to be easier, but even then, the CEC could intervene if it did not support the 
particular activities of IFES or its regional affiliates. 
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Consistent with the experience of many other U.S. NGOs working in Russia in 
the 1990s, the official registration process required for foreign NGOs was a time 
consuming and expensive obstacle to operating in Russia.  IFES felt that because it was 
in the business of promoting rule of law, it had to set a good example and abide by the 
rules.  IFES was officially registered and paid taxes, but described the registration 
process as lengthy and nightmarish.  
 
As noted earlier, political society in Russia was weak.  Political parties were not 
deeply tied to society at large and did not have vast constituencies.  Campaign finance 
remained one of the primary issues of concern with sources of private funding unclear 
and questions about foreign and criminal financing of parties and candidates prevalent.  
In 1994, IFES reported, “CEC officials have expressed grave concern about the financing 
of political campaigns in Russia, particularly the involvement of political parties in 
commercial activities. . . . In a depressed economy, where party dues and political 
fundraising do not provide a sizable or secure source of funding, many parties are 
dependent on commercial activity to compete” (IFES 1994, 10).  The impact of conflict 
of interest and involvement of organized crime was a concern for those trying to build a 
trustworthy electoral system.  To assist the CEC in dealing with such issues, IFES 
organized roundtable discussions, bringing in experts on these subjects to meet with the 
CEC on how other countries require and enforce political finance disclosure.  At the same 
time, IFES worked with two other USAID-funded organizations, IRI and NDI, to sponsor 
a parliamentary conference on political party law and finance, bringing together election 
authorities, parliamentarians, and executive officials.  IFES also sponsored observer 
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missions and training sessions for CEC members and staff to visit the United States for 
first-hand experience in U.S. electoral procedures, the efficiency of automated voter 
registration, and the role of political parties, mass media, the courts and NGOs in the 
electoral process.  In the late 1990s, IFES worked with the CEC RF to compile a 
comprehensive English/Russian vocabulary list of election-related terms.       
 
Lessons learned  
IFES Director of Programs for Europe and Asia Juliana Geran Pilon described 
“Lessons learned in Civic Education,” based on IFES’ experience in the NIS (IFES 
1998a, 43 and 52). 
 
• One important lesson was to not assume that people shared the same 
meanings of terms like “democracy,” “privatization,” “participation,” etc.  
As a result, in any group discussions, IFES asked participants to define 
the terms themselves. 
• IFES found that citizens often did not know well the legal structures of 
their countries, especially their rights as citizens.  It used its discussions 
on electoral issues to cover the legal structure broadly, as well as the idea 
of self-initiative and leadership. 
• Through discussions on the electoral system, IFES brought together 
citizens with state structures, like the CEC or SECs, and with NGOs like 
NPF and IESD.  Many of IFES’ activities helped to build civil society by 
strengthening citizens’ self-confidence in articulating their goals and then 
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carrying them out; and by enhancing trust between citizens and state 
structures. 
 
More broadly, based on its experiences with developing free and fair electoral processes, 
IFES collected information to share with emerging democracies around the world.  IFES 
believed that: 
 
• elections officials must be free from undue political pressure and 
interference to be able to proceed with organizing elections in a 
professional and well-planned manner. 
• Election law must guarantee a level playing field for those who wish to 
participate in the political process. 
• Effective civic and voter education programs needed to be in place to 
make voters aware of their rights and responsibilities as participants in the 
electoral process. 
• Political parties and candidates must have access to official election 
information. 
• Finally, international election observers and advisers, while valuable, have 
a responsibility to assist in development of a domestic capability for such 
oversight and organization.        
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Teaching Party Politics
International Republican Institute  
 While IFES focused on strengthening the electoral process and NGO development 
to support it, the International Republican Institute (IRI) sought to build democratic 
political party strength.  IRI was a private, non-profit organization created in response to 
President Ronald Reagan’s plea in 1982 to spread democracy around the world in the 
fight against authoritarianism and tyranny.  IRI promoted democracy by working with 
pro-democracy activists around the world at the grassroots level to teach them how to 
organize politically, manage campaigns, conduct polling, train parliaments, assist in 
judicial reform and monitor elections.  IRI made clear that it was not part of the 
Republican Party of the United States, its programs and approaches were nonpartisan, 
adhering to fundamental American values of “individual liberty, the rule of law, and the 
entrepreneurial spirit that fosters economic development” (IRI 1999).  IRI worked 
worldwide and selected its sites where it felt it could make a difference.  Its staff in the 
Moscow office in the late 1990s numbered only a few, and they relied on volunteers to 
serve as trainers and election observers.      
 
IRI received funding for its Russia programs from USAID and the National 
Endowment for Democracy (NED) to conduct observer missions to national and local 
elections, including the 1993 referendum and parliamentary elections and the 1995 State 
Duma and 1996 Presidential elections.  From these exercises, IRI prepared assessments, 
identified problems, and made recommendations to legislators and elections officials to 
improve the conduct of future elections.  IRI’s recommendations, which were published 
394
in the Russian media, were addressed, for the most part, in revised parliamentary and/or 
presidential election laws.  IRI pursued its work in Russia, believing that “democratic and 
free market reform is the basis for security and prosperity of the Russian people” (IRI 
1995, 1).  In its recommendations, IRI noted that Russian voters were cynical about 
democracy so efforts needed to be taken to build confidence in the electoral process. 
 
IRI assisted national and local legislators in their governing abilities, strengthened 
democratic party organizational skills, and supported the development of Russian NGOs.  
Many of the problems noted over time in the elections process were attributed to the lack 
of professional training of elections workers and party organizations, though IRI reported 
significant improvement in the electoral process after the 1993 elections.  IRI’s 
recommendations focused on the process of registering members of political parties; 
enhancing campaign finance disclosure to avoid the potential election of criminals before 
charges were brought against them and to show clearly the source of contributions; 
continuing to reassess and strengthen election law upon reviewing election results; and 
encouraging the CEC RF to be a truly independent agency free of government control to 
enforce election law effectively and to make election results more quickly available to 
enhance trust in the electoral process.  Other lingering electoral problems included the 
practice of “open voting,” meaning voting outside the booth with no regard for the secret 
ballot, and the lack of objectivity of the media in reporting on elections.  IRI stressed the 
need to foster the sanctity of the secret ballot and to develop a truly independent media 
free of government funding.  Assessing the results of the 1996 presidential elections, IRI 
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confirmed “the significant strides made over the past five years by the Russian people in 
institutionalizing democratic electoral processes” (IRI 1996, 2).     
 
IRI was in the political party building business and, with its NED counterpart 
organization, NDI, split Russia into two parts with each organization targeting about 12 
major cities.  IRI worked with local grassroots organizations to train them in the 
mechanics of running campaigns and developing strategies, and to move away from the 
personality driven parties so prevalent in Russia.  IRI advised local organizations in the 
political basics such as developing a message and selling it to the voters, and the 
importance of party representation at the polls on election day.  “In 1995, IRI observers 
noted again [as in 1993] the overall absence of reform or centrist party poll watchers.  
Only the Communist Party of the Russian Federation had poll watchers present at nearly 
every polling station” (IRI 1995, 12).  On the other hand, IRI noted that in the ten cities 
where it had conducted its party-building work, Russia’s reformers won half the 1995 
parliamentary elections, versus 19 percent nationwide.  Following the 1996 presidential 
elections and communist victory, IRI established the Local Party Leaders Academy 
(LPLA), which brought leaders from throughout Russia to Moscow to participate in a 
series of seminars on party registration and charters, building coalitions and membership, 
communication, and message and platform development.  Party participants included 
leaders from Our Home is Russia and Yabloko. IRI focused on teaching these parties 
how to build local organizations, and reported that power in Russia was devolving from 
the center into the regions.         
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In 1997, USAID assisted IRI and the Moscow School of Political Studies in 
conducting training programs on democratic political culture in southern Russia in 
Asktrakhan and Rostov-on-Don.  From 1992-1997, over 1,000 Russian citizens 
participated in these training programs and many of them went on to serve in 
parliamentary and government positions.  IRI with NDI provided political party training 
working with pro-reform parties in 16 Russian regions.  From 1994-1997, USAID 
supported the training of 16,000 Russian citizens in the conduct of campaigns and 
political party development.  In addition, IRI helped establish a training facility with 
Russian trainers for local political party leaders, thereby creating an indigenous capacity 
for such skills.  USAID was particularly focused on pairing up Russian and U.S. 
institutions.  
 
IRI/Moscow assisted in identifying political leaders to participate in the “Young 
Leaders” program created in 1999 by Librarian of Congress James Billington and 
administered by the American Councils for International Education.  (This program is 
discussed in more detail in the ACIE section below.)  In preparation for the 1999 
parliamentary and 2000 presidential elections, this program brought young Russian 
political leaders to the U.S. to observe the legislative process and meet with election 
officials.  Many in the democracy building community in Russia were concerned, 
however, about the timing of this new program, which planned to take political leaders 
away from their duties at home just at the outset of the campaign season for the 
December 1999 parliamentary elections.  As a result, the Young Leaders program was 
postponed until after the elections. 
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Challenges to assistance for IRI   
 Head of the IRI/Moscow office was pessimistic in summer 1999 about the short-
term obstacles to the consolidation of democracy in Russia.  He expressed concern about 
the possible union between Russia and Belarus, painting the dismal picture of a union, 
leading to the creation of a new constitution allowing Yeltsin to begin another term with 
Belarus President Lukashenko as his deputy.  In this dark scenario, Yeltsin would depart 
the political scene and Lukashenko would gain the presidency, throwing Russia back to a 
much more authoritarian system. 
 
In terms of its own operations, IRI was especially concerned, along with NDI, 
about the March 30, 1999, law that placed restrictions on the political activities of foreign 
NGOs and threatened to shut down the party building activities of IRI and NDI, and 
potentially the poll watchers’ training conducted by IFES.128 USAID provided new 
funding to IRI in 2000 in fulfillment of its strategic objective to promote “increased better 
informed citizens’ participation in political and economic decision-making” for its work 
in political party building at the national, regional and local levels (USAID 1999b, 7).  
While the political party system remained weak in Russia, it was more promising on the 
regional level.  In a statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in February 
2005, the Director of the Eurasia Programs for IRI noted that while there had been 
setbacks in democracy at the national level under Putin, political parties appeared to be 
more active in the regions where “regional opposition parties have been able to 
accomplish what the national leadership could not; namely, form coalitions with other 
 
128 IRI remained in Russia as of 2006, funded by a grant from USAID in 2001 to continue its work in 
political party development, development of NGOs and parliamentary training. 
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like-minded parties and candidates to present a unified opposition choice on the ballot” 
(IRI 2005).  IRI worked with many opposition leaders and civil activists in the region on 
how to get out their messages.    
 
National Democratic Institute  
The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) was a nonprofit 
organization, created in 1984 through the National Endowment for Democracy, to 
strengthen and expand democracy worldwide.  In the national interest of the United 
States, NDI promoted democracy as an investment in peace, offering the benefits of the 
practical experience of the Democratic Party in the United States.  Like IRI, NDI did not 
promote any one structure or ideology of democracy, focusing its nonpartisan approach 
instead on the institutions and process of democracy.  NDI drew volunteer expertise from 
an international pool of more than 500 practitioners to conduct training on-site as needed.  
NDI’s website noted that “NDI, along with [IRI], is the only organization dedicated 
solely to political development programs” (NDI Mission Statement, Section II).129 
NDI’s work began in 1990 in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic 
(RSFSR) with NED funding to convene a meeting of democratic reformers from city 
councils throughout Russia, leading later to creation of the League of Russian Cities, 
which played an instrumental role in supporting Boris Yeltsin during the 1991 putsch.  At 
the outset of NDI’s work in Russia, J. Brian Atwood, who would become USAID 
Administrator, was the President of NDI and participated in the first delegation to the 
 
129 www.iri.org/aboutiri/iri.htm, accessed 8/2/99. 
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RSFSR to assess local government reform.  Funding to NDI was later provided by 
USAID to continue democratic development programs. 
 
NDI’s work in Russia during the 1990s was based on its own worldwide 
experience in building political institutions and was largely self-initiated, i.e., not 
designed just to respond to a USG request for proposals.  One program manager 
explained that, beginning in the early 1990s, when the still young NED had limited 
experience in promoting democracy, NDI prepared unsolicited proposals to seek support 
for its programs in the Soviet Union.  It was more confident in its ability to design 
programs to strengthen a political party system in the Soviet Union than in a federal 
agency to pre-determine the necessary elements to include in a call for proposals.  NDI’s 
work prior to 1992 was funded by NED and after 1992 by USAID. 
 
NDI proposed to USAID three areas for support:  1) political party development 
based on the assumption that democracy could not survive without parties; 2) civil 
organizations in Russia, which were an outgrowth of dissident groups of the Soviet 
period, focused on such issues as civil rights, human dignity, women’s issues, etc.; and 3) 
local government in such forms as mayors’ associations, replicating local autonomy in 
the United States.  Initially, a very small office of two or three workers conducted 
political training for a few political activists in preparation for the 1993 parliamentary 
elections.  A key player and adviser to NDI was political scientist Michael McFaul, who 
since has conducted extensive research on democracy promotion and the process of 
democratization.  Following the 1993 elections, NDI decided to focus its efforts on 
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“growing” the democratic political parties of Yabloko, DemRossiya, and Nash Dom 
Rossiya. NDI trained individual candidates as well, including Galina Staravoitiva, 
stressing to them the importance of joining a political party rather than running for 
election as an individual.130 
NDI did not promote a particular model of democracy, but worked instead within 
the framework of people’s requests.  In the early days of the transition, there was some 
disagreement about whom to train in political organization.  According to NDI, they felt 
some pressure from the U.S. government to be willing to train a broad range of political 
orientations without being too selective; NDI instead wanted to focus only on those who 
already were democratically oriented.131 NDI’s approach was to focus on training at the 
local, grassroots level to build the institutions of national democratic parties.  NDI’s 
philosophy was to teach processes that would lead to the institutionalization of 
democratic procedures.  Its aim was not to win elections, but to build the infrastructure of 
the process. 
 
Comparative advantage  
 As NGOs, NDI and IRI could more easily undertake political activities, such as 
working with select parties, than could the U.S. government, which would be seen as 
interfering in the domestic affairs of another country—as was the particular concern of 
 
130 Galina Staravoitava was a human rights activist who was murdered in her apartment building in St. 
Petersburg in November 1998, silencing an important voice for reform. 
131 Strobe Talbott (2002) noted concern early in the 1990s about the appearance of the U.S. interfering too 
much in the domestic issues of a sovereign country.  This outlook shifted by the end of the decade when 
assistance efforts deliberately targeted those who had already proven themselves reform-oriented. 
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President Bush in the early days of the transition.  Furthermore, government agencies did 
not have widespread in-house technical expertise on building political parties to share 
with Russian organizations.  NDI noted in its mission statement, “While governments can 
set the tone and foreign aid can provide needed resources for democratic development, 
much of the real work must be done by non-governmental organizations.  Groups such as 
NDI are capable of assuming responsibility, yet are not constrained by the stringent rules 
of diplomacy.  NDI activities are relatively free from the need, imposed on 
representatives of the U.S. government, to take into account the full range of official 
interests and bureaucratic purviews.  NGOs can readily share information, knowledge 
and experiences that will be valuable to individuals and groups who are pursuing or 
consolidating democracy, sometimes without the cooperation or sanction of their 
government” (NDI Mission Statement, Section IV).  Furthermore, newly emerging 
democracies needed to see that government was not involved in all aspects of society.  
Finally, NGOs could go to international organizations and other groups for funding or 
volunteer work to pursue joint efforts.  NDI, for example, relied on the pro bono work of 
its experts. 
 
Prospects for democracy  
 When asked about the future prospects for democracy in Russia, a NDI/Moscow 
program manager noted that even Russia’s measured progress by the late 1990s was by 
no means assured.  While significant progress was made toward the institutionalization of 
democracy, it was too soon to speak of its consolidation because continued movement in 
that direction lay principally in the hands of whoever was at the top of the Russian 
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government.  In other words, because power in Russia was so heavily vested in the 
executive, whoever occupied that position determined to what extent free market and 
democratic political practices would be deepened.  The program manager believed that 
the process of electoral democracy was in place in Russia, and reported that Russian 
citizens, in general, had come to expect elections as the means of choosing leaders.  Since 
1991, some 30 percent of the Russian population had voted for democracy, with some 
slight increase over time, but not above 40 percent in any election.  According to the 
program manager, in some ways, Russians’ behavior toward democracy was much like 
that in the U.S.; it had become the normal business of politics.  People in power sought to 
stay there; there existed certain geographic pockets of specific party support such that 
urban areas tended to be more liberal/democratic and rural more 
communist/conservative/nationalist.  The State Duma behaved in accordance with the 
constitution. 
 
On the other hand, political parties had much to learn about crafting a message 
and getting it out to the people.  NDI reported that Russians often complained about the 
uncertainty of democracy, not knowing who would be the next leader, to which NDI 
explained that the same was true in the United States.  It was the nature of open society 
and democracy.  NDI explained to Russian audiences that U.S. citizens did not know who 
would be the next President, but, based on the rule of law, they trusted the electoral 
system to be free and fair and, therefore, were willing to accept the results because there 
would be the opportunity to compete again.    
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Challenges to assistance for NDI  
 Organizations like NDI were faced with the uncertain world of working in Russia, 
especially under such regulations as the March 30, 1999, Rule on Basic Guarantees that 
said foreign nationals could not support or impede candidates nor provide in-kind 
services.  NDI trained individuals and parties to create and organize their message, 
package it for mass distribution, and go door-to-door to talk to voters and gain supporters.  
The deadline for the new law to go into effect was September 1, 1999, effectively halting 
NDI’s work for the December 1999 parliamentary elections.  NDI also noted that because 
of the communist-dominated Duma, they had been unable to influence legislative 
programs and even could not gain access to the Duma building. 
 
Like IRI, NDI worked to build political parties and to help loose organizations of 
people come together, identify problems, set goals together for the party, and conduct 
strategic planning.  According to the NDI program manager, this was an entirely new 
concept for Russians who were not accustomed to crafting a vision of how they would 
like their society to be.  NDI facilitated such discussion.  In some cases, NDI sought out 
party organizers to offer their services; in others, the groups came to NDI requesting 
assistance.  While turning away no one, NDI tempered its assistance depending on the 
political orientation of the group and supported most vigorously those parties that were 
democratically-oriented.  NDI’s approach was to build political parties and civic 
organizations by training individuals in organizational and fundraising skills.  In terms of 
NGO development, NDI chose not to create its own NGO, but to identify seven national 
non-aligned, civic organizations already in place in the regions with a base of voters.  
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NDI brought the leadership of these organizations to Moscow for training.  Participants 
included:  New Perspectives Foundation, Mothers of Soldiers, Moscow Helsinki Group, 
Free and Fair Elections and Migrants Forum.  
 
With a staff of 17 in 1999 (five Americans, 1 Latvian, and 11 Russians) based in 
Moscow, NDI staff traveled frequently to the regions to conduct training seminars with 
political groups to teach them how to build party strength and to gain supporters.  NDI 
noted that it did not receive much attention from Russian authorities and purposely 
maintained a low profile in its activities.  NDI taught the political parties how to take a 
hands-on approach, going door-to-door to sell their message.  NDI reported that its 
Russian trainees were hesitant to take this approach and genuinely surprised to find it 
successful in attracting supporters.  They learned to package their message to catch 
voters’ attention, demonstrating, for example, the notable difference between a typical 
Russian political poster with a candidate’s portrait and paragraphs of small print versus 
one that shows a teacher at a blackboard sending the message of a candidate supportive 
of education.  As simple as it sounds, NDI reported that this was a major shift in thinking 
for political activists in Russia.  NDI, in such an instance, was introducing a new political 
culture, encouraging Russian activists to think creatively about the message they wished 
to convey and how they could do that.  According to NDI, democracy had a bad name in 
Russia, but in reality Russians had not had genuine democracy; they had experience only 
elections.  There was no open federal budget; stealing from the state remained a problem.  
Civic organizations were not focused on advocacy and were not holding government or 
political parties accountable.  NDI noted that Russia had an educated base of voters, but 
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of the 143 parties on ballots, only seven or eight were “real” parties with ideas and 
platforms. 
 
In 1999, NDI/Washington was fairly optimistic about the upcoming elections and 
the strength of the democratic forces.  NDI/Washington expected Yabloko, Nash Dom 
Rossiya, and the Fatherland Party to all cross the five percent threshold mark and become 
a permanent fixture of the competitive electoral process in Russia.  Each of those parties 
had developed structures resembling those of western parties.  To the contrary, 
NDI/Moscow was less optimistic about the future of party politics in Russia, stressing 
that because the power of the executive was so strong, if the “wrong” person were in that 
position, political parties could be obliterated.  As noted by other organizations, the 
regions had become more powerful by the end of the decade, with governors controlling 
regional branches of political parties, effectively eliminating local politics as an early 
training ground for future political leaders.  There were no “farm teams” in Russia to 
prepare political leaders.  In an attempt to end on a potentially more positive note, 
NDI/Moscow stated that by 2007, half of Russia’s voters would not have lived under 
communism. 
 
From institutions to individuals  
 Through FSA funding from USAID, IFES, NDI and IRI designed and conducted 
programs in Russia focusing on the political institutions of democracy, specifically the 
electoral system and political parties.  They divided their efforts between political 
training programs, which reached only a small number of individuals spread out across 
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the Russian Federation, and much more far-reaching and long-lasting investments to 
create indigenous nongovernmental organizations to carry on their work and make 
available a rich database of information on electoral procedures around the world.  Still 
these institutional contributions were minimal compared to Russia’s vast needs for 
democratic development.  Of relatively lower priority in the U.S. democracy promotion 
goals until later in the decade, but fundamental to the strengthening and consolidation of 
democracy, was a focus on the individual, i.e., deliberate efforts to invest in individual 
Russian citizens to create the informed citizenry that supports and keeps democracy alive.  
Compared to the highest priority goal of promoting a market economy, which targeted 
the elite, federal level, civil society programs that invested in the development of 
individual Russian citizens were low-profile and conducted at the grassroots level, below 
the radar.  For the most part, programs to develop civil society relied on academic, 
cultural, and professional exchanges funded through USIA.  Through these programs, 
thousands of Russian citizens—students and professionals—traveled to the United States 
each year to undertake short and long-term training opportunities.  They returned to their 
home schools and institutions in Russia with new contacts outside Russia, new 
knowledge and skills, and new understanding of living in an open society.  These 
energetic and risk-taking individuals bring home the promise of a better future for their 
communities and they become the fertile soil in which democracy may take hold in the 
long-run.  Tracking alumni from exchange programs indicated that they have become 
active citizens in civil society.  The next section examines USIA’s efforts to build civil 
society in Russia through funding to American Councils (ACIE/ACTR), the Institute for 
407
International Education (IIE), and the International Research and Exchanges Board 
(IREX).           
Building Civil Society and a Civic Political Culture
Civil society is a vital part of a democracy because it is the unofficial space where 
individuals are free to make known their preferences and complaints, hold their 
government accountable, and organize around their interests.  In civil society, individuals 
can learn to be active participants of a democracy.  At the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
the U.S. foreign policy elite articulated the need to build robust civil societies in the 
region as a goal for democracy promotion.  Sec. 498 of the FSA, which described how to 
foster the establishment of a “democratic and free society,” did not explicitly call, 
however, for the strengthening of civil society in the new independent states as one of its 
goals.  FSA did authorize under Sec. 807 funding through USIA and USAID for 
exchanges and professional training programs, respectively.  The implementing federal 
agencies justified these programs though their contribution to strengthening civil society 
by supporting the development of the individual.  FSA called specifically for other means 
of building civil society, including support for the “development of a free and 
independent media,” which was stated as one of the FSA goals under Sec. 498, and 
creating non-governmental organizations through the Democracy Corps per Sec. 401 
(U.S. Congress. Senate. 1992b).   
Promoting Democracy through Exchanges
Before it was dismantled in October 1999, USIA was the premier federal agency 
responsible for academic and cultural exchanges, which it conducted through such non-
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governmental organizations as ACIE/ACTR, IIE, and IREX.  The purpose of the FSA-
funded exchanges was to promote all the objectives of Sec. 498, in other words to support 
the development of democratically-minded individuals to participate in Russia’s 
emerging democratic infrastructure.  The legislation implied that exchanges and training 
would promote democracy through activities that fostered pluralism, respect for human 
rights and the rule of law, processes of democratic governance (civic education), 
improvement in governance at all levels, and independent media.  The overall goal of 
such assistance was to develop an informed citizenry that would be willing to become 
involved in the political process, to have an impact on public policy, and to hold 
government accountable for its actions.  A USIA Fact Sheet (1997a) stated that USIA 
programs in the NIS were designed to promote the development of free market 
economies and democratic institutions principally through the tool of exchange visits.  
USIA’s FSA programs focused on “democratization, rule of law, free market reform, free 
and independent media, and educational reform” (USIA 1997a, 1).   
 
USIA, operating as the U.S. Information Service (USIS) in country, conducted 
exchange programs with the Soviet Union for decades, so its assistance programs under 
FSA were an expansion of work already well established.  At the fall of communism, 
USIS’ capabilities included USIS officers in the Embassy and U.S. NGOs on the ground.  
Building on its base appropriation for the Fulbright Exchange Program, USIA used FSA 
funds to create new exchange programs targeting particular cohorts in Russia to 
strengthen democracy.  During 1994, “approximately 10,000 Russian high school and 
university students, teachers, entrepreneurs, business managers, public administrators, 
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lawyers, [and] journalists . . .participated in training and exchange programs in the U.S., 
gaining new skills, insights into a democratic, market-oriented society, and opportunities 
for networking with counterparts both in the United States and Russia” (State Department 
Coordinator’s Office 1995, 21).  The 1996 Annual Report identified academic exchanges 
as “an effective means of reaching out to the up-and-coming generation of reformers in 
Russia” (State Department Coordinator’s Office 1997, 36).  USIA conducted the 
following exchange programs designed to attract a particular audience, and 
simultaneously strengthened training in and access to the Internet to keep exchange 
program alumni connected with each other, their host families, and to the open flow of 
information on the web.    
 
High school students 
 USIA, working in conjunction with the NIS Ministries of Education, hosted 
students under the Secondary School Initiative Program from nearly every corner of the 
NIS.  ACIE and Youth for Understanding (YFU) conducted far-reaching recruitment for 
students throughout the NIS to participate in the year-long study programs in the United 
States.  It took much effort on the part of U.S. NGOs to convince holdover Soviet 
ministries to accept the openly advertised, merit-based competition as the procedure for 
selecting exchange participants.  The Secondary School Initiative included several 
components—the Future Leaders Exchange Program (FLEX) for secondary school 
students for one academic year “to promote mutual understanding among the young 
people of the NIS and the United States and to help the future leaders of the NIS build a 
new and open society and establish democratic values and institutions” (State Department 
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Coordinator’s Office 1998, 93).  The participants lived with host families during their 
stay in the U.S.  
 
In the first year of the FLEX program, 887 Russian high school students from all 
of the 89 regions of the Federation traveled to Washington, D.C. for an introduction to 
U.S. history and political development, prior to beginning their year-long study (1994 
Annual Report, 72).  Another 1000 Russian students participated in shorter-term, highly 
focused thematic exchanges in such areas as youth leadership, volunteerism, agriculture, 
environmental education and business.  In 1996, 1300 Russian students studied in the 
U.S. and 660 American high school students studied in Russia.  By 1998, only 313 
Russian students participated in FLEX as USIA followed the general shift in democracy 
promotion activities away from Russia toward the other NIS.  USIA, however, continued 
to track these participants after completion of the program when they had returned home, 
encouraging them to stay active in alumni associations.     
 
USIA also supported the U.S.-Russia Awards for Excellence in Teaching, created 
in 1996 to provide funds for materials and equipment to teachers who demonstrated 
innovation in the classroom.  USIA awarded a grant to ACIE/ACCELS to run Teaching 
Excellence Awards (TEA) competitions held throughout Russia to make awards to 
outstanding secondary school teachers in the fields of English language and American 
studies.  The goals of this program were to recognize talented teachers, promote the use 
of innovative teaching methodologies, and to build contacts between schools in the U.S. 
and Russia, for which the winning teachers received materials for themselves (@$200) 
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and equipment for their classrooms (@$2,000).  The FY 1996 Annual Report described 
this program as a high-profile cooperative program conducted in agreement with the 
Ministry of Education.  In the competition, 225 Russian teachers were selected as semi-
finalists to receive the materials and equipment and from those winners, 30 were chosen 
as finalists to travel to the U.S. for professional seminars during the summer of 1997.  
During that time, they worked with 10 U.S. teachers who then traveled to Russia in the 
fall.  In 1998, 486 were successful in the first round, 190 in the second round and 30 
traveled to the U.S. where they worked with 13 U.S. teachers who then visited Russia.  
The purpose of this exchange was “to contribute to the development and reform of 
educational systems in the NIS, and to promote mutual understanding” (State Department 
Coordinator’s Office 1999, 122).  The TEA program was recognized as one of the most 
highly visible U.S. government programs in the NIS because of the multiplier effect 
whereby teachers share their experiences with their students (ibid., 122).      
 
Undergraduate students 
 USIA supported Undergraduate Exchange programs, “designed to introduce the 
future NIS leaders to the U.S. system of higher education, democratic values, and the 
principles of free market economies” (State Department Coordinator’s Office 1995, 72).  
ACTR, YFU, IIE, and the American Collegiate Consortium (ACC) worked together to 
conduct recruitment, selection and placement of NIS participants in U.S. institutions, 
which for the most part were new to the international academic exchange programs.  The 
Undergraduate Exchange Program supported one year of non-degree study in the U.S. in 
the fields of agriculture, business administration, communications/journalism, computer 
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science, library and information sciences, public policy, and sociology.  This program 
gave each participant an opportunity to complete a three-month internship appropriate to 
his/her field of study, including a Congressional internship, and to attend a leadership 
seminar. Approximately 100 Russian undergraduates participated in this program each 
year. Beginning in 1998, all participants were required to complete 40 hours of 
community service during the first semester.   
 
Graduate students 
 USIA combined its base and FSA funding to support the Edmund S. 
Muskie/FREEDOM Support Act Graduate Fellowships Program, which brought NIS 
citizens to the United States for one to two years of graduate-level study, resulting 
usually in a master’s degree or certificate in business administration, economics, 
education administration, journalism and communications, law, library and information 
sciences, public administration, and public policy.  In 1996, 75 Russian graduate students 
were selected for the program, declining to 32 in 1998.  The fellowships included an 
eight- to twelve-week internship during the summer following the first academic year.  
ACIE/ACTR administered this program for USIA.         
 
Parliamentary and regional leaders 
 USIA designed this program targeting parliamentarians and staffers for one to 
two-week fellowships to support democratic and market reform.  The U.S. Embassy was 
responsible for choosing the participants.  In 1994, 134 deputies and staff members from 
the Duma and Federation Council and regional political leaders participants.  They 
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researched such topics as the judicial system, local government, the U.S. political system, 
economics and investments, and arms control.  Some 200 senior-level Russian 
policymakers participated in professional exchanges to meet their U.S. counterparts in 
1996.   
 
Professionals 
 USIA’s Community Connections program was created 1996 as a follow-on to the 
highly successful Business in Russia program, both addressed in the discussion of 
programs to promote market reform in Chapter Five.  Community Connections, which 
targeted particular regions in Russia, was designed in conjunction with local authorities 
to focus on specific areas of interest: environmental policy, fiscal federalism, support for 
small and medium-sized businesses, social services, civic education, state-municipal 
relations, law enforcement, land management, educational reform and public policy.  
This program brought groups of Russian entrepreneurs and local government officials 
from specific cities together with their U.S. counterparts.  The Community Connections 
Program was conducted through U.S. nongovernmental organizations in close 
coordination with the U.S. embassy to identify business people, NGO leaders, local 
government officials, legal professionals and educators from Russia to work with their 
counterparts in the U.S. in customized, community-based projects for six weeks.  The 
participants then returned home to open their own small businesses or work in local 
government.  In 1998, 850 Russian citizens interned in the U.S.  At the request of the 
Russian government, USIA expanded Community Connections to include the 
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Presidential Management Training Initiative (PMTI), which targeted mid-level Russian 
managers, as the request of President Yeltsin.    
 
USIA created the Fellowships in Contemporary Issues (CI) program through 
which Russian policy makers and government officials, leaders of NGOs, journalists, 
lawyers and other professionals traveled to the U.S. to pursue three-month policy oriented 
research studies at U.S. universities, think tanks, NGOs, and government offices.  Their 
research was to “advance the transition to democracy, free markets, and civil society in 
their home countries” (State Department Coordinator’s Office 1997, 86).  CI targeted 
established professionals, providing fellowships to conduct research in the U.S. in the 
areas of sustainable growth and development; democracy, human rights, and rule of law; 
international relations, national security and public policy; strengthening civil society; 
and the Internet.  These fellowships were intended to support reform efforts in the NIS 
and to help U.S. citizens better understand the challenges of transition.  New efforts in 
this program were devoted to the study of trade and investment, crime and corruption, 
foreign policy, international security and human rights.  Many of these professionals 
returned home to key positions in government, NGOs and the private sector.  IREX 
conducted the CI program.  
 
The NIS College and University Partnership Program (NISCUPP) was designed 
to promote curriculum development and administrative reform in higher education 
through partnerships between U.S. and NIS universities in the fields of law; business, 
economics and trade; education, continuing education, civic education and educational 
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reform; public administration, public policy, government, urban and regional 
development; and journalism and communications.  The 1998 Annual Report noted, 
“NISCUPP projects support the ability of NIS academic institutions to contribute, 
through curriculum reform and applied research, to the creation of democratic 
institutions, rule of law, and an environment hospitable to foreign investment in their 
home countries” (State Department Coordinator’s Office 1999, 120.)  Under 13 
partnerships with Russia, 250 Russian citizens participated in 1998, supporting mainly 
the Regional Initiative (RI) in Samara, Novgorod, and the Russian Far East in the field of 
business.  A partnership between the University of Rhode Island and Novgorod State 
University created an Executive Business Training curriculum for paying students. 
 
Providing connectivity 
 USIA was creative in designing its democracy programs, for example, choosing 
early on in the transition to focus considerable attention on the use of the Internet to 
provide information and maintain connections between people. USIA launched in 1996 
its Internet Access and Training Program (IATP) to provide reliable access and training 
in connectivity capabilities like e-mail and use of the Internet and the World Wide Web 
for alumni of all U.S. government funded exchange programs and others working toward 
democracy.  Working through organizations like IREX and Project Harmony, USIA 
selected and set up Internet sites for public access at universities, libraries and NGOs that, 
in turn, contributed existing computer equipment, staff, training facilities and other 
resources.  The host institutes then were trained to take over and operate the site on a 
permanent basis.  In Russia, public access sites were established in universities, libraries, 
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institutes and NGOs in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Novosibirsk, Irkutsk, Tomsk, 
Yekaterinburg, Penza, Rostov-on-Don, Vladivostok, and under the Regional Initiative—
Novgorod, Khabarovsk and Samara.  The 1996 Annual Report noted, “Access to email, 
Internet, and the resources of the World Wide Web helps those NIS citizens who are 
engaged in consolidating the transition to democracy, free markets, and civil society, to 
keep current and connected in their fields, obtain educational and professional materials, 
disseminate information, publish articles on the Web, and continue collaborative projects 
with their U.S. and NIS colleagues” (State Department Coordinator’s Office 1997, 89).  
 
Civic education 
 The Civic Education Curriculum Development Program helped educators in the 
NIS develop civic education programs, highlighting the “philosophy of democratic 
institutions, citizen behavior and social responsibility” to be applied to national and local 
curricula (State Department Coordinator’s Office 1998, 99).  Under this program, the 
History Departments of the University of Maryland and Samara State University 
conducted faculty exchange programs, assessing the Russian Department of History and 
strengthening the program.  Junior faculty from the Russian side spent a semester in the 
U.S. developing new courses, which they implemented upon their return to Russia.  In 
1998, Syracuse University worked with secondary school teachers in Bryansk to develop 
public policy handbooks on Russian civic issues, which were distributed to local media 
and public officials.       
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The NIS-U.S. Teacher Exchange Program was initiated in 1995 to support 
educational reform by bringing teachers from the NIS to teach in the U.S. for one year at 
the secondary level “to develop knowledge and skills reflecting democratic approaches 
and methods” (State Department Coordinator’s Office 1998, 95).  Each teacher 
developed a civic education curriculum to take back to his or her school. Teachers from 
Russia and the U.S. conducted civic education teaching programs in which the U.S. 
teachers taught civics in a Russian secondary school and pedagogical institute, and 
Russian teachers taught social studies courses in U.S. secondary schools, attended local 
civic and community activities, and designed civic-education curriculum reform projects 
to implement at home.  Program alumni met in Moscow for a workshop on how to apply 
their training in their home classrooms and expand their connections with each other, 
mainly through the Internet.  The FY 1997 report noted the example of a Russian teacher 
from Novosibirsk who brought back and established a student government mechanism to 
an initially reluctant faculty and student body.  In 1998, the University of Hawaii helped 
Russian educators develop a civic education curriculum for secondary schools in 
Krasnoyarsk, which won recognition from the regional Department of Education.      
 
Connecting exchange alumni 
 USIA made the important effort in 1995 to begin to organize alumni from all U.S. 
government-funded exchange programs to promote networking among program alumni 
and to encourage them to maintain contact with their U.S. counterparts through the 
Internet.  USIA devoted efforts to create electronic ListServs, newsletters, and pubic 
access information resource centers in country.  Exchange students who already were 
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pursuing their programs in the United States in 1995 attended a USIA-organized 
workshop, either in Chicago or Houston, to establish relationships among themselves in 
the context of a workshop on the process of developing a civil society.  Similar alumni 
activities were held in Russia in 1996 including a conference on civil society in 
Vladivostok and Nizhniy Novgorod.  USIA also sponsored a career development forum 
in Moscow, bringing together over 250 exchange alumni with about 30 U.S. and Russian 
businesses.  USIA also developed a directory of program alumni (State Department 
Coordinator’s Office 1997, 85). 
 
The high school students who participated in the FLEX academic year program in 
1994 formed alumni associations and worked together to share their insights on what they 
had learned in the U.S.  Because of their skills in the English language, many alumni 
secured employment with multinational companies, NGOs, and government agencies.  
The 1997 Annual Report cited two examples of FLEX students who had returned home to 
organize their own NGOs, one in St. Petersburg to create a youth organization, PRIME, 
dedicated to promoting democracy and Russia’s integration into the democratic world 
and the other a youth organization in Saratov to provide psychological and social support 
to teens.  USIA reported in The FY 1998 Annual Report that the first FLEX alumni had 
graduated from college and established professional careers with the highest percentage 
engaged in law and international business (State Department Coordinator’s Office 1999, 
128).   
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In 1996, the Contemporary Issues program added to its activities an on-line 
interactive journal by and for alumni, regional alumni conferences on professional 
development issues, and policy roundtables in Washington, DC.  From home, alumni 
wrote articles and policy papers, participated in conferences, drafted legislation, created 
NGOs and advised U.S. government officials on such issues as organized crime in 
Russia.  In June 1996, alumni of the Junior Faculty program met in Moscow to 
consolidate the group and better connect themselves through newsletters and small 
groups initiatives and to discuss offering small follow-up grants to publish textbooks 
based on the ideas developed during their program. 
 
The FY 1996 Annual Report noted that “USIA undergraduate program alumni 
have been very successful after returning to their home countries” including a Russian 
alumnus who became an economics professor at Kuban State University (State 
Department Coordinator’s Office 1997, 85).  The FSA Graduate Exchange Program for 
Master’s level and professional development had 900 total alumni from around the NIS 
in 1997 who had returned to their home countries to secure positions in their areas of 
study, many at the level of director, senior manager or department head.  Most of these 
participants established careers in education, library science, business administration and 
public administration.  A group of Russian business development officials who had 
participated in the PMTI program returned home to Petrozavorsk to create the Karelian 
Agency for Support, a better business bureau, which offered advice and support in 
business development.  Another group returning to Rostov formed an NGO to promote 
democratization of the educational system and one PMTI participant became one of the 
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first industrial psychologists in her region.  In 1998, USIA hired alumni assistants at each 
of its program hubs to develop greater outreach to returnees, who by then amounted to 
8,000.   
 
Democracy Fund Small Grants 
USIA worked with U.S. Embassies’ Democracy Commission to conduct the 
“Democracy Funds” Small Grants Program established in 1995 through which U.S. 
embassies could provide direct support for small projects at the local level (State 
Department Coordinator’s Office 1997, 84).  Awards up to $24,000 went to host-country 
individuals or organizations to advance democratic institution-building, independent 
media and the free flow of information.  Russia received $2 million for its program in FY 
1997 and awarded 26 grants through the Eurasia Foundation.  ADD HERE. 
 
USAID exchange program 
In the early days of the post-Soviet transition, USAID conducted the NIS 
Exchanges and Training (NET) Project, which provided short-term U.S.-based training 
for thousands of professionals including senior-level officials, deputy finance ministers, 
and presidents of national banks from throughout the NIS.  The International Research 
and Exchanges Board (IREX) ran the Institutional Partnerships Project under NET, which 
provided long-term (two-year) development assistance to training institutions in Russia in 
such areas as economic restructuring and NGO/PVO development.   In addition to 
creating modern training institutes, each partnership had to produce information material 
that could be shared with other NIS institutions and other USAID programs.  The FY 
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1996 Annual Report credited IREX for its hands-on involvement in working with the 
institutes in helping them improve their faculty and staff and business plans.  “The NET-
IPP partnerships have come to be seen as agents for promoting reform.”132 
This brief review of exchange activities from the view of USIA as prepared for 
inclusion in the annual reports indicates that exchange programs were a vital part of the 
U.S. assistance effort to Russia.  The collapse of the Soviet system created a void that 
only very slowly began to fill in with new institutions.  To address this void, the U.S. 
government invested in training future generations of post-communist leaders through 
USIA-funded exchange programs, which provided Russians citizens long-term 
opportunities to live, study and/or work in the United States.  With the appointment and 
elevation of Richard Morningstar as Coordinator, the emphasis of assistance shifted away 
from the large privatization projects of the early years of the transition to investment in 
people.  The assistance administrators of SEED and FSA-funded programs realized that 
putting in place the instruments of a market democracy was not sufficient to consolidate 
democracy, people had to change their mindsets as well to accept these new instruments 
as legitimate.  The 1996 Annual Report noted, “Greater emphasis was given to expanding 
linkages through low-cost, high impact activities such as community-based exchanges 
and training, and the promotion of partnerships and other institutional relationships 
designed to be increasingly self-sufficient and ultimately self-sustaining” (State 
Department Coordinator’s Office 1998, 204).  The U.S. decided to support Russia’s 
transition through normal bilateral relations based on partnerships, exchanges, joint 
 
132 There is little information on USAID’s NET project in Russia after 1996.  This corresponds to the point at 
which the Coordinator’s Office shifted exchange activities predominantly to USIA to administer. 
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ventures, and collaborative projects between universities, cities, and professional 
associations.  Under Morningstar, 1997 marked a shift in the assistance relationship with 
Russia toward partnerships between people and institutions and toward a focus on the 
regions outside Moscow.  Exchange programs employed a quota system to control the 
number of participants from the big cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg where 
opportunities to study were much more abundant.  These quotas ensured that students in 
more remote regions had access to these programs as well and could bring back to the 
regions their experiences and knowledge from study and work abroad.   
The Grassroots View of Building a Democratic Cohort
USIA relied on the expertise of NGOs like ACIE, IIE, and IREX to select the best 
and the brightest among Russia’s youth to begin building a cohort accustomed to 
widespread access to information and debate and thoughtful analysis, preparing them to 
be the future political, business, and social leaders of Russia.  USIA also invested in mid-
level professionals and established leaders to expose them to the institutions and culture 
of a democratic open society.  This section takes a closer look at the operation and 
perspectives of these NGOs who were on the ground working with Russian citizens on a 
daily basis to build a market democracy.     
 
The unrecognized value of exchanges 
 U.S. assistance efforts to invest in human capital through educational and 
professional exchanges seemed to contribute effectively to building the grassroots 
foundations over time for support of a democratic political culture and free market 
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economy.  The importance of these exchange activities in building democracy often is 
overlooked and undervalued, compared with the more costly and high profile 
privatization projects.  They may prove, however, to have the longest lasting effect of any 
of the assistance programs by directly impacting people’s lives, giving them skills and 
experiences that could be life-changing.  The benefits of such programs, implemented by 
ACIE, IIE, and IREX and NDI, IRI, and IFES, was the exposure of individuals to 
information to develop their skills for critical thinking and analysis to help them make 
their own choices for the types of systems that would work best for their culture.  
Academic exchanges, which had been part of U.S-Soviet/Russian relations for 50 years, 
appeared on all the checklists of democracy promotion activities in official statements, 
but almost as an afterthought and with little attention to the potential value-added they 
represented. The Internet provided a whole other dimension to this relationship, allowing 
exchangees to build networks, to stay in contact after they returned home with people 
they had met while abroad, and more importantly, to build their own networks back home 
of people with similar experiences.  Academic exchanges, many of which focus on young 
people at a formative stage of their development, are an important and often undervalued 
resource for democracy promotion.  These programs are relatively inexpensive, but 
promise a big bang for the buck through their multiplier effect.  Exchange program 
participants return to their home countries bringing with them the ideas and experiences 
of another culture that can then inform their later professional activities.   
 
ACIE President Dan Davidson noted, “Educational and professional exchanges 
between the United States and peoples of the region play a vitally important role in 
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expanding the knowledge and skill base of a new generation of NIS citizens’ who have 
had little or no experience with the culture or practices of an open and democratic 
society” (ACIE/ACTR 1997, 3).  Based on its long history of implementing exchange 
programs and its dedication to gathering extensive longitudinal data on its exchange 
participants, ACIE/ACTR claimed, “Study abroad programs can change people and their 
(mono-cultural) habits of mind, and shape new ways of viewing the world and one’s role 
in it.”133 Ted Kniker, Chief of the Office of Policy and Evaluation in the State 
Department’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, oversaw a study from 
September 2001 to December 2002 to evaluate the affect of international exchanges on 
the U.S. hosts and communities as a means of justifying U.S. taxpayers’ support for 
international academic and cultural exchanges.  Through a series of focus groups 
involving U.S. hosts, the study sought to determine “whether or not professional 
international exchange programs: (1) increase mutual understanding, (2) strengthen ties 
that unite people of the United States with those of other nations, (3) promote 
international cooperation for educational and cultural advancement, and (4) assist in the 
development of ‘friendly, sympathetic and peaceful relations’ between the United States 
and other nations” (IAWG 2003).  The focus groups included participants in USIA’s 
Business for Russia/Community Connections program.  The study found an “across-the-
board” impact of international professional exchanges on local hosts and communities in 
the U.S.  “From establishing personal friendships to furthering business contacts, from 
 
133 This quote is taken from a presentation and Powerpoint slides presented by ACIE President Dan 
Davidson on January 20, 2006, in the Interagency Language Roundtable Plenary held at the Foreign 
Service Institute of the George P. Shultz National Foreign Affairs Training Center.  In an alumni survey 
spanning 25 years, 68 percent of 750 respondents claimed that the study abroad experience was first or one 
of three of the most significant educational experiences in their lifetime. More information is available at 
http://www.americancouncils.org or by writing to Ddavidson@actr.org. 
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dispelling negative stereotypes to gaining a better appreciation of their own country, the 
Americans who participated in the study reported a wide range of favorable and 
sometimes eye-opening experiences that can out of their interactions with foreign 
visitors” (IAWG 2003).  The study suggested that the international exchanges were as 
valuable to the American hosts as to the international participants.    
 
Off-setting Russia’s troubled educational system 
Despite Russia’s ill-funded educational system of the 1990s, the students who 
applied for fellowships to study in the U.S. were extraordinarily bright and capable, 
according to the U.S. program managers.  They took the process of selecting Russian 
exchange participants very seriously.  ACIE’s application process, for example, required 
that students submit their transcripts, two letters of recommendations, the Test of English 
as a Foreign Language (TOEFL) and other standardized test scores depending on the type 
of fellowship, and a personal interview.  Program managers reported that in the selection 
process, they were faced with the significant problem of fraud and relied very little on 
written documentation from Russian sources, e.g., transcripts, submitted with 
applications.  According to several program managers, it was common practice in Russia 
for students to buy questions on upcoming exams, grades, and even diplomas and there 
was no way for NGOs to guarantee the authenticity of documents submitted with 
applications.  The program managers attributed these fraudulent practices to the 
excessively low wages of teachers and educational administrators in Russia (e.g., about 
$20 per month in 1999 for a high school teacher).  Often, even those wages were not 
paid.  NGOs weighed most heavily the results of the tests they administered themselves 
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and, most importantly, to the personal interview at the final selection stage.  In this way, 
ACIE, for example, could be assured of the student’s scholastic, social, and emotional 
capability to prosper from study in the U.S. 
 
ACIE/ACTR, IIE, and IREX collaborated with USIA in implementing exchange 
programs to build a cohort of more democratically minded professionals and scholars 
who, for the most part, returned to Russia to pursue meaningful studies and careers.  By 
1998, more than 35,000 Russians had participated in U.S. government-funded training 
and exchange programs.  The exchange organizations made special efforts to sustain the 
earlier investments of the U.S. government by promoting on-going activities for alumni 
of USIA-funded exchange programs.  
 
The American Councils on International Education (ACIE), an umbrella 
organization including the American Council of Teachers of Russian (ACTR), was a 
major player in the realm of educational exchange.  Its extensive field presence set it 
apart from most other U.S. NGOs working in Russia.  ACTR was founded in 1974 as a 
professional organization of Russian-language teaching professionals and expanded its 
activities over the next two decades to include research and training programs for 
students at the secondary through graduate school level.  “American Councils designs 
and implements academic exchange, professional training, distance learning, curriculum 
and test development, technical assistance, consulting, research and evaluations services 
in international education on behalf of governments, foundations, and development 
banks” (ACIE/ACTR 2006).  ACIE, which maintained a substantial staff in Moscow and 
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seven other offices in the Federation, broadened its field presence as a way of building 
trust in these exchange programs in the regions outside Moscow and St. Petersburg.  
Having offices in more remote areas made these exchange programs more real and 
trustworthy for the people there because the process was not controlled from Moscow, as 
was the custom.   
 
ACIE administered some 20 different exchange and training programs in the 
1990s in Russia with approximately 75 percent of its funding from the U.S. Government, 
including the six exchange programs that ACIE administered through USIA with FSA 
funding as described below.  Those included:  the secondary school FREEDOM Support 
Act Future Leaders Exchange Program (FSAFLEX); undergraduate exchange programs; 
the degree granting Edmund S. Muskie Program and Freedom Support Act Graduate 
Exchanges in specific market economics and democracy related fields; the United States 
Awards for Teachers of English and American Studies (TEA) for top secondary school 
teachers of English and American Studies in Russia; Partners in Education Program 
providing Russian secondary school administrators and civics teachers training in civics 
education in the U.S.; and the Library of Congress Russian Leadership Program. All of 
these programs were conducted on the basis of open, merit-based competition, a new 
concept in the Russian education system in the 1990s.  Overall, about 700 Russians 
studied in the United States each year in high schools, colleges, and universities.   
 
According to ACIE, USIA’s plan to develop democracy in the NIS centered on 
the idea of investing in a generation at the critical point at which students attitudes were 
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formative--this was deemed to be ninth and tenth graders, those who were no more than 
15 years old on January 15 of the recruitment year.  The aim was to provide these high 
school students with a long-term, substantial immersion experience in the United States 
where they had to learn to take responsibility for themselves. 
 
FSAFLEX for high school exchanges 
 Senator Bill Bradley (D-NJ) was the driving force in 1992 to establish an 
exchange of 5,000 high-school students from each side, Russia and the United States.  
Few in the Congress agreed with him at the time, and even though the numbers of 
potential participants were trimmed significantly to 1000 on each side during the drafting 
stage of the legislation, Senator Bradley had the political clout to get his legislation 
passed.  Its goal was to expose Russian students to life in the United States, focusing on 
the elements of civil society, including volunteerism and a respect for the rule of law; to 
motivate these students to serve as agents of change upon their return to Russia; and to 
show an appreciation for American culture in hopes of creating lasting ties between the 
two cultures.  ACTR consulted on the drafting of this bill, emphasizing especially the 
need for an open competition to be run in the NIS to select the fellows.  As a result, the 
Bradley program, now called the FREEDOM Support Act Future Leaders Exchange 
Program (FSAFLEX), was a totally merit-based, one year long study program.  For 
Russians accustomed to payoffs and connections, this merit-based procedure was a sharp 
cultural break from the past.  ACTR saw this exchange program as historic for the 
formative stage and level of immersion at which it targeted the Russian student and the 
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potential long-term benefits of this early study abroad experience.  About 300 Russian 
students participated in the program each year.   
 
ACTR recruited for the high-school participants in 56 cities across the Federation 
with testing centers located in 18 cities.  At the outset of recruitment in September of 
each year, ACTR advertised the competition where possible in local and/or national 
papers and on radio and television.  ACTR staff traveled to the recruitment cities, 
working with local ministries of education to give presentations about the program and 
encourage students to apply.  ACTR reported that, depending upon the location, some 
ministries thought this program was a brain drain, but most were cooperative in working 
with ACTR staff to conduct the recruitment.  Pairs of American and Russian testers 
visited the designated testing centers to conduct the competition for all high school 
students who met the eligibility requirements.  Round one was a 15 minutes, 16 questions 
multiple choice English Language test used to screen out those students who did not have 
a sufficient level of English language competency.  Round two, conducted in October, 
was more challenging, consisting of three essays written in English and formulated to 
indicate a student’s ability to complete successfully a year long study abroad program 
while living with an American family—the essays focused on such topics as household 
chores a student may be expected to do in the host family, how a student might adjust to 
no longer being the best student in his/her English class; or how to handle people who 
may make fun of the student’s accent.  Round three consisted of a role-playing group 
activity designed to see how students interacted with their peers, a 15 minutes personal 
interview, and a detailed application including biographical information, a letter of 
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introduction from the student to the host family, recommendations from teachers, and 
official transcripts.  Panels of experts in international education and exchanges evaluated 
the essays, interviews, and applications.  One ACTR program manager noted, “In Russia 
the goals of the program are supported by exposing thousands of students, teachers, and 
parents to the structure of an American run competition.”  Round three was the most 
intense as parents pushed hard for their children to be accepted and, having made it to 
Round three, expected their children to be selected.  For 1998, for example, 305 Russian 
students received FSAFLEX scholarships to study for one year in a high school in the 
United States.  The applicant to award ratio was 40:1 and for Moscow, the ratio was 
800:14, indicating how competitive the program was, particularly so in the crisis mode of 
the economic crash of August 1998.  Interestingly, the applicants, and, subsequently the 
awardees, were predominately female.  Notably, ACTR made a special effort to recruit 
for disabled participants, a group long neglected in Russian education.  Following 
selection, the Washington office of ACTR (ACTR/Washington) placed the students in 
appropriate high school settings in the U.S. based on the individual applications. 
 
ACTR had to handle recruitment with sensitivity.  Sometimes the youthfulness of 
the NGO program managers was a hindrance in Russian political culture, which 
respected age as authority.  ACTR had to take this into consideration particularly in 
assigning which program managers traveled to more remote areas for recruiting.  ACTR 
conducted FSAFLEX recruitment through a mix of American and Russian staff.  It was 
easier for the American staff to reject attempts at bribery.  The Russian employees were 
particularly valuable in interfacing with Russian parents in those instances when a student 
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on an exchange program experienced some difficulty in the United States.  The 
FSAFLEX staff maintained very close contact with ACTR/Washington, enjoyed a close 
relationship with the U.S. Embassy in Moscow--specifically the USIS Assistant Cultural 
Affairs Officer, but was not much involved with the Russian authorities who preferred to 
let ACTR address any problems without official intervention, for example, in dealing 
with regional ministries. 
 
A lasting commitment to alumni 
 Importantly, ACTR made a commitment to support the alumni of its own and 
other programs funded by the USG.  FSAFLEX alumni numbered around 1000 in Russia 
at the end of the 1990s, with those who had participated in the first year in 1994 just then 
graduating from college.  Their majors tended to be in the areas of foreign languages and 
business or economics.  Many were looking to work with western businesses or 
international NGOs.  Soon after their return to Russia from their exchange programs, 
ACTR brought the alumni together for a “re-entry” seminar to help them adjust to life 
back in Russia after their experiences in the U.S.  To counter the potential brain drain 
claim, one of the conditions of the FSAFLEX fellowship was a two-year residency 
requirement back in Russia.  According to ACTR, one problem some exchange 
participants faced upon return was discrimination against their English language 
capability.  In some instances in regions outside Moscow and St. Petersburg, alumni had 
stronger language skills than their teachers, so they returned to classrooms where they 
had very little to learn.  In other places, teachers penalized students for speaking 
American English rather than the preferred and traditional British English that the 
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Russian system used for exams.  Most students returned home for their senior year of 
high school in Russia over concern that a U.S. high school diploma, where awarded, 
might not be accepted by a Russian university.  Students could take equivalency exams, 
repeat the final year of high school, or reach an agreement with their principal--who 
wielded considerable power--to receive a diploma.  ACTR reported that gaining entry 
into university was particularly important for boys who otherwise might be subject to 
military conscription.  ACTR speculated, therefore, that boys may have been more 
hesitant to apply for exchange fellowships, fearing that they would not be prepared 
sufficiently to pass the Russian university entrance exam after a year of study abroad in a 
different system. 
 
The FSAFLEX alumni organized themselves to undertake specific projects, 
including publication of their own quarterly newsletter, the Bradley Herald, still in 
publication as of 2005, as well as celebrating American holidays like Halloween and 
Valentine’s Day.  They organized an Alumni Chapter in each of the following cities:  
Yekaterinburg, Moscow, Nizhny Novgorod, Novosibirsk, St. Petersburg, Samara, 
Stavrapol, Vladivostok, and Volgograd.  In the late 1990s, the Yekaterinburg alumni 
group used a Valentine’s Day celebration to establish closer connections with the 
American Information Center, the U.S. Consulate, and several Russian and American 
companies “to show the scope of FSA Urals Alumni Association activities.”  For this 
event, they obtained sponsorship from Coca-Cola, UralPremier Trading Co., and 
Casanova Shops and received media coverage from regional television, radio, and 
newspaper.  The Yekaterinburg chapter also conducted the “Public Service 
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Announcement and Public Opinion Research Project” to help alumni learn about 
producing public service announcements and how they can be used to promote social 
change.  Outside participants included the BBC school for journalists, representatives of 
city and regional government, the United Nations Education, Social and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO), Ural State Technical University, and the U.S. Consulate. 
 
One of the most notable fundraising events was the annual Charity Spring Ball in 
Moscow which the U.S. Embassy regularly attended and which received press coverage.  
In 1998, the Charity Ball raised $2,500, which the FSAFLEX alumni used to build 
playrooms in children’s cancer centers.  Those from Vladivostok and Volgograd likewise 
organized charity balls, which supported local orphanages and hospitals.  Alumni in 
Nizhny Novgorod created debate teams in connection with Nizhny Novgorod State 
University, addressing such issues as whether “Human Rights Ought not be Sacrificed for 
National Security Interests.” In honor of the Fourth of July, they planned a debate on July 
3, 1999, on whether Russia was truly a free country.  The Novosibirsk chapter organized 
a summer internship program--another new concept in Russia--with four companies 
(AquaVitae, Pepsi, Project Aid Siberia, and the Siberian Civil Initiative Support Center) 
and held a resume-writing seminar to assist in competing for the internships.  The 
Stavropol chapter organized the clean-up of a renovated orphanage, and invited 
representatives of different social and religious movements and communities to help.  All 
the chapters regularly performed such services including entertaining the elderly, 
working with blind children, and assisting in hospitals. 
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Some alumni have registered their own NGOs in Nizhny Novgorod, St. 
Petersburg, Volgograd, and Yekaterinburg.  By interacting within these groups, alumni of 
U.S. exchange programs strengthened their professional cohesion.  ACTR with small 
amounts of grant money supported some of the activities of these NGOs - a vital function 
to help them survive.  Some groups formed alumni associations, on the model of those of 
U.S. universities, where networking was of primary importance. 
 
These activities demonstrated the types of students in which FSA assistance 
programs invested.  They were energetic and creative in their efforts to initiate projects 
themselves and find ways to carry through with them.  These alumni, located throughout 
the Federation, comprised a very important cohort for the future of Russian society in that 
they had been exposed to the mechanisms of an open democratic system and the free 
flow of information. 
 
USIA’s Office of Research and Media Reaction published in September 1998 the 
results of a survey, which compared FLEX alumni to other Russian youth of the same age 
(18-29 years).  Some of the key findings included: 
 
• “FLEX alumni, much more than other youths, are open to and accepting of 
Western values, democratic ideals, and foreign involvement (including 
investment) in their country.  They are much less suspicious of Western motives 
in offering aid to Russia. 
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• Both groups [FLEX youth and Russian youth in general] tend to agree, however, 
on what is wrong with Russia today (rampant corruption, lack of real 
democracy). 
• FLEX alumni are somewhat more critical of the U.S. than are other youths. 
• Compared to other Russian young people, FLEX participants are more likely 
(often much more likely) to want to become leaders in and to make a 
contribution to their society.  They are more inclined to become active in 
community affairs and to want to have opportunities to be original and creative. 
• FLEX youths tend to be more optimistic about the future of their country—
especially its evolution to a more democratic, rule of law society—than their 
counterparts.  Three-fourths of FLEX participants, moreover, believe that 
economic conditions in Russia will improve in the next decade and a half, 
whereas fewer than half of young people in general feel this way. 
• FLEX youths believe more in the value of hard work, self reliance and ‘the 
private sector’ than do other Russian youths, who are more apt to think that luck 
and ‘connections’ bring success, that bribes must be paid to get ahead, and that 
the state should play a larger role in their lives” (USIA Office of Research and 
Media Reaction 1998c). 
 
These are very interesting results, showing that the exchange participants were 
different from those who did not participate in exchanges.  USIA, however, did not claim 
that the FLEX alumni expressed views aligned with a more democratic culture 
necessarily because they had studied in the U.S.  USIA noted that from the beginning 
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FLEX targeted the best and brightest students in Russia to participate in the exchange 
program.  FLEX participants were different from other Russian youth even before the 
exchange experience in that they were mostly female, from large urban cities, had well-
educated parents, had studied English extensively in school, and tended to be materially 
better off.  The FLEX survey respondents were not told the purpose of the survey, nor did 
it mention anything about an exchange program.  However, survey findings indicated that 
the FLEX alumni were a cohort positively inclined toward democracy, free market, and 
civil society—a group with which the U.S. should continue to interact as it seeks to 
promote democracy in Russia. 
 
Undergraduate fellowships 
 ACTR ran a similar scholarship program for study in the United States for the 
next cohort at the undergraduate level.  The competition attracted undergraduate students 
from across Russia and recruitment was conducted much the same as the FSAFLEX 
program.  For this and other exchange programs, U.S. universities covered the cost of 
participants’ tuition and fees and students tended to stay with host families.  A 
component of this program was the requirement of 20 hours of community service, to 
teach students how communities work together to help those in need.  Volunteerism was 
a new phenomenon in Russia in the 1990s.  One ACTR program manager noted that the 
Russian students “come to the U.S. believing that democracy equals freedom equals 
‘doing whatever you want.’  They learn, however, that with democracy and freedom 
comes responsibility.  They see how rules and laws allow democracy to work.”  
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Muskie/FSA fellowships  
 
ACTR administered the Edmund S. Muskie Fellowship Program in conjunction 
with the FREEDOM Support Act Graduate Fellowship Program (Muskie/FSA) to 
conduct an open, merit-based competition among the brightest citizens of Russia to 
receive fellowships for graduate-level study and professional development programs in 
the United States.  The Muskie program originally was established in 1992 in legislation 
sponsored by Senator George Mitchell (D-ME), among others, and subsequently was 
named in honor of the public service of Edmund S. Muskie, former governor and U.S. 
Senator from Maine and former Secretary of State.  The FSA Graduate Fellowship 
Program was sponsored by Senator Bill Bradley (D-NJ) and incorporated into the 
FREEDOM Support Act of 1992.  For the first several years of the Muskie/FSA 
fellowships, USIA divided administration of the programs among four NGOs--ACTR, 
IIE, IREX, and Soros Foundation/Open Society Institute.  In 1998, USIA changed its 
approach, awarding the program to just one organization, ACIE/ACTR.  All four 
organizations continued to collaborate on alumni activities for these programs.   
 
ACTR/Moscow maintained the all NIS database of 1500 Muskie alumni 
regardless of which organization administered their individual fellowship.  Of these 
alumni, 300 were located in Moscow and 30 in St. Petersburg, drawn from all over the 
NIS to these relatively more prosperous regions where the job market was more 
promising and their job skills more in demand.  ACTR noted a threefold increase in its 
Muskie applications in fall 1998 (coinciding with the collapse of the economy) with most 
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pursuing degrees in business administration and an applicant to award ratio of 65:1.  
Approximately 60-70 Russian scholars received Muskie fellowships each year. 
 
Muskie Alumni also published their own newsletter, Alumni Update, to serve as a 
useful networking tool.  The newsletter highlighted the accomplishments of alumni who 
in many cases moved into important positions in business and government.  Alumni 
activities varied depending upon the program--while the younger FSAFLEX alumni were 
more concerned with community organization activities, the Muskie/FSA alumni were 
focused on further professional development and networking to enhance career 
opportunities.  In the late 1990s, some of the first Muskie/FSA alumni from 1992 had 
gained important positions as CEOs, directors, and officers.  Those selected in 1997, 
entered the job market at mid-level positions by the end of the decade.  At the crash of 
the ruble, ACTR organized for these alumni a “Survival of the Crisis” conference 
bringing in public relations officers of recruiting agencies and five major companies.  Of 
the 1997 alumni, only one remained unemployed following the conference.  ACTR also 
organized for the alumni conferences on team building and conflict management, the 
Russian tax system and its possible reform, and the 2000 presidential election and 
campaign.  ACTR reported that it organized about one event per month for this group, 
but because the Muskie/FSA alumni tended to be busy professionals working to build 
their careers, they did not have much free time for community service or group activities. 
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The multiplier effect of training the trainers 
Several FSA-funded efforts targeted training for teachers because the teacher has 
the opportunity to impact the development of a multitude of students over the course of a 
teaching career.  ACTR administered the Teaching Excellence Awards (TEA) program, 
created by Ambassador Richard Morningstar, to recognize and reward top secondary 
school teachers of English and American Studies.  Nominations for participants from 
local education experts were submitted and competed within each of 75 oblasts of the 
Federation with local committees making the selections.  Nominations were accepted 
from local ministries of education, journalists, business people, pedagogical institutes, 
and other such relevant professions.  The 190 regional winners each received $2,000 
worth of educational equipment and materials for their schools, e.g., books, computers, 
fax machines, cassette tape recorders and tapes for English language instruction or 
whatever the winning teacher requested for his or her school.  With the $200 for the 
classroom, the teacher usually purchased reference materials or books on methodology or 
U.S. history and literature.  All 190 winners competed in Round two through scored 
interviews conducted by a combined American and Russian team.  Their applications 
then were reviewed at ACTR/Washington.  The 30 national winners (mainly women, 
with only three men in 1998) traveled to the U.S. for a seven-week professional 
development seminar where they stayed together as a group.  While in the U.S., they 
spent a week in Washington, D.C., visiting ACTR, USIA, State Department, Library of 
Congress, Supreme Court, the White House, Department of Education, Mt. Vernon, and 
Williamsburg, VA.  They then traveled to the University of Delaware’s Department of 
International Programs where the English as a Second Language (ESL) Department had 
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competed successfully for the opportunity to host the seminar.  At the University of 
Delaware, they took courses in U.S. History, U.S. Government, English language, 
American literature, economics, and civics.  The teachers visited schools in New York 
City, Philadelphia, and Baltimore, to learn how schools were run by individual school 
districts, contrary to their experience in Russia where all schools throughout the 
Federation essentially were run from Moscow.  In 1997, 950 nominations were submitted 
from nearly every oblast with $500,000 in prizes awarded at the oblast level.   
 
As with the other ACTR competitions, the TEA competition was open and merit-
based.  In some cases, the winner was the only teacher in a small rural village.  The 
impact of this one teacher on his or her students, returning to the village with new 
information and a much broader perspective, was significant.  Such a small investment 
could be life-changing for the teachers and subsequently for the many students they 
would impact over their careers.  According to ACTR, when these teachers returned to 
their schools, their peers and principals treated them with great respect. 
 
The TEA exchange program also involved U.S. teachers who competed to travel 
to Russia to study its educational system.  In 1998, USIA re-designed and renamed the 
High School Academic Partnership Exchange program, which began in 1993, to the 
School Excellence Program, to link the schools of the winners on both sides for future 
exchange of information and people.  This was a continuation of the school linkage 
program, which began in 1988 to connect Soviet and American schools.  At that time, the 
Soviet government selected and covered the expenses of participants.  From the 
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beginning, the purpose of this program was to teach about the rights and responsibilities 
of the individual citizen in the United States, as protected by the Bill of Rights.  It also 
stressed the accessibility of elected officials.  When Russians visited the U.S. under this 
program, they met with Members of Congress from the state or district where the U.S. 
partner school was located.  In the program’s inaugural year, 1997, First Lady Hillary 
Rodham Clinton met with the first group of TEA winners to demonstrate the 
Administration’s support for these kinds of programs.      
 
Likewise, the Partners in Education (PiE) program, created in 1997, supported 
democratic and educational reform in Russia by advancing the development of civics 
education in the school system.  Russian secondary school social studies teachers and 
administrators participated in a five-week community-based training and internship 
program at U.S. high schools where they were paired with an American counterpart and 
mentor and lived with an American family.  Often the Russian oblast team was paired 
with a local U.S. university as well as a high school.  The Russian participants were 
selected by oblast, with nine teachers and one administrator selected from any one oblast.  
In fall 1999, teams traveled to the United States from Volgograd, St. Petersburg, and 
Leningrad Oblast.  They attended professional development seminars focusing on civics 
education, teaching methodology, curriculum development and secondary school 
administration.  Internships included class observation, working with school boards and 
PTAs, and collecting teaching materials.  The purpose of this program was to develop 
civics curricula--a new field and terminology for Russia.  Given the regional focus of the 
participant groups, the teachers continued to work together to further educational reform 
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once they have returned home to their oblast.  ACTR reported that after they returned 
from the U.S., some participants started their own American studies course in their 
secondary school.  Their American counterparts also were given the opportunity to travel 
to Russia to visit the high schools where the Russian teachers worked. 
 
Building political leadership 
 At the end of the 1990s, ACTR was selected to administer the Russian Leadership 
Program (RLP), sponsored by the U.S. Library of Congress, to bring 2,000 Russian 
political and civic leaders to communities across the United States from July 28-
September 30, 1999, to let them see first hand the U.S. government at work and how 
American citizens lived and worked in a democratic system.  The program especially 
targeted regional and local leaders who never had visited the U.S.  Authorized in 
legislation (P.L. 106-31) sponsored by Senator Ted Stevens (R-AK), the program was 
designed to “bring the largest number of visitors to the U.S. ever to see and experience 
the multi-layered American political system--from our small town mayors and town 
councils to governors and Members of Congress” (Library of Congress 1999).  “The idea 
was to develop a cadre of people committed to democratic and free market principles by 
reaching out to emerging leaders, similar to the way that young German leaders were 
targeted by the Marshall Plan after World War II” (GAO 2004, 4).  ACTR worked 
closely with other U.S. and Russian NGOs in Moscow and throughout the Federation to 
help identify potential participants in a short period of time.134 The U.S. Embassy also 
 
134 The Russian Leadership Program (RLP) was a pilot program implemented on a very short time frame to 
“promote mutual understanding by exposing emerging Russian leaders to the American economic system 
and democratic institutions” (GAO 2004).  When I visited ACTR offices in Moscow in early July 1999, 
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played a key role in nominating participants.  The participants were not required to have 
competency in English, so several hundred English-speaking Russian graduate students--
many who had participated earlier in the FSAFLEX program, accompanied the groups 
and served as interpreters.  They traveled in groups of 300 to U.S. communities that as 
closely as possible matched their own communities in Russia and met with their U.S. 
counterparts, e.g., state and county legislators, mayors, health officials, etc.  They 
experienced first hand how officials and NGOs, and citizens and law enforcement 
interacted in the U.S., as well as the role of the media in an open society.135 
ACTR program managers were identifying participants, obtaining visas, flights, and all the logistics for this 
huge number of exchangees traveling on very short notice.  As other U.S. NGOs conducting political 
development programs had noted, ACTR, too, was concerned that leaders who needed to be focused on 
upcoming campaigns were being drawn away from those activities to participate in this program.  Others 
were concerned that they would not be able to find 2000 participants because many would refuse to leave at 
such a critical campaign time.  RLP was designed in fiscal year 1998 and funded with fiscal year 1999 
appropriations, but because of the slow budget process as described in Chapter Four, the funds were not 
available to ACTR until late in fiscal year 1999 and had to be spent by September 30, 1999.  In 2003, 
Congress renamed RLP to the Open World Leadership Center and expanded its scope to the rest of the NIS 
(GAO 2004).  By then, about 6,800 Russian citizens from seven regions had traveled to over 1,200 
communities in the U.S. 
135 I had the pleasure of working with two participants in the RLP, Elena, a director of the drug and alcohol 
abuse division of a large Siberian NGO based in Irkutsk, and her FSAFLEX alumna, Sasha, a medical 
student from Moscow.  Because Elena spoke no English, Sasha served as a proficient, professional and 
much needed interpreter for Elena while she was in the U.S.  Because this program was implemented on 
such a tight schedule, their U.S. hosts received only one week’s notice of their arrival and very little 
information about Elena’s professional interests.  As enthusiastic hosts, however, the family arranged a full 
week-long schedule of meetings with local county and Maryland State officials, local health specialists, 
including domestic violence departments, and related NGOs.  Elena was especially interested in learning 
how U.S. NGOs fundraise.  While she was a bit overwhelmed with the vast range of choices in the U.S., 
she was able to experience even briefly a sense of American life and work.  She seemed most impressed by 
the way substance abuse counselors were trained in the U.S. and how they treated their clients.  RLP relied 
on the dedication, energy, and capability of the volunteer American host families to fulfill the Russian 
visitors’ wishes.  Sasha, the FSAFLEX alumna, was very interested in the Muskie/FSA fellowship and 
planned to apply upon her return to Moscow.  Unlike her parents, she did not want to be a practicing 
physician, and instead wished to work in the health care administration field.  Sasha served a very useful 




Supporting professional exchanges 
ACIE/ACTR worked closely with another prominent exchange organization, the 
Institute of International Education (IIE), to conduct USIA programs in Russia.  For more 
than 75 years, IIE, the oldest and largest U.S. private, nonprofit international education 
organization, facilitated worldwide international education and training opportunities for 
individual students and scholars, provided through some 260 programs, including Russia.  
IIE opened its Moscow office in 1993, as a base from which a very small staff traveled to 
all parts of the Federation as needed for recruitment and advising exchange competitions 
to support the region’s transition to free market democracy.  Its programs thematically 
targeted a broad range of sectors from restructuring national energy policies to 
developing an independent legal system.  USIA and USAID funded IIE’s programs in 
Russia.   
 
An important part of IIE’s programming, integral to its many academic and 
professional exchange programs, was its role as USIA’s Regional Educational Advising 
Consultant (REAC) throughout the NIS.  REAC centers were open to the public and 
provided detailed information and guidance about educational opportunities in the United 
States, including specifics on colleges and universities and testing requirements.  In 
addition, REAC centers conducted specialized workshops for educational advisors in 
Russian institutions. IIE had to tailor its program to fit Russia’s educational culture.  For 
example, written objective exams were new to Russian students who were accustomed to 
oral exams, which were very subjective.  Only with the onset of competitive exchange 
opportunities were Russian students exposed to standardized multiple-choice tests like 
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the SAT, TOEFL, GRE, and GMAT.  IIE targeted its efforts to training the trainer and 
emphasizing organization and analytical skills.  IIE found that professionals trained in the 
Soviet period were not well-equipped to analyze problems, arrive at their own 
conclusions, and communicate results. 
 
IIE worked closely with USIA in conducting the NIS-wide Fulbright Senior 
Scholar Program, which brought university faculty to the United States for research and 
lecturing for up to one academic year.  Likewise, U.S. faculty members were selected to 
conduct research and lectures in Russia.  IIE’s affiliate, the Council for International 
Exchange of Scholars (CIES), administered the Fulbright program in Russia, providing 
about 35 fellowships for Russians to go to the U.S. and 18 American teachers to Russia 
each year.  Fields of study included economics, political science, and history. 
 
IIE had worked with ACIE/ACTR and IREX in the past to administer the 
Edmund S. Muskie Fellowship Program for USIA and actively maintained relationships 
with its alumni.  IIE’s portion of the Muskie program focused on giving professionals 
first-hand opportunities to learn about the free market.  These fellowships provided nine 
months of first-year graduate-level studies in business, economics, law and public 
administration, followed by three months of on-the-job training.  Upon their return home, 
IIE helped alumni establish contact with one another for purposes of networking and 
arranged meetings with potential employers like the EBRD and Ernst and Young 
Accounting firm.  IIE also organized topical conferences for alumni in conjunction with 
USIA, including labor law and tax policy; grant proposal writing, fundraising, and 
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volunteerism featuring representatives of the MacArthur, Eurasia, and Ford Foundations, 
the Open Society Institute, and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; and 
public and government relations covering such issues as strategic planning, lobbying 
activities, and perspectives from State Duma deputies.  
 
IIE played a special role in the FSA Undergraduate Program by arranging pre-
academic training in the U.S. for these undergraduates and introducing them to U.S. 
academic philosophy and practices as well as U.S. culture, to highlight the interdependent 
nature of American society.  IIE arranged summer work internships for participants at the 
end of their academic work.  It collaborated with the American Chamber of Commerce in 
1998 to prepare the second edition of Returning to Russia:  Career Guide for Russian 
Graduates of American Universities, which offered advice to those who had completed 
study in the U.S. on how to prepare for the job search in the new Russian market and 
included profiles of 25 companies particularly interested in hiring graduates of U.S. 
universities.  These businesses were in the fields of international law, advertising, 
banking and finance, oil, telecommunications, and healthcare.  IIE, along with other U.S. 
NGOs, was concerned about the re-entry of alumni to Russia and the problem of reverse 
culture shock—adjusting to life back in Russia.     
 
Through USAID, IIE worked with the American Bar Association to strengthen 
the legal system in Russia to make it more independent and transparent by offering 
training opportunities to lawyers, judges, and legal scholars.  For example, IIE organized 
a series of seminars in 35 cities across Russia, targeting defense lawyers.  Working 
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through the Collegium of Lawyers, IIE identified the brightest and those most open to 
new ideas to participate in the seminars.  While American lawyers had the tradition and 
requirement for public service, Russian lawyers had no notion of volunteerism or pro 
bono work.  Importantly, IIE’s designed its work with the ABA to be entirely Russian—
those who taught the seminars were practicing Russian lawyers and the instructional 
materials, which stressed public service, were developed completely by Russians.  IIE 
reported that it trained 800 attorneys, 16 law professors, and 30 law students in Russia in 
such areas as private practice and organization, adversarial skills training, judicial reform 
training, and legislative drafting. 
 
The International Research and Exchanges Board 
In 1998, the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX), an independent 
non-profit organization, celebrated its fortieth anniversary of administering advanced 
field research and professional training exchanges between the United States and 
countries of the now former Soviet sphere.  In 1958 the United States and Soviet Union 
signed a Cultural Agreement, the first in a series to collaborate in the fields of science, 
technology, culture, and education.  In recounting the boom and bust history of 
exchanges following the vacillation of U.S.-Soviet relations during the Cold War, former 
USIA officer Yale Richmond noted, “Thus, it gradually came about that through foreign 
travel and study abroad, a new generation of Soviet scholars, scientists, and policy 
advisers came to power with a better understanding, not only of the world beyond their 
borders, but of their own country as well and its need for change and reform.  The reform 
movements came, not from Soviet democrats and dissidents, but from the younger people 
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in the Communist Party who had been abroad in the West for travel or study” (Richmond, 
4).  From its incorporation in 1968 through 1998, IREX supported more than 6,400 U.S. 
scholars studying in the former Soviet region, and assisted more than 26,000 foreign 
leaders of academia, business, government and media from the region in building 
relationships with their U.S. counterparts.  Many of the participants in IREX programs 
became political, educational, governmental, and business leaders in their native 
countries.  IREX was well-known and respected in Russia.   
 
IREX’s democracy programs funded under the FREEDOM Support Act included 
the FSA Graduate Fellowship Program begun in 1994, Institutional Partnerships Project 
in 1996, FSA Fellowships in Contemporary Issues in 1998, and Internet Access Training 
Program (IATP) in 1995.  According to IREX/Washington, in designing its democracy 
programs for Russia, IREX “always championed wide outreach and merit-based 
competition” and aimed for gender and regional balance among grantees.  As a result, 
IREX was perceived in Russia to be very fair in its selection procedures.  IREX 
maintained four offices in the Federation, in Moscow, Rostov-on-Don, Vladivostok, and 
Irkutsk, and had local field representatives, often exchange alumni, in eight other cities.  
In Russia, IREX worked with NGOs, educational institutions, local and state government, 
and media, and dealt mainly with elites, a mix of male and female, and of non-Russians, 
including ethnic Ukrainians, ethnic Germans, native peoples, and ethnic Koreans.  The 
Moscow office described its Russian applicants as middle-upper class, entrepreneurial, 
educated, and a mix of male and female, with slightly more male interest in the 
Contemporary Issues fellowships.  One program manager described IREX’s core 
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assumptions that Russians must accept if they wish to participate in an IREX program:  
1) individuals can change the way they think and do business within a lifetime; 
2) individuals, not fate, are accountable for much of what happens to them; 3) there are 
rules and they are for everyone; 4) choices have consequences; and 5) transparent 
procedures are necessary for things to work well.136 
Moscow Education Information Center 
Beginning in 1992, IREX operated for USIA education information and advising 
centers in Moscow, Irkutsk, and Vladivostok to provide Russian students and scholars 
detailed information about universities and programs in the United States and about 
standardized testing procedures for admission.  The Moscow Education Information 
Center, located in the Russian Library of Foreign Literature, was founded in 1991 to 
provide information to the Russian public on education in the U.S. and to promote all 
U.S. government-funded programs.  Its website, http://www.useic.ru had over 20,000 hits 
per month. Demand for services was much greater than anticipated when the Center first 
opened.  The reading hall only seated 24 people and had only three public access 
computers with only one powerful enough to install a CD-ROM searcher, yet 
approximately 28,000 people visited the Center each year.  IREX reported that students 
stood in line for hours waiting to use this one computer.  In addition, the Center received 
32,000 inquiries by phone, e-mail, and regular mail.   The staff was comprised of one 
American, two Russian advisors, one Russian advising assistant, and two Russian 
librarians.  The student patrons were mainly Russian, not overwhelming Muscovite, well-
educated, but with limited financial resources, and were interested primarily in 
 
136 Correspondence of 2/11/99 from IREX/Vladivostok. 
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undergraduate and graduate education.  Topically, they were most interested in business, 
and economics, especially MBA programs.  The Center reported that some “New 
Russians,” meaning those who had profited since the collapse of the Soviet Union, were 
visiting the Center, but, for the most part, they would pay someone else to do the research 
and select a university for their child.  The Russian Ministry of Education invited the 
Center to participate in an educational exhibition it was preparing.  With all this demand 
for its services, the Center was hampered by its very small budget, staff, and space and 
desperately needed updated information to provide to its clients.  On-line access to U.S. 
university information and application materials was very helpful in Russia where the 
mail service was slow and unreliable.  The Center staff noted they could easily have used 
20 computers dedicated solely to providing information on U.S. education and would 
have liked to have had more resource information to provide to NGOs, which frequently 
visited the Center seeking information on grants. 
 
The Center maintained a register of students applying to U.S. universities and 
offered seminars to help prepare applications and, for those who had been successful, for 
departure to the U.S.  All the seminars that the Center conducted on employment-related 
topics as well as educational topics were open to the public and advertised on its website 
and in universities and libraries.  The Center viewed itself as a useful tool for Russian 
students at the outset of their interest in pursuing a U.S. education.  For those students 
applying for U.S. government funded fellowships through IREX, ACIE or others, the 
Center helped smooth the way for the programs to run as efficiently as possible and for 
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students to get the most out of their experience by being well prepared for study in the 
United States prior to their departure.  
 
The Center’s Coordinator stated, “I think the existence of our center shows a new 
kind of openness that was not possible before 1988. . . . the average person now has 
access to information about the U.S. system of education that was impossible to even 
dream about under the Soviet system.”137 The Moscow Education Information Center 
sponsored with IIE and ACIE an annual education fair, which made available information 
on how the U.S. education system worked and how Russian students could apply to U.S. 
universities.  Some 15 U.S. universities participated in the March 26-27, 1999, Education 
Fair in Moscow.   
 
Supporting alumni 
From 1994 until 1998, IREX was one of four organizations administering the 
Edmund S. Muskie and FREEDOM Support Act Graduate Fellowship programs until 
USIA decided, through competitive bid, to consolidate administration into one 
organization, selecting ACIE.  For this reason, IREX switched its activities under this 
program to target alumni to give them opportunities to interact and design seminars to 
meet their own needs.  The Muskie fellows required more help upon return to Russia 
because they were just at the beginning stages of their careers after receiving a graduate 
degree.  The most important event for career development was the annual Career Forum 
 
137 Correspondence with Dova Wilson, IREX Moscow Educational Information Center, 2/3/99. 
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and Job Fair in Moscow, which attracted more than 30 large Western and Russian 
companies seeking employees. 
 
IREX/Moscow regularly updated the Muskie/FSA Alumni Directory listing 
professional contacts of all NIS alumni of the Muskie and FREEDOM Support Act 
Graduate Fellowship Programs.  USIA stressed that the alumni were each other’s greatest 
resources covering broadly the business, academic, legal, medical, government, NGO, 
and other professional sectors.  The directory was alphabetized by name with each entry 
including information on the year, place, and field of study of the fellow, the sponsoring 
organization, and the participants’ recently verified mail and, where applicable, e-mail 
addresses.  In appendices, the alumni were cross-referenced by country of citizenship and 
by field of study, so it was easy to identify those with similar interests.   
 
IREX reported that the alumni activities of its Muskie/FSA program included 
organizing seminars, meetings, training and monthly special events, depending upon the 
needs and interests of the alumni.  More and more the alumni took the lead in designing 
activities.  They became the local experts and community resources for much of what 
FSA assistance sought to accomplish—promoting a market democracy and building a 
robust civil society.  With the increased participation of alumni in conferences, the 
benefits of their individual exchanges were spread to a much wider community.  To each 
seminar, the U.S. NGOs invited all Russian alumni who had participated in U.S. 
government funded programs, bringing together business and professional people, 
academics and politicians for discussions that focus on civil society.  Some seminars 
453
were organized exclusively for the alumni, others were open to the public if the alumni 
wished to provide public lectures on specific topics.  IREX elicited conference topics 
from alumni who often took the responsibility of designing them and inviting speakers.  
Alumni events in the late 1990s included workshops on taxation law for individuals and 
public organizations, copyright and intellectual property law—a new field in Russia, and 
many on information technology like MS EXCEL and how to use the Internet in 
collaboration with Far Eastern State Technical University.  
 
Given Russia’s relative ease of Internet connectivity, IREX encouraged its alumni 
to pursue opportunities for distance learning, especially in the areas of law, economics, 
and library science, hoping to register 20-25 participants, or as many as the server could 
handle.  IREX also developed several alumni ListServs to help connect alumni.  One 
IREX program manager described the alumni as their “gold” and their reason for doing 
their jobs everyday. 
 
IREX conducted semi-annually a Small Grants (up to $5,000) Competition for 
current exchangees and alumni to apply for funding for specific projects supporting the 
development of democracy and civil society.  For example, in August 1997, IREX 
brought together 140 foreign scholars (from throughout Eurasia and the Baltic states) 
who were studying in the U.S. to the University of Maryland for a four-day conference 
on using their U.S. experience professionally when they returned home. IREX also 
organized Internet training workshops in Moscow, Novosibirsk, St. Petersburg, 
Khabarovsk, and Yekaterinburg; grant proposal writing and fundraising workshops in 
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Moscow; conferences on “Economic Transition in Russia: The View of the New 
Generation;” “Mass Media in the Balance;” and “Ethics in Journalism” in Moscow; and a 
seminar on “What Russians Think: Alumni Perspectives on Prospects for the Russian Far 
East’s Participation in Pacific Rim Economic Development” in Vladivostok.  Many of 
these scholars participated in professional internships while studying in the U.S., at such 
institutions as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, Voice of America, 
Corporation for Public Broadcasting, and the Library of Congress.  As a result, once 
these fellows returned home with their professional degrees, they often did not return to 
their regions, but sought higher paying jobs in Moscow, which they could readily attain 
or alternatively, they emigrated to the West. 
 
IREX also created Community Service Day to encourage alumni to take on local 
volunteer projects.  On March 11, 1999, for example, Vladivostok alumni cleared out a 
heavy snowfall from Children’s Hospital #1 and later in the month arranged for children 
from Vladivostok’s Orphanage #2 to go to the theater.  In addition, IREX and the alumni 
conducted a series of psychological training for the children of this same orphanage to 
help them cope with crisis.  IREX/Moscow also ran the Small Business Assistance 
Initiative to finance the administration of over 15 FSA business alumni to help smaller 
Russian businesses that are struggling. 
 
Focus on partnerships 
 Following Ambassador Morningstar’s mandate to move toward people-to-people 
linkages, IREX’s other main FSA program was the Institutional Partnerships Project 
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(IPP).  This program was a major three-year initiative linking Russian and Ukrainian 
educational and professional associations with counterpart institutions in the U.S. in the 
fields of public health, agribusiness, public policy research and training, business 
management, the environment and pollution, and public transportation.  The program 
helped Russian partners create business plans, glossaries of legal and business terms in 
Russian, databases of local business interests in foreign investment, and training 
handbooks on public and business administration for government officials and 
entrepreneurs.  Some partnership examples included:  America’s Development 
Foundation (Alexandria, VA) and the Moscow Research Center for Human Rights to 
establish and maintain a network of nine regional affiliate human rights organizations 
throughout the Federation; the American Road and Transportation Builders Association 
(Washington, DC) and the Russian Association of Territorial Bodies of Highway 
Administrations (Moscow) to strengthen the capacity of the Russian organization to serve 
as a transportation development trade association in the RF, providing training in free-
market industry operations; and Iowa State University, College of Business and Nizhniy 
Novgorod State Agricultural Academy to establish a continuing education center and 
produce a core of trained leaders in business, financial services, and agribusiness. 
 
Closely related are three other partnership programs: Partnerships for Civil 
Society and Economic Development (PCSED) and Sustaining Partnerships into the Next 
Century (SPAN) funded by USAID and the Russian University Social Science 
Partnership Project funded by USIA.  PCSED specifically targeted the development of 
democratic civil society and economic growth in Novgorod by linking regional 
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organizations with counterparts in the United States.  The University of Iowa, St. 
Petersburg Medical Academy for Postgraduate Studies, Novgorod Regional Medical 
Administration and the Medical Faculty of the Novgorod Medical Institute collaborated 
to develop family practice medicine in the Novgorod Region.  The World Institute on 
Disability (Oakland, CA), Perspektiva (Moscow), and the Novgorod regional office of 
the All-Russian Society of the Disabled worked on an extensive public awareness 
campaign for people with disabilities and how they could be integrated into the work 
force.  Other PCSED partnerships targeted land reform and business development, the 
housing and real estate market, agribusiness development, and the empowerment of 
women.  Likewise, SPAN was begun in 1997 to expand partnerships between U.S. and 
Russian institutions to reinforce reform in important sectors like business development, 
the environment, health care, civil society, the rule of law, the tax system, and the 
financial sector.     
 
IREX administered the Russian University Social Science Partnership Project 
involving two exchange arrangements between: 1) the University of Nebraska at Lincoln 
and Far Eastern State Technical University, and 2) Villanova University and Nizhniy 
Novgorod State University.  Exchanges were conducted in the Departments of 
Economics, Political Science, International Relations, and Modern History.  The program 
allowed faculty exchanges, acquisition of new materials and teaching methodologies, 
equipment donations, and, most importantly, sought to foster lasting institutional 
relationships between partners.  IREX assisted the universities with conferences, 
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obtaining books and journals from the U.S., and maintaining Internet and e-mail 
capability on the Russian side.   
 
Contemporary issues fellowships  
Beginning in 1996, IREX administered the Freedom Support Act Fellowships in 
Contemporary Issues (CI) with funding from USIA for study and independent research at 
U.S. institutions in key social science and humanities fields relating to the transition from 
communism.  The program targeted policy makers, practitioners, NGO leaders, and 
professionals for three-month fellowships, which allowed them to interact with U.S. 
counterparts in the fields of sustainable growth and economic development; 
democratization, human rights, and the rule of law; political, military, security and public 
policy; civil society development; and the Internet, communications revolution, and 
intellectual property rights.  As in other USIA-funded programs, participants were 
selected through open, merit-based competition beginning with Federation-wide 
recruitment in the fall of the year, selection process through application and interviewing 
in the winter, selection in the spring and departure of participants beginning in late 
spring.  The applicants had to present a well-developed research proposal in their field, 
but English proficiency was not as stringent for these fellowships as for other longer-term 
fellowships.  Participants were experienced leaders in their fields with advanced degrees 
and pursued research with practical applications for the development of democracy, free 
markets, and a civil society.  
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Participants their topics included:  Svetlana Glinkina of the Institute of 
International Economic and Political Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences who 
studied “New Trends in the Shadow Economy and Organized Crime in Russia” at the 
American University; Marina Gvozdetskaia of the Ural Regional Board of Registration 
and Legal System Control of Mass Media of the Russian Federation Committee on 
“Journalists’ Professional Rights and Legislative Foundations of their Activities” at New 
York University; Sergei Leonov of the Economic Research Institute of the Russian 
Academy of Sciences on “Economic Reform and Development in the Russia Far East” at 
the Monterey Institute of International Studies; and many more with topics central to the 
transition to a market democracy.138 CI alumni created their own association called 
“Professionals for Cooperation” through which they organized and hosted conferences in 
their particular fields of specialization and increased their standing in the professional 
communities.  With IREX’s help, Professionals for Cooperation published its own 
newsletter.  Once these fellows returned to their homes, they immediately applied their 
newfound knowledge in their areas of expertise.  Many worked in regional governments.  
In their post-program questionnaires, many noted that they did not change jobs, only their 
ideas about how to do them.  In 1999, IREX targeted its NGO contacts, hoping to attract 
more applications from this sector.  “These NGOs have been extremely helpful in 
advertising as the [Contemporary Issues] program is one of the few things they can offer 
 
138 In discussion in fall 1999 with one CI fellow from Moscow who was working in the field of civil 
aviation safety, he explained he was working first in Seattle with Boeing then for three months on technical 
research in Dallas.  In response to a question about the extent to which he worked with local or federal 
officials at home to enhance safety standards, he laughed cynically, explaining that such affiliation would 
discredit him professionally and be a death sentence for his research agenda.  He was looking instead for 
U.S. collaboration to push forward his civil aviation improvements.  He in no way saw the Russian 
government as a channel to advance his project or as a potential partner in civil aviation.  In fact, he 
explained how much more beneficial maintaining distance from government affiliation was for the sake of 
his project. 
459
their clients under tight financial constraints.”139 IREX reported that CI alumni from the 
regions tended to return to those regions because they were already well-placed 
professionally there before the fellowship and in most cases did not have Western 
graduate degrees. 
 
In February 1999, IREX launched a Distance Learning Project for Library and 
Information Sciences (LIS) to serve the LIS constituencies of the Muskie/FSA and 
Contemporary Issues programs.  Participants took a course over the Internet to increase 
their professional qualifications.  This pilot distance learning project could be extended 
other fields like law, governance, and public administration.  Distance learning, as a 
method to meet alumni needs, promised to be much more productive and cost effective 
than bringing alumni to Moscow for a conference.  The only drawback was that a few 




USIA, working with IREX, created the Internet Access and Training Program 
(IATP) in December 1995, a U.S.-NIS public-private sector partnership promoting 
academic and professional exchange of information through access and training in e-mail 
and the Internet for alumni of U.S. government funded exchange programs.  Internet 
access allowed scholars to continue their research after they returned home.  In addition, 
USIA established a program for creating Public Access Internet Sites throughout the NIS.  
 
139 Correspondence with Chris Cavanaugh, IREX/Moscow, 2/3/99.  
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IREX established Internet access sites in 21 cities across Russia with regional 
coordinators, often a Russian citizen, in Khabarovsk, Novosibirsk, St. Petersburg, and 
Yekaterinburg.  IATP was envisioned to be a three-year program.  The first stage was to 
establish Internet sites in libraries, universities, and IREX partner organizations for use 
by IREX program alumni.  The second stage was to expand training in Internet use at 
these sites.  IREX’s sites throughout Russia received requests daily from Russian 
institutions seeking public access to the sites.  This project required the IATP program 
manager to monitor technical and political developments for their possible impact upon 
telecommunications projects.  The program manager worked closely in Russia with 
universities, libraries, educational institutions, NGOs, and museums, and dealt mainly 
with researchers, students, teachers, librarians and average citizens.  These program 
managers shared and collected information via the Internet, fostering free and unlimited 
flow of information among people located in different countries.  IREX conducted 
surveys of its partner institutions and end-users about the value of the Internet for them. 
 
With IATP coordinators and trainers holding free classes open to the public on 
how to use the Internet, IREX played a very important role in providing the exchange of 
free information.  IAPT products were disseminated on www.irex.ru. In 1999, Project 
Harmony, a computer-oriented NGO, assumed responsibility for running IATP and 




 This program organized groups of NGO leaders from a particular town, for 
example, Yakutsk in 1999, and sent them as a group of 10 for two-weeks training to the 
U.S. where they learned how NGOs operated in the United States, about “501” status, 
corporate and government relations, fundraising activities, and building a membership 
base.  The concept behind this group training was to raise the social consciousness of a 
critical mass of people so when they returned home they could work together to make 
changes.  They built a coalition among themselves and helped establish new practices.  
The Young Leaders program targeted individuals who already had an established 
community service record and demonstrated leadership to send them to the U.S. for one 
year of training in their field and continued community service.  
Civic Education
The U.S. government devoted a significant amount of effort in the exchange and 
alumni activities to fostering a sense of social responsibility through community service 
requirements for participants while they were in the United States and after they returned 
home.  The attitude of these youth, however, was more pragmatic than altruistic.  USIA 
placed special emphasis on civic education programs, particularly in training civic 
education teachers in middle schools, hoping to instill a commitment to broader 
community responsibility in the youth at large. Civic education programs needed to stress 
not just the benefits of democracy, but the responsibility of citizens for exercising their 
rights.  Russians needed to understand voting as a right and a responsibility like 
expressing an opinion publicly. 
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The National Endowment for Democracy (NED), a private, non-profit 
organization charged with strengthening democracy around the world, approached 
Russian democracy through efforts to strengthen the relatively new field of civic 
education.140 It provided direct grants to a few indigenous organizations in Russia to 
create new teaching methodologies suited to Russian education and culture to foster 
attitudes of tolerance and mutual respect.  One of its grantees was the educational 
newspaper Uchitel’skaia gazeta (Teacher’s Gazette), which organized a conference in 
1994 with the American Federation of Teachers (AFT), a promoter of civic education in 
the United States, to explore ways to extend civic education in Russia.  The Russian 
Association of Civic Educators (ACE) then was created in April 1995 with a membership 
of 10,000, essentially all the subscribers to the newspaper.  ACE served as an umbrella 
organization for some 14 branches across the Federation.  In collaboration with AFT, 
Russell Sage College and Boston University, ACE exchanged teachers with St. 
Petersburg Law School.  As in other exchange programs, the thrust was to train the 
trainers (middle school teachers for grades 5-9) through civic education seminars.  From 
1995-1999, 50 Russian civics teachers came to the U.S. for training in such areas as 
federalism.  While in the U.S., they were required to develop new lesson plans and new 
curricula to implement in their schools at home.  They learned the technique of the 
“active classroom,” a new approach for Russian teachers and students where they 
interacted and role played.  Additionally, the civics teachers developed a new vocabulary 
for civics education in Russia.  They explained to their students how government works 
and the rights and responsibilities of being a citizen in a democracy.  They focused on 
 
140 This information on NED was provided by the Cultural Affairs Officer at Embassy Moscow in July 
1999. 
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such issues as minority and human rights, tolerance, criminal justice, family relations, 
conflict resolution, and social skills.  Russian civics teachers had much more freedom by 
the end of the decade to develop their own lesson plans compared to the past when every 
lesson plan had to be approved by the principal.  IFES worked with the staff of 
Uchitel’skaia gazeta to co-sponsor a conference on voter education, training high school 
teachers in the methods of role-playing to acquaint students with participating in 
democratic practices—for example, taking on the role of political parties, formulating 
their platforms, presenting them to other students, and playing the role of media in 
questioning candidates.   
 
NED also supported the supplement to Uchitel’skaia gazeta, Grazhdanovedenie 
(Civics), which was published by ACE.  This supplement reviewed new textbooks in the 
civics education field and provided sample lessons.  Through these efforts, NED stressed 
to non-governmental organizations the need to conduct themselves democratically in 
their internal workings and to spread the values of civics education, i.e., compromise, 
respect for the individual, tolerance, and respect for the rule of law, to all teachers in the 
Russian educational system.  The civics education field in Russia was faced with the 
difficulty of teaching such democratic qualities in a system rampant with crime and 
corruption and fraud at all levels.  These legacies of the communist period posed 
significant obstacles to the teaching of civics.  NED made the point to these civics 
educators that it was only through the extension of civics education that Russian society 
would be able to tackle and resolve these pervasive problems.  This was a difficult task 
given the devastated state of the Russian educational system where schools could not 
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afford to purchase new textbooks or retrain teachers.  Many of the best and the brightest 
teachers, therefore, left the profession; those who stayed were either extraordinarily 
dedicated or had no other alternative. 
 
In a review of its civics education funding, NED noted, “The challenge for civic 
educators is to advance democratic values while acknowledging that those gains have 
taken place alongside growing inequality, rampant corruption, criminality, and the gross 
manipulation of public power and ‘democratic’ rhetoric for private gain” (NED Website). 
Civic education teachers had to explain to their students the functioning of a real 
democracy and make them realize that what Russia had accomplished in the 1990s was 
not real democracy. 
 
Independent Media
While the FSA legislation and official statements noted the importance of 
independent media in the development of democracy, the U.S. government devoted 
surprising little attention to it in the assistance programs until the economic crash of 
1998.  Until then, there were only a few programs providing support to a relatively small 
number of journalists.  USAID supported the development of independent press, 
television and radio through training, technical assistance and equipment through funding 
to Internews Network, Inc., a 501(c)(3) organization incorporated in California.  It 
founded in 1992 Internews Russia, an independent public news organization, dedicated to 
improving access to information and promoting ethical journalism.  USAID was only one 
of many funders for Internews, which trained journalists and helped build non-
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governmental broadcasting stations in Russia.  Through the Russian-American Media 
Partnership Program, Internews linked U.S. and Russian media to help the Russian side 
become self-sufficient financially and not so dependent on the state.  Called the Media 
Development Program (MDP) by 1996, this program supported a partnership between the 
National Association of Broadcasters and the Russian National Association of 
Telebroadcasters.  One of the most visible successes was USAID funding to the 
Children’s Television Workshop for a Russian version of Sesame Street to focus on 
teaching democratic and civic values.  Ulitsa Sesam began broadcasting in late 1996.  A 
partnership between Internews and its counterpart Internews-Russia provided support to 
over 90 emerging independent regional television stations in 1997, which captured 12 
percent of the Russian viewing public (State Department Coordinator’s Office 1998, 41).  
In 1998, Internews supported 200 independent television stations across the Federation.   
 
In FY 1995, FSA provided $2 million for media programs in Russia, which 
supported USIA’s Professionals-in-Residence Program where an American journalist was 
resident in the Russian American Press Center (RAPIC) and eight media workshops 
around Russia through which U.S. experts worked with individual Russian newspapers 
on newspaper management, circulation and distribution.  USIA also donated desktop 
publishing equipment worth about $20,000 to individual newspapers.  USIA’s University 
Partnership program linked an American and a Russian university to develop a 
journalism curriculum and exchange faculty and media experts.  In 1994, the partnership 
was between the University of North Carolina and Ural State University in 
Yekaterinburg.  In addition to a visiting UNC faculty member at Ural State, the 
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partnership also brought media experts to Yekaterinburg to work on specific needs such 
as advertising, graphics, and broadcasting.  USIA conducted three two-week long training 
workshops in the U.S. on the business of media development with time spent at local 
newspapers and broadcast stations.  USIA, which deliberately focused its efforts beyond 
Moscow and St. Petersburg, also supported internships for 20 Russian journalists to work 
at media outlets in the U.S.  Most of the journalists in its exchange programs came from 
the Urals, Western Siberia and the Russian Far East to work on management issues to 
make their independent media news outlets self-sustaining.  In 1997, a small number of 
Russian journalists studied for two weeks at Duke University and interned for two weeks 
at the North Carolina Center for Public Television and at CNN.   
 
Replicating the successful model of the Russian American Press Center in 
Moscow, USIA gave a grant to New York University to establish new media centers in 
Nizhny Novgorod, St. Petersburg, and Novosibirsk.  According to The 1994 Annual 
Report, RAPIC helped Russian journalists research 10,000 stories in its first two years 
and made available a bilingual reference library, on-line databases like Lexus-Nexus and 
Russian databases.  RAPIC also hosted seminars on such contemporary issues as nuclear 
proliferation and economics.  In 1997, RAPIC changed its name to the National Press 
Institute (NPI) of the Russian Federation and officially registered itself as an NGO.  
USIA helped NPI apply for USAID funding and in 1998 set up a project to provide 
Internet access to 50 media outlets and journalism departments at regional universities.  
Through the National Forum Foundation, USIA targeted regional media in 1997, 
recruiting and developing internships for eight Russian journalists from outlying regions.  
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The economic crisis of 1998 dealt a serious setback to independent media in 
Russia caused by the sharp decline in advertising revenue.  In response, USAID increased 
its activity dramatically in 1999.  Through Internews, it provided technical assistance to 
over 300 regional television stations in 81 regions and created a new training tool called 
“Local Time” for television stations to compare their programming across regions and 
have access to professional training and expert legal advice from the Moscow Media Law 
Center and Policy Center, Glasnost Defense Fund and the National Association of 
Telebroadcasters.  Internews helped create a National Association of Regional 
Advertising Agents, launched a newsroom computerization effort and Internet-based 
news exchange network called “InterNovosti,” and helped organize a group of media 
organizations to loosen government controls on local media.  Likewise, the National 
Press Institute provided technical support and legal assistance to more than 1,500 
regional independent newspapers (State Department Coordinator’s Office 2000, 60). 
 
Program managers of U.S. NGOs reported excellent relations with the local media 
with all the free press on radio, in the newspaper and or television that they wanted.  
Local media attended all IREX events to which they were invited and provided positive 
coverage.  IREX called press conferences to announce new programs and media covered 
their seminars.  One IREX program manager reported that, in general, the local media in 
the Russian Far East was biased because it was dangerous for journalists to be critical of 
the government.  Governors in the Russian Far East jailed reporters and blacklisted them.  
Local media either served the purposes of the Governor or the Mayor or was communist, 
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which ironically provided the best news coverage.  National media provided no coverage 
of events in the Far East and reports in the local media did not reflect much positive 
coverage of democracy. 
 
IREX/Moscow consistently reported good relations with the media, but noted that 
local media was often under severe financial constraints.  IREX relied on media to 
advertise large alumni events such as the annual Career Forum and Job Fair in Moscow.  
Local media in smaller towns were much more willing to advertise the Contemporary 
Issues fellowships than were the Moscow media.  IREX/Moscow noted that “democracy” 
was not featured so positively in Russian media and society, as much as the term was 
used as a catch-phrase.  The press tended to view U.S. assistance programs, not as 
democracy building, but as “institution building,” in that they supported advanced 
journalism, business, and other non-commercial professionals.   
 
USIA supported professional development exchange opportunities for media 
representatives to travel to the U.S. to produce high-quality television programming on 
American life for Russian audiences on such topics as civil rights protection in a multi-
ethnic society and U.S. television news.  An exchange program on journalistic ethics 
brought to the U.S. six Russian journalists, who published articles on their experiences in 
the U.S. once they returned home.  USIA also launched a new initiative in 1999, which 
sent U.S. experts on journalism to Russia to lecture and arranged media internships in the 
U.S. for Russian journalists.  Even with this increased attention, support to develop 
independent media was surprisingly thin.   
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Lessons Learned in Building Civil Society
Building trust 
 Drawing on the assumption that trust is the foundation of democracy, many U.S. 
government-funded efforts to build civil society focused on building relationships among 
individual Russian and American citizens and between individuals and the state.  
Exchange programs were the primary tool for building those relationships and that trust.  
While undertaking widespread recruiting for the exchange programs, U.S. NGO staff 
reported that they often were asked, especially in more remote regions outside Moscow 
and St. Petersburg, why they were running these programs and why the U.S. was 
spending this money to send them to study.  Many Russians presumed that the real goal 
of U.S. government-funded exchange programs was to stimulate a brain drain enticing 
Russia’s best and brightest youth to the riches of the West, thereby further weakening the 
country.  These reports supported the findings of USIA surveys throughout the decade 
that showed widespread mistrust in the intentions of the U.S., reinforcing the 
psychological obstacles to U.S. effort to promote democracy in Russia.  The NGO 
managers explained to skeptical applicants and parents that it was in the interest of the 
United States that Russia be a stable, prosperous member of the international community 
and a reliable partner for the U.S. 
 
Entrusting one’s child to the care of a foreign family was another approach to 
building trust.  During the Soviet period, ACTR, working with USIA Administrator 
Charlie Wick in the Reagan Administration, established a school-to-school program with 
the innovation of the “homestay” mechanism.  This new feature of exchange programs 
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has been replicated regularly since its introduction.  The “homestay” matches foreign 
exchange students with carefully selected families in the host country for an exchange 
experience much more personally enriching than would be the case in the institutional 
setting of a dormitory.  This was an important way of meeting USIA’s mandate to 
promote mutual understanding among cultures.  From all accounts, these homestays have 
resulted in deep relationships between Russian students and their host families that 
continued even after the students returned home to Russia.   
 
Working through a nongovernmental organization, as opposed to the U.S. 
Embassy, was another mechanism for building civil society and trust.  When asked to 
identify the advantages of working through an NGO to promote democracy, one 
ACIE/ACTR program manager explained, “An NGO is able to avoid being labeled a 
policy tool of the U.S. government with an agenda that first and foremost serves the 
political goals of the U.S. government.”  U.S. NGOs providing technical assistance dealt 
with a broad range of organizations and individuals in Russia, including indigenous 
NGOs, university presidents and professors, local and regional government officials, 
students, and business people, among others.  The U.S. Embassy officials, limited in staff 
and resources, were more constrained in what they could do.  U.S. NGOs offered an 
opportunity for the U.S. to be seen much more broadly in Russian society.  By 
participating in NGO sponsored events, U.S. Embassy and Consulate personnel could 
meet with Russian opposition leaders, for example, in more informal social settings, 
meetings that otherwise would not take place because of political sensitivities and 
constraints.  Furthermore, NGO representatives, because they had to live in this society, 
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became experts, especially at the local level, on such topics as tax codes, small business 
development and the banking system.  This was the realm in which they had to carry out 
their daily business. 
 
U.S. NGOs in Russia were more readily accessible to Russian citizens than 
official U.S. representatives.  In the late 1990s, most of the U.S. NGOs working in Russia 
who were interviewed for this study provided to the Russian public open access to their 
offices and resources.  Visitors did not have to show a passport or go through a metal 
detector.  The facilities were “end-user friendly” in a way that the U.S. Embassy or 
Consulates could not be for security reasons.  The NGOs were run by fluent Russian-
speaking Americans or local Russians who actually lived in the communities there, not in 
a compound.  ACIE, which was well-established in Russia with a staff knowledgeable of 
the language and culture, was able to assess quickly the often fluid situation on the 
ground and make adjustments and improvements accordingly in the implementation of its 
programs.  ACIE/ACTR also drew on an extensive pool of Russian experts in the United 
States to assist with its work.  IIE explained that the value of NGOs was their ability to 
develop trust.  The people with whom they interacted trusted that IIE was not the U.S. 
government.  Building this trust was especially challenging given the suspicions many 
Russians harbored about U.S. intentions to promote democracy. 
 
Demonstrating democracy 
During the Soviet period, Soviet principals and teachers exclusively selected 
Soviet participants, often the sons and daughters of the communist party elite and 
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members of the nomenklatura. Only those with appropriate connections were chosen to 
participate in exchange programs through a series of official nominations.  There were no 
open, merit-based competitions.  That changed, however, with the collapse of the Soviet 
Union when ACTR and other exchange organizations were able to set the rules of 
competition according to their standards.  ACIE/ACTR program managers reported that 
this change in rules and implementation of this new concept of an equal playing field 
were not easy for many Russian citizens to accept, especially for parents who could no 
longer influence the selection of their child.  This was an important lesson to all the 
students to learn that they were responsible for their own success.  If they were selected 
for the program, it was on the basis of their own merit, not because their parents had 
influenced the process.  When students or parents protested about not being selected, 
ACIE/ACTR reviewed the rules and provided the parents with impartial detailed 
evidence about why the student was not selected.  The way ACIE/ACTR administered its 
programs, i.e., through an open, merit-based competition, was a powerful example of the 
democratic process in action—a selection process conducted on the basis of clear and 
well-known written rules.  Such an open competition clearly demonstrated the democratic 
values of openness, transparency, and accountability.  
Investing in human capital for the long-term 
 The reward of exchange programs is the growing cohort of alumni who share 
long-term exposure to open society in the U.S.  Support to alumni early in the post-
communist years focused on building networks, providing them Internet access to each 
other, to information at large, and to sustaining contact with their advisors and 
counterparts in the U.S.  But by the end of the decade, thanks to such programs as 
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USIA’s Internet Access and Training Program (IATP), the Soros Foundation, and most 
importantly, the influx of Western business, Russia was well connected electronically.  
For the most part, USIA exchange program alumni had access to the Internet either 
personally or at work, so their needs became more sophisticated.  They wanted new 
opportunities to compete for small grants from their respective NGOs--ACIE, IREX, or 
IIE.  Because of the various levels and professions targeted by the exchange programs, 
the alumni tended to have widely varying needs.  Muskie alumni, for example, sought 
professional development--as in organizing a conference on a current topic like Russia’s 
tax policy or the upcoming elections or pursuing further coursework through distance 
learning.  More junior alumni looked for career guidance. 
 
The U.S. government already had made a major investment in these individuals 
and USIA was very concerned with maintaining that investment through support for 
alumni activities.  The philosophy behind continued investment in these alumni was to 
encourage them to attain future leadership positions in their society.  Because of the 
rigorous selection processes of the U.S. NGOs, the U.S. government already was 
connected with the best and the brightest of the younger generations.  Investment in them 
was an investment in the future of Russia. 
 
Several of the U.S. NGOs explained that alumni often experienced significant 
adjustment difficulties after they returned home from their research work in the U.S.  
They reported that colleagues and neighbors “just don’t get it.”  Many alumni worked for 
foreign companies rather than Russian ones where the salaries were lower.  They also 
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reported that they felt their U.S. education was valued more by a foreign firm than by a 
Russian one.  The alumni worked, for example, at Price-Waterhouse, the Eurasia 
Foundation, the U.S. Consulate, ACIE, private businesses, universities, and in 
government. 
Russia’s Future
At the outset of the transition and the euphoria about a democratic future, 
Russians tended to equate democracy with the wealth of the West.  Since then, IREX 
noted that Russians had become cynical about democracy, given the high levels of 
corruption and inefficiency of their own “democratic” structures.  “Speaking [broadly] 
about democracy as individual responsibility is not appropriate . . . most Russians [i.e., 
not the target of U.S. assistance programs] still rely heavily upon government and social 
responsibility.”141 
I had a very interesting discussion with a Russian program officer who worked for 
IIE for several years.  She explained at length that Russians were “waiting for 
something”—that was their mental outlook on life.  In 1999, they were waiting for the 
next elections; they are waiting for rules.  They would not be proactive and struggle for a 
new life; they would wait for someone else, a leader, to deliver a new life to them.  They 
waited for the quality of life to improve.  In 1999, they were very poor, and yet, they did 
not struggle.  They waited and just tried to get by in the meantime.  Many were growing 
their own food.  The collapse of the ruble in 1998 revealed the size of the barter 
economy.  When the cash economy disappeared, it became apparent that people had been 
 
141 Survey Response, Chris Cavanaugh, IREX, 2/3/99, Moscow. 
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doing other things.  Companies were exchanging material products and paying taxes in 
this way, too. 
 
In speaking informally about democracy with patrons of the Moscow Educational 
Information Center, the Director found that, while they all agreed things had changed 
since Soviet times, they also agreed that democracy did not exist in Russia in 1999.  They 
acknowledged access to information, like the Educational Information Center and that the 
window to the West was open, bringing in foreign food and other products.  They saw 
different perspectives in newspapers and could travel to foreign countries without 
government approval or KGB interference.  Many new laws had been passed even though 
they were not carried out in practice.  It was possible to privatize property like 
apartments.  If they referred to democracy in Russia today, however, it meant mainly the 
absence of Stalinist-type suppression.  Some expressed real concern that the country 
would be closed again if a dictator came to power.  The majority of Russians did not see 
the connection between improving their lives and taking individual responsibility for 
themselves and their actions. 
 
While Russians had high hopes for democracy at the outset of the transition, they 
realized that the quick results and significant changes in their personal living standards 
were not realistic and became disillusioned.142 Most people did not trust the government, 
any politicians, or banks.  But these same people were apathetic to try to change the 
things they did not like.  The older people were especially bitter about the events of the 
 
142 Survey Response, Dova Wilson, IREX Moscow Educational Information Center, 2/3/99. 
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past decade that had left them destitute and hungry.  They had fully expected the 
government to provide for them in their retirement.      
 
In on-going discussions with alumni from the Russian Far East about democracy, 
the IREX program manager reported that many subscribed to the historical argument that 
“we didn’t have an industrial revolution, it is not in our national character to be active, 
Russians are just receivers of history, not agents of change.”  The program manager often 
countered with “What happened to you?  Why are you different?”  to which they 
answered, “Maybe I am a bad Russian” or “I am an exception.”  The program manager 
was quite clear that Russians did not see democracy as having made their lives better.  
Perhaps early in the transition Russians assumed that democracy and prosperity went 
hand-in-hand, hence their enthusiasm early in the post-communist period.  By the end of 
the decade, according to the program manager, they associated democracy with chaos and 
uncoordinated action.  “Democracy for many people here is a lot of individuals acting out 
of self-interest to maximize their benefits (Homo-Economicus).  Democracy gets 
conflated with Capitalism, while communism gets conflated with stagnation and 
stability.”  She concluded that the practice of democracy didn’t really exist in the Russian 
Far East, it was just an idea where they could throw “all their fantasies and suppositions” 
and as an idea, it was not too popular.   
 
The program manager reported that Russians thought it was strange that the U.S. 
government and others wanted to pay for programs in Russia.  They had no cultural 
concept of an NGO or what not-for-profit status meant.  She was often asked why IREX 
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was conducting these programs in Russia.  On talk shows and in other interviews, she 
responded “America is not doing this because we are such nice altruistic people.  We are 
doing it because we believe it will help support a stable strong democratic Russia and that 
is firmly in our economic and security self-interest.”  She often heard conspiracy theories 
from Russians about why the U.S. was conducting these programs – to promote a brain 
drain and to weaken Russia.  In response, she explained in detail the two-year home 
residency requirement in Russia that a participant must fulfill after each program.   
 
IREX/Moscow reported in 1999 that it was “too soon to hint at democracy 
building in Russia.”  By choosing the best people to participate in exchange programs, 
IREX worked hard with other assistance providers to build the critical mass of Russians 
to build that future democracy through the example they set and the work they did.  An 
IREX staffer stated that one of the greatest needs in the Russian Far East toward 
promoting democracy was to support the development of local media, training of 
journalists and editors in developing standards of ethics, professional guidelines and 
newspaper/television management.  She saw the need for “more group exchanges—this 
seems the way for change to happen—to get a cohort linked by proximity or industry or 
interest to participate in an exchange program and then, upon their return, be able to 
support one another in undertaking changes.”  According to one program manager, 
Russia needed more institutional capacity building programs.  “When you take an 
individual scholar and send him to the U.S., he often has a limited impact when he 
returns because there is resistance to all his new ideas.”  U.S. assistance programs need to 
work with institutions as a whole to “get them on the bandwagon of reform and 
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development.”  Another program manager described the Russians with whom she works 
as associating “democracy” with the freedom to take initiatives and have an impact on the 
community.  She reported that people were generally still positive and hopeful.   
 
IREX noted that for those cities with a more robust civil society and NGO 
community, the pool of applicants for exchange programs was much broader than in 
areas where the NGO community was undeveloped.  From those latter areas, most 
applicants were from the government sector.  One program manager noted that many 
Russians were involved in unofficial voluntary associations, but they did not understand 
themselves to be NGOs or part of the “third sector.”  These groups, which were not 
registered, were formed around a set of common interests like a professional association 
of women lawyers, embryonic PTAs, or housing collectives.  These were not political 
groups, but they did fundraise and seek to build memberships.  In the Russian Far East 
there was a growing interest in community service in Vladivostok and a growing NGO 
community in Yakutsk, as people realized that many of the social services the state used 
to provide had to be met through other means.  “The movers and shakers in these 
[informal] organizations were women.”143 
Challenges to Assistance
The two main obstacles to conducting assistance activities in Russia were the 
ongoing financial turmoil and the unpredictability of the future.  For example, when 
Dialogbank, the Russian bank used by IREX/Moscow, went bankrupt on August 18, 
1998, IREX lost money and was forced to do all business in cash, for recruiting costs and 
 
143 Survey Response, Russia Far East, IREX, 5/17/99. 
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paying consultants and temporary employees.  IREX described the impact of the 
economic collapse as immediate and desperate because suddenly there was no legal way 
to get money to the grantees and IREX had to suspend transfers.  IREX’s field offices 
reported major obstacles to getting their work done as “money, transportation, and 
infrastructure.”  With the bank closures, program managers had to carry around large 
sums of cash, which was dangerous, to fund programs and cover office costs.  As a result 
of the crash, IREX switched its banking operations to Citibank and no longer dealt with a 
Russian bank. IREX survived the immediate crisis through connections with other 
organizations and swapping information.  By November/December 1998, IREX/Moscow 
was able to restore its project activity to a fairly normal level through legally operating 
banks. The resourcefulness of the financial and administrative department in 
IREX/Moscow kept the programs going without interruption. 
 
Many businesses in Russia stopped accepting credit cards for many months, 
complicating the purchase of such necessities as train or airline tickets.  ACIE felt an 
immediate impact of the ruble crash in its fall recruitment as the numbers of applicants 
skyrocketed.  It witnessed many parents trying to get their children out of Russia and 
noted that, while so many were losing jobs at that point, those with English language 
capability were less likely to suffer job loss.  A bittersweet benefit for ACIE, and 
reported by other NGOs with widespread recruitment activities, was a noticeable 
decrease in the cost of traveling around the country for recruitment purposes that fall.  
ACIE also reported that with the corresponding drop in income many students who 
wished to participate in exchange competitions, but lived outside the test center, could 
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not afford to travel to the sites to take the tests.  According to IRI, the collapse of the 
ruble wiped out the foreign business community in Russia and many, even most, ex-pats 
left Moscow.      
 
Across the board, all program managers I interviewed reported a marked increase, 
in response to the ruble crisis, in interest and applications to all programs, but especially 
the Muskie/FSA, in the fall 1998 recruiting period.  “Everybody wanted out.”  The 
Moscow Educational Information Center received such an increased volume in inquiries 
about U.S. universities that it had to curtail some of its special events just to handle 
regular educational inquiries.  The Center Coordinator attributed the rise in interest “to a 
need to re-tool in a more competitive job market, as well as those who lost their jobs 
when companies closed down and decided to pursue their education further.”144 
While many Russians lost everything in the collapse of the economy, the U.S. 
NGOs bounced back fairly quickly and were able to resume normal operating procedures, 
thanks to the resourcefulness of the programs’ staffs. 
Disillusioned Russian society 
As the program managers described Russian society at the end of the decade, they 
characterized it as becoming increasingly atomized as people tried to protect themselves.  
Program managers reported that Russians, in general, did not feel there was the rule of 
law to guarantee their security or to protect their property.  They felt they had to take care 
of themselves and their immediate friends and family with little concern about the well 
 
144 Survey Response, 2/3/99, IREX/Moscow Educational Information Center. 
481
being of a broader community.  In many ways, this seemed a continuation of the Soviet 
past when people feared the state and relied only on small networks of contacts to meet 
their needs.  While they did not fear the state in 1999, they had no respect for its 
institutions.  Their cynicism was manifested in many ways.  U.S. academic exchange 
programs reported problems with fraudulent diplomas and transcripts.  Because schools 
were not receiving adequate state support and teachers are not getting paid, they started 
charging fees for documents and even selling grades.  The practice was widespread and, 
as a result, the academic exchange organizations relied much less on official 
documentation and much more on their own proctored tests and extensive interviews.  
The program managers reported that these students were not going to the United States 
for ideological reasons, in hopes of building some form of western democracy at home, 
but rather to attain knowledge and skills, especially in foreign languages and economics 
or business, in hopes of improving their job prospects in the future.  Program managers 
reported widespread misconceptions about democracy, which most students equated with 
the freedom to do as one pleased.  They did not appreciate the social responsibilities that 
went along with democracy’s freedom. 
 
Interestingly, I found similar assessments of Russia from the Russian staff of the 
U.S. NGOs.  They explained that the fundamental political culture of Russians was one 
of distrust because there had been no rule of law to protect the people.  Government had 
been statist and dictatorial throughout history.  Russia had a very corrupt society that 
needed fundamental reform, but there was no tradition of making demands on the system.  
Russians were a passive people who were able and willing to sustain a great deal of 
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hardship.  Russia had no middle ground and it was not like any other country--it could 
not follow the model of other countries, not the West nor China. The Russian staff of 
U.S. NGOs did not expect fundamental change in Russia for a long time, if ever.  They 
asserted that Russia was suffering from “Big Nation” mentality and the distress of being 
turned into a nation begging the West for money. 
 
It’s hard to be legal 
In terms of Russian authorities, the exchange organizations worked most closely 
with those at the local level, e.g., the local ministry of education, during the 
advertisement and recruitment phases of the exchange programs and in organizing 
activities of local alumni.  IREX, for example, reported that local authorities tended to be 
very cooperative in assisting with recruitment and dissemination of program information 
for the Contemporary Issues Fellowships.  Federal authorities simply did not get involved 
in programs of this type.  As one program manager stated, “Our activities fall beneath the 
federal radar.  They just don’t notice us.”  These U.S. NGOs attracted most attention 
from the tax authorities who checked on their registration status.  In addition to 
registration of the NGO, all employees were required to be registered as well.  In 1999, 
the tax authorities were more vigilant about obtaining the names of all employees, 
especially the comparatively well-paid Americans, and their addresses for the purpose of 
going after their Russian landlords who, in most instances, were not reporting the rental 
income.  IIE explained the tendency toward tax evasion—once registered, an NGO is 
subject to taxes of 65 percent and “social taxes” of 39 percent.  It is very expensive to do 
business in Russia, and these organizations are not even doing business.  The authorities 
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placed no distinctions between income and profit.  Everything was treated as income.  In 
order to persuade people and organizations to pay their taxes, the Russian tax system 
desperately needed to be reformed and the government needed to provide the services 
people expected for paying taxes.  IIE worked toward this through its seminars by 
focusing on labor laws and tax policy.  If there were a reasonable tax policy, most people 
would have paid. 
 
IRI, officially registered as an NGO in Russia, explained the difficulty of abiding 
by this official status.  The authorities controlled how much an organization was allowed 
to withdraw from its bank account at any one time, and, consequently, what an 
organization spent at any one time.  The organization had to present receipts for all its 
purchases, but this was impossible to obtain, for example, when buying stamps because 
stamps were treated like currency.  I heard many anecdotes of the difficulties, boarding 
on absurdities, of trying to be legal in Russia.  There often was a disconnect between 
what the Washington, DC office of an NGO may require, what the U.S. Embassy wanted 
the NGO to do in country, and the realities of what was possible in Russia.  IRI was a 
very small staff of only a few workers.  It did not have the extra human resources to 
devote to cumbersome registration activities, which placed a real hardship on the few 
workers there. 
 
Bribery was a very real problem. Local authorities tended not to acknowledge 
federal jurisdiction so NGOs had to register with the city and the state.  As a result, for 
example, the city fire marshal wanted a bribe to declare an NGO building safe, “through 
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negotiation and pleading we were able to receive our certification in return for buying 
two fire extinguishers.”  When a head visa official in the Russian Far East wanted a $500 
cash payment for the visa, the staffer showed him the law that said he must give it to her 
if she fulfilled certain requirements or he must deport her.  He continued to demand the 
$500 payment and she explained that the organization does not pay bribes—end of deal.  
She left the country, got a new visa, and then met with her counterparts in other NGOs.  
Together they agreed they would not bow to such demands and all would get deported if 
need be.  Every time an applicant offered the program manager money or favors for 
acceptance into an exchange program, she explained that the organization did not accept 
such “gifts;” every time she fought with a train conductor about the illegality of “double 
pricing—one price for foreigners, another for Russians,” she showed the high courts 
judgment supporting her position.  In these instances, she was upholding and reinforcing 
the rule of law.  And any small change in attitude and practice was noticeable, e.g., when 
a staffer went to the Post Office for a package and the official recognized that the NGO 
was not charged taxes or custom duties; or when a program alumnus requested funding 
and the program manager found a way to meet the request in the budget through open and 
transparent ways.  Working under these conditions was very hard and often discouraging, 
but there were some signs of hope of change in a more democratic, rule-based direction.   
 
According to one program manager, “Our only legal documentation is a letter 
from the vice-governor [which] basically says [they] are okay – leave them alone.”  The 
program manager showed this letter to city and state officials and it worked; sometimes it 
worked with federal authorities, too.  “When I travel I literally carry a stack of laws with 
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me, from the Pickering agreement on technical assistance in Russian to the copy of the 
law that says foreigners don’t have to have cities listed on their passport to travel there.  I 
show these laws and argue with militia, hotel clerks, postal authorities, immigration 
officials, train conductors, etc. . . . And each time it is the first time that the Russian has 
seen or heard of the law.”  Sometimes, showing the legal documentation worked, 
sometimes it was seen as “just a piece of paper.”  “From the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 
to the Tax Inspectorate, to the Customs officials, to the Post Office—everybody wants a 
bribe or does not want to follow the law.”  The NGOs refused to pay bribes to officials 
and tried to be as legal as possible, following whatever laws they possibly could.  The 
staffer concluded “there is little rule of law where I work.” Often the NGOs had to rely 
on their alumni to mediate any local problems, e.g., with the mayor’s office, university 
presidents, or landlord. 
 
The purpose of sharing all this program detail is to provide texture at the 
grassroots level to U.S. efforts to promote democracy, insight was not captured in the 
annual implementation reports to the Congress or in the grand visions of the foreign 
policy elite.  The concluding chapter reflects on the lessons learned on many levels from 
promoting democracy in Russian in the 1990s.    
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Chapter 7:  Lessons Learned from a Decade of Democracy 
Promotion in Russia  
 
For the U.S. government, democracy promotion in Russia was a high priority 
foreign policy objective in the 1990s toward the goal of peace, security, and prosperity 
for the American people.  It was also an experiment without established guidelines to 
follow.  Because democracy promotion has gained even greater prominence as a U.S. 
national security interest in the new millennium, it is important to understand the 
complex inter-relationships among the various levels of players in democracy promotion 
from the U.S. foreign policy elite to the federal donor agencies to the individual program 
managers of U.S. NGOs implementing programs on the ground.  Equally important is the 
inter-relationship among the primary objectives of democracy promotion—strengthening 
the rule of law and establishing an independent judiciary, creating a market economy, 
developing pluralistic and representative political institutions through free and fair 
elections, and expanding civil society with independent media.   
 
The purpose of this study was to explain the bureaucratic procedures underlying 
the U.S. foreign policy decision to promote democracy in Russia in the 1990s and 
comparing those procedures to the conceptual visions of democracy as presented in the 
scholarly literature.  The key attributes of democracy as presented above were well-
established in the official foreign policy statements and legislation passed in the early 
1990s.  The Support for East European Democracy Act of 1989 and the FREEDOM 
Support Act of 1992 appropriately identified the objectives for U.S. democracy 
promotion, as listed above.  Neither the legislation nor official statements, however, 
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clearly defined those attributes or how to accomplish them.  The task of designing 
democracy promotion programs was left to the program officers in U.S. federal agencies 
granting funds to U.S. NGOs to accomplish those goals in the chaotic and confusing 
context of Yeltsin’s Russia.  After a decade and billions of dollars spent in democracy 
promotion activities, Russia had made significant progress toward a more open society 
compared to its communist days, but its democratic attributes were still shallow and 
weak.  By all accounts, results of U.S. democracy promotion programs in Russia in the 
1990s were mixed, with some modest successes and many dashed expectations.  Under 
Vladimir Putin, Russia has slipped back toward a more centrally controlled government.  
Many have called Russia a “managed democracy” under Putin and Freedom House 
lowered its rating of Russia from partly free to not free in 2005 (Freedom House 2005). 
 
My research suggests that Russian society, emerging from the distortions of 
communism and with no democratic tradition, was ill-prepared for democracy promotion 
efforts to take root.  Much more attention should have been devoted from the state to 
preparing the Russian people to understand the meaning of market democracy and to 
creating conditions that protected them from the hardships of transition.  U.S. democracy 
promotion efforts put greatest priority on creating a market economy.  Equally important 
would have been attention to strengthening the rule of law and providing a social safety 
net to help buy broad-based support for and time to put democratic political and market 
economic institutions in place.  The bottom line for these efforts would have been priority 
to the individual at the heart of democracy, not just the institutions.    
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A quick review of Russia’s democratic attributes by the end of the 1990s shows 
mixed results: 
 
• Polls indicated that most Russian citizens were cynical about democracy 
and the free market, associating them with a decline in the standard of 
living and a chaotic society.  Russian democracy did not appear to have 
the support of the population.  Russia’s political culture remained 
supportive of a strong central leader and preferred order and stability to 
the “freedom” of the chaotic Yeltsin years.  The Russian people did not 
call loudly for democracy and a market economy.  “The transition to a 
market economy and democratic society in Russia required grassroots 
support and the development of effective institutions, laws, and 
enforcement processes.  These changes have profound implications for 
Russian society and politics and thus required a degree of political 
consensus within Russia that did not exist for much of the decade” (GAO 
2000, 20). 
• Some progress was made in written laws with the passage of the Civil 
Code and Criminal Procedure Code, but the rule of law remained weak as 
laws were not enforced and people ignored them.  Pervasive corruption 
continued at all levels.  The judiciary grew stronger from within as 
organizations were created to bring judges together, but it remained under 
the influence of the Kremlin. 
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• The first phase of privatization was completed by the middle of the 
decade, but stalled on the privatization of large state-owned enterprises.  
Even where large enterprises were privatized, the state retained a high 
minority share.  Many called this system “crony capitalism” because 
business transactions still relied on connections, not impartial market 
mechanisms.  At the end of the decade, market institutions were in 
disarray from the collapse of the ruble, but the economy recovered 
quickly, growing steadily, even impressively, since then.  That growth, 
however, was on the basis of increased oil exports and high world oil 
prices, not because of domestic production.  Many Russians remained at 
the poverty level and unemployment was high.   
• Russia’s democratic gains were most noticeable in the 1990s in the 
political arena where elections became regularized and people came to 
expect that they would chose their leaders through free and fair elections.  
Key democratic institutions were in place with a Constitution protecting 
individual rights, the Duma as an elected representative lawmaking body, 
and numerous political parties, though they were centered mainly on 
individuals rather than ideas. Power rested in the strong president and 
there was little concept of a loyal opposition.  Under Putin elected 
positions have been scaled back, particularly in the regions, as the Kremlin 
sought to consolidate the power of the center.   
• Civil society grew impressively in the 1990s with the creation and 
registration of thousands of NGOs, 65,000 according to the Coordinator’s 
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Office in 1999.  People were free to express their opinions through 
independent media and exercised their individual freedoms of assembly 
and movement.  Many NGOs remained very poor, however, and relied on 
the state or foreign assistance to operate.  Under Putin, civil society 
freedoms have been reduced as the Kremlin closed independent television 
stations and the Duma passed a law on January 10, 2006 restricting the 
activities of NGOs and foreign support for them.  Perhaps the Kremlin 
viewed civil society as having grown sufficiently strong to pose a threat to 
its central power.145 
In a January 3, 2006 op-ed in the Wall Street Journal, David Satter challenged 
Russia’s January 1 ascension to the presidency of the G-8, claiming, “Russia is daily 
sinking deeper into authoritarianism and lawlessness” (Satter 2006).  He asserted that, 
beyond the façade of elections, there is no democracy in Russia.  “The country lacks 
three of the fundamental requirements of democracy—political pluralism, the rule of 
law and respect for human life” (ibid.)  Viable opposition has been squelched as 
independent media are closed and the new NGO law threatens “the last outposts of 
civil society” (ibid).  The lack of rule of law alleviates checks and balances leaving 
the executive all powerful.  Satter called for the remaining members of the G-8 to 
hold Russian accountable to the standards of free market democracies.  He insisted is 
was the “proper business” of those democracies to tend to Russia’s internal situation, 
 
145 According to Washington File staff writer Louise Fenner, the new law increases the Kremlin’s oversight 
of the registration, financing and activities of NGOs in Russia, contradicting Russia’s human rights 
commitments under the OSCE.  The new law exposes NGOs to the arbitrary implementation of regulations 
that would restrict NGO activities.  Freedom House declared that the legislation “would further curtail the 
rights of civil society in Russia.”  See http://usinfo.state.gov/eur/Archive/2006/Jan/19-280131.html. 
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stressing that Putin cannot ignore the wishes of the G-8 members.  Satter called for 
the West to “use all its influence to counteract Russia’s self-destructive behavior” 
(ibid.) 
 
The intent of the FREEDOM Support Act was to encourage the development of 
market democracies in the new independent states of the former Soviet Union.  Given 
Russia’s limited progress toward that goal by the end of the 1990s, many were quick to 
criticize the accomplishments of U.S. programs.  Russia had not become a market 
democracy by the end of the 1990s for several reasons, including:  1) the transition to a 
market democracy is a long-term evolutionary process; 2) Russian political culture was 
accustomed to a strong central leader making all the decisions and, after the communist 
experience of forced participation, people were not interested in being politically active; 
3) after becoming disillusioned with the lack of progress and prosperity, the people did 
not demand democracy and the free market; and 4) widespread corruption allowed 
entrenched interests from the Soviet period to retain influential positions and resist 
reform to protect their privileged positions, in fact, making them richer.  Many of these 
reasons were beyond the purview of U.S. assistance programs, so it is important to 
understand where U.S. intervention may contribute positively to the transition. 
 
Clearly, the euphoric early expectations of the U.S. foreign policy elite that 
Russia would make a natural and smooth transition to democracy were misplaced.  While 
not realizing the initial intent of promoting a swift transition to democracy, the U.S. 
government and democracy promotion community learned many lessons.  The most 
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significant lesson was that external donors can only have a marginal impact on 
establishing a market democracy without the support of the host population.  In other 
works, democracy will only happen in Russia when the Russian people want it and the 
elite permit some opening for it, no matter what the U.S. and other international donors 
desire for the Federation.  Democracy would not emerge in post-communist society just 
because the community of established democracies wanted it to.  Democracy can emerge 
through revolution from below at the grassroots level or from political opening at the top, 
but from the outside the international community can have only limited impact.  That 
said, however, certain types of assistance programs focused purposely on the grassroots 
level, where they introduced democratic values, practices, and society to Russian citizens 
who later could become change agents in their own societies.   
 
If we accept the assumptions that democracy must have the broad-based support 
of the populace and that external donors will only have marginal influence, U.S. 
assistance funds are directed more effectively to those activities, which help build support 
across the population.  Some of the programs described in Chapters Five and Six met 
those criteria, specifically the academic and professional exchanges and training 
programs that invested in individuals, as well as those, which created indigenous 
institutions to strengthen civil and political society.  These programs have in common the 
basic goal of sharing knowledge and information between people.  Examples of those 
“successful” programs include:  1) ABA/CEELI, which provided the pro bono work of 
thousands of U.S. lawyers sharing their expertise and setting the example of law based 
society and democratic behavior.  They provided valuable guidance in drafting laws and 
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strengthening the judiciary by bringing judges together in associations; 2) IFES’ creation 
of IESD, the Russian version of IFES to carry on its duties of providing information on 
election methods through the resource center to assist local and federal election 
commissions.  IFES built indigenous capacity in its own image to continue its work after 
it departed Russia; 3) ACIE, IIE, and IREX’s ongoing educational and professional 
exchanges at all levels with follow-up investment in the alumni who have built networks 
within Russia and between Russia and the U.S.  These programs are particularly good at 
tapping into the youth; 4) Commerce Department’s BISNIS, which shares information 
and knowledge about investment possibilities in Russia; and 5) IATP, public Internet 
access sites, which gave Russians electronic connectivity in a public forum.  
Contrary to some of the other assistance programs, the goals of these programs 
were not to build specific democratic institutions, but to provide individual Russians with 
information, experience, and skills to create those institutions themselves.  By investing 
in individuals, these programs built relationships and networks.  The key to the value of 
these “successful” assistance programs is that they demonstrated in practice democratic 
values of transparency and accountability in their day-to-day operations through easy 
access to their resources, open and merit-based competitions, and abiding by the rule of 
law, registering officially despite the administrative difficulties of doing so.  In their 
interactions with these U.S. NGOs at the grassroots level, democracy can come alive for 
Russian citizens.  It is critical that U.S. assistance providers practice and demonstrate the 
democracy that they seek to build.  In this way, these NGOs breathe life into U.S. 
democracy promotion programs.  Discussion of these grassroots activities was absent in 
the annual reports to Congress and was a missed opportunity to showcase the benefits of 
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private-public partnerships between U.S. federal agencies and U.S. NGOs.  Clinton 
Administration tried to “fix” the structure of the U.S. foreign affairs community to fit the 
new context of the post-Cold War world.  Dismantling USIA was not the answer, 
however, because it gave even less support and attention to an effective tool of 
democracy promotion, i.e., educational and professional exchanges. 
 
Some U.S. democracy promotion activities had clearly disappointing results.  In 
particular, the way Russia’s privatization program was conducted as an insider’s privilege 
and U.S. support to the vouchers program and permissible attitude toward the loans-for-
shares program clearly did not have the intended effect.146 Under these privatization 
programs, a few Russians became very wealthy and many more were at the poverty level 
after the economic crisis of August 1998.  Russia’s economic success now is largely a 
reflection of natural resources and high world oil prices.  “Russia’s transition path has 
been made harder by the concentration of power and income in the hands of a few, which 
had begun prior to the transition process and was accelerated through the privatization of 
some of the most valuable enterprises in Russian industry” (GAO 2000, 106).  Because of 
the experience with privatization and resulting disillusion with the market democracy 
concept since then, the ability to influence Russia’s democratic development has 
diminished because the people do not trust market institutions. 
 
Progress in strengthening independent media and independent judiciary fell far 
short of expectations as set forth in the early official statements of U.S. policy makers 
 
146 GAO (2000, 107) suggested that the international community should have objected strongly to Russia’s 
loans-for-shares privatization program in 1995.   
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because, in practice, very few programs were devoted to accomplishing those goals.  
Likewise in the area of a social safety net to soften the economic hardships of the 
transition to which very little attention was devoted.  One of the major obstacles to 
making progress in the broad range of democracy promotion goals is the pervasive 
culture of corruption in Russia.  The insider approach to privatization restricted the 
emergence of a genuine free market.  Investigative journalists were threatened and 
murdered.  Officials ignored laws on tax-exemption of foreign assistance.  Minor 
instances to major assaults of corruption limited the ability of Russian society to reform 
and U.S. NGOs to conduct their programs to assist reform.  Given that some programs 
made positive contributions to Russian society and others thwarted efforts to promote 
democracy, the U.S. experience in Russia during the 1990s offers many lessons learned 
for future U.S. efforts.    
 
Lessons Learned: What to Promote
Lessons learned from U.S. efforts to promote democracy in Russia are as much 
about what did not work as expected, as what worked well.  The lessons can be examined 
on two levels, the first focused on the specific attributes of democracy promotion and the 
second on the approaches to or the actual implementation of democracy promotion.  As 
identified in the objectives of the FREEDOM Support Act, the U.S. government knew 
what attributes it wanted to promote democracy in Russia—rule of law, democratic 
political institutions, representative government, free and fair elections, free market, 
independent judiciary, independent media, and civil society.  There was no blueprint or 
roadmap, however, on how to create or strengthen those attributes to consolidate 
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democracy.  Blueprints for democracy showing how the different attributes interacted 
with one another did not exist in 1989 or 1991 as communist regimes gave way to 
expected new democracies. 
 
Most importantly, the foreign policy elite discussed the attributes as separate 
goals without sufficient appreciation for how the various pieces of a democracy fit 
together to support the whole democracy.  Democracy promotion is deeply complex, 
multi-faceted, and multi-disciplinary, involving law, economics, political science, history, 
and anthropology.  In the case of Russia, democracy promotion was fundamentally about 
changing human behavior politically, economically, and socially.  By focusing primarily 
on which institutions to create, those goals were assigned to different federal agencies to 
design appropriate programs.  As a result, the pieces became stovepipes – on rule of law, 
market reform, elections, independent media, and civil society—and only came together 
in the Office of the Coordinator for Assistance, either at the appropriation of new funds 
or at the reporting to Congress on the expenditure of old funds.  It seemed to be an 
exercise of coordinating stovepipes rather than coordinating actual activities on the 
ground. 
 
The most valuable lessons learned from the review of U.S. democracy promotion 
in Russia during the 1990s concerned those attributes necessary for democracy to take 
hold in a society that were not given sufficient attention.  These include specifically 
prioritization of the rule of law, provision of a social safety net to meet the basic needs of 
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the population during the transition as a means to sustain their support for reform; 
investment in individuals to build broad-based support for democracy through academic 
and professional exchanges; and knowledge-sharing capabilities to inform the citizenry.  
Priority to the rule of law 
Respect for the rule of law underpins all elements of a democracy.  By 
guaranteeing citizens their security—personal and property—rule of law provides the tool 
for convincing citizens to trust the democratic system.  In retrospect, strengthening the 
rule of law and the independent judiciary needed to enforce it should have received much 
more attention as key priority in the U.S. democracy promotion agenda.  There did not 
appear to be much effort devoted to thinking creatively about what the U.S. could do to 
deepen respect for the rule of law in Russian society.  
Provide a social safety net 
 Because democracy depends on the support of the people, the government must 
meet their basic needs during the difficult transition period to win their consent for 
reform.  Government needs to provide an adequate safety net providing for jobs, food, 
shelter, and health care, especially in the transition from a centrally planned communist 
economy where a person’s place of employment covered many needs from housing to 
childcare to vacations.  The Russian government did not provide a safety net for people 
who lost their jobs in the privatization process nor did it pay the wages it owed to people 
because it was critically short of funds.  Despite some promising words about the need to 
provide a social safety net, neither the international community nor the U.S. stepped in to 
assist.  The FREEDOM Support Act mentioned the safety net, but provided few funds to 
it.  Humanitarian assistance was the top priority in the immediate aftermath of the 
498
collapse of the Soviet Union, but emphasis shifted quickly to support for market reform.  
Humanitarian assistance needed to remain a priority at the same time efforts were made 
to promote market reform.  U.S. policy makers believed that if they provided such social 
support they would be letting the Russian government off the hook, that it would not 
make necessary structural reforms to the economy.  The Russian government, however, 
neither met the basic needs of the people nor made the difficult structural reforms.  As a 
result, the Russian people became disillusioned with democracy and the free market, 
which did not deliver the prosperity they expected.  Supporting Joan Nelson’s emphasis 
on the importance of the social safety net in the transition process, GAO (2000, 106) 
found that “The lack of a social safety net to cushion the impact of transition on workers 
and vulnerable groups has increased the social cost of transition, decreased Russian 
public support for reform, and contributed to the difficulties of economic restructuring.”  
International donors needed to help identify and support groups most vulnerable during 
the transition. 
Without the consent of the people, democracy cannot exist.  GAO’s (2000) 
overall conclusion of its review of economic assistance programs across five international 
donors, including the U.S. FREEDOM Support Act, was that without commitment and 
political will within Russia, the achievements of external donors would be limited.  
Institutions like elections and parliaments can be created relatively quickly, but it takes 
time for people to learn to trust them.  The people need to see that democracy has 
something to offer them besides hardship.  Aside from the Defense Department offering 
surplus humanitarian aid, the U.S. neglected the social safety net issue.  Poverty and 
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unemployment remained significant problems for the Russian population throughout the 
1990s. 
Build a democratic political culture 
Given their Soviet experience, post-communist societies tended to be anti-
government so this needed to be taken into account when designing assistance programs.  
Democracy requires a strong state, but these post-communist countries had just 
overthrown a strong state that oppressed them for decades.  Reformers, therefore, needed 
to prepare the groundwork for establishing another strong state. 
 
This study suggests that the realization of a free market democracy in Russia 
could not happen without the development of a robust civil society to which U.S. NGOs 
like ACIE, IIE, and IREX are dedicating their missions and energies daily.  The 
development of civil society and its attendant democratic political culture is a long-term 
evolutionary process that never truly ends and involves changes in the mindset of Russian 
citizens.  The communist legacy weighs heavy on Russia, a society accustomed to control 
from above.  Russian citizens, if they truly wished to be democratic, needed to learn that 
the democratic citizen is perpetually active in terms of dealing with the state and political 
society and holding its members accountable. 
 
The U.S. General Accounting Office determined in 2000 that U.S. assistance 
programs to Russia had limited success because, from the start, U.S. decision makers 
underestimated the difficulty in and complexity of establishing a market from scratch, the 
Russian people were not solidly behind the project, and vested interests emerged to play a 
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powerful role in the economy.  The major finding from GAO was that without genuine 
commitment from within Russia, programs to promote democracy and a free market from 
the outside would only have limited success.   
 
Focus on the individual 
The initial assumptions of the U.S. foreign policy elite that democracy would 
grow quickly and smoothly in the wake of communism’s collapse proved unfounded.  
There was nothing natural about the emergence of democracy in Russia – it needed to be 
learned behavior.  Russian citizens had had little knowledge of democracy and the free 
market under the Soviet system.  One way to address this was through participation in 
academic and professional exchanges, a major part of U.S. democracy promotion 
activities that had existed even during the Soviet period. 
 
Exchanges are a win-win for democracy promoters and prospects for democracy 
in Russia.  Exchange programs benefit Russian citizens who come to the U.S. and 
experience life in an open society and American citizens who are exposed to new and 
different perspectives of Russians.  While it is difficult to quantify the value of such 
interaction aside from the numbers of exchange participants, for example, there is 
qualitative evidence of the growing value of several grassroots activities in exchange 
programs, professional training of teachers, and new alumni associations.  These 
activities are important because Russian citizens who have been exposed to democratic 
practices through exchange programs and training opportunities in the U.S. return home 
changed people with different expectations about how a government should work.  As 
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exchange programs continue to be implemented, mainly in the State Department’s 
Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA), formerly USIA, the number of 
exchange alumni in Russia continues to grow.  While we do not know what volume 
might represent a critical mass, these alumni are making a difference in their 
communities.  Many exchange participants are or will become teachers sharing and 
multiplying the impact of their exchange experience.  A review of their alumni 
newsletters from the USIA Archives and the current ECA homepage suggests that, at this 
point, they are more involved in volunteer and charitable work and not much in politics.  
They are not fomenting grassroots revolution from below, but they are pushing 
incremental change, which over time may shift the political culture.  
 
Much more was happening under the radar in the area of U.S. democracy 
promotion than was communicated to the Congress in the official annual reports.  
Exchanges are one way to share America’s democratic story by exposing Russian citizens 
to every day life in the U.S.  This exposure to open society brings new knowledge to 
exchange participants like abiding by and trusting in the rule of law and holding 
government accountable.  The relationship between the citizen and the state is different in 
a democracy where the citizen holds the state accountable.  In Russia, the relationship 
between the state and the citizen continues to be one of patronage.  Unfortunately, just as 
the Coordinator’s Office shifted the emphasis of U.S. democracy promotion to the 
development of civil society through exchange programs, USIA was dismantled as a 
federal agency and put into the State Department where its exchange programs became 
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just an instrument in a bureau, diminishing exchanges as an effective foreign policy tool 
for telling America’s story and obscuring their potential value. 
 
Specific individuals make a difference, too, as demonstrated in the rule of law 
example in Chapter Five.  Until Elena Mizulina was in an elite position to champion 
passage of the Criminal Code Procedure in the Duma, the legislation was stalled.  
Matthew Spense (1998) called her a “policy entrepreneur.”  The lesson here for 
democracy promoters is to be alert to and support those who already are pursuing reform 
consistent with U.S. values, such as a criminal procedure code protecting the human 
rights of the accused.  It seems, therefore, useful for those conducting democracy 
promotion activities to watch for political openings and opportunities, which could be 
created by a change at the top, by an influential likeminded official, or by a charismatic 
leader in the grassroots.  The rule of law example demonstrates also that democracy 
promoters need to be engaged at all levels of society, at the elite as well as the grassroots. 
 
Lessons Learned: How to Promote Democracy
Understanding the complex process of democratization or how the individual 
elements of a democracy interact is as important as understanding the attributes of 
democracy.  The process informs how democracy promotion programs should be 
implemented.  Again, fundamental to democracy is the consent of the people, so the first 
lesson learned was the importance of realistic expectations.  Democracy promoters need 
to realize that despite their intentions without the support of the people democracy cannot 
take hold.  Progress toward democracy, a market economy and civil society depends on 
503
the willingness of the public and leaders.  External assistance can support that 
development, but cannot create it.  
 
Realistic expectations 
U.S. expectations about what could be accomplished within certain time frames 
needed to be realistic, meaning that U.S. policy makers needed to take into account that 
democracy is a long-term evolutionary process.  Democracy promoters needed to be 
willing to remain engaged for the long term.  The U.S. government—executive and 
legislative branches—did not appreciate fully the immensity of the reform process in 
Russia, how deep and wide the changes needed were from past conditions.  As a result, 
expectations of a smooth and rapid transition to democracy and free market were 
unrealistic.  Donor strategies needed to be based on the premise of long-term involvement 
in Russia.  The international community’s initial assumptions about the transition process 
in Russia were faulty—namely that the transition would happen quickly and that Russian 
society would support it.  Donors expected that Russian officials would accept their 
advice and implement it.  GAO (2000, 107) stated “The transition to a market economy 
and democratic society in Russia required grassroots support and the development of 
effective institutions, laws, and enforcement.”  Political consensus in Russia was more 
for order and stability, especially after the uncertainty and flamboyancy of the Yeltsin 
years. Traditionally, there has little constituency for foreign assistance in the U.S. and 
likely will not be for the foreseeable future.  Therefore, it is safe to assume that large 
sums of assistance from the U.S. will not be forthcoming.  Democracy promotion 
programs, therefore, needed to be planned accordingly and needed to be careful not to 
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raise expectations unrealistically on the recipient side.  There are effective democracy 
promotion activities that do not require large sums.  At the top of this list are exchange 
programs, which provide a big bang for the U.S. taxpayer buck.  
 
Demonstrating democracy 
Democracy promotion activities have double duty – not only do they seek to 
strengthen democratic attributes, they must also be a model of democracy in their 
implementation.  The U.S. government needed to be sure to stress to NGOs implementing 
democracy programs that they must demonstrate democratic values in the ways they 
implement their programs and interact with Russians.  As described earlier, this was true 
of the open, merit based competitions for exchange participants.  NGOs needed to be 
inclusive in their dealings with Russians and not play favorites, which would just 
perpetuate the Soviet legacy.  People who worked in U.S. NGOs tended to be very driven 
and dedicated to their missions, thereby, thereby showing themselves to be active 
participants in civil society.  U.S. NGOs operating under FSA funds needed to exemplify 
such values as openness, transparency, fairness, and respect for the rule of law. 
 
Integrate the whole story of assistance 
U.S. federal agencies involved in democracy promotion activities needed to make 
a better case for their value.  The annual reports to Congress did not adequately reflect 
the full range of activities on the ground nor did they analyze democracy promotion 
programs against a conceptual framework of democracy.  Rather than reporting strictly 
on what certain agencies did, the annual report should have addressed all that was 
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accomplished across federal agencies toward a certain goal.  A fuller description of the 
personal connections made between Americans and Russians, the lasting relationships 
developed through participation in exchange programs and ongoing alumni activities 
after participants have returned home should have been communicated through the 
Annual Reports.  The work of the very small staffs of U.S. NGOs, working under 
challenging business and legal conditions in Russia was not told.  Democracy promotion 
practitioners and scholars need to work together to develop measures of success that 
resonate with Congress – for example, ways to measure the value of having exchange 
students in U.S. local schools, exposing U.S. students to features of an increasingly 
connected and globalizing world.   The annual reports should take on the responsibility of 
clearly defining terms and goals of democracy promotion programs.  Too much of the 
democracy promotion story is left untold in the public record. 
 
Clarity matters 
The FREEDOM Support Act addresses democracy promotion in vague terms 
without sufficient definition of such goals as rule of law.  It would behoove the 
democracy promotion community in government to establish as set of agreed upon 
meanings.  USAID has moved in that direction for its own purposes.  At the 
organizational level, terms must be defined clearly so everyone knows what they are 
working toward.  Clear definitions are important because they get everyone—funders, 
implementers, and recipients--on the same page to understand the goals they are seeking 
to accomplish. Definitions matter because they determine approaches to accomplishing 
goals and measures of success.  In discussing rule of law reform, Belton (2005) stressed 
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not conflating goals with tools—passing laws, for example, is a tool toward the goal of 
strengthening the rule of law, not an end in itself.  As noted earlier, officials gave lip 
service to the terms of democracy and wanted to accomplish them, but neglected 
establishing clear definitions of what they meant.  Julia Geran Pilon of IFES agreed that 
definitions matter and noted that Americans and Russians had different understandings of 
democracy.  For this reason, IFES created a Russian/English dictionary for election 
terms.  Clarity on what the U.S. government is trying to achieve in democracy promotion 
is important. 
 
Collaborate with the private sector 
Democracy promotion is a joint effort requiring collaboration between the U.S. 
private sector—NGOs, academia, business, media, etc.—and the U.S. government.  
Federal agencies reporting on their efforts to promote democracy on site did not give 
public credit to the NGOs who were responsible for implementing programs on a daily 
basis.  In reading the annual reports, it sounded as if the U.S. agencies—the State 
Department, USAID, and USIA—conducted the programs directly.  In fact, in many 
cases, they designed the broad goals for democracy promotion programs, advertised them 
through RFPs, and sought the expertise of U.S. NGOs, 501(c)(3) organizations to conduct 
them.  Federal agencies should make clear in the annual reports with whom they worked 
to implement programs on the ground.  This model of relying on the expertise and 
contacts of the U.S. private sector is a fruitful partnership for the U.S. government.  
Likewise, in reviewing the open source literature of the NGOs, it is often not clear from 
where they received funding for a particular program.  There is value added in 
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acknowledging the joint collaboration of these projects.  More attention needs to be given 
to exploring the relationship between funders and implementers.  
 
Timing matters 
As I researched public statements, congressional testimonies, and journal articles 
on democracy promotion and interviewed practitioners, I watched and listened for 
recurring themes.  One was the term “opportunity”—the collapse of communism was an 
“historic opportunity” to promote democracy.  It opened a “window of opportunity.”  If 
the U.S. did not act quickly to assist reform, it would be a “missed opportunity.”  The 
point was that timing mattered.  Assistance providers needed to be alert to unexpected 
openings or opportunities to move the reform program forward.  Such opportunities 
could come from political changes at the top or from pressure from below.  When an 
opportunity to promote reform change arose, donors needed to be ready to act.  
 
There were no quick fixes to Russia’s transition process, which will be lengthy 
(GAO, 105).  Assistance programs, therefore, need to be designed for the long-term for 
example by developing grassroots support for market reform and democratic 
institutions.  GAO noted that “Donor-sponsored exchange programs have been 
frequently mentioned as an effective mechanism for transferring to the Russians 
knowledge about and support for how market economies and democracy function.  The 
impact of exchange programs can be felt over time” (GAO 2000, 108).  This is one of 
the key findings of my research, that exchange programs, though difficult to measure, 
are a modest investment with a promising large payoff.  
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Coordinate programs 
A significant obstacle to democracy promotion in Russia was not the type of 
programs designed, but in their coordination within the U.S. government.  Because of the 
lengthy budget process, the Coordinator’s office requested a budget from the Congress 
for FSA with details of specific assigned amounts per country and program activity; 
Congress appropriated a total amount to USAID, which then transferred the funds to the 
relevant federal agencies who then designed and implemented the program details.  From 
the legislative objective to the final implementation of an assistance program on the 




U.S. efforts to assistance the development of a market democracy in Russia in the 
1990s will have been to good purposes on two levels:  first, there were some worthy 
programs that still promise future benefits such as the exchange programs and activities 
that established mechanisms of information sharing such as the Internet Training and 
Access Program, IFES’ electoral database, and BISNIS business data.  Second, and 
more importantly, there can be significant progress in the knowledge about how to 
promote democracy if the evidence dispersed around U.S. government agencies and 
throughout different disciplines is gathered systematically and analyzed to determine 
what kinds of programs worked best under what conditions and why some programs did 
not achieve their intended results.  This is a task the U.S. government should undertake 
to inform its future foreign policy decisions and to assist implementers in designing 
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effective programs.  Such a move could start as easily as linking electronically the 
websites of donors (USAID, State Department) and grantees and contractors (IFES, 
NDI, IRI, ACIE, IIE, IREX) who carried out the programs and indigenous groups, such 
as the exchange alumni, who would want to be part of a discussion. 
 
Because U.S. government procurement rules require contractors and grantees to 
report on program activities regularly, usually quarterly, there are volumes of written 
products sitting on U.S. government shelves or in archives that could be catalogued and 
compared.  A rich resource for lessons learned in democracy promotion is the programs 
officers in government and NGOs who have designed and implemented the programs on 
the ground.  Many, in fact, have worked in their careers on both sides of the assistance 
coin, usually first as drafters of NGO proposals responding to RFPs and later in 
government as drafters of RFPs.  Capturing their oral histories systematically would 
enrich understanding of democracy promotion and help devise suitable measures for 
assessing programs. 
 
The process of democratization is evolutionary, building over a period of time, 
two generations according to some.  The U.S. government would benefit from an 
ambitious research project that looks back for lessons learned to the transitions of the 
1960s in Africa and Asia, 1980s in Latin America, and 1990s in the postcommunist 
region.  To date, within the U.S. government, that analysis has been restricted to 
assessing what a particular agency did in a particular year on a particular program, in 
other words, an approach that stovepipes analysis according to the implementing agency.  
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This approach was clear in the annual reports on FSA submitted to Congress, which 
failed to assess the overall goal of promoting democracy and how that would be 
measured.    
 
Exercise soft power 
As Joe Nye would suggest, U.S. assistance to support democracy is an exercise in 
soft power and indirect influence.  This is a foreign policy approach that should be at 
work in all U.S. interactions with the rest of the world.  Democracy promotion should 
become an innate part of U.S. foreign policy, blended in with all other pillars. 
 
The impact of external donors who wish to promote democratic and market 
reform is dependent upon the consent of the people to support it.  It is difficult to create 
pluralism from the outside.  With that consent, donors must be alert to timing, looking for 
windows of opportunity, and to the emergence of influential individuals who can make a 
difference in the reform process.  This is not a simple formula for democracy promotion.  
It requires sensitivity to the history and culture of the recipient society and the acute 
perception to realize when forces are coalescing to make impact possible. 
 
With an eye toward future democracy promotion efforts, the U.S. government 
needs to move away from compartmentalizing democracy assistance by attribute because 
all the necessary pieces need to work in concert.  Focusing on one area in isolation from 
another does not necessarily advance the democracy project.  The approach to democracy 
promotion needs to be more holistic and comprehensive, starting with a clear 
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understanding of the goals and clear definitions of the terms.  Those definitions then 
serve as the basis on which to design tools to accomplish the goals and determine how to 
measure success.  Measures of success to date tend to tally the number of institutions 
created, number of elections held, laws recodified, or NGOs registered, but these do 
capture the attitudes, underlying values, and behavior of the people they are to support.   
 
A more holistic approach to future democracy promotion efforts would include: 
 
1) Deep research and preparation at the outset of the design stage, to take into 
consideration the historical and cultural context of the proposed reform.  How 
conducive is the climate in country to democratic reform?  Think creatively about 
custom designing democracy assistance. 
2) Include all stakeholders in the discussion stage—those who wish to reform, those 
with vested interests in the status quo, those who stand to lose the most.  Think 
broadly about all those who would be impacted by the reform.  Spend time 
building in country public support for reform.  Public education matters.  Think 
about the needs of the people to attract their support for reform.  Provide a social 
safety net where needed. 
3) Invest in people as well as institutions.  Tackle the corruption problem first.  It is 
pervasive worldwide. 
4) Design democracy promotion programs in concert.  How does an activity to 
strengthen rule of law, for example, impact market reform?  How can civil society 
programs work with a growing middle class? 
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5) Focus on knowledge sharing.  This is the aim of technical assistance, which needs 
to be done for the long-term, not through short-term advisers lacking cultural 
grounding.   
6) Watch for changing political situation that may create an opening or close off an 
opportunity. 
7) Connect with likeminded people.    
8) Capture lessons learned and share them. 
 
The intent of this study has been to bring together many lessons learned over the 
decade of the 1990s about democracy promotion in Russia across sectors of political, 
economic, and social reform.  The findings of this study suggest that democracy 
promotion is not the same as democracy making.  Expectations often were not met.  
Many of these activities are experiments as donors learn what types of programs work 
where, but the U.S. government democracy promotion environment is not conducive to 
risk taking.  The U.S. Congress sought to allocate U.S. taxpayers’ dollars to projects that 
would show positive results quickly, so as not to be accused of wasting money.  Federal 
agencies needed to demonstrate results quickly to the Congress to secure future 
appropriations.  NGO implementers in the field, who were competing for subsequent 
years’ grants from federal agencies, needed to demonstrate that their programs were 
effective.  There was little room in this process to analyze results, recognize successes 
and admit failures.  As a result, many lessons learned were lost and not shared.  While it 
is difficult to admit that a particular program did not work, that information is just as 
valuable for future projects as identifying approaches that did work.  Inadequately 
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capturing lessons learned may doom democracy promoters to repeat mistakes.  The 
democracy promotion mechanism should incorporate rewards for learning, but this must 
be done outside the competitive bidding process for future projects.  U.S. government 
funding agencies could take deliberate steps to capture lessons learned in an unclassified 
site bringing together the experiences from donors, implementers, and researchers.  The 
goal would be to share information widely among all relevant parties—within and outside 
the U.S. government.  My research suggests that there are valuable interactions among 
NGO program officers implementing U.S. government programs and Russian citizens 
that support democracy promotion goals and that programs which invest in the potential 
of the individual promise a long-term payoff.  GAO noted, “[I]n December 1998, a 
meeting of the G-7 technical experts on assistance to Russia concluded that assistance 
projects showed the greatest success when they made use of both Russian expertise and 
western support” (GAO 2000, 101). 
 
It is easy to criticize U.S. efforts to promote democracy in the post-communist 
world where results may not have yet been realized and sometimes seem entirely 
thwarted.  Russia is still early in its post-communist experience and it may never be the 
kind of democracy the drafters of the FREEDOM Support Act envisioned, but democracy 
promotion programs, especially exchange programs, serve to keep the U.S. globally 
engaged as it needs to be.  Democracy promotion should remain a high priority for U.S. 
foreign policy.  This study has identified ways the U.S. can adjust its approach to 
democracy promotion based on some lessons learned during the 1990s and some steps 
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the U.S. government can take to be sure the mechanism for capturing lessons learned is 
institutionalized, so they can be widely shared.              
 
The United States cannot make another country be democratic, that has to be a 
choice made by the citizens of that country, but the United States can adjust its approach 
to other countries to encourage the people to want to create a democracy.  The 
environment in which democracy promotion programs are implemented must be 
conducive to and supportive of its activities regarding development of the rule of law, 
free market, and democratic institutions.  The people have to want to live in a democracy 
for U.S. assistance to be effective. The key to democracy promotion is reading accurately 
the citizenry of another country, knowing its history and culture, and adjusting U.S. 
interactions to promote democracy at all levels of society with sensitivity to the 
particulars. Assuming that the human desire to be free is a universal value, the U.S. needs 
to explain clearly what democracy means.  Democracy provides the mechanism, the 
institutions through which people can pursue peaceful debate about the future and 
resolution of conflict, but democracy only works when the people genuinely believe in it 
and want it to work.  U.S. democracy promotion efforts in Russia supported the 
development of democratic institutions like political parties, non-governmental 
institutions and the free market.  Investment in human capital, however, is equally as 
important as the structural ones.  This is particularly true of educating the next generation 
of leaders, broadly defined.  Institutional reforms often stop short of addressing their 
political and cultural impact on society.  Changing the institutions does not automatically 
change the behavior and thinking of the people without additional attention to public 
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debate and discourse.  The U.S. should invest in the next generation of Russian leaders, 
to take steps toward making Russia an open, democratic society and a responsible partner 
for the established democracies on the world stage.  The negative experience of the 
average Russian citizen with democracy in the 1990s suggests that it likely will take 
longer to build that political consensus.  GAO recognized that even though U.S.-Russian 
relations will fluctuate depending on international events and progress on reforms, there 
are certain long-term programs that will remain in place, including exchange programs, 
which are mutually beneficial and serve to make available knowledge and direct 
experience of democracy and the market economy.     
 
I used to think of the evolution of democracy as its refinement over time, based on 
the U.S. experience of gradual expansion of political and civil rights.  But refinement 
suggests movement toward an end-point at which democracy is achieved and the work is 
done.  The attempted transitions to democracy in the post-communist world suggest 
otherwise, however.  I now think of democracy as a continual process without a final 
end-point.  Because the future holds unknown challenges and opportunities, political 
systems could look quite different in the future than they do now as they react, for 
example, to ongoing demands and pressures of globalization or threats of terrorism.  
Democracy, as a flexible political system reflecting the wishes of the people, may 
become even more important to human society in understanding and responding to the 
challenges of the future, many of which will be transnational, requiring cooperation 
across countries.  Democratic values of openness, accountability, transparency, tolerance 
and respect for the individual are translatable across cultures and histories.  The diversity 
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of views inherent in democratic society is important because no one segment of society 
holds the answers to future challenges, just as no one country demonstrates the perfect 






History of State Department Coordinators for U.S. Assistance to the NIS 
(Fiscal Years 1992-2000) 
 
1992 Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Coordinator of U.S. 
Assistance Policy for the New Republics of the Former Soviet Union with 
assistance from Ambassador Richard L. Armitage 
 
1993 Ambassador Thomas W. Simons, Jr., Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to the New 
 Independent States (NIS) of the Former Soviet Union (and former U.S. 
 Ambassador to Poland, 1990-1993) 
 
1994 Ambassador Thomas W. Simons, Jr., Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to the NIS 
 
1995 Richard L. Morningstar, Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State 
on Assistance to the NIS. 
 Ambassador Morningstar entered government service in 1993 at the Overseas 
Private Investment Corporation.  Having spent most of his career in the private 
sector, he accepted, with a great deal of skepticism, President Clinton’s offer in 
February 1995 to coordinate U.S. government assistance to the NIS at the State 
Department.  At that time, the assistance program was in disarray and suffering 
from the critical Gephardt/Gingrich trip report on their recent visit to Russia to 
survey U.S. assistance programs.147 
1996 Ambassador Richard Morningstar, Special Advisor to the President and Secretary 
of State on Assistance to the NIS  
 
1997 Ambassador Richard Morningstar, Special Advisor to the President and Secretary 
of State on Assistance to the NIS 
 
1998 William B. Taylor, Jr., Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to the NIS and former 
 Deputy to Ambassador Morningstar.  
 
1999 Ambassador William B. Taylor, Jr., Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to the NIS  
 
2000 Ambassador William B. Taylor, Jr., Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to the NIS 
 




The Organization of Annual Reports on U.S. Assistance and Related Programs for the 
New Independent States of the Former Soviet Union, as required under Section 104 of the 
FREEDOM Support Act. 
 
The Coordinator for Assistance to the NIS was required to submit to the U.S. 
Congress an annual report on the broad range of activities and accomplishments of U.S. 
efforts to assist the creation of free markets and democratic political systems in the new 
states of the former Soviet Union.  The annual reports, which were divided into the 
following specific sections, grew longer, more organized, and more detailed over time. 
 
The Annual Reports included the following information: 
• Introduction - an instructive summary of how the State Department 
viewed the assistance programs and revealed key assumptions about the 
designs and goals; 
• Assessment of effectiveness and overview of U.S. assistance by country to 
provide a snapshot of activities for the year; 
• Description of FSA-funded assistance projects conducted by specific U.S. 
government agencies; 
• Trade and investment initiatives; 
• Small business development programs; 
• The Cooperative Threat Reduction Program;148 
• U.S. Department of Agriculture Food Assistance; 
• Humanitarian Assistance Programs by country; 
• Other Assistance Programs, e.g., farmer to farmer exchanges; 
• Assessments of Progress of Meeting Standards of Section 498A of the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961;149 
• Evaluation of the Use of “Notwithstanding” Authority;150 
148 Also known as the Nunn-Lugar program, this legislation was passed in FY 1992 to decrease the threat of 
weapons of mass destruction by helping with the safe and secure transportation and storage of such 
weapons, and to promote nonproliferation.  This study does not address the specifics of this program. 
149 Section 201 of the FREEDOM Support Act amended Section 498A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1961 to set forth the criteria by which the United States would provide assistance to a specific country.  The 
provisions for assistance included progress toward development of a democratic system based on principles 
of the rule of law, individual freedoms, and representative government through free and fair elections; 
progress toward economic reform based on market principles, private ownership, and integration into the 
world economy; respect for internationally recognized human rights; respect for international law and 
obligations and adherence to the Helsinki Final Act of the CSCE and Charter of Paris; cooperation in 
seeking the peaceful resolution of ethnic and regional conflicts; implementing responsible security policies, 
including arms control obligations, military force reduction, nonproliferation, and restraining conventional 
arms transfers; protection of the international environment and sustainable use of natural resources; not 
supporting international terrorism; paying an equitable portion of indebtedness to the U.S. incurred by the 
USSR; cooperation with the U.S. in identifying American prisoners of war or as missing in action during 
the Cold War; and termination of support for the communist regime in Cuba.  Each New Independent State 
also was rated against a checklist for grounds for ineligibility of assistance.  
150 The “Use of Notwithstanding Authority” was designed to give the executive branch greater flexibility in 
moving funds to where they were needed most or pursuing new opportunities for assistance as they arose.  
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• International Financial Institutions and Initiatives, e.g., World Bank; and  
• Appendix on Financial Charts showing obligations and expenditures in 
total and by county. 
 
These annual reports provide a valuable record of the goals and implementation of 
U.S. assistance to the NIS and are a basis for much of the analysis contained in this study. 
 
The 1994 Annual Report (232) noted, for example, that “USAID has abbreviated and expedited procedures 
for NIS project design and approval, a process that can take 18-24 months otherwise.”  The 
Notwithstanding Authority was invoked in 1994 for Russian Officer Resettlement activities, establishment 
of Enterprise Funds where monies were granted in advance of need and invested in the market to earn 
interest accordingly, and certain contract activities to alleviate the lengthy process of conducting full and 
open competition through USAID.  The purpose of the Notwithstanding Authority was to streamline the 
bureaucratic procedures for implementing aid programs.  It also gave agencies the ability to circumvent the 
traditional procedure of awarding grants through open competitive bid.  The Notwithstanding Authority 
was used extensively under the Support for East European Democracy (SEED) programs, for example, in 
selecting the “Big Six” accounting firms to advise the Central and East European countries on development 





1989 Spring   President Bush Series on “A New World Order” 
 April 17  President offers first economic assistance package to 
Poland 
 
May 12  President’s second speech on new relationship with USSR 
 
May 21  Boston University Commencement speech on the Future of 
 European Unity 
 
May 24  Coast Guard Academy Commencement speech on security 
 Issues with USSR. 
 
May 31  Capstone speech at Mainz, West Germany, US post-Cold 
 War strategy of Europe whole and free 
 
June   President announces Polish-American Enterprise Fund  
 
November 10  Fall of Berlin Wall 
 




 August 18-21  Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev held in house arrest by  
 Soviet hardliners. 
 October 3  Bill Clinton announces candidacy for US president 




 February 1  Yeltsin meets George H.W. Bush 
 June 18  Yeltsin in Washington for first state visit 
 November 3  Bill Clinton elected US president 
 
1993 
 January 2-3  Yeltsin and George H.W. Bush hold final summit 
 And sign START II treaty in Moscow 
 January 21  Clinton inaugurated 
 March 23  Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev visits 
 Washington and Proposes creation of Gore- 
 Chernomyrdin Commission (GCC) 
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March 28  Russian parliament tries to impeach Yeltsin and fails. 
 April 3-4  First Summit between Clinton and Yeltsin; US announces 
 $1.6 billion aid package for Russia 
 April 25  Referendum in Russia supports Yeltsin and calls for  
 Parliamentary elections 
 July 9   Clinton and Yeltsin meet in Tokyo; G-7 announces $28.4 
 Billion aid package for NIS 
 September 1  first GCC meeting 
 September 21  Crisis in Russia – Yeltsin suspends parliament; sets new 
Election date for December. 
 October 2-4  Yeltsin under attack from parliament and wins. 




 early   Strobe Talbott becomes Deputy Secretary of State. 
 
January 8-15  Clinton visits region.  In Moscow, Yeltsin, Clinton, and 
Kravchuk sign accord on removal of nuclear weapons from 
Ukraine. 
 July 10  Meeting of G-7 in Naples.  Clinton demands Russian troops 
be withdrawn from Estonia. Publicly, Yeltsin blindsides 
Clinton and says no. 
 July 26  Agreement to remove Russia troops from Estonia is 
reached. 
 
September 27  Clinton-Yeltsin summit in Washington.  Focus in on 
 NATO enlargement; push for Partnership for Peace. 
 December 11  Russian military launches war in Chechnya 
 
1995 
 May 9-10  Clinton in Moscow.  Begin NATO-Russia dialogue, 
 Russia joins PFP, Russia restricts nuclear cooperation 
 With Iran. 
 June 17  Clinton and Yeltsin meet at G-7 in Halifax. 
 August 28-30  NATO conducts airstikes in Bosnia to protect Bosniaks 
 From Serb strikes/ethnic cleansing. 
 October 23  Clinton and Yeltsin meet at Hyde Park to discuss Russian 
 Participation in Bosnia peace settlement. 
 October 26  Yeltsin has heart attack. 
 November 1-21 Peace talks on Bosnia in Dayton, Ohio. 
 December 17  Russian parliamentary elections; communists win;  
 reformers lose. 
 
1996 
 January 9  Yevgeny Primakov becomes Russian foreign minister. 
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June 16  First round of Russian presidential election; Yeltsin in slim 
 Lead over Communist Zyuganov, but faces second round. 
 July 3   Yeltsin wins re-election. 
 August 31  Chechen war ends with peace agreement. 
 November 5  Yeltsin has heart surgery.  Clinton is re-elected. 
 
1997 
 March 20-21  Clinton and Yeltsin meet in Helsinki.  Discuss NATO  
 Enlargement, outline START III, anti-missile system 
 Under ABM treaty. 
 May 27  Yeltsin signs NATO-Russian Founding Act in Paris 
 With NATO leaders. 
 June 20-21  G-7 meeting in Denver.  Yeltsin will address problem 
 Of nuclear technology transfer to Iran. 
 
1998 
 January 22  Chernomyrdin announces efforts to track Russian transfer 
 Of nuclear technology to Iran. 
 March 23  Chernomyrdin is replaced by Sergei Kiriyenko. 
 May 16-17  Clinton and Yeltsin meet in Birmingham.  Russia officially 
 Becomes member of G-8. 
 June 23  Clinton vetoes anti-Russian sanctions legislation in US  
 Congress. 
 August 18  Economic crisis in Russia - collapse of the ruble. 
 August 23  Yeltsin plans to replace Kiriyenko with Chernomyrdin. 
 
September 1-2  Clinton visits Yeltsin in Moscow.  Yeltsin plans to  
 Disband Duma. 
 September 7  Duma rejects Chernomyrdin. 
 September 10  Yeltsin appoints Primakov as prime minister, Igor 
 Ivanov as foreign minister. 
 October 13  Crisis in Kosovo. 
 
1999 
 January 15  Serbs massacre Kosovar Albanians. 
 March 24  NATO conducts air strikes against Serbia. 
 April 24  Yeltsin appoints Chernomyrdin as special envoy 
 For Kosovo. 
 April 23-24  NATO summit in Washington.  Poland, Hungary and 
 Czech Republic admitted into NATO. 
 May 12  Yeltsin replaces Primakov with Sergei Stepashin. 
 June 19-20  Clinton and Yeltsin attend G-8 summit in Cologne. 
 August 9  Yeltsin replaces Stepashin with Vladimir Putin. 
 September 23  Russia bombing Chechnya. 
 December 31  Yeltsin resigns as Russian president and appoints 
 Putin as acting president. 
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2000 
 March 26  Putin wins Russian election for president. 
 June 3-5  Clinton and Putin hold summit in Moscow. 
 July 21  Clinton and Putin meet at the G-8 summit in 
 Okinawa. 
 September 1  Clinton defers NMD deployment. 
 September 6  Clinton and Putin meet in New York 
 November 15  Clinton and Putin meet for last time in Brunei. 
 
2001 
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